ERISA Standing, Actuarial Non‑Fiduciary Status, and High‑Risk Investment Strategies: Commentary on Carlisle v. Board of Trustees of the New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order; non‑precedential)
Docket: 25‑511‑cv
Date: November 21, 2025

I. Introduction

This summary order from the Second Circuit in Carlisle v. Board of Trustees of the American Federation of the New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund addresses a cluster of important ERISA issues arising out of the investment strategy of a distressed, multiemployer defined‑benefit pension plan.

The plaintiff, Robert Carlisle, is a participant in the New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, a multiemployer defined‑benefit plan governed by ERISA. After the Plan’s funding deteriorated, benefits (including Carlisle’s) were suspended under the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (MPRA). The Plan’s fiduciaries—its Board of Trustees—and its professional advisors allegedly responded to this funding crisis by “gambling” on high‑risk, illiquid private market investments in an effort to restore the Plan’s solvency.

Carlisle filed a putative class action alleging that:

the Trustees and the Plan’s investment consultant/manager, Meketa Investment Group, Inc. (“Meketa”), breached their ERISA fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty by adopting and implementing an unduly risky investment strategy; and
the Plan’s actuary, Horizon Actuarial Services, LLC (“Horizon”), became an ERISA fiduciary and participated in those breaches.

While the case was pending, the Plan received federal “rescue” funding under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), restoring Carlisle’s suspended benefits. The defendants argued: (1) lack of Article III standing under Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., (2) mootness as a result of ARPA funding, and (3) failure to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

The Second Circuit:

affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state an ERISA fiduciary breach claim;
rejected the jurisdictional challenges, holding that Carlisle had standing and the case was not mooted by ARPA funds; and
clarified the boundary of ERISA fiduciary status for actuaries and the pleading standard for challenging “high‑risk” investment strategies and alleged fiduciary conflicts in a defined‑benefit, multiemployer context.

Although designated a “summary order” without precedential effect, the decision is an important data point in ERISA litigation, especially for:

multiemployer defined‑benefit plans responding to funding crises;
service providers (actuaries and investment consultants) concerned about fiduciary exposure; and
plaintiffs seeking to plead imprudent investment strategies and conflicts of interest under ERISA.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Article III Standing:
The court held that Carlisle had Article III standing:
- He alleged a concrete injury in fact—his pension benefits were suspended due to the Plan’s poor financial condition.
- The relief sought—equitable and injunctive relief designed to improve the Plan’s financial health—would, if granted, improve his prospects for receiving his pension benefits and therefore redress his injury.
- Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 590 U.S. 538 (2020), did not bar standing because Thole involved participants who had suffered no monetary injury and whose benefits were secure; here, Carlisle’s benefits were actually suspended.
Mootness and ARPA Funding:
The Plan later received federal funds under ARPA, and Carlisle’s suspended benefits were restored. Defendants argued this mooted the case. The court disagreed, relying on the “collateral source” rule: benefits received from third parties (here, the federal government) cannot be used to defeat a claim or reduce recovery against the defendant wrongdoer. Thus, ARPA assistance did not extinguish Carlisle’s “personal stake” in the litigation.

B. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

Proceeding to the merits, the court reviewed the dismissal de novo under the standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:

All well‑pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in the plaintiff’s favor.
Legal conclusions are not accepted as true.
The complaint must plausibly—not just possibly—allege entitlement to relief.

The court reached three principal merits determinations:

