Exclusive State Authority to Prosecute—and Dismiss—Dependency and Neglect Petitions: Colorado Supreme Court Overrules R.E. and Limits Counsel for Youth’s Ability to Proceed Over the State’s Objection

Introduction

In In re People ex rel. R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, No. 25SA78 (Colo. June 2, 2025), the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a high-stakes and first-impression question in juvenile law: whether a child, represented by newly authorized “counsel for youth” (CFY), may carry forward a dependency and neglect petition against a parent when the State—acting through the county department of human services—moves to dismiss its own petition.

The case arose after Denver Human Services filed, and later sought to dismiss, a petition alleging that thirteen-year-old R.M.P. and his younger sister were dependent or neglected in their father’s care. R.M.P., through CFY, objected and urged the juvenile court to proceed to the merits. Relying on a 1986 Colorado Court of Appeals decision, People in Interest of R.E., the juvenile court convened a hearing to determine if “credible evidence” supported moving forward despite the State’s dismissal. It found sufficient support and set the case for adjudication.

On original jurisdiction review under C.A.R. 21, the Supreme Court made the rule to show cause absolute. The Court held that only the State, in its parens patriae capacity, has standing to prosecute dependency and neglect proceedings. It overruled R.E. to the extent it allowed a guardian ad litem (GAL)—and by extension a CFY—to pursue adjudication once the State seeks dismissal. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. Justice Gabriel dissented, arguing that the Children’s Code entrusts significant oversight to the juvenile court and preserves the child’s voice—including the right to object to dismissal and to be heard—such that a court may require an adjudicatory determination when appropriate.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reaffirmed and extended its long-standing rule that “the State is the exclusive party entitled to bring an action in dependency and neglect” to encompass not only initiation but also prosecution of such proceedings. The State alone has standing to carry a dependency and neglect petition to adjudication.
Neither the Children’s Code nor the rules confer authority on a child, GAL, CFY, or any non-state party to prosecute a dependency and neglect petition, including when the State seeks dismissal.
People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d 1032 (Colo. App. 1986), is overruled insofar as it permits a non-state party to oppose and overcome the State’s dismissal and continue to adjudication.
The Court analogized to the criminal sphere’s historical prosecutorial discretion to dismiss charges, emphasized the absence of any dependency-and-neglect analogue to Crim. P. 48 or section 16-5-209, and concluded the juvenile court had no authority to deny dismissal under the governing statutes.
Because the Department’s motion to dismiss here was supported by reasonable grounds (including new information undermining the allegations and evidence of escalating harms while in foster care), the juvenile court erred in allowing the petition to proceed.
Original jurisdiction was appropriate due to the issue’s urgency, recurrence potential, and statewide significance—especially given the relatively new CFY role under section 19-3-203.

Factual and Procedural Background

Denver Human Services filed a petition in September 2024 alleging that R.M.P. (13) and his sister (9) were dependent or neglected in their father’s care, citing alleged physical assault, unsecured firearms and fentanyl in the home, and confinement/punitive acts. The juvenile court issued a temporary placement order (foster care), appointed counsel for youth for R.M.P., appointed a GAL for the sister, and set an adjudicatory trial.

In February 2025, after further investigation, the Department moved to dismiss, concluding that key allegations were untrue (e.g., no unsecured firearms or fentanyl) and that the physical incident reflected reasonable parental discipline while attempting to retrieve a child refusing to go home. The Department also documented that, since removal, R.M.P.’s behavior had deteriorated markedly in foster care, including school refusal, disruptive behavior, substance use, public masturbation, running away (including an overnight with an unrelated adult), and a juvenile delinquency case arising from alleged violent threats at school. The Department had no ongoing safety concerns at home and believed court involvement was harming the father–child relationship; the sister had already been reunified.

