Eviction After Statutory Contract‑for‑Deed Cancellation: North Dakota Affirms Posted Service and Strict Nonjoinability in Summary Proceedings — Cache Private Capital Diversified Fund v. Braddock (2025 ND 168)

Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota
Date: October 22, 2025
Author: Justice Douglas A. Bahr (unanimous, with Jensen, C.J., Crothers, McEvers, and Tufte, JJ., concurring)
Docket Nos.: 20250176 & 20250177

Introduction

This appeal arises out of a vendor–vendee dispute under a contract for deed for two commercial properties in Gladstone, North Dakota. After Joshua K. Braddock defaulted on his payment obligations, the vendor, Cache Private Capital Diversified Fund LLC (Cache), pursued statutory cancellation of the contract for deed under Chapter 32‑18 of the North Dakota Century Code. When Braddock remained in possession past the cure period and post‑cancellation, Cache commenced summary eviction actions under Chapter 47‑32.

On appeal, Braddock—appearing self‑represented—advanced three principal arguments: (1) the district court lacked personal jurisdiction because service of process in the eviction cases was insufficient under N.D.C.C. § 47‑32‑02; (2) the court improperly excluded over a thousand pages of documents he contended showed ongoing efforts to cure and supported equitable defenses; and (3) the court improperly “adjudicated ownership” via summary eviction, which is limited to present possession and cannot decide title or the validity of a cancellation.

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The decision confirms and clarifies three important points for practitioners in North Dakota real property and civil procedure:

A process server’s signed return showing posted service of the summons and complaint in eviction, accompanied by mailing to the last known address, is prima facie evidence of valid service under § 47‑32‑02 and can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.
Eviction actions are strictly limited to the immediate right to possession. Under § 47‑32‑04, defenses and counterclaims—other than setoff to a demand for damages or rents and profits—are not cognizable. Equitable defenses to contract‑for‑deed cancellation must be timely raised via affidavit under § 32‑18‑06 during the statutory cancellation process, not later in eviction.
After statutory cancellation is properly completed under Chapter 32‑18, the vendee’s interest terminates by operation of law; an ensuing eviction adjudicates possession, not ownership or title.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the eviction judgment on both properties, holding:

Service of process: The district court’s finding that Cache served Braddock by posting the summons and complaint on February 23, 2025, and mailing copies on February 26, 2025, was not clearly erroneous. The process server’s return created a presumptively correct prima facie showing of valid service, which Braddock failed to rebut with strong and convincing evidence. Consequently, personal jurisdiction existed.
Evidentiary exclusions: The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding more than 1,100 pages of Braddock’s exhibits for lack of foundation and relevance to the limited issue of possession in an eviction action. Because Cache sought only possession—not damages, rents, or profits—§ 47‑32‑04 barred interposed counterclaims or defenses.
Propriety of summary eviction: Cache proved it completed statutory cancellation; Braddock did not cure or invoke § 32‑18‑06 to have defenses heard in court during the cancellation process. The contract for deed was therefore canceled by operation of law, terminating Braddock’s interest and making his continued possession wrongful. The district court decided only the immediate right to possession; it did not impermissibly adjudicate title.

Key timeline

February 2021: Contract for deed executed.
Notice of cancellation served and published; six‑month cure period warned (N.D.C.C. § 32‑18‑04).
After cure period: Braddock neither cured nor filed an affidavit under § 32‑18‑06; Cache recorded notice of cancellation (N.D.C.C. § 32‑18‑05).
January 2025: Three‑day notice to vacate served and mailed (N.D.C.C. §§ 47‑32‑01, ‑02).
February–March 2025: Eviction actions filed; repeated attempts at personal service; posting on February 23, 2025, and mailing on February 26, 2025, for 1013 Main; separate filing on March 13, 2025, for 1005 Main; cases heard together.
April 2025: Eviction granted orally on April 23; written order and judgment issued April 30; Supreme Court affirms.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Service of process and personal jurisdiction
- State by Workforce Safety & Ins. v. Oden, 2020 ND 243: Reaffirms that valid service is necessary for personal jurisdiction and establishes that a prima facie showing of service is presumptively correct, rebuttable only by strong and convincing evidence. The Court relied on this to place the burden squarely on Braddock once Cache produced the process server’s return.
- Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Servs., LLC, 2016 ND 176: Applied for the same burden‑shifting principle in service disputes; cited to confirm the sufficiency of a return of service affidavit.
- Gessner v. City of Minot, 1998 ND 157; Est. of Glasoe v. Williams Cnty., 2016 ND 18; Dakota Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 437 N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1989): Together, these cases underpin that sufficiency of service is a fact question reviewed for clear error, guiding the appellate court’s deferential posture.
- Nagle v. Nagle, 2025 ND 94; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 2011 ND 57; Ted J. Boutrous, L.L.C. v. Transform Operating Stores, LLC, 2023 ND 35; Van Beek v. Van Beek, 2025 ND 96: Cited for the definition and application of the clearly erroneous standard and deference to trial court fact‑finding.
Evidence, foundation, and relevance
- Markgraf v. Welker, 2015 ND 303: Defines “foundation testimony” and confirms district courts’ discretion to exclude evidence lacking foundation. Applied to uphold the exclusion of Braddock’s voluminous exhibits.
- Langness v. Fencil Urethane Sys., Inc., 2003 ND 132: Affirms broad discretion to decide relevance; relied on to sustain the court’s decision that the materials were beyond the eviction action’s scope.
Statutory framework: eviction and contract‑for‑deed cancellations
- Locken v. Locken, 2011 ND 90: Establishes that statutory interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo, framing the Court’s analysis of Chapters 47‑32 and 32‑18.
- Axvig v. Czajkowski, 2025 ND 135, quoting Bendish v. Castillo, 2012 ND 30: Clarifies the two paths to cancel a contract for deed—statutory cancellation or court action—and the nonjudicial, expeditious nature of the statutory route. This fortifies the conclusion that, upon strict compliance, cancellation occurs by operation of law without judicial adjudication.
- Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1978), and Minnesota authorities Rudnitski v. Seely, 452 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1990), Schrunk v. Andres, 22 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1946): Used to analogize the effect of statutory cancellation—that the vendee’s interest terminates and possession must be yielded, making eviction proper if possession continues.