Horizon (the actuary) was not an ERISA fiduciary.
ERISA fiduciary status is functional and turns on discretionary control or investment advice for a fee. Although Carlisle acknowledged that actuaries are “not typically” fiduciaries, he argued that Horizon effectively enabled the allegedly risky investment strategy. The court held the complaint did not plausibly allege that Horizon:
- exercised discretionary authority or control over Plan assets or management; or
- rendered “investment advice for a fee” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii).
Merely providing actuarial work that allows fiduciaries to act does not by itself make an actuary a fiduciary.
The Trustees and Meketa did not plausibly breach the duty of prudence.
The complaint targeted the Plan’s allegedly aggressive allocation to private market investments (risky, volatile, illiquid) and argued that “peer” plans used more conservative allocations. The court held:
- ERISA’s prudence duty is judged “under the circumstances then prevailing,” based on information available when each investment decision was made—not with hindsight.
- Fiduciaries are permitted to choose among a “range of reasonable judgments” and balance risk–return “tradeoffs.”
- The complaint’s generalized allegations about riskiness and peer comparisons did not cross the line from possible imprudence to plausible imprudence.
- Allegations of a supposed conflict from Meketa’s dual role (non‑discretionary advisor and private markets manager) were also insufficient; the complaint failed to plead facts showing that Meketa’s compensation or incentives actually created a meaningful conflict that influenced advice.
The Trustees and Meketa did not plausibly breach the duty of loyalty.
Carlisle argued the same dual role constituted a breach of loyalty and that the hiring/retention of Horizon was disloyal. The court held:
- Fiduciaries do not violate the duty of loyalty simply because their actions incidentally benefit themselves; a plaintiff must plausibly allege that they acted for the purpose of benefiting themselves or another party at the expense of participants.
- The complaint did not plausibly allege that Meketa’s dual role or the Trustees’ hiring of Horizon was motivated by self‑dealing or third‑party benefit rather than by the Plan’s interests.
- On appeal, Carlisle also invoked ERISA’s prohibited‑transaction provisions (29 U.S.C. § 1106) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University, 604 U.S. 693 (2025). The panel noted that § 1106 “supplements” the duty of loyalty by categorically barring certain self‑dealing transactions, but emphasized that a prohibited‑transaction claim is legally distinct. Because the complaint never pled such a claim, it was not before the court.

The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal in full, without reaching additional merits arguments (including the argument that MPRA purportedly bars suits by participants affected by benefit suspensions).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 590 U.S. 538 (2020)

Thole is the Supreme Court’s leading case on Article III standing for participants in defined‑benefit plans. There, participants in a fully funded defined‑benefit plan alleged that fiduciaries mismanaged plan assets. The Court held they lacked standing because:

They had received all payments to which they were entitled and were legally entitled to the same benefits regardless of how the plan was invested; and
They alleged no monetary injury, no increased risk of nonpayment, and no injury to themselves apart from injury to the plan.

Defendants in Carlisle tried to use Thole to argue that any relief would benefit only the Plan, not Carlisle personally, and thus he had no standing. The Second Circuit distinguished Thole on two grounds:

Actual monetary injury. Carlisle suffered a direct, personal monetary loss—his pension benefits were suspended. Thole expressly concerned plaintiffs who “never suffered any monetary injury.”
Redressability through plan‑level relief. The panel emphasized that Thole does not say that plan‑level relief can never redress a participant’s injury. Here, improving the Plan’s financial condition through equitable and injunctive relief would directly improve Carlisle’s prospects of receiving his full benefits. That was enough for redressability.

In effect, the Second Circuit reads Thole as carving out a narrow category of defined‑benefit cases—those where participants have suffered no monetary harm and their benefits are legally insulated from plan performance—but leaving room for standing where participants’ benefits are actually cut, suspended, or materially threatened.

2. Mootness: Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013)

Genesis Healthcare reiterates the basic mootness principle: if at any point an intervening event deprives a plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome, the case must be dismissed as moot. Defendants argued that ARPA’s rescue funding and the restoration of Carlisle’s benefits eliminated his personal stake.

The Second Circuit rejected that argument by importing the “collateral source rule” from tort law: recovery or assistance from an independent source generally does not reduce or nullify a defendant’s liability. That is, the federal government’s bailout is separate from Defendants’ alleged breaches. Thus, Carlisle’s interest in a judicial determination—and potential equitable relief—survived, and mootness did not apply.

3. Collateral Source Rule: Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964), and Ebert v. City of New York, 2006 WL 3627103 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

The panel cites Cunningham and Ebert for the collateral source rule:

Courts may not reduce a defendant’s liability based on payments or benefits the plaintiff receives from independent, third‑party sources (e.g., insurance, government funds).
Applying this rule, ARPA’s special financial assistance to the Plan is treated as an independent benefit; it cannot be used to wipe out Carlisle’s claims against the Plan’s fiduciaries.

