Eleventh Circuit Squarely Limits § 3553(e) Departures to Substantial Assistance: Commentary on United States v. Perez & Rivera Rodriguez

Eleventh Circuit Squarely Limits § 3553(e) Departures to Substantial Assistance: Commentary on United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez & United States v. Jovan Rivera Rodriguez

I. Introduction

In this consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit confronted a recurring question at the intersection of statutory mandatory minimums, cooperation departures, and the general sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a):

When the government files a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) to permit a sentence below a statutory minimum based on a defendant’s substantial assistance, may the district court go further below that minimum using the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a)?

The panel, in an opinion by Chief Judge William Pryor and joined by Judge Branch, holds that it may not. Judge Abudu concurs fully in the legal holding but writes separately to raise systemic and policy concerns about the resulting “one-directional” sentencing regime.

The defendants, Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez, played relatively minor roles in a large fentanyl distribution conspiracy in the Orlando area. Despite their minor roles, the quantities attributed to each exceeded the 400-gram threshold that triggers a 10-year mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), as incorporated by the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846. Both pleaded guilty.

At sentencing, the government acknowledged their cooperation and moved under both U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) to allow a downward departure from the mandatory minimum. But the prosecution maintained that any reduction below the mandatory minimum had to be based only on cooperation, not on other considerations like the defendants’ minor roles, personal history, or rehabilitation prospects.

The district court disagreed. It treated the government’s § 3553(e) motion as “resolving” or effectively removing the mandatory minimum, and then used the general factors in § 3553(a) to fashion much lower sentences: 66 months for Perez and 60 months for Rivera Rodriguez. The government appealed, arguing that the sentences were unlawful because they rested on non-assistance factors in going below the mandatory minimum.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated both sentences and remanded. In doing so, it:

  • Reaffirmed that § 3553(e) provides “limited authority” to go below a statutory minimum;
  • Held that the extent of any departure below the minimum must be based solely on substantial-assistance considerations; and
  • Explicitly barred the use of § 3553(a) factors to further reduce a sentence beneath that cooperation-based level.

The decision cements, in clear terms, a rule that had been strongly implied in prior Eleventh Circuit cases and aligns the Circuit with unanimous authority from its “numbered” sister circuits. At the same time, Judge Abudu’s concurrence spotlights deeper questions about fairness, prosecutorial power, and sentencing asymmetry under the current federal regime of mandatory minimums and cooperation-based departures.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Facts and Procedural Background

  • Perez and Rivera Rodriguez were part of a fentanyl pill distribution conspiracy in the Orlando area.
  • Each played a minor role:
    • Rivera Rodriguez: picked up packages of fentanyl and delivered them to co-conspirators.
    • Perez: helped her partner unpack fentanyl pills at their home and send them to lower-level distributors.
  • Despite their lower-level roles, each was responsible for multiple kilograms of fentanyl, far above 400 grams, triggering a 10-year mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi).
  • Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy under § 846.

At sentencing:

  • Perez sought an extremely lenient sentence (two years of home confinement plus supervised release) and invoked both § 3553(a) and § 3553(e) as independent bases for going below the mandatory minimum.
  • The government filed a substantial-assistance motion under:
    • U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (permitting a guideline reduction for cooperation), and
    • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (permitting a departure below the statutory minimum to reflect substantial assistance).
    It asked for a two-level reduction and insisted that the court could not go below the mandatory minimum based on § 3553(a) factors.
  • The district court:
    • Accepted the government’s motion, recalculated the guideline range to 97–121 months,
    • Declared that, “until the Eleventh Circuit tells me otherwise,” it believed a § 3553(e) motion freed it to consider all § 3553(a) factors and disregard the statutory minimum,
    • And imposed 66 months in prison.
  • Rivera Rodriguez received a similar treatment:
    • The government again moved under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e) for a two-level reduction and again objected to a below-minimum sentence based on non-assistance factors.
    • The district court declared that, once a 5K/§ 3553(e) motion is filed, it has “discretion to impose any sentence that I think is warranted.”
    • It imposed 60 months in prison after weighing § 3553(a) factors.

The government appealed. The only question on appeal was legal: whether the district court could rely on § 3553(a) to go below the statutory minimum beyond what was warranted by cooperation.

B. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit held:

  • Section 3553(e) does not authorize a sentencing court to reduce a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum based on non-assistance factors.
  • Any departure below the statutory minimum under § 3553(e) must be based solely on the defendant’s substantial assistance.
  • District courts may not invoke § 3553(a) to “vary” further downward once below the statutory minimum.

Accordingly, the panel vacated both sentences and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this rule.

C. Key Reasoning in Brief

  • The text of § 3553(e) expressly limits departures below a statutory minimum to those “to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance.”
  • Section 3553(e) is structurally paired with § 3553(f) (the “safety valve”), which explicitly permits sentencing “without regard to any statutory minimum.” The omission of such language in § 3553(e) is deliberate and constraining.
  • Eleventh Circuit precedent—Aponte, Mangaroo, Castaing-Sosa, and Williams—already strongly indicated that only assistance-related factors can justify going below the statutory minimum.
  • Every other numbered circuit has read § 3553(e) the same way.
  • While a district court may still consider § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to depart under § 3553(e), those factors cannot be used to justify a further downward “variance” once the statutory floor is breached.

III. The Statutory and Guideline Framework

A. The Three Main Cooperation Mechanisms

The Court situates § 3553(e) within a broader cooperation framework involving three separate tools:

  1. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance Departure at Initial Sentencing)
    This Guideline provision allows the government to move for a downward departure from the advisory Guidelines range based on a defendant’s substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting others.
    • The text lists non-exhaustive, assistance-related factors (e.g., usefulness, timeliness, risk to the defendant) that may guide the extent of the reduction.
    • It does not itself authorize going below a statutory mandatory minimum; it only alters the Guideline range.
  2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (Post-Sentencing Reduction)
    Rule 35(b) allows the government to move, after sentencing, for a reduction in the term of imprisonment if the defendant provides substantial assistance after sentencing.
    • Rule 35(b)(4) explicitly authorizes the court to “reduce the sentence to a level below the minimum sentence established by statute.”
    • Like § 3553(e), it is keyed to cooperation, but applies post-judgment.
  3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Substantial Assistance Below Statutory Minimum at Sentencing)
    This is the central provision in the case. It provides:
    Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
    • It is triggered only by a government motion.
    • It authorizes sentencing below a statutory minimum, but only for the specified purpose of reflecting substantial assistance.

B. The Safety Valve: § 3553(f)

Section 3553(f) (“safety valve”) is a separate exception to mandatory minimums for qualifying low-level, non-violent drug offenders who satisfy several narrowly defined criteria and truthfully provide all information they have about the offense. It states that the court shall impose a sentence:

... without regard to any statutory minimum sentence ...

This is a critical contrast point:

  • Under § 3553(f), once a defendant qualifies, the mandatory minimum is entirely disregarded and the court sentences using the usual framework: Guidelines + § 3553(a) factors.
  • Under § 3553(e), the statute explicitly grants only “limited authority” to go below the minimum, and only “to reflect” cooperation.

C. General Sentencing Factors: § 3553(a)

Section 3553(a) contains the framework of factors a court must consider in determining an “appropriate” sentence, including:

  • The nature and circumstances of the offense;
  • The history and characteristics of the defendant;
  • The need for the sentence to reflect seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford deterrence, protect the public, and provide rehabilitation;
  • The kinds of sentences available;
  • The Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements;
  • The need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and
  • The need to provide restitution to victims.

In Booker, the Supreme Court made the Guidelines advisory, but § 3553(a) still governs how courts select a sentence within statutory limits. Crucially, § 3553(a) does not itself authorize departure beyond those statutory limits. That was the holding reaffirmed in Castaing-Sosa and applied again here.

IV. Precedents and Their Influence on the Court’s Decision

A. Eleventh Circuit Precedents

The panel’s holding rests heavily on prior Eleventh Circuit decisions.

1. United States v. Aponte, 36 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 1994)

In Aponte, the Court addressed a § 3553(e) motion and emphasized that the defendant is entitled to “full credit only for the ‘substantial assistance’ he had rendered.” This case established, early on, a tight link between the scope of a § 3553(e) reduction and the quality and quantity of assistance.

The present opinion cites Aponte as foundational support for the proposition that § 3553(e) reductions should be limited to “assistance factors” and not diluted by general sentencing considerations.

2. United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007)

In Mangaroo, the Eleventh Circuit remanded with an explicit instruction that the district court “consider only substantial assistance factors” in determining the extent of a § 3553(e) departure. That instruction is central in this case.

