Continuing Ancillary Jurisdiction to Enforce Restitution Orders After Completion of Probation: United States v. Mikel Mims (11th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Mikel Mims, the Eleventh Circuit confronted a recurring but previously unresolved question: may a district court, years after a defendant has completed probation, re-enter the criminal docket and compel renewed compliance with an unsatisfied restitution order? The panel (Judges Jill Pryor, Branch, and Grant, opinion by Judge Branch) answered “yes,” grounding its holding in the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and the court’s inherent authority to enforce its judgments.

The ruling arose after defendant Mikel Mims—who had paid only 23 % of a $255,620 restitution obligation—stopped paying upon finishing her three-year probation term. When the district court ordered her to resume payments and supply updated financial disclosures, Mims argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and violated her due-process rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, establishing a significant new precedent on federal courts’ post-sentence powers.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Jurisdictional Holding. A district court possesses ancillary jurisdiction, derived from its inherent authority, to enforce restitution components of a criminal judgment even after the defendant’s probation or supervised-release term has expired.
• No Sentencing Modification. Ordering renewed compliance and collection of arrears does not “modify” a sentence; it merely enforces the original judgment and is authorized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 38(e)(2).
• Due Process. The defendant received notice and multiple opportunities to be heard; therefore, no plain-error or due-process violation occurred.
• Affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s compliance order in all respects.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)
  — Provided the modern framework for ancillary jurisdiction. The panel analogized enforcement of a restitution order to enforcement of a settlement incorporated into a dismissal order, falling squarely within Kokkonen’s “effectuate its decrees” rationale.
• Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996)
  — Reinforced that courts must retain enforcement power or their judgments would be “incomplete.” The Eleventh Circuit cited Peacock to underscore the constitutional necessity of enforcement jurisdiction.
• Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991)
  — Recognized inherent contempt power for enforcing orders; used by the panel to bolster the inherent-authority strand of the reasoning.
• United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) & United States v. Martinez, 241 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2001)
  — Allowed post-judgment Rule 41(g) motions within criminal dockets, illustrating that “civil” matters ancillary to a criminal case can remain in the same docket.
• Statutory Context
  § 3663A & § 3613A of the MVRA and the FDCPA were debated, but the court ultimately rested on ancillary jurisdiction, thus sidestepping statutory limits or procedural prerequisites.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Scope of Article III and § 3231. The initial criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 indisputably attached at sentencing, including restitution as a mandatory element under the MVRA.
2. Ancillary Jurisdiction Doctrine.
   a. Purpose: to “manage proceedings, vindicate authority, and effectuate decrees.”
   b. Application: An unfulfilled restitution obligation is a continuing violation of the judgment. Enforcing that judgment is “incidental” to the original case.
   c. No Jurisdictional Expiration: The close-of-probation or administrative closure of the docket does not strip the court of power; docket closure is a clerical act only (FARC v. Bush).
3. No Sentence Modification. The compliance order did not change the amount or rate beyond what the judgment already required. Rule 38(e)(2) expressly contemplates post-appeal enforcement orders (e.g., injunctions, deposit orders, bonds).
4. Due Process Satisfied. Notice via government motions, a Zoom status conference, written briefing, and a subsequent order to provide a financial statement provided ample opportunity to contest ability-to-pay.
5. Plain-Error Framework. Because no “plain” error or prejudice existed, defense arguments failed at the third and fourth prongs of plain-error review.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Legal Landscape

• Victim Restitution Enforcement. U.S. Attorneys can now confidently seek enforcement in the original criminal docket, reducing costs and delays associated with separate civil FDCPA suits.
• Probation-Completion Strategies. Defendants cannot rely on the expiration of supervision to shield non-payment. Defense counsel must proactively seek § 3664(k) modifications if circumstances change.
• District Court Practice. Clerks may keep financially-unsatisfied cases “closed” yet dormant, re-opening them on motion without re-filing. Judges can order financial disclosures, set hearings, or issue restraining orders under Rule 38(e) without concern for jurisdictional pitfalls.
• Circuit Split Potential. Several circuits have dicta but not square rulings on this question. The Eleventh Circuit’s clear holding may influence sister circuits or spark Supreme Court review if conflicts emerge.
• Separation of Civil and Criminal Remedies. By declining to rely on the FDCPA, the decision preserves a dual-track option: the government may choose civil enforcement, but it is not compelled to.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Restitution Order. A court mandate that the defendant repay victims for losses. It is part of the criminal sentence, unlike fines payable to the government.
• Ancillary Jurisdiction. Power that attaches to a court to deal with matters related to a case already before it, ensuring its judgments are meaningful and enforceable.
• Inherent Authority. Courts’ traditional, non-statutory powers (e.g., contempt, management of docket) derived from the need to function effectively.
• MVRA (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act). Federal statute requiring restitution for certain crimes; sets default enforcement mechanisms.
• FDCPA (Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act). Provides civil tools for collecting judgments, including criminal restitution, but is not the exclusive avenue post-Mims.
• Plain-Error Review. Appellate standard applied to unpreserved objections: the error must be obvious, affect substantial rights, and seriously impair judicial integrity.
• Rule 38(e)(2). Federal rule permitting various enforcement orders (injunctions, restraining orders, bonds) to secure restitution or fine payment after appeal.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Mikel Mims crystallizes a vital proposition: completion of probation does not dissolve a district court’s power—or its duty—to enforce restitution. Anchored in ancillary jurisdiction and inherent authority, the decision streamlines enforcement, fortifies victims’ rights, and closes a loophole that invited strategic non-payment. Practitioners must now assume that restitution obligations survive not only as civil debts but as enforceable components of the criminal judgment, subject to the continuing reach of the sentencing court.

Going forward, defendants seeking relief must invoke statutory mechanisms (such as § 3664(k)) rather than contest jurisdiction, while prosecutors and victims gain a direct, efficient pathway for post-judgment collection. The Eleventh Circuit’s precedent thus strengthens the remedial purposes of the MVRA and adds a crucial building block to federal sentencing jurisprudence.