R.M.P., through CFY, objected, claimed dependence/neglect in the father’s care, and sought either summary judgment on adjudication, a jury trial, or an evidentiary hearing on credible evidence. Relying on R.E., the juvenile court held a “probable cause–like” hearing (offers of proof only, no testimony or cross-examination) to decide whether sufficient evidence existed to go forward. The court found sufficient support and reset for adjudication. Father petitioned for C.A.R. 21 relief, supported by the Department, challenging the juvenile court’s authority to allow the case to proceed over the State’s dismissal.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Considered

McCall v. District Court, 651 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1982) and its progeny (L.G. v. People, A.M. v. A.C., People in Interest of L.M., C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S.): Repeatedly stated that “the State is the exclusive party entitled to bring an action in dependency and neglect.” The Court grounded this exclusivity in the State’s parens patriae role, which uniquely empowers the government to intrude on familial relationships where necessary to protect children.
Parens patriae doctrine (Alfred L. Snapp & Son; Black’s Law Dictionary; In re House): Establishes the State’s duty and standing to protect those unable to protect themselves. The Court emphasized that dependency and neglect proceedings are a manifestation of that duty, with the State as the decision-maker on whether to intervene.
Children’s Code structure (sections 19-3-312, 19-3-501, 19-3-502, 19-3-505): Details the reporting, investigation, authorization, filing, and adjudication processes. Critically, it does not authorize non-state parties to file or prosecute dependency and neglect petitions.
People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d 1032 (Colo. App. 1986): Created a narrow exception allowing a GAL to continue a case after the State sought dismissal. The Supreme Court overruled R.E. to the extent it is inconsistent with the exclusive State role, noting R.E. lacked supporting statutory or doctrinal authority and conflicted with McCall’s reasoning.
Criminal-justice analogies (People v. Storlie; Crim. P. 48; section 16-5-209): Prosecutors historically possessed unilateral dismissal authority, later conditioned on court approval, with narrow limits on judicial refusal. No comparable rule exists in dependency and neglect matters. Even if such a rule existed, the Department’s grounds here were not arbitrary or capricious.
Constitutional family autonomy (Troxel v. Granville): Reinforces that State intrusion is unwarranted absent parental unfitness or necessity—framing the State’s involvement as an exception, not the norm.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds from two foundational propositions: (1) dependency and neglect cases are an exercise of the State’s parens patriae authority to intervene only when necessary to protect a child; and (2) the Children’s Code vests initiation and prosecution of such cases exclusively in the State. From those premises, the Court draws several consequential conclusions.

Standing is exclusive and jurisdictional. Because the State alone has standing to prosecute dependency and neglect proceedings, a non-state party’s attempt to press the petition forward presents a standing defect that may be raised at any time. This justified de novo review even if the argument was not preserved below.
No statutory authorization exists for non-state prosecution. Neither section 19-3-203 (CFY) nor any other Children’s Code provision empowers a child, GAL, CFY, foster parent, or other non-state party to institute or maintain a dependency and neglect petition in the State’s stead. C.R.C.P. 17(a) does not help because it permits actions in the name of the People only when a statute so provides—none does here.
R.E. is inconsistent with McCall’s logic and the Code’s text. Although the State must allege credible facts to initiate a petition, the fact of filing does not transfer standing to other parties. R.E.’s judicially-crafted exception undermined the State’s parens patriae gatekeeping role and risked transforming the system into a “weaponized family court” where adversaries could commandeer State power to litigate private disputes.
No criminal-law analogue authorizes court denial of dismissal. In criminal cases, court approval to dismiss exists by rule and statute and is narrowly circumscribed. In dependency and neglect, no comparable rule or statute empowers courts to refuse a State dismissal based on the court’s view of the merits. Absent such authorization, the juvenile court lacked authority to deny dismissal here.
Application to the record. The Department’s motion was supported by reasonable, case-specific justifications: investigative findings undermined critical allegations; safety concerns had abated; the father developed plans with the Department to address behavior; removal correlated with escalating harm to the child; and the sibling had reunified. The juvenile court therefore erred in holding a threshold “credible evidence” hearing and in setting the matter for adjudication despite the State’s motion to dismiss.

