Errato v. Seder (2d Cir. 2025): No Federal Do‑Over of Divorce Judgments; Independent Fraud Claims May Evade the Domestic Relations Exception but Are Precluded After Prior Litigation

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Date: October 9, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (Summary Order; nonprecedential under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1)

Introduction

This summary order arises from a recurring post-divorce litigation pattern: a federal suit alleging that an ex-spouse used fraudulent affidavits in state domestic proceedings, with the plaintiff seeking federal relief from resulting alimony and other aspects of the state judgment. In Errato v. Seder, pro se plaintiff Robert M. Errato sued his former wife, Lauren T. Seder (also pro se), contending that supposedly fraudulent submissions in their Connecticut divorce case led to an unjust alimony award. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Second Circuit affirmed.

The appeal teed up familiar but consequential threshold doctrines: the Rooker-Feldman bar on federal district court review of state judgments; the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction (and the distinct, broader abstention idea sometimes invoked in domestic disputes); and preclusion doctrines (issue preclusion/collateral estoppel and claim preclusion/res judicata). The Second Circuit held that:

Rooker-Feldman barred any attempt to have a federal court overturn or revise the state divorce judgment or alimony orders;
The narrow domestic relations exception would similarly bar federal jurisdiction over requests to modify the divorce/alimony decrees, though not necessarily over standalone damages claims for fraud; but
Any fraud claims that might squeeze past those jurisdictional barriers are nevertheless foreclosed by preclusion because the same issues were already decided in prior federal litigation involving these parties, including a Second Circuit affirmance noting that Connecticut’s litigation privilege would bar such fraud claims.

Although the decision issues as a nonprecedential summary order, it provides a clear, integrated roadmap for future district court handling of similar post-divorce federal suits in this Circuit.

Summary of the Order

The district court dismissed Mr. Errato’s complaint based on arguments raised by Ms. Seder: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the domestic relations exception, and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). On de novo review (applicable to dismissals under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)), the Second Circuit affirmed.

Rooker-Feldman: Because Errato’s lawsuit followed the end of state proceedings and all appeals, and because his injury flowed from the state judgment and he invited the federal court to review and reject it, Rooker-Feldman barred federal court intervention in the divorce judgment and alimony orders.
Potential carve-out for independent fraud claims: The panel acknowledged that some allegations—fraudulent affidavits submitted before the state judgment—might be construed as injuries not “produced by” the state judgment but merely “ratified” or “left unpunished,” thus potentially evading Rooker-Feldman and the narrow domestic relations exception.
Preclusion controls regardless: Even assuming jurisdiction over any such fraud claims, both issue preclusion and claim preclusion bar relitigation because a prior federal case involving these same parties already determined that Connecticut’s litigation privilege would defeat any state-law fraud claims arising from the divorce litigation, and any unraised claims from the same nucleus of facts are now barred.

The court granted Errato’s request for submission without oral argument, denied as unnecessary Seder’s motion to supplement the record, and took judicial notice of filings and decisions from prior related federal actions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) — The foundational cases establishing that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to act as appellate tribunals over state-court judgments.
Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023) — Provides the Second Circuit’s four-part test for Rooker-Feldman and clarifies a crucial temporal limit: the doctrine does not apply if a direct appeal of the state judgment is still pending. Here, appeals had concluded, so Rooker-Feldman applied.
Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) — Distinguishes between injuries “produced by” a state-court judgment (barred) and injuries merely “ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished” by that judgment (potentially not barred). The panel used this nuance to acknowledge that some pre-judgment fraud allegations might fall outside Rooker-Feldman’s reach.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) — Recognizes a narrow domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, confined to issuing or modifying divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.
American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) — Earlier Second Circuit articulation of a broader domestic relations abstention concept (in a federal-question interpleader context). The panel highlights that whether this abstention doctrine applies in diversity cases after Ankenbrandt remains unresolved in a precedential decision.
Mochary v. Bergstein, 42 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2022) — Emphasizes that the domestic relations exception is “rather narrowly confined,” and, notably, expressly reserves whether domestic relations abstention can apply in diversity cases post-Ankenbrandt. The panel again reserves that question here because preclusion resolves the case.
Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 6 F.4th 361 (2d Cir. 2021) — Supplies the operative standards for issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion (res judicata), which the panel applied to bar the surviving fraud allegations.
International Star Class Yacht Racing Association v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1998) — Confirms courts may take judicial notice of filings and decisions in other cases to demonstrate the fact of such litigation, not the truth of their contents. The panel used this to reference prior Errato-related decisions.
Errato v. Seder, No. 23-638, 2024 WL 726880 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2024) (summary order) — In the parties’ prior federal appeal, the Court observed that any state-law fraud claim against Seder would be barred by Connecticut’s litigation privilege. That holding undergirds the issue-preclusion ruling in this case.
Zappin v. Comfort, No. 23-7363, 2024 WL 5001624 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (summary order), and Keane v. Keane, 549 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) — Illustrate instances where the Second Circuit has abstained from exercising diversity jurisdiction in domestic relations tangles even when the formal exception did not apply. The panel notes these are nonprecedential and that a precedential resolution on abstention-in-diversity remains pending.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

