Ex parte intervention to secure a family member’s pre‑arraignment release in contravention of a court bond schedule warrants a conditionally stayed six‑month suspension

Introduction

In Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley, 2025-Ohio-910, the Supreme Court of Ohio imposed a six-month suspension, fully stayed, on Portsmouth Municipal Court Judge Russell Dee Kegley for intervening to secure the late-night release of his son from jail on domestic-violence and resisting-arrest charges before the son’s first court appearance. The Court found violations of multiple provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, including the misuse of the prestige of judicial office and prohibited ex parte communications. Importantly, the Court rejected the Board of Professional Conduct’s recommendation of a public reprimand and elevated the sanction to a stayed suspension, stressing the aggravating circumstances surrounding victim safety and the foreseeably dangerous consequences of the early release.

This commentary unpacks the factual background, the Court’s holdings, the legal standards applied, the precedents compared, and the broader implications for judicial conduct—particularly where familial relationships intersect with judicial authority in the sensitive context of domestic-violence proceedings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court adopted the Board’s findings that Judge Kegley violated four judicial-conduct rules by:

• Failing to act at all times to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary (Jud.Cond.R. 1.2);
• Abusing the prestige of judicial office to advance the interests of another (his son) (Jud.Cond.R. 1.3);
• Permitting family relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment (Jud.Cond.R. 2.4(B)); and
• Engaging in prohibited ex parte communication with jail personnel (Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)).

Although a subsequent conversation with the co-judge about scheduling fell within the scheduling/administrative exception to the ex parte rule (Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)(1)), the Court determined that the core misconduct—phoning the jail as “Judge Kegley” and directing release contrary to the court’s own domestic-violence hold policy and bond schedule—warranted a sanction more serious than a public reprimand. Drawing on comparable precedent, especially Disciplinary Counsel v. Goulding, 2020-Ohio-4588, the Court suspended Kegley for six months, with the suspension fully stayed on the condition of no further misconduct. Costs were taxed to Kegley.

Case Background and Key Facts

• Arrest and charges: Around 11 p.m. on May 25, 2023, Judge Kegley’s son, Case, was arrested for domestic violence (a first-degree misdemeanor) and resisting arrest (a second-degree misdemeanor) after an incident that left the victim, E.K. (his wife), with visible injuries.
• Bond schedule and procedure: Under a bond schedule adopted by Judges Kegley and Mowery, domestic-violence arrestees were to be held without bond until their initial appearance; arraigning judges typically issued a temporary protection order (TPO) at the initial appearance.
• The late-night call: At approximately 1:05 a.m., Judge Kegley phoned the jail, identified himself as “Judge Kegley,” spoke to his son, then told the corrections officer, “Let him sign his bond. He’ll be there tomorrow morning.” After consulting a supervisor, the officer complied and released Case on his own recognizance. E.K. was not notified.
• Morning developments: Without a TPO in place, Case returned home where E.K. was present. Police later performed a welfare check. Case missed his 9:00 a.m. arraignment; at the police chief’s request, Judge Mowery issued an arrest warrant. Case was re-arrested.
• Aftermath: Judge Kegley recognized he had “overstepped” and declined to seek a second release. At a subsequent arraignment (May 30), Judge Mowery set a recognizance bond and issued a TPO, then recused. Case later pleaded to reduced charges; the failure-to-appear count was dismissed.

Violations Found

The Board and Court found by stipulation and evidence that Judge Kegley:

• Compromised public confidence in judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality (Jud.Cond.R. 1.2), by intervening in a family member’s criminal case;
• Abused the prestige of office (Jud.Cond.R. 1.3), by invoking his judicial title and directing jail staff to release his son contrary to the standing bond schedule;
• Allowed family relationships to influence his conduct (Jud.Cond.R. 2.4(B)); and
• Engaged in prohibited ex parte communications (Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)), through private directives to jail staff about a detained defendant’s release.

The Court agreed that a later conversation with the co-judge about scheduling fell within the 2.9(A)(1) exception (scheduling/administrative purposes, no merits, no tactical advantage).