The Dissent (Justice Gabriel)

Justice Gabriel would discharge the order to show cause and uphold the juvenile court’s procedure. He reframed the central question as whether the Department may unilaterally dismiss a dependency and neglect petition “for any or no reason” without judicial oversight. He emphasized several statutory features that, in his view, compel a contrary answer:

Judicial control over filing and adjudication. Sections 19-3-501 and 19-3-505 give the court significant oversight: ordering petitions to be filed, ensuring adjudications occur “at the earliest possible time,” and conforming pleadings to proof. Allowing the Department to dismiss at will undercuts the court’s statutory authority, including its power to order filing.
The child is a statutory party with a right to be heard. Section 19-3-502(4.5) grants the child party status and participation rights. The dissent argues the majority effectively mutes the child’s voice by making dismissal unreviewable, despite legislative choices (especially in 2022 CFY enactments) to strengthen youth representation and participation.
R.E. harmonizes with the Code. The dissent reads R.E. as requiring a court to determine whether a petition is supported by competent evidence when the State seeks dismissal over a GAL/CFY objection—not as transferring standing to non-state parties or allowing them to “prosecute” the petition in the State’s stead. On this account, R.E. simply preserves court-centered adjudication when evidence warrants it.
Comparative authority. Other jurisdictions have required courts to inquire whether dismissal is in the child’s best interests and to hear evidence when necessary before allowing dismissal (citing decisions from D.C., Illinois, Indiana, and Maryland).
CFY legislative purpose. The 2022 CFY enactments reflect legislative intent to amplify youths’ voices and ensure client-directed representation for those 12 and older. The majority’s rule, the dissent argues, conflicts with these aims and risks adopting a policy judgment contrary to the legislature’s choices.

Impact and Practical Implications

The Court’s decision establishes a clear, statewide rule that will materially alter practice in dependency and neglect courts:

End of the R.E. “credible evidence” pathway. Juvenile courts may no longer convene threshold hearings or proceed to adjudication over the State’s dismissal based on a child’s, GAL’s, or CFY’s objection. The R.E. procedure is disapproved to the extent it allowed continuation absent State prosecution.
No non-state prosecution. Children, GALs, CFYs, foster parents, and other non-state parties cannot initiate or maintain a dependency and neglect proceeding when the State elects not to proceed. Party status and the right to be heard do not translate into standing to prosecute.
State gatekeeping consolidated. County attorneys and departments now have the final say—absent new legislation—on whether to carry a case to adjudication. Judicial tools to compel prosecution do not exist in the dependency and neglect context, unlike the criminal context’s limited court oversight under Crim. P. 48 and section 16-5-209.
CFY scope clarified. Counsel for youth maintain full participation rights (including advocacy on placements, services, and case management), but cannot force an adjudication to proceed when the State moves to dismiss the petition. CFY advocacy must operate within the bounds of State-controlled prosecution.
Legislative opportunity. The Court’s express reliance on the absence of an analogue to Crim. P. 48 and section 16-5-209 signals that any check on State dismissal decisions would need to be statutory. The General Assembly could, if it chooses, specify standards and procedures for court review of State dismissals in child-protection cases.
Case management and timelines. Where departments reevaluate evidence midstream, trial courts should promptly entertain dismissal motions. The opinion emphasizes urgency and potential harm from prolonged removal when safety concerns abate, encouraging swift termination of unwarranted cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Parens patriae. Literally “parent of the country.” It is the doctrine authorizing the State to step in to protect those who cannot protect themselves—here, children. Because this power is exceptional and intrusive on family autonomy, the State alone decides when to invoke it in dependency and neglect cases.
Dependency and neglect adjudication. A civil proceeding where the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is dependent or neglected. If proven, the court can enter orders to protect the child, including removal from the home.
Counsel for youth (CFY) vs. guardian ad litem (GAL). A CFY provides client-directed representation for children aged 12 or older, advocating for the child’s expressed positions. A GAL represents a child’s best interests, which may differ from the child’s wishes. Neither role, however, confers authority to prosecute a dependency and neglect petition.
Standing. The legal authority to bring or maintain a claim. The Court held that only the State has standing to prosecute dependency and neglect proceedings; standing is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time.
C.A.R. 21 original jurisdiction. A discretionary, extraordinary remedy the Supreme Court uses when there is no adequate appellate remedy and the issue is time-sensitive, of public importance, or likely to recur. The Court used it here due to urgency, recurring nature, and the novelty of CFY practice.

