Introduction

People v. Emanuel is a Fourth Department decision affirming a jury verdict convicting Jamison L. Emanuel of attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and grand larceny in the third degree. The case arises from two related but distinct episodes: a pre-dawn shooting at the victim outside her home, and the defendant’s months-long failure to return the victim’s car after borrowing it in exchange for drugs.

The appeal presented several recurring criminal procedure and evidence issues: (1) whether the defendant’s statements made after an officer told him his charges—given before Miranda warnings—should be suppressed; (2) whether the victim’s statements to her daughter and a responding officer were properly admitted as excited utterances; (3) whether the trial court’s handling of jury communications complied with CPL 310.30 and People v. O’Rama; (4) whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the jury-note procedure; (5) whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (6) whether, in light of Erlinger v. United States, the defendant had to be resentenced as a first-time felony offender.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court held:

• Miranda/suppression: No error in refusing to suppress; the officer’s answer to the defendant’s question about his charges did not constitute interrogation and was required by CPL 140.15(2).
• Excited utterances: The victim’s statements to her daughter moments after the shooting were admissible as excited utterances; statements to an officer minutes later were admissible for the same reason; even if admitting the latter was error, it was harmless.
• Jury notes (CPL 310.30/O’Rama): Any claim that the court erred by addressing the foreperson directly was unpreserved; there was no mode-of-proceedings error because the court read the jury note verbatim and provided meaningful notice per Nealon.
• Ineffective assistance: Counsel’s failure to object to the jury-note handling did not render representation ineffective under the meaningful-representation standard.
• Weight of the evidence: The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence given eyewitness testimony, vehicle stop near the anticipated route, recovery of the gun along that route, location data placing the defendant near the scene, and an incriminating draft text.
• Sentencing/Erlinger: The defendant’s argument for resentencing as a first-time felony offender in light of Erlinger was unpreserved because he admitted his prior conviction and did not dispute the incarceration period. The court declined interest-of-justice review.

Detailed Analysis

1) Miranda, “Interrogation,” and CPL 140.15(2)

Core holding: An officer’s statement informing an in-custody defendant of the charges—made directly in response to the defendant’s question—does not constitute interrogation and thus does not require Miranda warnings. It is an informational response mandated by CPL 140.15(2).

The court relied on established Fourth Department authority holding that interrogation consists of words or actions “intended or likely to elicit an incriminating response.” See People v. Wearen, 19 AD3d 1133, 1134 (4th Dept 2005), lv denied 5 NY3d 834 (2005); People v. Cirino, 203 AD3d 1661, 1663 (4th Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1132 (2022). The officer’s single, factual answer (“two counts of criminal possession of a weapon”) did not cross that line. Moreover, CPL 140.15(2) imposes a duty to inform an arrested person of the reason for the arrest. The court thus harmonized Miranda doctrine with statutory arrest procedures: providing required notice of charges is not an interrogation tactic.

Practice impact: Officers can safely and succinctly answer charge-identification questions pre-Miranda without risking suppression, provided they do not expand into accusatory questioning. Defense counsel should differentiate between permissible notice-of-charges responses and questioning designed to elicit incriminating admissions.

2) Excited Utterances and Harmless Error

Core holding: The victim’s statements to her daughter immediately after the shooting were admissible as excited utterances. The victim’s statements minutes later to an investigating officer were also admissible; in any event, any error in admitting the latter was harmless because identical statements to the daughter were properly admitted and the victim testified and was cross-examined.

The court applied the New York Court of Appeals’ excited utterance standard: admissibility turns on “the nature of the startling event, the amount of time between the event and the statement, and the activities of the declarant in the interim.” People v. Hernandez, 28 NY3d 1056, 1057 (2016). The declarant must remain under the stress of excitement and lack the reflective capacity for fabrication. See also People v. Vernay, 174 AD3d 1485, 1486 (4th Dept 2019).

As to harmlessness, the court used the familiar New York formulation: even assuming error, it did not create a “significant probability” of a different result given overwhelming evidence and duplicative properly admitted statements. See Hernandez, 28 NY3d at 1058; People v. Tirado, 175 AD3d 970, 971 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 984 (2019), reconsideration denied 34 NY3d 1133 (2020); People v. Swift, 160 AD3d 1341, 1342 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1122 (2018).