This is a notable application of an older tort principle to the ERISA context, particularly in the multiemployer rescue‑fund setting.

4. ERISA Fiduciary Status: 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); Massaro v. Palladino, 19 F.4th 197 (2d Cir. 2021); Forgione v. Gaglio, 2015 WL 718270 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), defines a fiduciary functionally:

Anyone who exercises discretionary authority or control over plan management or assets,
Anyone who renders investment advice to the plan for a fee, or
Anyone who has discretionary authority or responsibility in plan administration.

Massaro and Forgione reiterate that a defendant must be a fiduciary with respect to the specific actions at issue, not merely a service provider in the abstract. The Second Circuit applies this framework to Horizon:

Horizon provided actuarial services but did not control investments or administration.
No non‑conclusory allegations showed that Horizon “rendered investment advice for a fee” as ERISA uses that term.
Therefore, Horizon was not a fiduciary regarding the alleged misconduct.

This reinforces the widely held understanding that actuaries, like many third‑party professionals, generally are not ERISA fiduciaries unless they cross the line into discretionary control or true investment advice.

5. Prudence Standard: 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation, 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011); Hughes v. Northwestern University, 595 U.S. 170 (2022)

ERISA’s duty of prudence requires fiduciaries to act:

“with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use…”

Two key precedents shape the court’s analysis:

In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation: courts assess prudence based on information available at the time of each investment decision, “not from the vantage point of hindsight.”
Hughes v. Northwestern University: fiduciaries often face “tradeoffs” and may choose among a “range of reasonable judgments.” The mere fact that different (or even better) investment options existed does not make a fiduciary’s choice imprudent, so long as the decision falls within that range.

The panel invokes both principles to find that:

The complaint did not plausibly allege that the Trustees and Meketa stepped outside the permissible “range of reasonable judgments” when choosing private market investments to address the Plan’s funding crisis.
Differences from “peer” plan portfolios and the inherent riskiness of private markets are not, standing alone, enough to show imprudence at the pleading stage.

6. Loyalty and Conflicts: Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982); Brown v. Daikin America, Inc., 2021 WL 1758898 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)

Donovan v. Bierwirth remains the Second Circuit’s cornerstone case on the duty of loyalty. It holds that fiduciaries:

“do not violate their duties… simply because [an action] incidentally benefits [themselves].”

The key is the purpose behind the action—whether they act with an eye single to participants’ and beneficiaries’ interests.

Applying this:

The mere fact that Meketa held a dual role—non‑discretionary investment advisor and private markets manager—does not, without more, constitute a loyalty breach.
The complaint needed to plausibly allege that the Trustees or Meketa acted to benefit Meketa (or some other party) at the Plan’s expense. It did not.
Brown v. Daikin was cited to reinforce that conclusory assertions of conflicts or dual roles, without factual detail about self‑interested motivation or outcome, are insufficient.

7. Prohibited Transactions: 29 U.S.C. § 1106; Cunningham v. Cornell University, 604 U.S. 693 (2025); 86 F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023)

On appeal, Carlisle attempted to recast the alleged conflicts as “prohibited transactions” under ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106, invoking the Supreme Court’s then‑recent decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University. The panel notes:

According to Cunningham, § 1106 “supplements” the duty of loyalty by “categorically barring” certain self‑dealing transactions between a plan and a fiduciary or party in interest.
Nonetheless, a prohibited‑transaction claim is legally distinct from a generic loyalty‑breach claim under § 404.
The complaint in Carlisle never pled a § 1106 claim or alleged facts framed as prohibited transactions.

The court therefore declined to entertain a prohibited‑transaction theory raised for the first time on appeal, and emphasized the importance of properly pleading such claims at the outset.

8. Other References: MPRA and ERISA § 1085(e)(9)(I)(iii); Carlson v. Principal Financial Group, 320 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2003)

Defendants also raised a “third threshold problem”: that MPRA, as codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(9)(I)(iii), bars suits by participants “affected by” a suspension of benefits. The panel explicitly characterizes this as a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one, analogizing to Carlson, which distinguished jurisdictional bars from substantive defenses going to the sufficiency of claims.