Perez and Rivera Rodriguez attempted to cast this language as dicta, arguing that Mangaroo dealt with narrower issues. The panel rejects that characterization, noting (quoting Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co.) that specific instructions to a trial court on remand are not dicta. Thus, Mangaroo already made clear that assistance-related factors alone should determine the size of a § 3553(e) reduction.

3. United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2008)

Castaing-Sosa squarely held that § 3553(a) does not give a district court authority to sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum:

Section 3553(a) merely lists the factors the district court must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.

In other words, § 3553(a) guides the judge’s choice within the statutory range, but cannot be used to escape a congressionally-imposed floor or ceiling. That principle directly forecloses the district court’s approach in Perez and Rivera Rodriguez, where § 3553(a) was used to go further below the minimum once a § 3553(e) motion had opened the door.

4. United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)

In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit underscored the difference between § 3553(e) and § 3553(f). It held that:

  • Section 3553(f) (“safety valve”) allows sentencing “without regard to any statutory minimum.”
  • Section 3553(e), by contrast, does not eliminate the statutory minimum but authorizes only a limited departure from it to reflect substantial assistance.

The current panel leans on Williams to stress that § 3553(e) is not a general license to ignore mandatory minimums. It keeps the minimum in place and only allows a carefully circumscribed exception.

5. United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2000)

Simpson recognized that § 3553(e) and § 3553(f) are “the only two circumstances in which a court can depart downward” from a statutory minimum. The present opinion uses this to reinforce that Congress has tightly cabined the scenarios in which courts may go below mandatory minimums.

6. Guideline Precedents on Substantial Assistance: Crisp and Livesay

While not central to the majority opinion, these cases are highlighted in Judge Abudu’s concurrence and are conceptually important:

  • United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006)
    Held that when granting a substantial-assistance departure under § 5K1.1, the extent of the reduction must be based only on assistance-related factors; district courts may not use other § 3553(a)-type considerations (like restitution) to further expand the reduction.
  • United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 2008)
    Reiterated that a § 5K1.1 departure cannot be driven by non-assistance factors such as culpability or personal history; cooperation is the engine for the reduction.

These cases mirror, at the Guidelines level, the same structural idea the majority affirms at the statutory level under § 3553(e): cooperation-based mechanisms are meant to reward assistance, not reweigh all sentencing equities.

B. Sister Circuit Authority

The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes that its reading of § 3553(e) aligns with a unanimous line of authority from the First through Tenth Circuits. Each has held that a court granting a § 3553(e) motion must base the extent of a below-minimum sentence exclusively on substantial-assistance considerations:

  • United States v. Ahlers (1st Cir.) – § 3553(e) departures are “specific, carefully circumscribed” and “retain the mandatory minimum.”
  • United States v. Richardson (2d Cir.)
  • United States v. Winebarger (3d Cir.) – the reduction must “reflect” assistance; non-assistance factors are out of bounds.
  • United States v. Spinks (4th Cir.)
  • United States v. Desselle (5th Cir.)
  • United States v. Williams (6th Cir.)
  • United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.)
  • United States v. Williams (8th Cir.) – a court that reduces further based on non-assistance factors “exceeds the limited authority granted by § 3553(e).”
  • United States v. Lee (9th Cir.)
  • United States v. A.B. (10th Cir.)

The panel invokes this “unanimous consensus” to bolster its interpretation and to reject any suggestion that there is a competing, plausible reading of § 3553(e) that would authorize broader discretion once a government motion is filed.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Textual Interpretation of § 3553(e)

The opinion begins with the text of § 3553(e), focusing on three key components:

  1. “Upon motion of the Government”
    The statute’s opening clause underscores that the district court’s authority to go below a mandatory minimum does not exist unless—and only to the extent that—the government moves for such a departure. This preserves prosecutorial gatekeeping.
  2. “the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence”
    This clause grants authority to go below the statutorily prescribed floor, but says nothing about erasing that floor entirely or empowering the judge to “impose any sentence [she] desires.” The court treats this grant as limited.
  3. “so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance”
    This purpose clause is the linchpin. The court interprets it as a limiting condition on the use of the newly granted authority:
    • The departure is justified only to the extent necessary to reflect the defendant’s assistance.
    • A further reduction based on non-assistance factors (e.g., personal background, minor role, family responsibilities) would not “reflect” cooperation and would therefore lie outside the authority conferred.

