Exclusive Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Appeals from New‑Trial Orders; Contract Bar to Unjust Enrichment

Case: Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. and Danny Webb v. North Hills Group, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Date: March 21, 2025

Authoring Justice: Justice Bunn (Chief Justice Wooton disqualified; Judge Lorensen sitting by temporary assignment)

Disposition: Reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the jury’s defense verdict and enter judgment

Introduction

This case arises from a Fayette County jury verdict returned in favor of defendants Danny Webb and Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. (collectively, “Webb”) on claims brought by North Hills Group, Inc. (“North Hills”) for negligence, trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty. The claims centered on Webb’s operation of an underground injection control (UIC) well (Well 508) on North Hills’ 3,624‑acre tract under a 2008 oil-and-gas lease, the installation of a pipeline from an adjacent Webb parcel, and alleged contamination from fracking wastewater disposal.

After the jury rejected all five claims, the circuit court granted North Hills a new trial under Rule 59, concluding the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and invoking this Court’s prior memorandum decision in Webb v. North Hills Group, Inc. (Webb‑I) from 2017, a contract and injunction case concerning the same lease. Webb pursued an interlocutory appeal of the new‑trial order.

The Supreme Court’s opinion addresses three central issues: (1) appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from orders granting a new trial in the post‑Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) era; (2) the strict standard for setting aside a jury’s verdict under Rule 59 and the sacrosanct role of the jury as fact‑finder; and (3) the preclusive effect of a written contract on unjust enrichment claims. The Court reverses, reinstates the jury’s defense verdict, and provides important guidance on appellate routing, trial court discretion, and quasi‑contract doctrine.

Summary of the Opinion

• Jurisdiction: The Court holds that, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 51‑11‑4(d)(8), the Intermediate Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of circuit court orders granting a new trial. Exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Supreme Court (Syllabus pt. 3), reaffirming Foster v. Sakhai’s principle that such orders are appealable without waiting for retrial (Syllabus pt. 1).
• Rule 59 Standard and Jury Primacy: Granting a new trial is an exceptional remedy. Trial courts may weigh evidence and credibility on Rule 59 motions but must not misapprehend law or evidence. The circuit court abused its discretion by relying on Webb‑I (a contract/injunction case) as determinative of tort claims and by concluding the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence absent proof of injury. The Court emphasizes the jury’s exclusive province to resolve factual disputes (Syllabus pt. 4) and reverses a new‑trial grant when based on legal or evidentiary misapprehension (Syllabus pt. 5).
• Unjust Enrichment Barred by Contract: Because the 2008 lease governed injection activities on Well 508 and provided consideration (annual injections payments), North Hills could not pursue unjust enrichment for the same subject matter (Syllabus pts. 6–7, applying Gulfport Energy). The circuit court erred in granting a new trial on this claim.
• Remedy: Where a verdict is improperly set aside, the Supreme Court reinstates the verdict and directs judgment (Syllabus pt. 8).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Foster v. Sakhai, 210 W. Va. 716, 559 S.E.2d 53 (2001): Reaffirmed that orders granting a new trial are appealable to the Supreme Court without awaiting retrial. It anchors Syllabus pt. 1 and supports the Court’s continued acceptance of such interlocutory appeals after the 1998 revision of W. Va. Code § 58‑5‑1. Foster also supplies the misapprehension-of-law/evidence standard warranting reversal of a new‑trial grant (Syllabus pt. 5).
• Aaron W. v. Evelyn W., 251 W. Va. 1, 909 S.E.2d 36 (2024): Recognized that the ICA generally lacks jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under § 51‑11‑4(d)(8). The present case builds on Aaron W. by announcing the specific rule that the ICA has no jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from new‑trial orders (Syllabus pt. 3), clarifying appellate routing post‑ICA creation.
• Koontz v. Long, 181 W. Va. 800, 384 S.E.2d 837 (1989) (per curiam), and Evans v. Farmer, 148 W. Va. 142, 133 S.E.2d 710 (1963): Establish the jury’s exclusive province to weigh evidence and resolve factual questions (Syllabus pt. 4). These cases bolster the Court’s insistence that trial courts tread lightly when disturbing jury verdicts.
• In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, 193 W. Va. 119, 454 S.E.2d 413 (1994): Sets the modern standard for reviewing Rule 59 grants of new trials: trial judges may weigh evidence and credibility, but appellate courts review for abuse of discretion, with reversals warranted for misapprehensions and absent prejudicial trial error. The Court reemphasizes Asbestos Litigation and warns against misapplying standards used for denials of new-trial motions (e.g., Walker).
• Walker v. Monongahela Power Co., 147 W. Va. 825, 131 S.E.2d 736 (1963): Applies only to review of denials of new-trial motions; the Court again cautions the bench and bar not to import Walker’s plaintiff-favorable inferences into review of new‑trial grants.
• Gulfport Energy Corp. v. Harbert Private Equity Partners, LP, 244 W. Va. 154, 851 S.E.2d 817 (2020): Provides the rule that unjust enrichment is not an alternative to breach-of-contract claims and is precluded where a valid contract governs the subject (Syllabus pts. 6–7). Dispositive of North Hills’ quasi‑contract theory because the lease covered injection rights and consideration.
• Maynard v. Adkins, 193 W. Va. 456, 457 S.E.2d 133 (1995), and Bronson v. Riffe, 148 W. Va. 362, 135 S.E.2d 244 (1964): Support the remedy of reinstating a jury verdict improperly set aside (Syllabus pt. 8).
• Additional authorities reinforcing parties’ burdens and tort elements: Carter v. Monsanto (duty, breach, causation, damages), Mays v. Chang (proximate cause and injury), Burk v. Huntington Development & Gas Co. and Mayhew v. Mayhew (plaintiff’s burden of proof).