Because the court affirmed dismissal on other merits grounds (no plausible breach), it did not decide whether MPRA bars participant suits challenging fiduciary conduct in connection with a benefit suspension—a significant question left open.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standing and Mootness in Defined‑Benefit ERISA Litigation After Thole

The decision provides an important clarification to how Thole applies in real‑world, multiemployer pension crises:

Where participants’ benefits have been actually reduced or suspended, they suffer a concrete monetary injury.
Equitable relief aimed at improving plan funding can redress that injury because restoring the plan’s financial health increases the likelihood and amount of future benefit payments.
Consequently, standing is not limited to situations where plaintiffs seek direct, individualized monetary relief; derivative, plan‑level relief can suffice if it affects participants’ own benefit entitlements.

On mootness, the reasoning is equally pragmatic:

Subsequent restoration of benefits via government rescue funds is a collateral event, not a concession or remedy from the defendants.
Under the collateral source rule, such third‑party assistance cannot erase the alleged injury nor the case or controversy against the alleged wrongdoers.
Thus, even in a post‑ARPA environment where many MPRA‑suspended plans have been “rescued,” participants can still press claims regarding past fiduciary conduct.

2. Fiduciary Status of Actuaries (Horizon)

The court’s treatment of Horizon underscores the high bar for converting professional advisors into ERISA fiduciaries:

Actuaries provide projections, valuations, and funding advice based on assumptions but typically do not decide how plan assets are invested or how benefits are administered.
To be a fiduciary, Horizon would have had to:
- exercise discretionary control over investments or plan management, or
- give “investment advice for a fee” under ERISA’s functional standard (i.e., advice individualized to the plan, on a regular basis, serving as a primary basis for investment decisions, with a mutual understanding that such advice will be relied upon).
At most, the complaint alleged Horizon’s actuarial work made the risky investment strategy possible, not that Horizon dictated or controlled that strategy, nor that it provided investment advice as ERISA defines that term.

The court concluded that “enabling” fiduciaries to act—by providing actuarial calculations or projections—does not transform the actuary into a fiduciary absent allegations of discretion or investment advice for a fee. This continues the general trend of confining ERISA fiduciary status to those with real control or advisory authority over investments or benefit decisions.

3. Duty of Prudence: High‑Risk Investment Strategy and Peer Comparisons

Carlisle’s core prudence theory was that the Plan’s heavy allocation to risky, volatile, and illiquid private market investments to address a funding shortfall was objectively imprudent, especially when compared to more conservative allocations by “peer” multiemployer plans.

The court’s reasoning emphasizes several points:

No hindsight bias. The prudence inquiry focuses on what was known or knowable at the time of each decision, not on how the investments ultimately performed. Even if the strategy worsened the Plan’s funding, that does not itself prove the decision was imprudent when made.
Range of reasonable judgments. In the wake of Hughes, courts recognize that fiduciaries must make balancing decisions: higher return potential vs. higher risk; liquidity vs. long‑term growth; etc. Where a decision sits within a spectrum of professional opinions, it can be prudent even if others might have chosen differently.
Peer plan comparisons are not dispositive. Allegations about how other plans invested do not, without more, show that a given plan’s strategy fell outside the range of reasonable prudence. Plans have different demographics, funding levels, employer bases, and risk tolerances.
No extreme outlier alleged. The panel notes that Carlisle fails to plausibly allege that the Plan’s allocation was such an extreme outlier relative to comparable plans that one could infer imprudence from the allocation alone.

In practical terms, the court is requiring more granular, process‑oriented allegations at the pleading stage to state a prudence claim based on an aggressive or unconventional asset allocation. Examples of what might have been required (but were absent here) include:

allegations that the fiduciaries ignored or suppressed contrary advice;
evidence that they abandoned any prudent process of vetting risks and liquidity constraints;
contemporaneous red flags, warnings, or internal documents showing reckless disregard; or
concrete statistical comparisons showing that the Plan’s strategy departed dramatically from industry norms without justification.