Legal Reasoning

1) Service of process and personal jurisdiction

Section 47‑32‑02 permits service of the eviction summons and complaint by posting “to a conspicuous place on the property” if the defendant cannot be found, coupled with mailing to the last known address when known. Here, the process server’s sworn return documented two unsuccessful in‑person attempts (February 21 and 23, 2025), followed by posting on February 23, and Cache documented mailing on February 26. Those filings constituted a prima facie showing of valid service. Under Oden and Monster Heavy Haulers, that showing is “presumptively correct” and can be overcome only by “strong and convincing evidence.”

Braddock’s assertion that he did not physically receive the packet until after a March 5 hearing did not disprove that posting and mailing actually occurred as the return stated, nor did it show noncompliance with the statutory service window (“not fewer than three nor more than fifteen days from the date on which the summons is issued,” § 47‑32‑02). The district court found as a fact that service occurred on February 23 by posting, and the Supreme Court, applying the clearly erroneous standard, deferred to that finding. Result: personal jurisdiction was properly acquired.

2) Evidentiary exclusions and the narrow scope of eviction

Evictions in North Dakota are summary proceedings limited to present possession. Section 47‑32‑04 is categorical: eviction actions are not joinable with other actions; counterclaims or defenses cannot be interposed, except as setoff to a demand for damages or for rents and profits. Because Cache sought only possession—not rents, profits, or damages—the only issue was who had the immediate right to possession on the hearing date.

Braddock sought to admit more than 1,100 pages of “contact” and related materials to show ongoing efforts and equitable defenses under § 32‑18‑06. The district court excluded these exhibits because: (i) Braddock did not lay foundation connecting the materials to the possession issue (Markgraf), and (ii) even if authenticated, they were not relevant to the narrow question of possession and the nonjoinability rule barred consideration (Langness and § 47‑32‑04). The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

3) Summary eviction following statutory cancellation

Section 47‑32‑01 authorizes eviction when a party “continues in possession” after cancellation and termination of a contract for deed. The Court reiterated there are two paths to cancellation: (1) nonjudicial statutory cancellation under Chapter 32‑18, and (2) judicial cancellation (Axvig; Bendish). Statutory cancellation is designed to be expeditious, with minimal judicial intervention. Compliance operates to cancel the contract by law at the end of the cure period if the vendee has not cured.

Under § 32‑18‑02, a vendor serves a notice of default and cancellation; under § 32‑18‑04, the vendee receives either six months or one year to cure, depending on contract value metrics; if not cured, the vendor may record and serve a notice of cancellation, which terminates the vendee’s interest (§ 32‑18‑05). Importantly, § 32‑18‑06 provides the vendee’s mechanism to present defenses or counterclaims—by filing an affidavit during the cancellation period, allowing a court to enjoin nonjudicial cancellation and shift the dispute into a judicial forum.

Here, Cache showed compliance with Chapter 32‑18; Braddock neither cured within the six‑month period nor filed a § 32‑18‑06 affidavit. The Court accepted the district court’s conclusion that the contract for deed was canceled by operation of law at the end of the cure period and recording. Once canceled, Braddock’s interest terminated; his continued occupancy was wrongful; eviction was therefore proper under § 47‑32‑01. Crucially, the Court emphasized that the district court did not adjudicate “ownership” or “title” in the eviction; it decided possession based on the undisputed fact of cancellation, leaving title questions (if any) to other proceedings.

Impact and Practical Implications

For vendors (sellers) using contracts for deed

This decision endorses a clean procedural sequence: strictly follow Chapter 32‑18’s notice and cure requirements; record cancellation; then, if possession is withheld, file eviction under Chapter 47‑32.
Maintain meticulous documentation: proof of service/publication for the cancellation notice, calculation of the correct cure period, proof of recording the cancellation, and detailed process‑server affidavits for eviction service (including dates, times, and attempts before posting).
Consider the strategic choice to seek possession only. By declining damages, rents, or profits in eviction, you prevent vendees from asserting counterclaims or defenses under § 47‑32‑04, keeping the proceeding concise and focused.

