1. Introduction

United States v. Jason Florence sits at the intersection of modern Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine and the enduring, controversial “prior conviction” carveout. Jason Florence was convicted by a jury of possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). The key sentencing consequence was the district court’s application of the statute’s ten-year mandatory minimum based on Florence’s earlier federal child-pornography convictions (2015), which the parties stipulated to before trial.

On appeal, Florence framed his principal constitutional argument around the Supreme Court’s jury-factfinding requirements in Alleyne v.  United States and the Court’s more recent decision in Erlinger v. United States. He claimed the prior conviction had to be charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before it could trigger § 2252A(b)(2)’s mandatory minimum.

Florence also raised (i) an evidentiary issue concerning his probation officer’s testimony about whether the officer believed Florence’s explanation for how he obtained the phone, and (ii) a sentencing challenge to the life term of supervised release (procedural and substantive).

2. Summary of the Opinion

A. Mandatory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2)

The court rejected Florence’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenge. It held that the “narrow” exception of Almendarez-Torres v. United States remains binding: a judge may find the fact of a prior conviction, and the government need not charge that fact in the indictment. The panel explained that Erlinger v. United States reaffirmed the narrowness of Almendarez-Torres but did not disturb it; Erlinger simply required jury factfinding for ACCA’s “separate occasions” inquiry because that determination goes beyond identifying the conviction and its elements.

B. Probation officer credibility testimony

Assuming arguendo that admitting the probation officer’s “I didn’t believe him” testimony was error, the court deemed any error harmless under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), emphasizing the “overwhelming evidence” of Florence’s knowing possession.

C. Life term of supervised release

The panel affirmed the life term as procedurally reasonable (reviewing for plain error due to lack of preservation) and substantively reasonable (reviewing for abuse of discretion). It stressed that the Guidelines recommend a life term for sex offenses, the statutory range under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) is five years to life, and the district court repeatedly cited Florence’s recidivism—especially offending while already on supervised release.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(i) The constitutional baseline: indictment and jury findings for “elements”

• In re Winship, Hamling v. United States, and Patterson v. New York were invoked for the classic proposition that essential elements must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Apprendi v. New Jersey supplied the modern rule that any fact increasing the statutory maximum is an “element” for Sixth Amendment purposes.
• Alleyne v.  United States extended that principle to facts increasing mandatory minimums.

(ii) The carveout: the “fact of a prior conviction”

• Almendarez-Torres v. United States is the linchpin. The panel treated it as controlling authority establishing that the fact of a prior conviction need not be alleged in the indictment nor proven to a jury.
• The court underscored that the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the carveout while describing it as narrow: Jones v. United States, Apprendi v. New Jersey, and Alleyne v.  United States.

(iii) What Erlinger v. United States changed—and what it did not

• The panel read Erlinger v. United States as drawing a constitutional line between (a) identifying the conviction and its elements (within Almendarez-Torres) and (b) finding additional historical facts about the prior crimes (outside it), such as ACCA’s “occasions different from one another.”
• The opinion relied on Mathis v. United States (quoted in Erlinger) for the limiting principle that a judge may do “no more” than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

(iv) Post-Erlinger lower-court signals

The panel bolstered its reading by pointing to decisions treating Almendarez-Torres as still binding after Erlinger: Lairy v. United States, United States v. Lopez-Villegas, and United States v. Martin. These citations function less as doctrinal drivers than as reassurance that Florence’s argument is part of a broader (unsuccessful) trend.

(v) Sixth Circuit applications of the carveout (indictments and recidivism)

• United States v. Smith and United States v. Walker were used to reject the claim that the indictment was defective for omitting the prior conviction. The panel also noted the indictment here actually cited § 2252A(b)(2) and identified the ten-year minimum.

(vi) Predicate-offense determinations in other settings

The court acknowledged that in many cases the “prior conviction” inquiry is not a mere formality, especially with state predicates, where courts must identify statutory elements and compare them to federal definitions (a terrain often associated with categorical-approach disputes). It cited: United States v. Davis, United States v. Mateen, and United States v. Williams. The panel distinguished Florence’s situation because his predicates were federal Chapter 110 offenses—making the qualifying inquiry effectively a straightforward code match.

(vii) Harmless error in evidentiary rulings

• The harmless-error framework drew from United States v. Agrawal and United States v. Kettles, with reinforcement from United States v. Hinojosa.
• For the “brief and not outcome-changing” nature of the testimony, the panel analogized to United  States v. Blankenship.
• It emphasized “overwhelming evidence” concepts with United  States v. White, and included cross-circuit support: United States v. Tom and United States v. Bailes.

(viii) Sentencing procedure and explanation

• Plain-error review was grounded in United States v. Hoyle and United States v. Mooney.
• The general procedural framework came from Gall v. United  States and the explanation requirement from Rita v. United States.
• The panel invoked United States v. Madden and United States v. Brooks to explain the limits of a judge’s obligation to respond to mitigation arguments.
• It acknowledged Sixth Circuit cautions about perfunctory factor recitations with United States v. Ferguson, but resolved the case under the en banc deference of United States v. Vonner.
• For supervised release explanations specifically in sex-offense cases, it cited United States v. Harmon and United States v. Babcock.