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Under Gov.Bar R. V(13):

• Aggravation:
  • Harm to a vulnerable victim (V(13)(B)(8)). E.K. was exposed to heightened risk when the domestic-violence arrestee was released pre‑arraignment without a TPO or notice.
  • The relator and panel initially recognized multiple rule violations. The Board viewed the misconduct as arising from a single incident; the Court did not explicitly resolve the “multiple offenses” characterization in aggravation, but it emphasized the gravity of the misconduct.
• Mitigation:
  • No prior discipline (V(13)(C)(1));
  • Cooperation and full disclosure (V(13)(C)(4));
  • Good character and reputation (V(13)(C)(5)).
  • The panel credited the absence of a selfish or dishonest motive (V(13)(C)(2)), but the Board rejected that without explanation; the Court proceeded without assigning that factor determinative weight.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court canvassed a spectrum of judicial-discipline cases to situate the appropriate sanction:

• More egregious than Kegley:
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Salerno, 2019-Ohio-435: A judge reduced bond after ex parte contacts through her bailiff; sanction was a one-year suspension, conditionally stayed.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 2019-Ohio-670: A judge repeatedly injected himself into his daughter’s juvenile speeding case and disparaged the officer; six-month suspension imposed.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-5053: A judge unilaterally dismissed a ticket for his personal attorney and misrepresented the prosecutor’s position; six-month suspension.
• Stayed six-month suspension for ex parte conduct:
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 2012-Ohio-4700: Improper ex parte lecturing of a probationer and interference in police investigation; six months stayed.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Winters, 2021-Ohio-2753: Inappropriate five-month Facebook ex parte communications with a criminal defendant about multiple pending matters and other violations; six months stayed.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Goulding, 2020-Ohio-4588: The touchstone case for Kegley—common pleas judge ordered a defendant’s pre‑arraignment release in a case assigned to another judge, engaged in ex parte communications, and failed to notify the prosecutor; six months stayed.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Porzio, 2020-Ohio-1569: Magistrate engaged in ex parte communications with a litigant and then issued orders favoring that party; six months stayed.
• Public reprimand cases:
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 2001-Ohio-1592: Judge drove a recent DUI arrestee home and later accepted her plea; extensive mitigation, no aggravation; public reprimand.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 2009-Ohio-261: Ex parte collaboration with the prosecutor in drafting a capital sentencing opinion; public reprimand with mitigation and no aggravation.

The Court determined that although some cited cases involved more aggravated misconduct, the closest analogue was Goulding because both involved:

• Ex parte intervention with custodial authorities;
• Pre‑arraignment release contrary to institutional safeguards;
• Use of judicial status to influence custodial decisions outside the assigned case.

Unlike Goulding, who displayed “an attitude of denial,” Judge Kegley promptly acknowledged he had overstepped. Nonetheless, the Court found that the risk posed to a domestic-violence victim—exacerbated by the absence of a TPO and notice—tilted the balance toward the same sanction as Goulding: a six-month suspension, fully stayed.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning hinged on several principles:

• Integrity and impartiality (Jud.Cond.R. 1.2): Judges must avoid conduct that erodes public confidence in judicial neutrality. A late-night directive to release a family member in custody for domestic violence undermines that confidence.
• Prestige of office (Jud.Cond.R. 1.3): Identification as “Judge Kegley” and issuing instructions to release a detainee expanded the reach of judicial authority into a matter where the judge was neither the assigned jurist nor acting within proper procedural channels.
• Family influence (Jud.Cond.R. 2.4(B)): Familial ties cannot influence judicial actions. The Court viewed the intervention as driven by that relationship.
• Ex parte communications (Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)): Directing custodial action via unilateral contact was an impermissible ex parte communication. In contrast, a later judge‑to‑judge conversation limited to scheduling fell within the 2.9(A)(1) exception because it did not touch substantive merits and did not confer a procedural or tactical advantage.
• Sanction calibration under Gov.Bar R. V(13): The Court recognized mitigation (no prior discipline, cooperation, character), but found significant aggravation due to the victim’s vulnerability and the foreseeable risk created by ignoring the bond schedule and TPO safeguards. It emphasized that a mere public reprimand inadequately “reflect[s] the gravity” of endangering a domestic-violence victim.

Why the Stayed Suspension (and not a Public Reprimand)?

Two decisive considerations drove the sanction:

• Comparability to Goulding: The structural similarities—ex parte direction to custodial authorities to release a detainee prior to arraignment; acting outside the proper channel; use of judicial status—align closely. Goulding received a stayed six-month suspension.
• Victim safety and public confidence: By overriding the domestic-violence hold policy and preventing timely issuance of a TPO and victim notice, the conduct increased risk in a volatile scenario. The Court explicitly rejected a reprimand as insufficient to capture that gravity.