Standard of Review: The court reviewed de novo the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) (subject-matter jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), accepting well-pleaded factual allegations and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
Rooker-Feldman Bars the Attack on the Divorce Judgment and Alimony Orders:
- All four Hunter elements were met: (1) Errato lost in state court; (2) he complained of injuries caused by the state divorce judgment; (3) he asked the federal court to review and reject that judgment; and (4) the state judgment predated the federal action, with no direct state appeal pending.
- Result: Any request to vacate, modify, or otherwise undermine the state divorce/alimony orders is outside federal district court power.
Narrow Domestic Relations Exception Does Not Necessarily Reach Independent Damages Claims:
- Under Ankenbrandt and Mochary, the exception is limited to suits seeking a divorce, annulment, custody, or support decree, or their modification. Claims seeking tort damages for alleged pre-judgment fraud do not necessarily fall within the exception.
- The panel carefully distinguishes the narrow exception from a broader domestic relations abstention approach referenced in older cases like American Airlines v. Block. It notes that, in a precedential diversity case post-Ankenbrandt, the Second Circuit has not decided whether to apply such abstention. The panel does not reach that unresolved issue because preclusion independently disposes of the case.
Preclusion Doctrines Foreclose Any Remaining Fraud Claims:
- Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel): In prior federal litigation between these parties, the district court—and the Second Circuit on appeal—concluded that Connecticut’s litigation privilege would bar any state-law fraud claim arising from litigation submissions (such as affidavits) in the divorce case. Because that issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in a final judgment, Errato cannot relitigate it.
- Claim preclusion (res judicata): To the extent Errato tries to plead new claims not previously asserted, they arise from the same transaction or “common nucleus of operative facts” (the divorce litigation and alleged fraudulent filings) and are therefore also barred because they could have been raised in the earlier case.

Impact: Practical and Doctrinal Significance

While nonprecedential, this order provides a clear template for handling a common litigation pattern in the Second Circuit: federal collateral attacks on state domestic judgments dressed as tort claims.