Put differently, § 3553(e) answers two distinct questions:

  • May the judge go below the statutory minimum? – Yes, but only if the government moves and only for cooperation.
  • How far below may the judge go? – Only as far as necessary to give full effect to the defendant’s assistance; not further in light of unrelated § 3553(a) factors.

B. Structural Context: Comparing § 3553(e) with § 3553(f)

The panel strengthens its textual reading by comparing § 3553(e) with the safety valve provision in § 3553(f), invoking the canon articulated in Russello v. United States—where Congress includes language in one subsection and omits it in another, courts presume the difference in wording is intentional.

  • Section 3553(f) expressly allows a court to sentence a defendant “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence.”
  • Section 3553(e) contains no such broad language; it retains the mandatory minimum and creates only a narrow exception “to reflect” cooperation.

This structural comparison underscores the “limited authority” of § 3553(e). Congress knows how to authorize broad disregard of mandatory minimums (it did so in § 3553(f)) and chose not to do so in § 3553(e). Instead, Congress tied the power to cross the statutory floor to a precise, cooperation-related purpose.

C. The Role of § 3553(a) Factors After Perez

One potentially confusing but important piece of the opinion is its treatment of § 3553(a) in the context of a § 3553(e) motion. The panel draws a careful line:

  • What § 3553(a) cannot do:
    It cannot be used as an independent basis to sentence below a statutory minimum. This is the holding of Castaing-Sosa and is reaffirmed here.
  • What § 3553(a) can still influence:
    The court states that “a sentencing judge may still consider the section 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to grant a departure from the statutory minimum.” That is, even when the government moves under § 3553(e), the judge:
    • Is not obligated to reduce below the statutory minimum, and
    • May weigh aggravating factors (e.g., seriousness of the offense, need for deterrence) in deciding not to grant the full departure the government might hope for.

However, the key constraint is that:

The extent of any departure from a statutory minimum under section 3553(e) must be based only on substantial-assistance factors. District courts may not vary downward based on section 3553(a).

In practical terms:

  • The decision whether to grant any below-minimum departure at all is discretionary, and the judge may consider the full § 3553(a) picture in deciding to depart less than the prosecution or defense would like—or not at all.
  • But once the judge determines that a departure for substantial assistance is appropriate, the size of that departure (how much below the statutory minimum) can only be justified by reference to assistance-related factors (similar to § 5K1.1’s framework).

The district court in this case crossed that line by effectively treating the government’s motion as erasing the mandatory minimum and then using § 3553(a) to grant additional, non-cooperation-based reductions.

D. Consolidating and Clarifying the Rule

The panel concludes by stating:

If this Court has not yet squarely held it, we do so now.

That sentence is significant. It signals that:

  • Prior Eleventh Circuit cases (Aponte, Mangaroo, Castaing-Sosa, Williams) already pointed strongly in this direction.
  • But given the district court’s insistence that “the law is unsettled,” the panel uses this case to remove any lingering ambiguity and make the rule explicit, binding, and unmistakable for district courts going forward.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For District Judges

After Perez and Rivera Rodriguez, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit must follow this roadmap when a § 3553(e) motion is filed:

  1. Determine the appropriate Guidelines range (including all adjustments such as role, acceptance of responsibility, etc.).
  2. Recognize the applicable statutory minimum and that it serves as a floor unless a § 3553(e) (or § 3553(f)) mechanism is available.
  3. If the government moves under § 3553(e), decide whether to exercise the limited authority to go below the statutory minimum, bearing in mind the § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether any departure is appropriate at all.
  4. Once the court decides to depart below the mandatory minimum, determine the extent of that departure based solely on substantial-assistance factors:
    • Usefulness, reliability, and timeliness of the defendant’s cooperation;
    • Nature and extent of the assistance;
    • Risk of harm the defendant incurred, etc.
  5. Avoid further downward “variances” based on general § 3553(a) considerations (e.g., minor role, family circumstances, health) to push the sentence below what cooperation alone would justify.

