Excluding Later Corporate-Filing Evidence Is Harmless Where the Duty to Report Personal Income Is Clear and the Good‑Faith Defense Was Otherwise Presented

Case: United States v. Michael Adix, No. 23-11548 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Panel: Rosenbaum, Lagoa, and Wilson, JJ.

Introduction

In this unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Dr. Michael Adix, an emergency-room physician convicted on four counts of tax perjury under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for underreporting income on his 2012–2015 personal returns. The appeal centered on a discrete evidentiary ruling: the district court excluded defense evidence that, in 2018—years after the charged returns were filed and after the IRS investigation began—Dr. Adix’s wife, Corinne, filed corporate tax returns for two entities (ICC and ICORP) through which some of his compensation had flowed. The defense argued those 2018 filings corroborated his “good‑faith” contention that he believed income paid to the corporations was Corinne’s responsibility to report, not his. The district court excluded the evidence on hearsay and relevance grounds and later denied a Rule 33 motion for a new trial premised on the same point.

The Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the standard of review was abuse of discretion and that the exclusion was erroneous. It nevertheless affirmed on harmless‑error grounds and upheld the denial of a new trial. The opinion clarifies a practical limit on good‑faith-intent evidence in tax prosecutions: where the defendant’s independent duty to report personal income is clear and the jury already heard the “substance” of the good‑faith defense, exclusion of marginal, post‑offense, corroborative evidence is harmless.

Summary of the Opinion

• Posture: Jury convicted Adix on four § 7206(1) counts for underreporting personal income for 2012–2015. The district court excluded defense questions and evidence about Corinne’s 2018 corporate filings for ICC and ICORP, and later denied a Rule 33 motion for a new trial.
• Issues on appeal: Whether excluding the 2018-filing evidence (on hearsay and relevance grounds) was reversible error; whether denying the new-trial motion was an abuse of discretion.
• Holding: Assuming error and assuming abuse-of-discretion review, any error was harmless because (1) substantial untainted evidence supported willfulness and material falsity, (2) the defendant’s duty to report his own income was unaffected by who filed corporate returns or whether they were filed later, and (3) the jury heard the “substance” of the good‑faith defense through other testimony. The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (as corrected 194 F.3d 1186): Provided the governing harmless‑error formulation: a conviction will not be reversed if the error had no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient uninfected evidence supports the verdict. The court repeatedly measured the trial record against this standard.
• United States v. Wellendorf, 574 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1978): Bound on the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner v. City of Prichard, this case supports affirmance where the defendant was able to place the “substance” of a good‑faith defense before the jury even if some corroborative evidence was excluded. The court relied on this principle to deem the 2018‑filings evidence nonessential.
• United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc): Recognizes that when willfulness is critical, defendants are entitled to wide latitude to introduce lack‑of‑intent evidence. The panel acknowledged this backdrop but emphasized it does not entitle a defendant to admission of every item of purported corroboration, especially when cumulative or weakly probative.
• United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)): Invoked to underscore that Cheek’s subjective good‑faith rule does not compel admission of “any and all” evidence purportedly bearing on the defendant’s belief. This reinforced the court’s conclusion that excluding the 2018 filings was not reversible error.
• United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2004): The defense cited Hurn for the idea that corroborative evidence can be important if it places the trial story in a “significantly different light.” The panel distinguished Hurn: the 2018 filings were too remote and ancillary to meaningfully change the willfulness calculus for returns filed years earlier.
• United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312 (11th Cir. 1995): A credibility principle: when a defendant testifies, if the jury disbelieves him, it may infer the opposite of his testimony. The panel noted the jury plainly rejected Adix’s testimony and that the trial evidence supported that rejection.
• United States v. Hiett, 581 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1978): Supports the prosecution’s “fair response” to defense arguments during closing. This muted any prejudice from the government’s remark that there was “zero evidence” supporting the defense’s corporate‑ownership narrative.
• United States v. Almanzar, 634 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2011): Presumption that juries follow limiting and instruction charges; used here to discount the impact of the prosecutor’s rhetoric in closing.
• Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Confirms that pre‑October 1981 Fifth Circuit precedent binds the Eleventh Circuit; explains the court’s reliance on Wellendorf and Hiett.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeds in two steps: (1) an “assume error” posture on the evidentiary ruling, and (2) a robust harmless‑error assessment paired with an abuse‑of‑discretion review of the Rule 33 denial.