How the Decision Fits with—and Changes—Existing Law

Continuity with McCall and progeny. The decision reaffirms that the State’s parens patriae role makes it the only party that can initiate dependency and neglect proceedings and extends that exclusivity to the prosecution stage when dismissal is sought.
Overruling R.E. R.E.’s decades-old exception allowing a child’s representative to require adjudication over the State’s dismissal is expressly disapproved. Trial courts should no longer rely on R.E. to hold “credible evidence” hearings to continue a case against the State’s wishes.
Judicial oversight narrowed by statute. Unlike the criminal context, no statute authorizes courts to deny dismissals in dependency and neglect. The Court’s analysis leaves room for legislative action, but, as of now, courts lack authority to compel the State to proceed.

Practice Pointers

For county attorneys/departments: Ensure dismissal motions articulate concrete reasons—investigative findings, risk assessments, service plans, changed circumstances. While judicial approval is not required by statute, a robust record will both guide the court’s orders and minimize disputes.
For CFY and GALs: You may advocate fully as parties on services, safety planning, placements, and procedural protections. But you cannot compel adjudication when the State seeks dismissal. Redirect advocacy toward ensuring safe transition plans, voluntary services, and addressing collateral risks (e.g., delinquency, education, mental health).
For parents’ counsel: Where the State moves to dismiss, request prompt termination and reunification orders as appropriate. Consider whether related orders (e.g., temporary restrictions, protective measures) remain necessary.
For juvenile judges: In light of this opinion, do not convene R.E.-style “credible evidence” hearings to countermand a State dismissal. Absent statutory authority, dismiss the petition and confine subsequent orders to matters within the court’s remaining jurisdiction.
For policymakers: If the General Assembly wishes to create judicial review of dismissals in child-protection cases, it may consider a tailored analogue to Crim. P. 48/section 16-5-209 that respects parens patriae limits while ensuring best-interest oversight and a defined role for a child’s voice.

Conclusion

In re People ex rel. R.M.P. crystallizes a decisive rule for Colorado juvenile practice: the State is the sole party with standing not only to file but also to prosecute dependency and neglect petitions. By overruling R.E., the Court eliminates the mechanism by which a child’s representative could previously press a case to adjudication after the State sought dismissal. The ruling grounds itself in the parens patriae doctrine and the textual structure of the Children’s Code, emphasizing that only the State may invoke and persist in the exceptional intrusion into family life that child-protection litigation entails.

The decision will streamline dismissals when departments reassess risk and evidence mid-case; it will also constrain the litigation leverage of non-state participants, including CFY and GALs, who must now channel advocacy into domains short of prosecuting the petition itself. The dissent highlights a competing vision drawn from the Code’s robust commitment to judicial oversight and youth participation and points to a path some other jurisdictions have taken: statutorily anchored judicial review of State dismissals. The majority’s opinion, however, signals that any such recalibration must come from the legislature, not the courts.

The key takeaway is clear: absent new statutory authority, Colorado juvenile courts must grant the State’s motion to dismiss a dependency and neglect petition, and no non-state party—including a child through counsel for youth—may prosecute the petition to adjudication over the State’s objection.