Reinforced boundaries of federal jurisdiction over divorce outcomes: Litigants cannot use federal court to undo or revise state divorce or alimony determinations once state appeals have concluded. The Rooker-Feldman test—especially its emphasis on injuries “produced by” the state judgment—is determinative.
Clarification of the domestic relations exception’s narrowness: Damages actions alleging pre-judgment fraud do not automatically fall within the exception. But plaintiffs should not mistake this narrow opening for a viable federal path: other doctrines, especially preclusion and litigation privilege, often foreclose relief.
Preclusion as the ultimate backstop: Even where Rooker-Feldman or the domestic relations exception do not apply, issue and claim preclusion can efficiently terminate repetitive litigation arising from the same divorce-related facts. The court’s reliance on its earlier decision concerning Connecticut’s litigation privilege underscores the importance of understanding how state immunities and privileges decided in one case can preclude follow-on litigation.
Unresolved but noted: domestic relations abstention in diversity cases: The panel flags, without resolving, whether this Circuit’s broader domestic relations abstention doctrine applies in diversity cases post-Ankenbrandt. Future precedential decisions may clarify that question, but for now, district courts have ample tools (Rooker-Feldman, the narrow exception, and preclusion) to dispose of collateral domestic disputes.
Pro se litigants in family-law disputes: The order illustrates how repetitive federal filings attacking state divorce outcomes tend to encounter multiple, overlapping barriers. The proper forum for challenging alleged fraud in a divorce case is ordinarily the state court system via its established mechanisms (subject to state-law privileges and preclusion), not federal court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Order (Nonprecedential): The court’s decision can be cited (FRAP 32.1), but it does not bind future panels the way a published precedential opinion does. It remains instructive and persuasive.
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A federal district court cannot act as a higher court reviewing state-court judgments. If your claimed injury is the state judgment itself, and you want the federal court to undo it—especially after state appeals are over—Rooker-Feldman blocks the suit.
“Produced by” vs. “Ratified/Left Unpunished”: If the harm you allege exists only because of the state judgment, Rooker-Feldman applies. If you suffered harm from someone’s independent misconduct that the state court merely failed to remedy, some claims may avoid the doctrine.
Domestic Relations Exception: In diversity cases, federal courts generally do not issue or modify divorce, alimony, or custody decrees. This exception is narrow and does not automatically swallow independent tort claims for damages.
Domestic Relations Abstention: A broader, judge-made practice of declining to exercise jurisdiction in domestic disputes even when technically permissible. The Second Circuit has not issued a precedential post-Ankenbrandt decision holding that abstention applies in diversity cases; the question remains open.
Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel): Once a court has finally decided an issue essential to its judgment, the same parties generally cannot litigate that issue again in a new case.
Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata): After a final judgment, the parties cannot bring later suits based on the same transactional nucleus of facts, including claims that could have been raised previously.
Connecticut’s Litigation Privilege (as applied in the prior case): Under Connecticut law, statements made in the course of judicial proceedings by participants are broadly protected, which can bar tort claims—here, the prior Second Circuit decision indicated this privilege would defeat state-law fraud claims premised on litigation submissions.
Judicial Notice of Other Court Filings: A court can acknowledge the existence and content of filings and decisions from other cases to show that they occurred, not to accept the truth of the underlying factual assertions.

Conclusion

Errato v. Seder reaffirms, in a tight and practical synthesis, that federal courts are not venues to relitigate or overturn state divorce outcomes. The Second Circuit’s order proceeds in three steps:

Rooker-Feldman blocks direct federal challenges to completed state divorce judgments and alimony orders.
The domestic relations exception is narrow and does not necessarily swallow separate fraud damages claims—though the court flags, without deciding, the broader abstention concept in diversity cases.
Preclusion (both issue and claim) ultimately forecloses any remaining claims where prior litigation has already resolved the controlling legal issues (here, Connecticut’s litigation privilege) or where claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts.

Although nonprecedential, the order offers a clear template for district courts confronting post-divorce federal suits: apply Rooker-Feldman to block appellate-style attacks on state judgments; recognize the limited scope of the domestic relations exception; and, when plaintiffs pivot to independent tort theories, evaluate whether preclusion—and applicable state privileges already adjudicated—resolve the case.

Key Takeaways

Federal district courts cannot provide “appellate” review of state divorce judgments; Rooker-Feldman forecloses that path once state appeals end.
The domestic relations exception is narrow; independent damages claims may proceed in principle—but other doctrines (especially preclusion and litigation privilege) often make them nonstarters.
When a prior case between the same parties has already determined, for example, that a state litigation privilege defeats fraud claims based on litigation statements, issue preclusion will prevent relitigation of that point.
The Second Circuit again notes—but does not resolve—whether a broader domestic relations abstention doctrine applies in diversity cases after Ankenbrandt.

Panel note: Decided by two judges due to the unavailability of the third originally assigned judge, consistent with Second Circuit Internal Operating Procedure E(b). The court granted decision on the briefs without oral argument and denied as unnecessary a motion to supplement the record.