4. Duty of Prudence and Alleged Conflicts: Meketa’s Dual Role

Carlisle further argued that Meketa was “conflicted” because it served both as:

the Plan’s non‑discretionary investment advisor, and
the Plan’s private markets investments manager.

He theorized that Meketa had an incentive to recommend higher allocations to private markets in order to secure or increase its own compensation as manager of those assets.

The Second Circuit rejected this as insufficiently pled, focusing on two gaps:

Compensation structure. The complaint did not allege facts showing that Meketa’s fee structure created a meaningful financial incentive to increase private market allocations (e.g., asset‑based fees that escalate with allocation size, bonuses tied to private markets volume, etc.). Instead, Carlisle alleged only a flat fee, without details suggesting the Plan would pay Meketa less if it invested less in private markets.
Other plans’ experiences. References to Meketa’s work with other plans in other circumstances did not establish Meketa’s specific incentives or conduct with this Plan.

As a result, the “conflict” allegations did not push the claim from conceivable to plausible. This underscores a recurrent theme in ERISA class action jurisprudence: alleged conflicts of interest must be supported by specific factual allegations about compensation, structure, and behavior, not just the observation that an advisor also earns fees from certain investment products or asset classes.

5. Duty of Loyalty: Purpose, Incidental Benefit, and Prohibited Transactions

On the duty of loyalty, the court applied the classic Donovan test: fiduciaries breach loyalty when they act with the purpose of benefiting themselves or a third party over the plan’s interests. Fiduciary actions that incidentally benefit the fiduciary are not necessarily disloyal if primarily undertaken for the plan’s benefit after careful investigation.

Working through Carlisle’s loyalty theories:

Meketa’s dual role. The complaint did not plausibly allege that the dual role was adopted or maintained for the purpose of enriching Meketa. There were no facts suggesting self‑dealing transactions, side agreements, or decisions clearly adverse to the Plan that were explained by self‑interest.
Hiring Horizon. Similarly, hiring or retaining Horizon as actuary—even if Horizon’s modeling supported the high‑risk strategy—did not, without more, show that the Trustees were motivated by a desire to benefit Horizon or themselves.
Prohibited transactions not pled. Although Carlisle invoked § 1106 and Cunningham on appeal, the panel stressed that prohibited transactions are a distinct cause of action. They categorically bar certain transactions between plans and fiduciaries/parties in interest—irrespective of subjective “purpose”—but they must be specifically pled. Because Carlisle’s complaint did not assert a § 1106 claim at all, the court declined to recast his loyalty allegations into a prohibited‑transaction theory post hoc.

This portion of the opinion sends a clear procedural message: plaintiffs must clearly label and plead prohibited‑transaction claims if they want to rely on the categorical nature of § 1106; they cannot rely on appellate reframing to convert loyalty theories into § 1106 claims.

C. Impact and Significance

1. For ERISA Standing Doctrine in Defined‑Benefit Plans

Although non‑precedential, the order is a useful data point in defining the contours of Thole:

Participants in defined‑benefit plans can have standing where they suffer actual benefit reductions or suspensions, even if they seek primarily plan‑level relief.
Courts may find redressability where equitable and injunctive relief improves the chances or amount of future benefit payment, rather than requiring direct, individualized monetary compensation.

This narrows the reach of Thole and indicates that, in real funding crises—particularly under MPRA—participants are not categorically barred from suing simply because the plan is formally a defined‑benefit plan.

2. For Post‑ARPA Litigation Involving Rescued Multiemployer Plans

The application of the collateral source rule to ARPA funding has concrete implications:

Federal rescue funding under ARPA does not automatically moot ongoing fiduciary‑breach suits about pre‑rescue conduct.
Defendants cannot argue that once the government has “made participants whole,” no live controversy remains.
Participants may still seek equitable remedies (e.g., removal of fiduciaries, changes in governance or investment policies) or other relief addressing past breaches, even though benefits have been restored.

3. For Service Providers: Actuaries and Investment Consultants

The decision offers some comfort to actuaries and certain consultants:

Actuarial firms remain generally outside ERISA fiduciary status unless they cross clear lines—such as assuming discretionary control or providing investment advice within the statutory definition for a fee.
Consultants with dual roles (e.g., advisor plus manager of certain assets) may still avoid fiduciary‑breach allegations at the pleading stage if plaintiffs do not allege specific facts about compensation structures, incentives, and self‑interested behavior.

