Excess Judgment Is for Damages, Not Liability: Eleventh Circuit Limits Use of UM Verdicts in Florida First‑Party Bad Faith Trials

Case: Lauren Woods v. Progressive American Insurance Company

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date: November 17, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (jury verdict for insurer on statutory first‑party bad faith)

Introduction

This published Eleventh Circuit decision addresses the contours of admissible evidence and jury instructions in Florida statutory first‑party bad faith actions arising out of underinsured motorist (UM) claims. After obtaining a UM verdict substantially above her $300,000 policy limits, Lauren Woods sued Progressive for statutory bad faith under Florida Statute § 624.155(1)(b), claiming Progressive failed to act in good faith in settling her UM claim. A federal jury returned a defense verdict on bad faith. On appeal, Woods challenged key evidentiary rulings: the district court’s exclusion of the underlying UM verdict and excess judgment from the bad faith liability trial and the refusal to instruct the jury that an excess judgment existed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The panel clarifies the distinct roles that (1) the underlying UM verdict and any resulting excess judgment play in bad faith litigation (damages, not liability), (2) the insurer’s contemporaneous knowledge and evaluation play in the “totality of the circumstances” analysis, and (3) pretrial stipulations and joint exhibit lists play in evidentiary determinations. The decision provides practical guidance on trial structuring and evidentiary boundaries in Florida bad faith cases litigated in federal court.

Summary of the Opinion

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the underlying UM jury verdict and excess judgment from the bad faith liability trial, especially where (a) the parties stipulated that the court, not the jury, would decide damages and (b) Woods limited her bad faith theory to Progressive’s conduct before the UM trial.
Under Florida law (as articulated in Fridman and later decisions), a UM verdict or excess judgment ordinarily goes to the damages element in a bad faith action; it is not substantive evidence of liability for bad faith.
The trial court’s reference to the insurer’s “state of mind” was not an improper legal standard; rather, it aligns with Florida’s “totality of the circumstances” test, which focuses on the insurer’s knowledge and conduct at the time of claims handling.
The district court did not improperly allow Progressive to “relitigate” the underlying UM trial; Progressive could present the contemporaneous materials it relied on to explain its pretrial handling decisions.
There was no error in declining to instruct the jury that an excess judgment existed, given the exclusion of the verdict from the liability phase and the stipulation that the court would determine damages.
Pretrial stipulations and joint exhibit listings do not dictate admissibility; the trial court retains discretion to exclude stipulated items as irrelevant to the issues tried to the jury.

Factual and Procedural Background

Woods suffered permanent injuries in a crash with an underinsured motorist. She made a UM claim under her Progressive policy. Progressive did not tender policy limits. In a UM breach‑of‑contract trial, a jury awarded Woods $545,760 (above the $300,000 limit), and a $412,208.17 final judgment was entered.

Woods then pursued statutory first‑party bad faith in the same federal court. Before trial, the parties stipulated:

to a jury trial on liability only, with the magistrate judge to determine damages;
to include the UM verdict as a joint exhibit; and
to facts establishing the existence of the UM verdict and resulting judgment.

At the outset of the bad faith trial, Woods asked to exclude Progressive’s claims notes referencing the UM trial; in response to the court’s inquiry, she limited her bad faith theory to pre‑UM‑trial conduct. The court excluded those notes. Woods also sought to admit the UM verdict and excess judgment (or alternatively, to instruct the jury that an excess judgment existed). Initially, the court was inclined to instruct the jury that an excess judgment existed (without amount) but not admit the verdict. Following openings, the court excluded both the verdict and any instruction, reasoning that:

damages were for the court, not the jury; and
Woods’ temporal limitation severed any connection between Progressive’s pretrial conduct and the eventual verdict/judgment.