1) Evidentiary exclusion: assumed error, but harmless

Without definitively resolving preservation or admissibility (relevance or hearsay) questions, the court held that excluding the 2018 corporate‑filing evidence could not have had a substantial influence on the verdict.

The court emphasized several pillars of untainted proof:

• Independent duty to report personal income: Regardless of who owned ICC/ICORP or whether they filed returns in 2018, Adix had a contemporaneous duty to report his personal income on his own returns for 2012–2015. The case “wasn’t about ICC’s or ICORP’s failure to file corporate taxes. It was about Dr. Adix’s failure to report his personal income.”
• Delinquency and concealment: He failed to file for years until the IRS initiated an investigation, then filed returns that omitted the ICC/ICORP income despite his understanding that those entities were created to process his compensation.
• Selective disclosure to his CPA: He supplied Pinnacle records to the CPA but not ICC/ICORP materials, even though funds flowed through those entities for his work.
• False dependent claim: He claimed a 20‑year‑old stepdaughter as a dependent without her knowledge—additional circumstantial evidence of willfulness.
• Personal expenditures far exceeding reported income: Bank records showed over $1.1 million on personal spending during the charged period (casinos, retail, amusement parks, hotels, salons/massages, and credit-card payments), while he reported only about $325,000 in income. This provided powerful circumstantial proof that he knew substantial income existed and was not reported.

Against that backdrop, the 2018 filings were both remote and weakly probative of his 2012–2015 state of mind. The filings occurred 2.5 to 3+ years after the returns at issue and after the IRS Criminal Investigation Division was involved. The court asked, in effect, “even if he thought Corinne would file ICC/ICORP returns, so what?”—his individual duty persisted. The panel also noted a key omission at trial: Adix never directly testified that he believed, at the time he filed, that Corinne would file corporate returns covering the ICC/ICORP income, even though the court would have allowed him to say so.

Finally, the court invoked Wellendorf to conclude the jury already heard the “substance” of the defense: the theory that ICC/ICORP were Corinne’s companies and that she handled (or was supposed to handle) their reporting. The excluded evidence would have been cumulative corroboration, not a game‑changer.

2) Prosecutor’s closing remarks did not tip the scales

The defense argued prejudice because the government said there was “zero evidence” supporting the notion that ICC/ICORP were Corinne’s companies and that she would file. The panel rejected this for multiple reasons:

• It was a fair response to the defense’s theory.
• Even if hyperbolic, the challenged remark did not materially mislead the jury given the evidentiary record and the court’s instruction that lawyers’ statements are not evidence.
• The post‑offense 2018 filings would not have materially altered the mens rea picture for returns filed years earlier.

3) Rule 33 new-trial motion: no abuse of discretion

Rule 33 allows a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires,” a standard committed to the district court’s sound discretion. Here, any assumed evidentiary error did not cause substantial prejudice. The district court also faulted the defense for an inadequate proffer describing the evidence and its intended use. On this record, denying a new trial was well within the court’s discretion.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although unpublished (and therefore non‑precedential in the Eleventh Circuit), the opinion offers several practice‑shaping takeaways for tax prosecutions and evidentiary strategy:

