Expanding Malicious-Prosecution Doctrine Beyond “Criminal” Prosecutions:
Gervin v. Florence & Milton, 85 F.4th 1102 (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has issued a published, precedential opinion that materially reshapes the scope of Fourth-Amendment malicious-prosecution actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Gervin v. Florence, the court held that:

• Fourth-Amendment protections against unreasonable seizures apply with full force to probationers, and
• a § 1983 “malicious-prosecution” claim is not confined to misconduct arising out of formal criminal prosecutions; it equally reaches seizures obtained through probation-revocation process or any other judicial/administrative legal process.

By rejecting the “criminal prosecution” limitation that had crept into prior Eleventh-Circuit dicta, the panel both clarifies and broadens the remedial reach of the Fourth Amendment, aligning circuit doctrine with Supreme Court guidance in Manuel v. Joliet, Thompson v. Clark, and related cases.

Background of the Case

• Parties: Deshawn Gervin, a Georgia probationer living in North Carolina, sued Georgia Department of Community Supervision officers Pamela Florence and Tandria Milton in their individual capacities.
• Underlying Facts:
  • 2012 — Georgia state court sentenced Gervin to nine years’ probation on a single banishment condition: he could not set foot in the South Georgia Judicial Circuit.
  • 2019 — While incarcerated in North Carolina on unrelated crimes, Georgia probation officer Florence sought, and obtained, an arrest warrant in Georgia alleging Gervin had “failed to report” and “absconded”—conditions never imposed.
  • North Carolina police arrested and extradited Gervin; Milton then filed a petition to revoke probation and testified at the revocation hearing.
  • After 104 days of Georgia confinement, the Superior Court found no violation and released Gervin the same day.
• District-Court Proceedings: Gervin sued under § 1983 for Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court (M.D. Ga.) denied summary judgment on the Fourth-Amendment claim, and officers appealed.
• Appeal: Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity and that Gervin’s claim is legally cognizable.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rosenbaum, Abudu, Wilson JJ.) unanimously:

1. Re-characterised the cause of action as “Fourth-Amendment malicious prosecution” (a seizure pursuant to legal process).
2. Held that Gervin produced sufficient evidence that Florence and Milton recklessly supplied false statements and material omissions to obtain and maintain legal process, thereby causing a constitutionally infirm seizure.
3. Rejected defendants’ central argument that malicious-prosecution claims under § 1983 require a “criminal prosecution,” explaining that the Fourth Amendment cares about the seizure, not the label placed on the underlying proceeding.
4. Concluded that any reasonable officer would have known—well before 2019—that recklessly falsifying or omitting material facts to secure an arrest violates clearly established law; thus qualified immunity was unavailable.
5. Affirmed district-court denial of summary judgment and remanded for trial on damages.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) — Established that Fourth-Amendment unreasonable-seizure claims can extend beyond the start of legal process when the process itself is tainted.
• Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022) — Clarified historical elements of malicious prosecution and favourable-termination requirements.
• Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020); Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2019) — Developed Eleventh-Circuit framework for “malicious-prosecution” seizures relying on false statements.
• Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) — Explained overlap between common-law tort and Fourth-Amendment standards.
• Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982) — Confirmed probationers retain Fourth-Amendment protections.
• A substantial historical survey (English and American common law, 1267–1871) demonstrated that malicious-prosecution actions long addressed civil as well as criminal proceedings when liberty or property were seized.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Element Analysis: The court distilled four merged elements: (1) seizure pursuant to legal process; (2) constitutional infirmity of that process; (3) favourable termination; (4) no independent justification. Gervin satisfied each.
2. Recklessness & Materiality: Both officers admitted reviewing the sentencing form (showing no reporting condition) yet swore contrary facts — textbook reckless falsehoods negating probable cause.
3. Scope of “Malicious Prosecution”: Relying on Manuel and common-law history, the panel deemed “criminal” label irrelevant; the Fourth Amendment focuses on wrongful seizures, whatever the process.
4. Qualified Immunity: Clearly established principles (fabricating/omitting material facts, lack of arguable probable cause) were sufficient; no precedent need have addressed probation revocations specifically.

C. Impact of the Decision

The ruling:

• Eliminates an analytical trap triggered by dicta suggesting that § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims arise only from traditional criminal prosecutions.
• Ensures that probationers and parolees can seek damages when officials use defective legal process to arrest or detain them.
• Creates binding precedent within Alabama, Florida, and Georgia that any governmental legal process—civil, criminal, or administrative—can ground Fourth-Amendment seizure liability if procured without probable cause.
• Promotes diligence among probation officers and others who draft warrants or violation reports, compelling closer review of sentencing documents and discouraging rote check-the-box practices.
• Likely to influence other circuits wrestling with similar scope questions and may appear in Supreme-Court briefing should confusion persist nationally.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Malicious-Prosecution Claim under § 1983: Despite the label, the core inquiry is whether a governmental actor caused or prolonged your seizure through faulty legal process. “Prosecution” is shorthand, not a categorical limitation.
• Probation “Banishment” Condition: Georgia occasionally conditions probation on geographic exclusion. If that is the only condition, failure to report to a probation officer is legally irrelevant.
• Qualified Immunity: Shields officials only if the unlawfulness of their conduct was not “clearly established.” Fabricating or omitting material facts to obtain a warrant has long been clearly unlawful.
• Arguable Probable Cause: A doctrine allowing officers some leeway; here, none existed because no probation condition required reporting, so probable cause was impossible.

Conclusion

Gervin v. Florence cements a pivotal principle: the Fourth Amendment’s shield against unreasonable seizures is process-neutral. Whether the seizure stems from an indictment, a civil commitment, or—as here—a probation-revocation petition, officials who recklessly mislead courts face liability. The Eleventh Circuit’s scholarly walk through centuries of Anglo-American common law reinforces that Section 1983 is a vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights, not for importing restrictive technicalities. Practitioners must now recognize that any misuse of legal process leading to detention—criminal or otherwise—potentially exposes state actors to damages, while probation departments must recalibrate training and oversight to ensure warrant accuracy. The decision advances Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence by ensuring that constitutional protections follow the person, not the procedural label affixed by the state.