At the same time, the opinion implicitly warns service providers that detailed allegations of performance‑based or volume‑based compensation, combined with facts showing biased advice, could satisfy the pleading standard. The line is factual, not categorical.

4. For Fiduciaries of Distressed Multiemployer Plans

Trustees of underfunded multiemployer plans often face a dilemma: continue conservative investing and risk inexorable decline, or pivot to higher‑return but riskier strategies. Carlisle is significant because:

It recognizes that choosing a higher‑risk strategy—such as substantial allocations to private equity, private credit, or other illiquid alternatives—does not by itself constitute imprudence.
Courts will evaluate whether such decisions fall within a range of reasonable professional judgments, given plan demographics, funding status, and economic conditions, and will be wary of hindsight bias.
Peer comparisons, while relevant, must be grounded in specifics and show an extreme and unjustified departure from norms to be compelling at the pleadings stage.

This helps fiduciaries understand that robust decision‑making processes, thorough documentation, and clear articulation of risk‑return rationales are key to defending against prudence claims—especially where plans are in crisis and “safer” paths may be mathematically incapable of saving the plan.

5. For ERISA Pleading Standards in Investment‑Related Class Actions

The order fits into a broader trend tightening the pleading requirements for ERISA investment claims:

Generic allegations that investments were “risky,” “volatile,” or underperformed, or that other investors did better, are often insufficient.
Plaintiffs must supply concrete, plan‑specific facts about process defects, ignored warnings, or extreme deviations from professional standards to survive a motion to dismiss.
Alleged conflicts of interest require detailed factual support regarding compensation and incentives, not mere assertions of dual roles.
Distinct legal theories (e.g., loyalty vs. prohibited transaction) must be cleanly and explicitly pled, with appropriate factual grounding.

For practitioners, this emphasizes front‑end strategy in drafting complaints—careful factual investigation and precise legal framing are essential.

6. Unresolved Question: MPRA’s Bar on Participant Lawsuits

The panel notes, but does not decide, the defendants’ argument that MPRA’s provision at 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(9)(I)(iii) bars suits by participants “affected by” benefit suspensions. By labeling this a merits issue and then not reaching it, the court leaves unresolved:

Whether and to what extent MPRA restricts participants’ ability to sue over fiduciary conduct tied to benefit suspensions approved under MPRA; and
How to reconcile such a bar (if applicable) with ERISA’s traditional enforcement scheme under § 502(a)(2) and (a)(3).

Future cases will likely grapple with the interaction between MPRA‑authorized suspensions, ARPA special financial assistance, and ERISA fiduciary‑duty litigation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Defined‑Benefit vs. Defined‑Contribution Plans

Defined‑Benefit (DB) Plan: Promises a fixed benefit (usually a monthly pension) based on salary, service, or a formula. Investment decisions are made by fiduciaries; participants’ benefits are not directly tied to their individual account balances.
Defined‑Contribution (DC) Plan (e.g., 401(k)): Participants have individual accounts, and their benefits depend on contributions and investment performance. Investment options and fees often drive litigation.

In DB plans, courts are often more cautious about participant standing because plan assets are legally owned by the plan, not by individuals, and benefits are formula‑based. Thole reflects that difference. However, as Carlisle shows, when benefits are suspended or at real risk, participants can still have standing.

2. Multiemployer Plans, MPRA, and ARPA

Multiemployer Plan: A pension plan maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements by more than one employer, usually in unionized industries (e.g., trucking, construction).
MPRA (Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014): Allows deeply troubled multiemployer plans to suspend accrued benefits (subject to Treasury approval and participant vote) to avoid insolvency.
ARPA (American Rescue Plan Act of 2021): Provided special financial assistance to qualifying multiemployer plans to restore suspended benefits and stabilize funding.

In this case, MPRA allowed the Plan to suspend benefits (including Carlisle’s). ARPA later provided funds to restore those benefits. Carlisle asks whether participants can still sue fiduciaries for their investment decisions during the crisis period, even after ARPA rescues the plan. The court says yes (at least as to standing and mootness).

