Escobar-Garcia v. Bondi: Clarifying the “Unwilling-or-Unable” Standard in Domestic Violence Asylum Claims

Introduction

Escobar-Garcia v. Bondi, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 1, 2025, addresses the scope of relief for domestic-violence asylum seekers under the “unwilling-or-unable” standard. Maria Maribel Escobar-Garcia, a Honduran national, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). At issue were (1) whether she suffered or feared persecution by private actors under circumstances in which Honduras was unwilling or unable to protect her and (2) whether she established a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence.

The principal parties are:

Petitioner: Maria Maribel Escobar-Garcia, represented by Joshua Bardavid, Esq.
Respondent: Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, represented by Department of Justice attorneys Brian Boynton, Leslie McKay, and Jessica E. Burns.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit denied Escobar-Garcia’s petition for review. It held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that:

Her former partner’s domestic abuse—though past persecution—was perpetrated by a private actor, and she failed to show that Honduran authorities were unable or unwilling to protect her beyond the 2011 court-ordered protective measures.
She did not present individualized evidence that, had she sought further relief, Honduras would have failed to intervene or that future intervention would lapse.
Her CAT claim likewise faltered because she could not show it was “more likely than not” she would be tortured with government consent or acquiescence, given the prior protective response and country-conditions evidence demonstrating legal penalties and protective mechanisms against domestic violence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005): Framework for reviewing IJ decisions as modified by the BIA.
Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009): De novo review of legal questions and application of law to fact.
Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020): Definition of persecution and the “unwilling-or-unable” standard for private-actor violence.
Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021): Clarified that persecution requires condonation or helplessness on the part of authorities when private actors are responsible.
Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021): Articulated the acquiescence element for CAT, emphasizing that failure to seek police help alone does not preclude a finding of acquiescence.
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014): Recognized domestic violence victims as a particular social group but did not apply to cases where authorities actively intervene.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in two principal strands: Asylum and Withholding of Removal: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), a petitioner must show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution “by reason of” a protected ground. When private actors perpetrate violence, the applicant must demonstrate that the government is “unable or unwilling” to control those actors. Drawing on Scarlett and Singh, the court underscored that:

Actual protective measures by courts or police—such as prohibiting the abuser from approaching the home and holding him in contempt—constitute evidence of willingness to protect.
A petitioner’s decision not to seek additional relief weakens but does not automatically foreclose a claim; however, absent evidence that authorities would fail future requests, the “unwilling-or-unable” threshold remains unmet.

CAT Relief: Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1), petitioners must show it is more likely than not they will be tortured by or with the consent/acquiescence of public officials. Relying on Quintanilla-Mejia, the court found that prior protective action, legal penalties for domestic violence, and the absence of evidence showing state acquiescence defeated the CAT claim.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision reiterates and refines the evidentiary burden for domestic-violence asylum seekers:

It highlights that successful past interventions by authorities undermine conclusions of future state unwillingness or inability.
Presents a caution: petitioners must introduce individualized country-conditions or direct evidence that subsequent abuse would go unchecked—even if they did not seek further help.
Clarifies the interplay between domestic-violence jurisprudence (Matter of A-R-C-G-) and the unwilling/unable standard—active state protection may render A-R-C-G- inapplicable.
Reaffirms that CAT relief requires not only a likelihood of torture but also evidence of state consent or acquiescence—government action to punish abusers cuts against such a finding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Unwilling-or-Unable” Standard: When persecution is inflicted by non-state actors (e.g., an abusive spouse), applicants must prove the government either explicitly condoned the abuse or is helpless to stop it.
De Novo vs. Substantial Evidence Review: Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo (fresh analysis); factual findings (e.g., credibility, weight of evidence) withstand review unless no reasonable adjudicator could agree (substantial evidence standard).
Acquiescence for CAT Relief: State acquiescence means authorities tacitly permit torture by refusing or failing to act against perpetrators—in contrast, active legal intervention counts against an acquiescence finding.

Conclusion

Escobar-Garcia v. Bondi reinforces the rigorous standards for asylum and CAT relief in domestic-violence contexts. By affirming that protective state action—absent contrary evidence—precludes findings of unwillingness or inability, the Second Circuit underscores petitioners’ burdens to present individualized evidence of future non-protection. The decision thus serves as a pivotal guidepost for practitioners and adjudicators handling claims where private actors inflict harm and where state capacity or will to intervene is contested.