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate Jurisdiction After Creation of the ICA

The 1998 rewrite of W. Va. Code § 58‑5‑1 narrowed the statute’s express enumeration of appealable interlocutory orders, but Foster preserved the Supreme Court’s constitutional and inherent authority to hear appeals from new‑trial orders. The Legislature later created the ICA with limited jurisdiction and expressly carved out “interlocutory appeals” from its purview, § 51‑11‑4(d)(8). In Aaron W., the Court recognized the general carve‑out; this case supplies the specific rule: the ICA lacks jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of circuit court orders granting a new trial, so those appeals continue to lie exclusively with the Supreme Court. This clarification is a key procedural holding for West Virginia appellate practice.

2) Rule 59: The High Bar for Setting Aside a Jury Verdict

Trial judges may weigh evidence and credibility on Rule 59 motions, but new trials are “rare” and appropriate only where it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error occurred or substantial justice was not done. The Court emphasizes the constitutional centrality of the civil jury and its exclusive role as fact‑finder. Against that backdrop, the circuit court erred in two ways:

• Misapprehension of law: The circuit court treated Webb‑I—an earlier declaratory and injunction proceeding arising from contract—as “determinative” of tort liability. Webb‑I did not adjudicate tort injury, causation, or damages. Contract breaches, by themselves, do not establish tort injury.
• Misapprehension of evidence: North Hills bore the burden to prove injury. The trial record, taken as a whole, permitted the jury to find that North Hills failed to prove actual injury to its property from Webb’s operations.

The Court catalogs the pivotal evidence: North Hills’ environmental expert detected compounds consistent with fracking fluids but no exceedances of health‑based standards and only the potential for synergistic effects; DEP’s inspector (Urban) described Webb as a conscientious operator, cited only minor issues, none implicating public health or safety, and recounted a fabricated “leak” incident; Webb testified that all injections were conducted under a DEP UIC permit with DEP-reviewed lab approvals and that operations ceased after the 2016 injunction. On this record, and absent any identified prejudicial trial error (no instruction error, no evidentiary abuse, no improper argument), the circuit court lacked a sound basis to conclude the unanimous defense verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

3) Tort Elements: Injury Cannot Be Presumed from Contract Breach

To recover in tort, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. The Court reiterates the axiom that “there is no tort … without an injury.” The circuit court’s reliance on lease violations (found in Webb‑I) did not obviate North Hills’ obligation to prove injury and causation at trial. The jury was entitled to evaluate credibility, discount inferences of harm, and accept testimony that minimized risk or showed compliance with regulatory standards. The absence of any health‑based exceedances, coupled with DEP oversight and remediation of minor leaks, provided a reasonable basis for the jury’s defense verdict.

4) Unjust Enrichment: Quasi‑Contract Is Not a Substitute for Contract

Gulfport Energy controls. Unjust enrichment does not provide an alternative pathway to recovery where a valid, enforceable contract governs the subject matter. The 2008 lease specifically addressed injection rights, limitations on injected substances, and consideration (an annual injection fee). North Hills’ theory—that Webb was unjustly enriched by charging third‑party operators for disposal—arises from the very injection activity governed by the lease. Because the claim falls within the contract’s subject matter, quasi‑contract is precluded. The circuit court’s grant of a new trial on unjust enrichment was an abuse of discretion. As the Court notes, the verdict form did not even solicit unjust‑enrichment damages, underscoring the mismatch between theory and remedy.

Impact

1) Appellate Practice

• Routing clarity: Parties challenging a circuit court’s order granting a new trial must file directly in the Supreme Court. The ICA has no jurisdiction over such interlocutory appeals. Calendaring and briefing strategies should reflect this exclusive route.
• Preservation: Appellants should frame arguments under the Asbestos Litigation standard (abuse of discretion; misapprehension of law or evidence) and resist the temptation to cite standards applicable to denials of new‑trial motions (e.g., Walker).