The jury returned a defense verdict on bad faith. The district court denied Woods’ motion for a new trial. She appealed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Florida Statutes
- § 624.155(1)(b): Creates a first‑party statutory bad faith cause of action for failure to settle in good faith under the circumstances.
- § 627.727(9): Specifies damages recoverable in UM bad faith, including amounts exceeding policy limits, interest, fees, and other statutory damages.
Laforet (Fla. 1995): Confirms the first‑party UM bad faith cause of action and totality‑of‑circumstances analysis.
Boston Old Colony (Fla. 1980): The insurer’s good‑faith duties include investigation, fair consideration of reasonable settlement offers, and settlement where a prudent person would do so.
Berges (Fla. 2004): Good faith means acting in the insured’s best interests; typically for a jury to decide under the totality standard.
Harvey v. GEICO (Fla. 2018): Restates the insurer’s duty of care and diligence akin to managing one’s own business.
Vest v. Travelers (Fla. 2000): A mistaken denial is not per se bad faith; the insurer may deny claims it in good faith believes not owed; good/bad faith turns on contemporaneous circumstances and facts.
Fridman v. Safeco (Fla. 2016): In UM bad faith, the underlying UM verdict is binding as to the amount of damages in the subsequent bad faith action; however, it does not preclude the insurer from explaining why it did not act in bad faith.
Cingari v. First Protective (Fla. 4th DCA 2024): Emphasizes the insurer’s duty to timely evaluate and pay benefits; reads Fridman as making the UM verdict a binding damages determination and condition precedent, not a liability shortcut.
Fortune v. First Protective (Fla. 2d DCA 2020): Reinforces that a mistaken denial does not necessarily equate to bad faith.
Standards of review and trial management
- Furcron (11th Cir. 2016): Abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); Morrison (11th Cir. 1987); G.I.C. Corp. (11th Cir. 1997); Central Distributors (former 5th Cir. 1968): Courts have broad discretion regarding pretrial stipulations and may relieve parties to prevent manifest injustice; stipulations do not override judicial control over admissibility.
- Noel Shows (11th Cir. 1983): Admissibility is a question for the court and is not dictated by the parties’ stipulation.
- Morris (11th Cir. 1994): Abuse of discretion standard for refusal to give jury instructions.

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three interlocking steps: relevance and function of the UM verdict/excess judgment, the proper focus of the good‑faith inquiry, and the management of stipulations and instructions.

UM verdict/excess judgment are damages tools, not liability evidence.
Relying on Fridman and Cingari, the court reiterates that the UM verdict and excess judgment typically serve to establish the amount of damages in a bad faith action. They do not, by themselves, prove that the insurer’s pretrial claims handling was unreasonable or in bad faith. The insurer remains entitled to show that its contemporaneous decisions were reasonable under the circumstances, even if a later verdict exceeded policy limits. Thus, the trial court properly excluded the verdict and the notion of an excess judgment from the liability jury when damages had been reserved to the bench.
Temporal limitation severed relevance to liability.
At the court’s prompting, Woods narrowed her bad faith theory to conduct occurring before the UM trial. That strategic choice secured the exclusion of Progressive’s post‑trial notes—but it also rendered the post‑trial UM verdict and judgment irrelevant to the jury’s liability determination. As the panel observed, introducing those outcomes would risk misleading the jury into thinking that an excess verdict equates to bad faith—an implication the Florida Supreme Court rejected in Vest.
“State of mind” comment was consistent with the totality standard.
The district court’s description that the issue concerned Progressive’s “state of mind” was not the application of an improper subjective standard; it simply recognized that bad faith turns on what the insurer knew, investigated, and reasonably concluded at the time. This aligns with Florida’s totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach, which centers on the insurer’s knowledge, diligence, and prudence in handling the claim when decisions were made.
No improper “relitigation” of the UM case.
Progressive did not re‑try liability; it presented the medical evaluations, opinions, and file materials that it had and relied upon when it declined to tender limits. That evidence pertains to its contemporaneous decision‑making—precisely what Florida law requires the jury to evaluate in assessing good faith.
Stipulations and jury instruction.
Although the verdict and existence of an excess judgment were included in the parties’ stipulations and joint exhibit list, the trial court retained discretion to deem them irrelevant to the limited issue presented to the jury (liability only) and exclude them from the jury’s consideration. Courts are not bound by stipulations in making admissibility rulings, and Rule 16(e) did not require an express “manifest injustice” finding because the court did not repudiate the stipulations; it only restricted their use to the bench damages phase that would occur only if liability were found. For the same reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an instruction that an excess judgment existed.

Impact

This decision carries tangible implications for the trial of Florida first‑party bad faith claims in federal courts:

Segregation of liability and damages evidence: When damages are reserved for the court and the plaintiff confines the time frame to pre‑trial conduct, the underlying UM verdict and excess judgment are properly withheld from the jury. Plaintiffs seeking to place the verdict before the jury must consider whether and how the temporal scope or the allocation of damages to the jury affects admissibility.
Insurer’s contemporaneous record matters: Insurers can defend by presenting the evidence they had and reasonably credited at the time, without that being treated as an impermissible challenge to the UM verdict.
Fridman clarified: The case reinforces that Fridman’s “binding verdict” concept is about the measure of damages and the condition precedent to a bad faith claim—not a shortcut to establishing liability.
Strategic tradeoffs for plaintiffs: Efforts to exclude portions of the claims file (e.g., post‑trial notes) by limiting the timeframe may make the verdict/judgment inadmissible on liability. Counsel must plan for these tradeoffs.
Trial management discretion: The decision underscores federal trial judges’ broad discretion to manage evidentiary flow, even where parties have stipulated to facts or exhibits. Stipulations do not guarantee jury‑facing admissibility.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory first‑party bad faith (Fla. Stat. § 624.155): A claim by the insured against her own insurer alleging the insurer failed to act fairly and honestly in attempting to settle the claim, given all the circumstances.
Underinsured Motorist (UM) claim: A claim by an insured to recover from her own insurer when the at‑fault driver’s insurance is insufficient to cover the insured’s damages.
Excess judgment: In the UM bad faith context, the amount by which the insured’s damages exceed the policy limits, ordinarily established by the underlying UM verdict or judgment.
Totality of the circumstances: A holistic assessment of the insurer’s conduct, including its investigation, evaluation, communications, and settlement efforts based on what it knew (or should have known) at the time.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard; the appellate court will not reverse unless the trial judge made a clear error of judgment or applied the wrong legal standard.
Pretrial stipulation (Rule 16(e)): An agreement narrowing issues or facts for trial. Courts can modify or limit the use of stipulations to avoid unfairness; stipulations do not override judicial control over what the jury sees.
Condition precedent (Fridman): The UM verdict must precede the bad faith action and establishes the damages amount for that later action; it does not, by itself, prove bad faith conduct.

Practical Guidance for Litigants

For Plaintiffs

Consider carefully whether to limit the bad faith theory to pre‑trial conduct. Doing so may help exclude certain claims‑file materials, but it will also likely bar the jury from hearing about the UM verdict and excess judgment.
If you want the jury to hear about the verdict in some form, avoid stipulating that damages will be decided by the court, or frame the theory to include conduct extending through trial or post‑verdict (if supported by the record). Expect insurers to seek countervailing evidence admission if you do so.
Do not rely on the excess verdict to imply bad faith. Instead, build the record of unreasonable claims handling: missed deadlines, inadequate investigation, ignored medical records, failure to respond, non‑consideration of reasonable settlement demands, etc.
Preserve objections and proffers. If the verdict is excluded, make a detailed proffer explaining its alleged relevance to liability to protect appellate review.

For Insurers

Document contemporaneous evaluations, investigative steps, and bases for settlement positions. The totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test places a premium on what you knew and did then.
Oppose efforts to place the UM verdict (and the existence/amount of any excess judgment) before the liability jury, particularly when damages are reserved to the bench and the plaintiff limits the timeframe.
Resist “relitigation” framing: Emphasize you are not challenging the verdict but explaining why your pretrial decisions were reasonable based on the evidence available at the time.
Use stipulations strategically. If the plaintiff leverages stipulations to present verdict-related facts while excluding your trial‑related file materials, seek exclusion or request reciprocal admission to avoid unfairness.

Unresolved Questions and Limits

State vs. federal practice: This decision governs federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit applying Florida law. State courts manage trials under Florida’s own evidence rules; while the substantive principles align, evidentiary outcomes could differ in state court practice.
Different trial structures: If damages are tried to the jury, or if the plaintiff’s bad faith theory includes conduct during or after the UM trial (supported by evidence), courts may find the verdict’s existence more probative to context (though still not dispositive of liability).
Scope of limiting instructions: The panel approved refusing an instruction about the excess judgment here; in other configurations (e.g., where damages and liability are intertwined), a carefully tailored instruction may be appropriate.
Fridman characterization: Fridman itself arose from a UM dispute; the Eleventh Circuit’s usage reinforces its damages‑only function in bad faith, leaving room for parties to test nuanced applications in different factual settings.

Key Takeaways

An excess UM verdict is a binding measure of damages in Florida first‑party bad faith—not evidence of liability.
When the plaintiff limits the bad faith theory to pre‑UM‑trial conduct and the court reserves damages to itself, the verdict and excess judgment may be excluded from the jury’s consideration.
Insurers may present contemporaneous file materials to explain their decisions without “relitigating” the underlying UM case.
Pretrial stipulations and joint exhibit lists do not guarantee jury‑facing admissibility; trial courts retain broad control over relevance and potential prejudice.
The totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test focuses on what the insurer knew and did at the time—not on hindsight from the ultimate verdict.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Woods v. Progressive distills a critical principle for Florida UM bad faith litigation: the underlying UM verdict and any excess judgment are about damages, not liability. Where the plaintiff narrows the temporal scope to pre‑trial conduct and the court reserves damages for itself, those verdict/judgment outcomes are appropriately kept from the jury to prevent confusion and undue prejudice. The decision brings procedural clarity to the often‑blurred line between the condition‑precedent function of a UM verdict (Fridman) and the substantive proof needed to show bad faith (Laforet, Boston Old Colony, Harvey, Vest). For practitioners, the case underscores the need to align trial structure, stipulations, and evidentiary strategy with the distinct roles of liability and damages in first‑party bad faith cases.