Establishing Internet-Use Controls in Supervised Release: Prior Authorization & Monitoring-Software Conditions Upheld in United States v. Kornacki

Introduction

United States v. Kornacki, decided May 8, 2025 by the Tenth Circuit, addresses the proper scope of special conditions imposed on sex‐offender supervised releasees who repeatedly violate registry and treatment requirements. The defendant, Nathaniel Kornacki, sought to overturn two special conditions requiring (1) prior authorization for any “internet‐capable device” use and (2) installation of monitoring software on approved devices. He argued those restrictions were neither sufficiently tied to his offenses nor supported by an individualized assessment, and that they imposed greater liberty deprivations than necessary. The panel, applying 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and Tenth Circuit precedent, unanimously affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The district court had imposed two computer‐related special conditions on Kornacki’s supervised release following a series of revocations and new convictions for failure to register under SORNA (the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act) and escape from a federal Residential Reentry Center (RRC). Those conditions required:

Prior authorization by probation for use of any internet‐capable device;
Allowing installation of monitoring software on approved devices, which could record keystrokes, applications used, browsing history, emails, and chats.

On appeal, Kornacki challenged these conditions, but the Tenth Circuit held that (a) the district court made the necessary individualized assessment, (b) the conditions were reasonably related to the nature of his underlying sexual‐battery and registry‐violation offenses and his history of non-compliance, (c) they involved no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary to protect the public, deter future offenses, and promote rehabilitation, and (d) they conformed to controlling policy statements. The panel thus affirmed the sentences and special conditions in both consolidated appeals (Nos. 24-1071 & 24-1073).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) – Governs permissible scope of special supervised‐release conditions:

§ 3583(d)(1): Must be reasonably related to offense characteristics, defendant’s history, public protection, deterrence, or correctional needs.
§ 3583(d)(2): Must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve those purposes.
§ 3583(d)(3): Must conform to Sentencing Commission policy statements.

United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019) – Held that computer/internet restrictions must allow sufficient lawful access while preventing improper behavior, and provided a template for “prior-authorization” and “monitoring‐software” language that respects First Amendment interests.
United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) – Recognized that a court may look beyond the narrow statutory crime to underlying conduct (e.g., sexual offenses) in shaping release conditions.
United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015) – Emphasized need for individualized assessment and sufficient explanation for special conditions, especially where constitutional rights (e.g., pornography possession) are implicated.
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011) – Framed abuse-of-discretion review for supervised‐release conditions and underscored district courts’ broad discretion.
United States v. Englehart, 22 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2022) – Clarified that special conditions need not be related to every § 3553(a) factor, only at least one.
United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719 (10th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Francis, 891 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2018) – Confirmed that a “generalized” explanation suffices so long as this Court can conduct meaningful review; district courts need not justify each specific condition in hyper‐technical detail.
United States v. Stan, No. 23-1174 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) – Recently affirmed that multiple, overlapping conditions are permissible if each serves legitimate § 3583(d) goals and is supported by the defendant’s violation history.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Tenth Circuit’s analysis followed the three § 3583(d) requirements in sequence:

Relationship to § 3553(a) Factors (§ 3583(d)(1))
The court found the restrictions tied to the “nature and circumstances” of Kornacki’s underlying sexual‐battery crime and his repeated SORNA failures, his documented escapes from the RRC, and his persistent refusal to comply with standard and special conditions over multiple terms of supervision. The conditions also furthers the goals of deterrence, public protection (especially vulnerable minors), and the defendant’s rehabilitation by reinforcing accountability and structured oversight.
Reasonably Necessary Liberty Deprivation (§ 3583(d)(2))
Relying on Blair, the panel held that prior-authorization plus targeted monitoring software strikes the appropriate balance: it does not impose blanket internet exclusion or unduly chill lawful speech, yet gives probation officers tools to detect and deter risky online behavior. Because Kornacki’s repeated recalcitrance demonstrated that less restrictive options had failed, the district court reasonably concluded these computer‐use controls were no more intrusive than necessary.
Commission Policy Consistency (§ 3583(d)(3))
The court noted no pertinent policy statement forbids computer/internet restrictions for high-risk sex offenders, so the conditions comport with Sentencing Commission guidance.

The panel further held the district court made the requisite individualized assessment—it reviewed Kornacki’s unique history of violations, considered the probation officer’s training and testimony about supervision challenges, admitted and rejected certain recommended special conditions, and tailored the prior-authorization and monitoring-software provisions to reflect Blair’s model language. Because Kornacki’s objections focused on reweighing the same facts, the Court found no abuse of discretion.

3. Impact

United States v. Kornacki cements the Tenth Circuit’s approach to technology-related supervised‐release conditions. Key takeaways likely to guide future cases:

District courts may impose prior-authorization and monitoring-software conditions when a sex‐offender’s history demonstrates risk of reoffense via internet channels.
Such conditions need not foreclose all lawful internet use so long as the restriction is targeted, time-limited, and grounded in a record of non-compliance.
Explicit findings tying the conditions to § 3583(d)’s three prongs, combined with factual recitation of the defendant’s violation history, satisfy the “individualized assessment” requirement without overburdening district judges.
This decision bolsters probation officers’ supervisory toolkit against high-risk offenders in an era of ubiquitous online access to potential victims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

SORNA (Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act): Federal law requiring convicted sex offenders to register and regularly update their whereabouts; failure to do so is a standalone crime.
Supervised Release vs. Probation: Both are community-based post-conviction supervision. Supervised release follows prison terms; probation substitutes for incarceration. Violations can trigger revocation and reimprisonment.
Special Conditions: Additional requirements a judge can impose beyond standard rules (e.g., no new criminal conduct, regular check-ins). Must meet § 3583(d)’s three tests (relatedness, proportionality, policy consistency).
Residential Reentry Center (RRC): A halfway-house facility where some federal inmates or supervised-releasees reside temporarily under electronic monitoring and program rules.
Prior Authorization Condition: A rule requiring probation officer approval before the defendant can obtain or use any internet-capable device.
Monitoring-Software Condition: A mandate allowing probation to install software on approved devices that records and reports online activity to detect prohibited behavior.

Conclusion

United States v. Kornacki reinforces that, when confronting high‐risk sex offenders with repeated registry violations and escapes, district courts possess broad discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) to impose targeted, tech-savvy special conditions. By aligning with Blair’s model language, making adequate factual findings about the defendant’s non-compliance history, and ensuring only the minimal liberty restrictions necessary to deter future offenses and protect the public, the Tenth Circuit confirmed the soundness of prior authorization and monitoring-software requirements. This ruling provides a clear template for future supervised-release cases involving internet access concerns, balancing public safety with defendants’ rights to lawful online activities.