(ix) Substantive reasonableness of a life term

• Abuse-of-discretion and totality review relied on United States v. Whitson and United States v. Johnson.
• The rebuttable presumption for within-Guidelines sentences came from United States v. Sears.
• The acceptability of lifetime supervision for sex offenders was supported by United States v. Kennedy.
• The panel’s response to mental-health-related mitigation cited United States v. Burnette, and it cited United States v. Rogers as another affirmation of a life term.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Why the mandatory minimum could be triggered without a jury finding

The opinion’s constitutional reasoning proceeds in three steps:

1. General rule: Under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v.  United States, any fact that increases the statutory maximum or mandatory minimum is treated as an “element” that must be charged and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Exception: Almendarez-Torres v. United States creates a narrow carveout for the fact of a prior conviction, permitting judicial finding. The Sixth Circuit treated this as binding and repeatedly reaffirmed (even if criticized).
3. Application after Erlinger: The panel read Erlinger v. United States as narrowing what a judge can do with priors: the judge may identify the conviction and its elements, but may not find additional historical facts (like “separate occasions”) that increase punishment. Here, however, Florence stipulated to federal Chapter 110 convictions; determining they are “under chapter 110” for § 2252A(b)(2) was characterized as essentially a legal classification requiring no extra-jury factual determinations.

B. The indictment challenge

The court treated the indictment argument as foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States and Sixth Circuit implementations (United States v. Smith; United States v. Walker). The panel added that the indictment in fact referenced § 2252A(b)(2) and disclosed the ten-year minimum—further undermining any claim of unfair surprise or constitutional deficiency.

C. The probation officer’s “truthfulness” testimony

Without resolving whether the testimony improperly vouched or intruded on the jury’s credibility function, the panel resolved the claim on harmlessness. Its reasoning was pragmatic: the government’s evidence linking Florence to the device and the contraband (possession, passcode knowledge, admission of use, relevant email account, timing of access) made it implausible that a brief credibility remark “substantially swayed” the verdict.

D. Life supervised release: procedure and substance

On procedure, the court applied plain-error review (United States v. Hoyle) and held that—even if the explanation was “less than ideal”—it was adequate under Sixth Circuit deference for within-Guidelines sentences (United States v. Vonner), especially where the judge explicitly tied the life term to recidivism and reoffending while on supervision.

On substance, the panel emphasized three pillars: statutory authorization (18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)), Guidelines recommendation (U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2)), and individualized justification rooted in Florence’s repeated sexual-offense conduct and prior supervision failure.

3.3 Impact

1) Post-Erlinger litigation: where the line is likely to be drawn

The opinion supplies a clear, defense-limiting template for courts confronting arguments that Erlinger v. United States impliedly displaced Almendarez-Torres v. United States. The Sixth Circuit’s message is categorical: unless the Supreme Court overrules Almendarez-Torres, lower courts will continue to allow judges to find the fact of a prior conviction.

2) A practical carveout within the carveout: “matching numbers” for federal predicates

The court’s “match numbers” framing is particularly consequential for federal predicate schemes like § 2252A(b)(2) when the prior is itself federal and explicitly listed (e.g., “under this chapter”). It signals that defendants will have difficulty recasting a qualifying determination as a jury question when the statute requires no inquiry beyond identifying the prior conviction’s statutory location.

3) Indictment drafting and notice

Although the panel reiterated that priors need not be pleaded, it also highlighted that the indictment here cited the penalty provision and minimum term. Prosecutors may view this as a best practice for notice, even if not constitutionally required, particularly when mandatory minimums are in play.

4) Supervised release in sex-offense cases: recidivism as the dominant justification

The decision reinforces that, in the Sixth Circuit, a life term of supervised release will often be upheld where (i) it is within the Guidelines recommendation and statutory range, and (ii) the sentencing judge ties it to recidivism and public-protection rationales—especially reoffending while already on supervised release.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Apprendi/Alleyne rule (jury must find sentencing facts): If a fact raises the top or bottom of the statutory punishment range, it generally must be treated like an element and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Almendarez-Torres exception (prior convictions): Courts may treat the existence of a prior conviction differently—allowing a judge (not a jury) to find that it exists for sentencing enhancement purposes.
• What Erlinger adds: Even if a judge may find that a prior conviction exists, a judge may not find extra historical facts about the prior crimes that the statute makes punishment-enhancing (like whether they happened on different “occasions”).
• Harmless error: Even if a trial ruling was wrong, an appellate court will affirm if it is confident the mistake did not affect the verdict in a meaningful way.
• Plain error: If the defense did not object in the district court, it is harder to win on appeal; the defendant must show a clear, outcome-affecting error that harms the integrity of the proceedings.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: “Procedural” asks whether the judge followed the right steps and explained the sentence; “substantive” asks whether the sentence is too harsh or too lenient given the whole record.
• Within-Guidelines presumption: If a sentence falls within the advisory guideline range, appellate courts often presume it is reasonable unless the defendant can convincingly show otherwise.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jason Florence clarifies that Erlinger v. United States does not unsettle the continuing force of Almendarez-Torres v. United States in the Sixth Circuit. When § 2252A(b)(2) is triggered by a prior federal Chapter 110 conviction—particularly one stipulated to— the sentencing judge may apply the ten-year mandatory minimum without requiring indictment pleading or a jury finding on the prior.

The opinion also illustrates two recurrent appellate realities: (1) evidentiary issues often fail on harmless-error review where the government’s proof is strong, and (2) life terms of supervised release for sex offenses are difficult to overturn when they are within the Guidelines recommendation and justified by recidivism and supervision failure.