Practice impact: Prosecutors should build a record on timing, demeanor, and intervening activities to sustain excited-utterance rulings. Defense counsel should emphasize any delay or intervening reflective conduct to challenge admissibility and preserve arguments for harmless error analysis.

3) Jury Notes, O’Rama, and Preservation

Core holding: The claim that the trial court erred by addressing the jury foreperson directly was unpreserved. No mode-of-proceedings error occurred because the trial court read the jury’s written note verbatim in the presence of counsel and the jury, thereby providing “meaningful notice” consistent with People v. Nealon, 26 NY3d 152, 160 (2015). When the court satisfies this “core responsibility,” counsel must object to preserve a claim. See also People v. Fleming, 153 AD3d 1648, 1649 (4th Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 1104 (2018); People v. Peller, 8 AD3d 1123, 1124 (4th Dept 2004), lv denied 3 NY3d 679 (2004).

Although People v. O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270 (1991), treats certain failures to provide counsel notice of jury notes as mode-of-proceedings errors that require no objection, Nealon clarified that when the court’s core duties are met—i.e., the contents of the note are shared meaningfully—objections to the court’s method of responding must be preserved.

Practice impact: Defense counsel must object contemporaneously to any perceived deficiency in a trial court’s response to a jury note when the court has provided meaningful notice of the note’s contents. Absent such objection, the claim will typically be unreviewable on appeal.

4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Core holding: The single failure to object to the jury-note handling did not deprive the defendant of meaningful representation. The court applied the state standard for effective assistance—“meaningful representation”—looking at “the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of this case as a whole and as of the time of the representation.” People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 (1981); People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 (2005). See also People v. Watkins, 42 NY3d 635, 640 (2024) (a single lapse, without more, generally does not rise to constitutional ineffectiveness), cert denied — US —, 145 S Ct 459 (2024).

Practice impact: Strategic or isolated omissions—especially where the underlying procedural claim is weak or unpreserved—rarely satisfy the demanding prejudice and performance standards necessary for reversal on ineffective assistance grounds in New York.

5) Weight of the Evidence

Core holding: The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The court conducted the standard review “in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury.” People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 (2007); People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 (1987). Evidence included the victim’s unequivocal identification of the defendant as the shooter, the defendant’s presence in a white Mercedes stopped along the anticipated route of flight, recovery of the gun along that route, cell-site data placing him near the scene, and an incriminating draft text message (“I just tried to gun [sic].”).

As to grand larceny, the victim testified she loaned the car in exchange for drugs under an informal arrangement requiring its return within one to two weeks; the defendant kept it for months despite repeated requests, sent threatening messages when she warned of police involvement, and allegedly retaliated by shooting. A jury could rationally infer larcenous intent by wrongful withholding with the intent to deprive. The court reiterated that where credibility is crucial, deference to the jury’s opportunity to observe witnesses is paramount. See People v. Barnes, 158 AD3d 1072, 1073 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1011 (2018).

Practice impact: The decision underscores how digital evidence (cell location), contemporaneous incriminating statements (draft text), and route-consistent firearm recovery can corroborate eyewitness identification to sustain serious violent convictions against weight-of-the-evidence challenges.

6) Sentencing: Erlinger and Preservation of Predicate Offender Challenges

Core holding: The defendant’s request for resentencing as a first-time felony offender, premised on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 US 821 (2024), was unpreserved because he admitted his prior conviction and did not dispute the incarceration period listed in the second violent felony offender statement. The Fourth Department followed recent authority holding that such Erlinger-based arguments must be preserved. See People v. Hernandez, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 00904, *3 (2025); People v. Lopez-Nunez, — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03451, *1 (4th Dept 2025); People v. Cox, 237 AD3d 1405, 1409 (3d Dept 2025). The court declined to exercise interest-of-justice review.

What Erlinger is about (in short): In federal sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the Supreme Court required a jury to find certain facts about prior convictions (e.g., whether they occurred on different occasions) when those facts increase punishment beyond the statutory maximum. New York courts are now confronting whether, and how, Erlinger affects state recidivist sentencing schemes. Emanuel confirms a threshold gatekeeping rule: whatever the merits, the argument must be preserved at sentencing.