For vendees (buyers) facing cancellation

Time is determinative. If you have defenses (e.g., waiver, estoppel, misapplication of payments, usury, unconscionability), you must raise them during the cancellation process by filing the affidavit under § 32‑18‑06 to seek judicial intervention. Waiting to raise them during eviction is too late if the vendor is only seeking possession.
Track and respond to notices diligently. The statutory cure period is rigid, and “substantial compliance” arguments are unlikely to prevail absent formal action under § 32‑18‑06.
Update your mailing address and monitor the premises. Posting plus mailing is presumptively valid service in eviction; nonreceipt will not defeat a process server’s return without strong contrary evidence.

On service of process

The Court reinforces the weight accorded to process server returns in summary evictions. Defendants must marshal “strong and convincing evidence” to rebut a sworn return (e.g., documentary proof the materials posted omitted the summons/complaint, evidence undermining timeline or issuance date, or statutory noncompliance).
Although not elaborated in this opinion, counsel should ensure compliance with § 47‑32‑02’s timing requirement: service must occur not fewer than 3 nor more than 15 days from issuance of the summons. Document the issuance date and method of service precisely.

On the scope of eviction and nonjoinability

Braddock confirms the strict nonjoinability rule in § 47‑32‑04. Unless a plaintiff seeks damages/rents/profits, defendants cannot interpose counterclaims or equitable defenses in eviction. The sole question is immediate possession.
The decision thus channels substantive disputes over cancellation into the § 32‑18‑06 mechanism or separate actions, preserving the summary nature of eviction.

Open questions and cautions

The opinion does not define how many personal‑service attempts are necessary before posting. Practitioners should continue to demonstrate diligent, good‑faith attempts consistent with local practice.
The Court did not analyze in depth the “issuance” date relative to the service window; ensure your record clearly ties issuance to service within § 47‑32‑02’s 3–15 day range.
While the Court again recognizes Minnesota guidance on the effects of cancellation, future cases could probe edge scenarios (e.g., partial cures, vendor conduct arguably waiving default) through § 32‑18‑06 affidavits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Contract for deed: A seller finances the purchase; title remains with the seller until the buyer completes payments. Default often triggers cancellation procedures rather than foreclosure.
Statutory cancellation (Chapter 32‑18): A nonjudicial process where the seller serves a cancellation notice identifying default. The buyer has a statutory cure period (six months or one year). If uncured, the seller can record cancellation, and the buyer’s interest terminates by operation of law.
§ 32‑18‑06 affidavit: The buyer’s tool to bring equitable or legal defenses into court during the cancellation process. Filing can lead to an injunction against nonjudicial cancellation and force judicial resolution.
Eviction (Chapter 47‑32): A summary action to recover possession. It is not designed to resolve title disputes or complex contract questions. Only possession is at issue, unless the plaintiff also seeks damages/rents/profits.
Nonjoinability (§ 47‑32‑04): Eviction cases cannot be combined with other claims, and defenses/counterclaims are generally barred—except a setoff against any demand for damages or rents/profits.
Posted service (§ 47‑32‑02): If the defendant cannot be found, the summons and complaint can be posted conspicuously on the property and mailed to the last known address; this is a valid substitute form of service in eviction.
Prima facie showing: The plaintiff’s initial evidence is sufficient unless rebutted. A process server’s return is prima facie proof of valid service.
Strong and convincing evidence: A demanding standard of proof; mere denial or speculation will not overcome a process server’s sworn return.
Clearly erroneous standard: Appellate courts defer to trial courts on facts and will reverse only if there is no supporting evidence or the court is firmly convinced a mistake occurred.
Abuse of discretion: A high bar for overturning evidentiary rulings; requires showing the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on a misinterpretation of the law.

Conclusion

Cache Private Capital Diversified Fund v. Braddock reaffirms the architecture of North Dakota’s contract‑for‑deed and eviction regimes. First, it underscores that statutory cancellation, when properly executed, terminates a vendee’s interest by operation of law; eviction thereafter addresses only the immediate right to possession and does not adjudicate title. Second, it emphasizes that defenses to cancellation must be raised promptly via § 32‑18‑06—not later in eviction, where § 47‑32‑04’s nonjoinability rule sharply circumscribes what can be litigated. Third, it confirms that posted service documented by a process server’s sworn return, with mailing to the last known address, is prima facie valid under § 47‑32‑02, shifting a heavy burden to the defendant to rebut.

Practically, the opinion provides a roadmap for vendors: scrupulous compliance with Chapter 32‑18 followed by focused eviction for possession. For vendees, it is a cautionary tale about timing and procedure: equitable or statutory defenses must be raised during the cancellation period through the statutory affidavit mechanism, or they are effectively forfeited in the subsequent summary eviction. The decision thus strengthens procedural clarity in an area where speed and certainty over possessory rights are paramount.