The fully stayed nature of the suspension signals that, while the conduct was serious, the Court credited meaningful mitigation, including prompt acknowledgment of wrongdoing and cooperation, and did not deem immediate active suspension necessary.

Impact and Forward-Looking Guidance

This opinion clarifies several points likely to influence future judicial-discipline cases and everyday bench conduct in Ohio:

• Baseline sanction for ex parte intervention to secure pre‑arraignment release: Where a judge uses judicial status to influence custodial decisions for a family member—particularly in domestic-violence contexts—courts should anticipate at least a conditionally stayed suspension, not merely a reprimand.
• Heightened weight for victim safety: Harm or risk to a “vulnerable victim” (Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8)) is a powerful aggravator. Disregard of protective protocols (holds, TPO issuance, victim notice) will sharply elevate sanctions.
• Ex parte boundaries: Communication with custodial staff about a specific detainee’s release is classic ex parte conduct. By contrast, judge‑to‑judge administrative coordination about case scheduling can fall within Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)(1), provided it is strictly non-substantive and confers no advantage.
• Prestige of office: Even a single, late-night phone call invoking judicial authority can constitute an abuse of office if it directs action outside appropriate channels.
• Mitigation remains meaningful but not dispositive: No prior discipline, cooperation, and character can convert an active suspension to a stayed suspension, yet they will not reduce a sanction to a reprimand when conduct endangers victim safety and public confidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ex parte communication: Any communication about a pending matter with one side or a third party (e.g., jail staff) without the other parties present or notified. Generally prohibited to protect fairness and the appearance of fairness.
• Scheduling/administrative ex parte exception (Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)(1)): A narrow carve‑out allowing non‑substantive, administrative contacts when necessary, so long as no party gains an advantage and merits are not discussed.
• Abuse of prestige (Jud.Cond.R. 1.3): Using one’s judicial title or authority to influence outcomes outside proper judicial process (e.g., to benefit friends or family) is prohibited.
• Domestic-violence hold and TPO: Many courts hold domestic-violence arrestees until a first appearance so a judge can consider issuing a temporary protection order, which restricts contact and enhances victim safety. Releasing a defendant before that step can increase risk to the victim.
• Recognizance bond: A promise to appear in court without posting money; typically conditioned on future appearance and sometimes on other terms.
• Conditionally stayed suspension: The lawyer or judge is suspended, but the suspension is not served so long as specified conditions (here, no further misconduct) are met. A breach lifts the stay and activates the suspension.
• Aggravating and mitigating factors (Gov.Bar R. V(13)): A standardized framework for sanctioning that considers both harmful aspects of misconduct (e.g., vulnerable victim) and positive considerations (e.g., no prior discipline, cooperation).

Practical Takeaways for Judges and Court Personnel

• Do not contact custodial personnel about a specific detainee’s release or conditions, especially when you are not the assigned judicial officer. Refer the matter to the assigned judge or the on‑call judicial process.
• Never invoke your judicial status in personal or family matters; it risks violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, and 2.4(B).
• Use the scheduling/administrative exception sparingly and narrowly. Keep communications strictly non‑substantive and without tactical benefit to any party.
• Prioritize victim safety protocols. In domestic‑violence cases, follow policies requiring detention until first appearance, issuance of TPOs, and victim notification.
• If a lapse occurs, immediate acknowledgment and full cooperation can mitigate sanctions, but they will not eliminate significant discipline when public safety and confidence are at stake.

Conclusion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley reinforces a clear boundary: judges may not use their office—explicitly or implicitly—to secure preferential treatment for family members, particularly in the pre‑arraignment window where protective safeguards are designed to shield domestic‑violence victims. By elevating the sanction from a recommended public reprimand to a six-month suspension fully stayed, the Supreme Court of Ohio aligns this case with Goulding, underscores the primacy of victim safety as an aggravating consideration, and signals that even a single episode of ex parte intervention of this kind will typically merit more than a reprimand.

The opinion provides important operational guidance: ex parte contacts with custodial staff are out of bounds; judge‑to‑judge administrative conversations are permissible only within strict limits; and public confidence in judicial impartiality must remain paramount. For Ohio’s judiciary, the case serves as a cautionary precedent and a practical roadmap for avoiding the appearance—and reality—of impropriety when personal relationships intersect with judicial responsibilities.

Case Citation

Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-910 (Supreme Court of Ohio, decided Mar. 20, 2025).