Expansive Definition of “Crime of Child Abuse” Encompassing Attempted Online Solicitation: Sandoval Argueta v. Bondi

Introduction

Sandoval Argueta v. Bondi (5th Cir. May 9, 2025) clarifies the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)—the provision that renders removable any “alien … convicted of … a crime of child abuse.” The petitioner, Erick Jose Sandoval Argueta, a lawful permanent resident from El Salvador, was convicted in Texas for online solicitation of what he believed to be a 13-year-old child. The Fifth Circuit confronted two principal issues: (1) whether a sting-operation conviction qualifies as a “crime of child abuse” under immigration law when no actual minor was involved, and (2) whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) abused its discretion in denying Sandoval Argueta’s second motion to reconsider that removability determination.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit unanimously held:

Under the best reading of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), “crime of child abuse” encompasses both completed and attempted offenses that create a high risk of harm to a child—including sting operations where an offender solicits what he believes to be a minor.
Sandoval Argueta’s conviction under Texas Penal Code § 33.021(c) categorically qualifies as a removable “crime of child abuse,” even though no actual child was involved.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying a second motion to reconsider on procedural grounds: the statutory bar on more than one motion to reconsider and the prohibition against seeking reconsideration of a decision on a prior motion to reconsider.
Both petitions for review were denied.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Adeeko v. Garland, 3 F.4th 741 (5th Cir. 2021) – Held that convictions under Texas Solicitation statute § 33.021(c) are “crimes of child abuse” under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Sandoval Argueta argued Adeeko was wrongly decided or no longer binding after Loper Bright, but the Court reaffirmed the result on statutory grounds.
Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo, 27 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 2020) – A BIA decision suggesting (without analysis) that an actual child must be involved; Sandoval Argueta urged its primacy over Adeeko, but the Court found Jimenez-Cedillo unpersuasive in light of broader agency and circuit authority.
Cruz v. Garland, 101 F.4th 361 (4th Cir. 2024) – Independently reasoned that § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) covers attempts, so long as the underlying offense would create a high risk of harm to a child.
Shroff v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2018) – Recognized that solicitation sting convictions are properly treated as attempt crimes under a federal statutory counterpart.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) – Overruled Chevron deference; parties debated whether it freed the panel from following Adeeko. The Court sidestepped that question, resolving the case on the best interpretation of the statute’s text.
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385 (2017) – Defined “sexual abuse of a minor” as requiring under-16 victims; discussed but distinguished because § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) treats “child” as under-18.

2. Legal Reasoning

• Textual Analysis and Ambiguity The Court began with the plain text of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which places “crime of child abuse” alongside “crime of domestic violence” and “crime of stalking.” Recognizing ambiguity in “child abuse,” the Court adopted a broad interpretive approach consistent with other circuits and the BIA’s longstanding definition: any intentional, knowing, reckless, or negligent act creating a high risk of harm to a child.

• Inclusion of Attempts Applying the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Cruz, the Court held that “crime of child abuse” encompasses attempt offenses if the underlying statute targets conduct posing a sufficient risk of harm. Texas’s online solicitation statute criminalizes knowingly seeking sex from a minor over the internet; a sting operation conviction is thus an attempt crime in which the actor knowingly undertook harmful conduct.

• Rule of Orderliness and Chevron Although Loper Bright eliminated Chevron deference for new cases, the panel avoided disrupting Adeeko by interpreting § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) on its own terms, reaching the same broad conclusion without relying on agency deference.

• Procedural Discretion On the motion to reconsider, the Court reviewed the BIA’s decision under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Because the BIA’s denial rested on clear statutory bars—the one-motion limit and prohibition on reconsidering a reconsideration—the Court found no capriciousness or irrationality.

3. Impact

Immigration Enforcement: Federal authorities can remove noncitizens for sting-operation convictions of solicitation, even without an actual child victim. This closes a perceived loophole where undercover operations were treated differently.
Statutory Interpretation: Confirms that attempt crimes are within “crime of child abuse,” influencing how courts analyze removal grounds involving risk-based statutes.
Agency Proceedings: Reinforces the finality of BIA decisions and the narrow scope for motions to reconsider, signaling that procedural bars will be strictly enforced.
Child Protection Principle: Emphasizes that the law focuses on the offender’s intent and risk creation, not on the actual presence of a minor.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Crime of Child Abuse”: Under immigration law, this label covers any intentional or reckless act that could harm a child—including attempts to solicit a child for sex—regardless of whether the court applied the statute in an undercover sting.
Categorical Approach: Courts compare the statutory elements of the state crime (solicitation) with the generic federal offense (“child abuse”)—if every conviction under the state law necessarily meets the federal definition, it is categorically removable.
Attempt Doctrine: An attempt crime punishes the actor who, with criminal intent, takes a substantial step toward completing an offense. Immigration law may treat attempts as removable offenses when the statute itself criminalizes the attempt (as Texas does).
Rule of Orderliness: Lower courts generally follow prior decisions of their circuit unless and until overturned by a higher authority. Here, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its own Adeeko ruling while also re-analyzing the statute on first principles.
Equitable Tolling: A doctrine allowing deadlines to be extended in extraordinary circumstances. The BIA did not reach Sandoval Argueta’s tolling argument because it denied his motion on straightforward procedural grounds.

Conclusion

Sandoval Argueta v. Bondi solidifies a broad understanding of “crime of child abuse” in removal proceedings, holding that convictions for online solicitation sting operations—where the offender mistakenly believes he is soliciting a minor—are removable offenses. The decision underscores the primacy of the offender’s intent and the risk posed to children, and it affirms strict limits on procedural motions before the BIA. Going forward, immigration practitioners and state courts will recognize that attempt crimes targeting children, even via undercover operations, fall squarely within federal removal grounds.