Practice impact:

• Defense counsel must object at sentencing to the predicate felony statement and any incarceration-related facts that drive enhanced sentencing, or else the issue will be deemed unpreserved on appeal—even when relying on recent Supreme Court decisions.
• Prosecutors and sentencing courts should continue to obtain explicit admissions or host fact-finding where appropriate; clear admissions foreclose later Erlinger-based challenges.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• People v. Wearen, 19 AD3d 1133 (4th Dept 2005), lv denied 5 NY3d 834 (2005): Defined interrogation as conduct intended or likely to elicit an incriminating response. Guided the court’s conclusion that a brief “charges” response is not interrogation.
• People v. Cirino, 203 AD3d 1661 (4th Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1132 (2022): Reinforced the Wearen interrogation framework; cited for consistency.
• CPL 140.15(2): Requires informing an arrestee of the reason for the arrest. The statutory duty squarely justified the officer’s response.
• People v. Hernandez, 28 NY3d 1056 (2016): Articulated excited-utterance parameters (startling event, timing, and intervening activities) and harmless error analysis; central to the hearsay rulings.
• People v. Vernay, 174 AD3d 1485 (4th Dept 2019): Applied excited-utterance doctrine; lent support to admitting statements shortly after a violent event.
• People v. Tirado, 175 AD3d 970 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 984 (2019), reconsideration denied 34 NY3d 1133 (2020), and People v. Swift, 160 AD3d 1341 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1122 (2018): Harmless error cases used to frame the prejudice analysis.
• People v. O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270 (1991): Established strict duties under CPL 310.30 regarding jury notes; however, the scope of non-preserved “mode-of-proceedings” errors was narrowed by later cases.
• People v. Nealon, 26 NY3d 152 (2015): Clarified that when a court gives “meaningful notice” of a jury note’s contents, objections to the response must be preserved; applied in Emanuel to find no mode-of-proceedings error.
• People v. Fleming, 153 AD3d 1648 (4th Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 1104 (2018), and People v. Peller, 8 AD3d 1123 (4th Dept 2004), lv denied 3 NY3d 679 (2004): Preservation cases reinforcing Nealon’s approach.
• People v. Watkins, 42 NY3d 635 (2024), cert denied — US —, 145 S Ct 459 (2024); People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143 (2005); People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 (1981): Set the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance; used to reject a single-omission claim here.
• People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007), and People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987): Directed the weight-of-the-evidence review approach applied by the court.
• People v. Barnes, 158 AD3d 1072 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1011 (2018): Emphasized deference to jury credibility determinations, key in upholding this verdict.
• Erlinger v. United States, 602 US 821 (2024): The defense’s touchstone for challenging predicate sentencing; its state-law implications are mediated through preservation rules.
• People v. Hernandez, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 00904 (2025); People v. Lopez-Nunez, — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03451 (4th Dept 2025); People v. Cox, 237 AD3d 1405 (3d Dept 2025): Confirm that Erlinger-based resentencing arguments are unpreserved where the defendant admits the predicate and does not dispute incarceration facts.

Legal Reasoning and Principles Applied

• Miranda/interrogation: The court distinguished between “interrogation” and mandated administrative or informational communication. A brief, direct answer to a defendant’s charge-identification question neither intends nor is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, satisfying Wearen/Cirino and aligning with CPL 140.15(2).
• Hearsay/excited utterance: The court evaluated spontaneity and stress, concluding the victim’s immediate statements qualified as excited utterances. Even if the later statements to police were a closer call due to the passage of minutes, the redundancy and strength of other evidence rendered any error harmless.
• Jury notes/preservation: By reading the note verbatim with counsel present, the court fulfilled its core duty under Nealon. Any further procedural objections required contemporaneous objection; without it, there is no reviewable mode-of-proceedings error.
• Ineffective assistance: Applying the meaningful-representation standard (Baldi, Caban, Watkins), the court found no egregious, outcome-altering deficiency in counsel’s performance.
• Weight of evidence: The court weighed credibility and corroboration: the victim’s unequivocal identification plus corroborative physical and digital evidence strongly supported the verdict as charged to the jury (Danielson/Bleakley).
• Sentencing/preservation: Following Hernandez (2025) and companion Appellate Division cases, the court required preservation of Erlinger-derived claims; defendant’s admissions at sentencing foreclosed the argument.