2) Trial Practice and Rule 59 Motions

• Deference to juries: Trial courts must articulate, with record citations, how a verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, rests on false evidence, or works a miscarriage of justice. Absent identifiable prejudicial error, new trials should be rare.
• Proof of injury: Especially in environmental tort cases, plaintiffs should marshal concrete proof of harm—quantified exceedances, demonstrable health or property impacts, credible causation opinions—rather than rest on regulatory noncompliance in a separate contract action or speculative “potential” risks.

3) Substantive Law: Environmental Torts

• Presence vs. injury: The mere presence of chemicals associated with industrial operations does not compel a finding of injury absent evidence of harmful levels, exposure pathways, or property damage. This decision does not announce a per se rule requiring regulatory exceedances to prove injury, but it illustrates that, on a fully tried record, the lack of exceedances can support a defense verdict that should not be disturbed.
• Regulatory context: Evidence of compliance, permitting, inspections, swift remediation, and lack of health‑related citations can significantly influence the jury’s injury assessment.

4) Contracts and Restitution

• Pleading strategy: Where a lease or other written agreement governs the allegedly wrongful conduct, unjust enrichment will ordinarily be barred. Plaintiffs should plead and prove breach-of-contract remedies or identify why the contract is invalid, unenforceable, or does not cover the subject matter. Defendants should move early to dismiss or for judgment as a matter of law on quasi‑contract claims that duplicate the contract’s subject.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before final judgment. Most are disallowed to prevent piecemeal review, but orders granting a new trial are a recognized exception—appealable directly to the Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia.
• Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) jurisdiction: The ICA hears many civil appeals but, by statute (W. Va. Code § 51‑11‑4(d)(8)), not interlocutory appeals in general. This case specifically confirms the ICA has no jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from new‑trial orders.
• Rule 59 new trial: A post‑verdict motion asking the trial judge to set aside the verdict for reasons like prejudicial errors or a verdict against the clear weight of the evidence. The judge may weigh evidence, but appellate review is for abuse of discretion.
• UIC well: An underground injection control well, regulated by the WV DEP, used here for disposal of certain fluids associated with oil and gas activities (e.g., fracking wastewater).
• Unjust enrichment: A restitutionary remedy (quasi‑contract) to prevent a party from unfairly retaining benefits. It is generally unavailable when a valid, enforceable contract governs the same subject matter.
• Injury as an element of tort: To win a tort claim, a plaintiff must prove actual harm caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. Absent injury, there is no tort liability.

What the Trial Court Did Wrong

• Treated a prior contract/injunction decision (Webb‑I) as “determinative” of later tort claims that required proof of injury, causation, and damages.
• Declared the verdict contrary to the clear weight of the evidence despite a record supporting the jury’s defense verdict and without identifying any prejudicial trial error.
• Allowed an unjust enrichment claim to proceed even though the written lease governed the injection rights and consideration, precluding quasi‑contract relief.

Key Evidence Undergirding the Jury’s Defense Verdict

• Environmental expert found compounds consistent with fracking operations but no health‑based exceedances; only “potential” synergistic risks were suggested.
• DEP oversight: monthly inspections; minor leaks repaired; no health or safety citations; testimony that Webb was a “good operator.”
• Evidence of a fabricated “leak” event involving used motor oil; credibility and reliability left for the jury.
• Webb’s testimony: UIC permits in place; DEP approvals for injections; operations ceased upon injunction.

Unresolved Issues (Not Reached)

Because the sufficiency analysis and unjust enrichment bar were dispositive, the Court did not address additional defenses Webb raised: res judicata, statute of limitations, the gist‑of‑the‑action doctrine, and whether the lease foreclosed a fiduciary duty claim. These remain open for future litigation in appropriate cases.

Conclusion

This opinion sets a clear procedural precedent and reinforces core substantive principles:

• New jurisdictional rule: The ICA has no jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from circuit court orders granting a new trial; such appeals go directly to the Supreme Court of Appeals.
• Jury primacy and Rule 59 discipline: Trial courts must defer to the jury’s fact‑finding absent prejudicial error or a verdict plainly against the clear weight of the evidence. Misapprehensions of law (e.g., importing contract findings into tort elements) or evidence warrant reversal of new‑trial grants.
• Contracts trump unjust enrichment: Where a valid written contract governs the conduct at issue, quasi‑contract recovery is ordinarily barred.

For litigants and courts, the decision is a reminder to respect the constitutional role of juries, to apply the correct standards when reviewing Rule 59 motions, and to route interlocutory appeals of new‑trial orders directly to the Supreme Court. Substantively, environmental tort plaintiffs must prove actual injury and causation; speculative harms or mere contractual breaches will not suffice. The Court’s remedy—reinstating the jury’s defense verdict—underscores its commitment to protecting the integrity of jury verdicts when trial courts overstep.