• Good‑faith evidence has limits—timing matters: Post‑offense acts (like later corporate filings) are often weak proxies for earlier state of mind, especially where the acts occur after an IRS investigation begins. Courts may exclude such evidence as minimally probative or as hearsay if offered through out‑of‑court discussions, and any exclusion is likely to be harmless when the defendant already presented the core theory.
• The “duty to report personal income” is central in § 7206(1): Who owns a pass‑through entity, or whether a spouse later files a corporate return, does not erase the signer’s obligation to ensure his own Form 1040 is true and correct as to material matters. This framing helps prosecutors focus juries on the personal‑return question rather than on corporate‑filing side shows.
• Substance-over-form in willfulness proof: Evidence that personal expenditures vastly exceed reported income remains potent circumstantial evidence of willfulness. Pairing expenditures with selective disclosure to a preparer and false statements (e.g., false dependents) can be dispositive.
• Cheek does not open the evidentiary floodgates: Subjective good‑faith misunderstanding may negate willfulness, but courts retain discretion to exclude marginal, cumulative, or remote corroboration. Defense counsel should prioritize contemporaneous, first‑person evidence of belief and reliance.
• Appellate posture: “Assume error, find harmless” is alive and well: Disputes over preservation and precise evidentiary rules can be mooted by the harmless‑error inquiry. Trial counsel should therefore build a record demonstrating why the excluded evidence would likely have changed the verdict—mere corroboration typically will not suffice.
• Proffers matter: The district court criticized the defense’s proffer as insufficient. To preserve and maximize the chances of admission, counsel should detail the specific content of the excluded evidence, the non‑hearsay purpose (if any), and the precise link to the mens rea element at the time of the offense.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Tax perjury under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1): This statute punishes willfully making and subscribing a tax return the signer does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter. It focuses on the truthfulness of what the taxpayer certified under penalty of perjury, not on tax deficiency per se.
• Good‑faith defense (Cheek doctrine): A sincere (even if unreasonable) misunderstanding of the law or facts can negate “willfulness” in certain tax crimes. But the belief must be genuinely held at the time and related to the specific reporting obligation; courts are not required to admit all evidence a defendant claims supports that belief.
• Harmless error: Not every trial error warrants reversal. For non‑constitutional errors, an appellate court will affirm if the mistake likely had no substantial influence on the verdict and sufficient untainted evidence supports the outcome.
• Hearsay and Rule 803(3) (state of mind): The rule allows statements of a declarant’s then‑existing state of mind (e.g., intent), but not statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered or believed. Using a later conversation to prove what the defendant believed years earlier typically runs afoul of this limitation. Moreover, the mere fact of a later filing is an act, not a statement—but attempts to introduce why it was filed or what was discussed with the IRS may implicate hearsay.
• Relevance and remoteness (Rules 401–403): Evidence must make a consequential fact more or less probable. Events occurring years after the charged conduct—especially after an investigation begins—often have slight probative value on earlier intent and may be excluded or, if admitted, carry little weight on appeal.
• Rule 33 new trial: A district court may grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” The standard is deferential on appeal, and the movant must demonstrate that any error caused substantial prejudice affecting the verdict.

Additional Observations and Practice Pointers

• Direct testimony beats inference: If a defendant’s trial theory is “I believed my spouse would report that income,” elicit that belief directly from the defendant about the relevant time period. The Eleventh Circuit expressly noted that such testimony was available but not elicited.
• Make a complete proffer: The defense never proffered the contents of the 2018 returns, only the fact of filing. Contents might have carried different probative value (e.g., whether those returns reported the same revenue streams), but without a proffer, appellate review treats the omission as non‑prejudicial.
• Reliance on a preparer is not self‑proving: Reliance defenses work best when the client provided complete and accurate information to the preparer and followed advice. Selectively providing records (Pinnacle only) undermines reliance and supports willfulness.
• Corporate form does not erase individual duties: Even where services are funneled through entities, the individual earner’s return must truthfully reflect taxable income received or constructive distributions taken. Later corporate filings do not retroactively sanitize earlier personal underreporting.
• Closing arguments and “fair response”: Prosecutors may push back firmly against defense theories. Defense counsel should preserve objections and request clarifying instructions if rhetoric strays, but reversal is unlikely absent concrete prejudice.

Conclusion

United States v. Adix reinforces a pragmatic limit on good‑faith‑intent evidence in tax cases: exclusion of post‑offense, marginally probative corroboration will be deemed harmless where the defendant’s duty to report personal income is clear, the trial record contains abundant untainted evidence of willfulness and material falsity, and the jury already heard the core of the defense theory. While Garber cautions that defendants should receive wide latitude to present intent evidence, Wellendorf and Hands together underscore that the appellate inquiry ultimately asks whether the exclusion likely changed the verdict. Here, it did not.

For practitioners, the opinion—though unpublished—offers a roadmap. Defendants should develop contemporaneous, first‑person proof of their beliefs at the time returns were filed and make detailed proffers to preserve evidentiary issues. Prosecutors, for their part, can effectively focus juries on the independent obligation to ensure personal returns are true and correct, using expenditure evidence and selective disclosure to preparers as compelling circumstantial proof of willfulness. The Eleventh Circuit’s disposition signals that in § 7206(1) cases, later corporate filings by a spouse will rarely move the needle.