Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision addresses the reach of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), which requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that prior crimes were committed on “occasions different from one another” to trigger the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandatory minimum—unless the defendant freely admits that fact in a guilty plea. The panel affirms a 300-month sentence imposed on Hiawatha Laquinta Scott, III, concluding there was no Erlinger error because Scott expressly admitted in his plea materials and colloquy that his prior convictions “occurred on separate occasions.”

The case also touches, in a reserved way, on whether Erlinger’s jury-finding requirement applies to the Eleventh Circuit’s longstanding interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 that treats prior convictions arising from a single “criminal episode” as a single conviction for enhancement purposes. Although the court assumes without deciding that Erlinger would apply to § 841’s “single episode” principle, it holds the outcome is the same because Scott admitted separateness.

Parties and posture: The United States prosecuted Scott in the Northern District of Florida for firearm and methamphetamine distribution offenses. Scott pleaded guilty to all counts. On appeal, he challenged the ACCA and § 841 mandatory minimums, arguing that under Erlinger a jury, not the judge, must decide whether his prior offenses were committed on separate occasions. The Eleventh Circuit affirms.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: No Erlinger error occurred because Scott “freely admitted in a guilty plea” that his prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” satisfying the Sixth Amendment requirement recognized in Erlinger.
• Scope: The court applies Erlinger’s admission exception to both the ACCA enhancement (15-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)) and, assuming arguendo, to the § 841 enhancement (25-year mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) where there are two prior serious drug/violent felonies), given Eleventh Circuit precedent that treats single-episode priors as one conviction.
• Disposition: Sentence affirmed.

Background and Procedural History

Charges: Scott was indicted on: - Two counts of felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (Counts 1, 4) - Two counts of distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)) (Counts 2, 5) - Two counts of distribution of fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)) (Counts 3, 6) - One count of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)) (Count 7)

Enhancement notice in the indictment: The indictment identified as “[e]nhanceable [p]rior [c]onvictions”: felony battery, two sales of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a place of worship, and attempted first degree murder. It alleged these were “committed on occasions different from one another.”

Plea and admissions: Scott pleaded guilty to all counts. In his signed statement of facts, he admitted the specified prior convictions “occurred on separate occasions from each other.” During the Rule 11 colloquy, he confirmed he had read the plea agreement and statement of facts line-by-line with counsel; had no outstanding questions; and agreed that the government could prove the facts beyond a reasonable doubt.

PSR and sentencing: The presentence report (PSR) found Scott subject to ACCA’s 15-year minimum and § 841’s 25-year minimum based on prior convictions detailed as follows: - Felony battery (Nov. 10, 2000) - Two cocaine deliveries (May 2, 2001) to different individuals at different times that day - Attempted first degree murder (July 30, 2001)

Objection: Scott objected that the drug sales and attempted murder occurred on the “same occasion,” contesting the applicability of the enhancements under Erlinger. The district court overruled the objection and imposed a 300-month sentence.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): The Supreme Court held that whether prior offenses were committed on “occasions different from one another” for ACCA purposes is a fact that increases the legally prescribed penalty range, thus triggering the Sixth Amendment rule from Apprendi. The Court required a unanimous jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt—unless the defendant “freely admitted” the separateness in a guilty plea. The Eleventh Circuit applies this admission exception directly to Scott’s case, finding his plea admissions dispositive.
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): Established that any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Erlinger invokes Apprendi’s core principle to classify “separate occasions” as a jury fact. Although not cited in the opinion, the logic is also consistent with Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), which extended Apprendi to facts that raise mandatory minimums.
• United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989): A guilty plea is a full and final admission of all elements and factual predicates necessary for the judgment and sentence; it waives many constitutional claims. The panel uses Broce to underscore that Scott’s valid guilty plea encompassed his admissions supporting the enhancements.
• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), and United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002): These decisions delineate which claims survive a guilty plea and emphasize that a plea knowingly and voluntarily waives trial rights and related constitutional guarantees. Here, the court relies on the general waiver principle and the explicit admissions to hold that no Erlinger error occurred.
• United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601 (11th Cir. 1995): Interprets § 841 to treat prior convictions arising from a single “criminal episode” as a single conviction for enhancement purposes. The panel notes that § 841 does not textually contain a “separate occasions” clause, but Rice effectively reads in a similar concept. The court assumes for argument’s sake that Erlinger’s jury/admission requirement would apply to this judicially recognized “single episode” rule, and concludes the same result follows because Scott admitted separateness.
• United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited for the standard of review: constitutional errors are reviewed de novo. This frames the panel’s straightforward Sixth Amendment analysis post-Erlinger.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Identifying the Sixth Amendment trigger: Under ACCA, a defendant with three qualifying prior convictions committed on different occasions faces a mandatory minimum of 15 years (§ 924(e)(1)), transforming the usual § 922(g) maximum (now 15 years, § 924(a)(8)) into a floor. Under § 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant with two prior “serious drug felony or serious violent felony” convictions faces a 25-year minimum. Post-Erlinger (and in line with Apprendi/Alleyne), the “separate occasions” fact is a jury question unless admitted in a plea.
2. Admission exception satisfied: The key move in the panel’s reasoning is to treat the record as unambiguously containing Scott’s free plea admission that the prior offenses were separate. The indictment alleged that the priors were “committed on occasions different from one another,” and Scott pleaded guilty to it. His written statement of facts explicitly stated the convictions “occurred on separate occasions,” and the judge confirmed during the Rule 11 colloquy that Scott was adopting those facts, acknowledging the government could prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. By Erlinger’s own terms, these admissions obviate the need for a jury finding on separateness.
3. Rejecting the “convictions vs. offenses” semantic argument: Scott argued he admitted only that the prior “convictions” were separate, not the underlying “offenses.” The panel rejects this as a distinction without a difference in this record. Because the indictment itself alleged the prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” and Scott pled to that allegation and affirmed the statement of facts in open court, his admissions encompassed offense separateness for Erlinger purposes.
4. Section 841’s “single-episode” rule assumed applicable: The court notes that § 841’s text does not contain a separateness requirement, but Eleventh Circuit precedent (Rice) treats multiple priors from a single episode as one. Without deciding whether Erlinger’s jury mandate formally extends to this judicially recognized principle, the court assumes it does and holds that Scott’s admissions resolve the issue identically, rendering any potential error harmless or nonexistent.
5. Conclusion and disposition: Because Scott “freely admitted” separateness in his guilty plea and colloquy, no Erlinger error occurred. The 300-month sentence—reflecting, at minimum, the § 841(b)(1)(A) 25-year minimum—stands.

C. Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Plea practice after Erlinger: This decision provides a clear roadmap for prosecutors: incorporate explicit admissions that prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” into the indictment, plea agreement, and factual proffer, and confirm them at the Rule 11 colloquy. Doing so satisfies Erlinger without a jury finding.
• Defense strategy: Defendants wishing to preserve an Erlinger jury determination should avoid admitting separateness in plea documents and colloquy. Options may include: - Negotiating a plea that omits separateness admissions and requests a post-plea jury determination limited to the enhancement fact; - Entering a conditional plea that preserves the Erlinger issue for appeal; - Proceeding to trial on the separateness issue (possibly via a bifurcated or special-verdict procedure). After this case, unqualified admissions will foreclose Erlinger claims.
• Use of PSR vs. admissions: Post-Erlinger, judges may not find “separate occasions” over a defendant’s objection based solely on PSR or Shepard documents. But a defendant’s explicit plea admissions, confirmed on the record, remove the need for a jury. Scott exemplifies the decisive effect of such admissions.
• § 841 landscape remains partially unsettled: The panel assumes, but does not decide, that Erlinger applies to § 841’s judicially recognized “single episode” rule (Rice). Future litigants may press for a definitive holding. Until then, this opinion signals that, even if Erlinger applies, plea admissions will defeat any Sixth Amendment challenge.
• Unpublished but persuasive: As a non-precedential (unpublished) decision, this opinion is not binding within the Eleventh Circuit. Nonetheless, it is strong persuasive authority on how the court is likely to apply Erlinger’s admission exception.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• ACCA and “separate occasions”: The Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)) imposes a 15-year minimum for a § 922(g) defendant with three prior qualifying convictions “committed on occasions different from one another.” The Supreme Court in Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), explained that “occasions” is a holistic inquiry that considers timing, location, and the character/relationship of the offenses. After Erlinger (2024), whether offenses occurred on different occasions is a jury fact—unless admitted in a plea.
• Apprendi/Alleyne rule: Under Apprendi, any fact (other than the bare fact of a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne extends this to facts that raise mandatory minimums. Erlinger applies these principles to ACCA’s “separate occasions.”
• Almendarez-Torres exception: The “fact of a prior conviction” itself remains an exception to Apprendi/Alleyne (Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). Erlinger clarifies that “separate occasions” goes beyond the bare fact of conviction and therefore is subject to jury determination absent an admission.
• “Freely admitted in a guilty plea”: For an admission to satisfy Erlinger, it must be clear, voluntary, and on the record (e.g., in a written factual proffer confirmed during the Rule 11 colloquy). The court will look to whether the defendant affirmatively adopted the allegation that prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Scott did so in both writing and open court.
• § 841’s “single criminal episode” principle: Although § 841 does not textually require offense separateness, Eleventh Circuit precedent (Rice) treats multiple prior convictions stemming from a single “criminal episode” as one conviction for enhancement purposes. Whether Erlinger formally extends to this judicially crafted rule remains an open question; this case assumes yes but resolves on admissions.

Conclusion

United States v. Scott crystallizes a practical and important corollary of Erlinger: the Sixth Amendment jury right to determine ACCA “separate occasions” (and, assumedly, § 841 “single episode”) yields when a defendant freely and explicitly admits separateness in the course of a guilty plea. The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis—anchored in Erlinger, Apprendi, and Broce—confirms that clear plea admissions are sufficient to impose ACCA and § 841 mandatory minimums without a jury finding.

For prosecutors, this opinion underscores the utility of precise plea drafting and colloquy practices that secure unequivocal admissions. For defense counsel, it is a cautionary marker: to preserve Erlinger challenges, avoid or carefully qualify admissions regarding “separate occasions.” While the decision is unpublished and thus nonbinding, it offers a persuasive template for how Eleventh Circuit panels are likely to evaluate Erlinger-based sentencing challenges in the plea context going forward.

Bottom line: After Erlinger, juries must decide “separate occasions”—unless the defendant says so. In Scott, he did, and the 300-month sentence is affirmed.