Expert Testimony Requirement and Rule 56(d) Compliance in Legal Malpractice: Rodowicz v. Feldman, Perlstein & Greene, LLC

Introduction

Rodowicz v. Feldman, Perlstein & Greene, LLC is a Second Circuit summary order decided on March 31, 2025. Pro se plaintiff Carter Rodowicz sued his former attorneys—Feldman, Perlstein & Greene, LLC—alleging legal malpractice in their representation of him in a state-court trust dispute. After the district court dismissed three of his four claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment to the defendant on the remaining malpractice count, Rodowicz’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He timely appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed, clarifying (1) the requirement of expert testimony to establish causation in complex legal malpractice actions, (2) the obligations of pro se litigants to satisfy discovery and summary-judgment rules, and (3) the standards for granting extensions under Rule 56(d).

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of three claims as forfeited under Green v. Department of Education and affirmed summary judgment on the sole remaining Connecticut legal-malpractice claim. It held that:

Under Connecticut law (as stated in Bozelko v. Papastavros), a legal-malpractice plaintiff must prove: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a wrongful act or omission by counsel; (3) causation; and (4) damages.
Causation in a complex trust-administration malpractice case cannot be established without expert testimony—absent an “obvious” dereliction of duty as in Paul v. Gordon.
Rodowicz, proceeding pro se, was not excused from identifying or calling an expert witness. His failure to designate an expert—despite repeated deadlines—and to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit justified summary judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a further 30-day extension to secure an expert, given Rodowicz’s long history of missed deadlines and lack of diligence.
Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) was properly denied, as Rodowicz identified no intervening law, new evidence, or clear error.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 16 F.4th 1070 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam): issues not raised in the opening brief are forfeited.
Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150 (2d Cir. 2021): standard for reviewing summary judgment (de novo; view facts in light most favorable to non-movant).
Bellamy v. City of New York, 914 F.3d 727 (2d Cir. 2019): a grant of summary judgment can stand only if no rational trier of fact could rule for the plaintiff.
Bozelko v. Papastavros, 147 A.3d 1023 (Conn. 2016): elements of a Connecticut legal-malpractice claim and the general requirement of expert testimony on causation.
Paul v. Gordon, 754 A.2d 851 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000): an exception to the expert-testimony rule where counsel “did absolutely nothing,” making negligence obvious to a layperson.
Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2003): pro se status does not excuse compliance with procedural rules governing summary judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 794 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1986): an interlocutory defect (pending counterclaim) is cured when the counterclaim is withdrawn, supplying appellate jurisdiction.
1077 Madison St., LLC v. Daniels, 954 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2020): abuse-of-discretion review of denial of additional discovery time.
Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132 (2d Cir. 1994): requests for discovery in the face of summary-judgment motions are disfavored when the party has been dilatory.
Elliott v. Cartagena, 84 F.4th 481 (2d Cir. 2023): requirements for a Rule 56(d) affidavit to secure additional discovery time.
Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2012), Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2019), and Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, 970 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2020): standards for evaluating Rule 59(e) motions for reconsideration.

Legal Reasoning

1. Forfeiture of unchallenged dismissals. Under Green, Rodowicz did not contest three dismissed claims on appeal, forfeiting them.

2. Summary judgment standard. The court applied Kee and Bellamy: viewing all facts in Rodowicz’s favor, summary judgment was proper because no rational jury could find for him without expert proof of causation.

3. Expert testimony requirement. Connecticut law (per Bozelko) demands expert testimony to connect counsel’s alleged negligence to the outcome in complex matters. The narrow exception in Paul applies only to “obvious” failures—absent here because the case involved “extended proceedings” in trust administration.

4. Pro se obligations. Despite his pro se status, Rodowicz could not rely on the court or opposing counsel to supply expert evidence. Under Jorgensen, he was bound by the same discovery and summary-judgment rules as represented litigants.

5. Rule 56(d) and extension requests. Rodowicz failed to file the mandatory Rule 56(d) affidavit explaining (a) what facts he sought, (b) how they would create a triable issue, (c) his diligence, and (d) why he was unable to secure them. Having had nearly two years of discovery with multiple expert-designation deadlines (extended repeatedly by the district court), his last-minute request for 30 more days was properly denied under Paddington Partners and 1077 Madison.

6. Reconsideration. Under Metzler and Van Buskirk, Rodowicz pointed to no new evidence, intervening law, or clear error justifying relief. The district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion was not an abuse of discretion.

Impact

This decision underscores three important principles for future malpractice and pro se litigation:

Expert testimony is generally indispensable to prove causation in complex legal-malpractice cases, unless counsel’s dereliction is so egregious that a layperson could discern it without expert context.
Pro se litigants must comply with procedural rules—particularly expert-designation deadlines and the requirements of Rule 56(d)—or face summary judgment.
District courts have broad discretion to grant or deny extensions for discovery and expert retention; dilatory conduct and failure to file a proper affidavit will doom late-filed requests.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A court decision without trial resolving claims when there is no real dispute of important facts.
Rule 56(d): Allows a party to request more time for discovery if it cannot oppose summary judgment without additional evidence—but only if supported by a detailed affidavit.
Legal Malpractice Causation: In a malpractice suit, the plaintiff must show that but for the lawyer’s wrongdoing, a more favorable outcome would have occurred—often proven by expert proof of standard-of-care violations and lost opportunities.
Pro Se: Litigants who represent themselves without a lawyer are still bound by court rules and deadlines.

Conclusion

Rodowicz v. Feldman, Perlstein & Greene, LLC crystalizes the rigorous standards governing expert testimony in legal malpractice litigation and the procedural obligations of pro se litigants under the Federal Rules. By affirming summary judgment for failure to designate an expert and comply with Rule 56(d), the Second Circuit has reinforced that even self-represented parties must diligently pursue discovery, meet expert-designation deadlines, and explain any need for extensions with specificity. This precedent will guide lower courts and practitioners in structuring discovery schedules and preparing malpractice complaints—emphasizing that knowledge of procedure and timely expert support are prerequisites to surviving summary judgment.