Impact and Forward-Looking Considerations

• Law enforcement: Officers may confidently provide charge information pre-Miranda when asked, so long as they avoid accusatory follow-up. Training should distinguish informational compliance (CPL 140.15[2]) from investigative questioning.
• Trial courts: Emanuel underscores that reading jury notes into the record with counsel present satisfies the “core responsibility.” Direct engagement with a foreperson after meaningful notice is not per se error, but courts should still document all exchanges meticulously.
• Defense counsel:
  • Object contemporaneously to jury-note procedures after the court provides meaningful notice, or the issue is waived.
  • At sentencing, if pursuing Erlinger-type challenges to predicate offender status, do not admit the predicate facts without reservation. Instead, contest the factual predicates and request adjudications as needed.
• Prosecutors: Build excited-utterance records with clear time stamps and descriptions of the declarant’s condition; corroborate identifications with digital and physical evidence to withstand weight-of-evidence review.
• Appellate landscape: Emanuel aligns the Fourth Department with the Court of Appeals’ emerging post-Erlinger preservation jurisprudence. Expect continued case-by-case development on which predicate-sentencing facts, if any, require jury findings versus judicial findings or admissions—and how preservation intersects with those questions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Miranda “interrogation”: Not every conversation with a suspect is interrogation. It must be words or actions that are reasonably likely to prompt an incriminating response. Factual, required notifications are not interrogation.
• CPL 140.15(2) (Reason for arrest): New York law requires officers to tell arrestees why they’re being arrested. Doing so does not violate Miranda.
• Excited utterance: A hearsay exception allowing admission of statements made under the stress of a startling event, before the speaker has time to fabricate.
• CPL 310.30/O’Rama “core responsibility”: When jurors send a note, the court must share its contents with counsel. If the court does so, any complaint about how the court responds must be raised immediately (preserved), or it’s typically waived.
• Mode-of-proceedings error: A rare procedural error so fundamental it can be raised on appeal without an objection. Under Nealon, meaningful notice of a jury note generally prevents such a claim.
• Harmless error (New York standard): Even if a mistake occurred, a conviction stands unless there’s a significant probability the jury would have acquitted without the error.
• Meaningful representation (NY ineffective assistance): The New York standard looks at counsel’s overall performance in context, not isolated missteps; the question is whether the representation, as a whole, was meaningful.
• Erlinger challenge: Based on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling about who (judge or jury) must find certain facts about prior convictions that enhance sentences. In New York, raising such challenges requires timely objection at sentencing, especially if the defendant would otherwise admit the predicate facts.

Conclusion

People v. Emanuel reinforces several practical, doctrine-shaping rules in New York criminal law. First, officers satisfy both Miranda and state arrest law when they simply inform a defendant of the charges upon the defendant’s request; that response is not interrogation. Second, excited utterances remain a robust exception to the hearsay rule, particularly in violent, unfolding events, and harmless error principles protect verdicts when identical statements are properly admitted and the declarant testifies. Third, the jury-note regimen is governed by Nealon’s “core responsibility”: reading a note verbatim to counsel and the jury typically requires counsel to object to any further procedural concerns or forfeit the claim. Fourth, a lone failure to object does not ordinarily constitute ineffective assistance. Fifth, thorough corroborative evidence—digital footprints, physical recovery aligned with the route of flight, and contemporaneous statements—can sustain convictions on weight-of-the-evidence review. Finally, and most notably for sentencing practice, Emanuel aligns with statewide authority requiring preservation of Erlinger-derived challenges to predicate felony offender adjudications; admissions to predicate facts at sentencing will foreclose appellate relief.

Taken together, Emanuel is a practical guide for police, trial judges, and litigators on Miranda’s limits, hearsay exceptions, jury communications, and the procedural rigors of preserving sentencing challenges in the post-Erlinger era.