3. ERISA Fiduciary and Non‑Fiduciary Service Providers

Fiduciary: Under ERISA, a person is a fiduciary to the extent they:
- exercise discretionary authority over plan management or assets;
- have discretionary responsibility in plan administration; or
- give investment advice for a fee and meet detailed requirements for such advice.
Non‑Fiduciary Service Provider: Professionals who provide services—such as actuaries, accountants, recordkeepers, and consultants—are not fiduciaries if they do not exercise discretion or provide qualifying investment advice.

In Carlisle, Horizon is squarely treated as a non‑fiduciary actuary. Meketa is treated as a fiduciary (at least in its advisory and discretionary roles concerning investments).

4. Duty of Prudence vs. Duty of Loyalty vs. Prohibited Transactions

Duty of Prudence (ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B)): Requires fiduciaries to act with the care, skill, and diligence of a prudent expert, based on current circumstances. Focuses on the decision‑making process and reasonableness of judgments, not on outcomes.
Duty of Loyalty (ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)): Requires fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries, for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and paying reasonable plan expenses. Prohibits self‑dealing or acting for another’s benefit at the plan’s expense.
Prohibited Transactions (ERISA § 406 / 29 U.S.C. § 1106): Categorically forbid certain transactions (e.g., self‑dealing, transactions with parties in interest, improper use of plan assets), regardless of subjective motivation, unless an exemption applies.

In this case:

Carlisle pleaded prudence and loyalty claims.
He attempted to layer in prohibited‑transaction arguments on appeal, but the court treated those as separate claims that were not properly before it because they were never pled.

5. The Collateral Source Rule in ERISA Context

The collateral source rule originates in tort law. It says:

If a person injured by a defendant receives compensation from a third party (e.g., insurance, charitable gifts, government aid), that compensation is “collateral” and does not reduce the defendant’s liability.

Carlisle adapts this principle to ERISA:

ARPA’s special financial assistance is treated as a “collateral source.”
The fact that Carlisle’s benefits were restored thanks to ARPA does not eliminate his claim that the defendants’ earlier conduct caused harm or was unlawful.

V. Conclusion

Carlisle v. Board of Trustees of the New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund—though a non‑precedential summary order—meaningfully illuminates several contested corners of ERISA litigation in the multiemployer, defined‑benefit context.

The decision:

Clarifies that participants whose benefits are actually suspended in a defined‑benefit plan have Article III standing, and that plan‑level equitable relief can redress their injuries.
Holds that ARPA rescue funding does not moot such claims, invoking the collateral source rule to preserve participants’ “personal stake” in challenging fiduciary conduct.
Reaffirms that actuaries are not ERISA fiduciaries absent allegations of discretionary control or investment advice for a fee, even if their work enables fiduciaries’ investment decisions.
Emphasizes that high‑risk investment strategies, including heavy allocations to private markets in a distressed plan, are not inherently imprudent; plaintiffs must plead process defects or extreme deviations from a reasonable range of professional judgment.
Signals that alleged conflicts of interest based on dual roles and compensation require detailed factual allegations to support prudence or loyalty claims.
Draws a clear procedural line between duty‑of‑loyalty claims and prohibited‑transaction claims, reminding plaintiffs that § 1106 theories must be explicitly and properly pled.

For plan fiduciaries, consultants, and litigants, Carlisle underscores the critical importance of:

documented, expert‑informed decision‑making in times of financial crisis;
careful structuring and disclosure of service‑provider roles and compensation; and
precise, fact‑rich pleading when challenging investment strategies and alleged conflicts under ERISA.

As multiemployer plans continue to navigate the aftermath of MPRA suspensions and ARPA special financial assistance, Carlisle provides a useful—if non‑binding—guidepost on the interplay between federal rescue policy, ERISA fiduciary obligations, and federal jurisdiction.

ERISA Standing, Actuarial Non‑Fiduciary Status, and High‑Risk Investment Strategies: Commentary on Carlisle v. Board of Trustees of the NYS Teamsters Fund