B. For Defendants and Defense Counsel

This decision has several concrete implications for defense strategy:

  • Cooperation is king below mandatory minimums.
    Once a mandatory minimum applies, non-assistance factors cannot justify going below that minimum. Cooperation is the only path, aside from qualifying for the safety valve under § 3553(f).
  • Safety valve remains distinct.
    If a defendant can qualify for § 3553(f), then the mandatory minimum is disregarded altogether and traditional § 3553(a) arguments can be fully deployed to advocate for a lower sentence, including sentences below any otherwise-applicable floor.
  • Limitations on “double counting” mitigating circumstances.
    Mitigating circumstances such as a minor role, lack of criminal history, or family responsibilities:
    • Can influence the Guideline calculation (e.g., via adjusted offense level, role reductions), and
    • Can influence where within the Guideline range (or above it) the court chooses to sentence,
    • But they cannot be used to push the sentence below the statutory minimum, unless the defendant either:
      • (a) qualifies for the safety valve, or
      • (b) obtains a § 3553(e) motion—and then only insofar as those mitigators legitimately relate to the quality or risk of cooperation (which is a narrow channel).
  • Negotiation dynamics with prosecutors.
    Because § 3553(e) motions are solely within the government’s control, prosecutors effectively control the only route to below-minimum sentences for defendants who do not qualify for the safety valve. This reinforces the importance of:
    • Securing a § 3553(e) motion (not just a § 5K1.1 motion), and
    • Building as robust and demonstrable a record of substantial assistance as possible.

C. For Prosecutors

The decision formally confirms and strengthens prosecutorial leverage in mandatory-minimum cases:

  • The government’s motion is a necessary precondition to any below-minimum sentence under § 3553(e) or Rule 35(b).
  • Even after a motion, the court may only reduce below the minimum to reflect a defendant’s assistance, not to correct perceived unfairness in the mandatory minimum itself or to account for other mitigating equities.
  • Charging decisions (e.g., which quantity thresholds to allege) and the willingness to offer cooperation credit thus play a central role in determining sentencing outcomes.

D. Sentencing Disparities and Systemic Concerns

Judge Abudu’s concurrence draws attention to the broader implications of this framework:

  • Sentences can differ dramatically among co-defendants primarily based on variation in cooperation, even if their underlying culpability or personal circumstances differ substantially.
  • Defendants who are unable or unwilling (for safety, loyalty, or other reasons) to cooperate may receive far harsher sentences than similarly situated cooperators, regardless of their respective moral culpability.
  • Empirical work (e.g., by Sonja Starr & M. Marit Rehavi) has suggested that prosecutorial charging and cooperation regimes, when layered onto mandatory minimums, can exacerbate racial and other disparities in sentencing.

While the concurrence acknowledges that these concerns are for Congress and higher courts to ultimately resolve, it places this case squarely within ongoing debates about discretion, fairness, and the balance of power between prosecutors and judges.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several technical concepts recur in the opinion. The following simplified explanations may help clarify them.

A. Mandatory Minimum Sentence

A mandatory minimum sentence is a floor set by Congress for certain offenses—usually drug, firearm, or sex offenses. The judge generally cannot go below this number, no matter how mitigating the circumstances, unless a specific statutory exception (like § 3553(e) or (f)) applies.

B. Substantial Assistance

“Substantial assistance” means that the defendant has provided help to law enforcement or prosecutors in investigating or prosecuting others. Examples include:

  • Identifying co-conspirators;
  • Explaining the structure of the criminal operation;
  • Testifying against co-defendants;
  • Providing information that leads to arrests, indictments, or convictions.

Only the government can certify this assistance by motion under § 5K1.1, § 3553(e), or Rule 35(b).

C. Departure vs. Variance

  • Departure – A change from the Guidelines range based on a specific Guideline provision (e.g., § 5K1.1) or a specific statute (e.g., § 3553(e), § 3553(f)).
  • Variance – A sentence outside the Guidelines range chosen by the judge based on the broad § 3553(a) factors (for example, a downward variance for unusually harsh collateral consequences, or an upward variance for extraordinary harm).

After Booker, Guidelines are advisory, and judges routinely vary from them. But variance cannot override statutory mandatory minimums: a judge cannot use general fairness considerations alone to sentence below a congressionally mandated floor.

D. Safety Valve (§ 3553(f)) vs. Substantial Assistance (§ 3553(e))

Safety Valve (§ 3553(f)):

  • Applies only in certain drug cases and only where the defendant meets strict criteria (e.g., very limited criminal history, non-violent offense, truthful disclosure).
  • Once the defendant qualifies, the court sentences “without regard to” the mandatory minimum and can use all § 3553(a) factors freely.

Substantial Assistance (§ 3553(e)):

  • Applies when the government moves based on cooperation in any offense with a mandatory minimum.
  • Allows the court to go below the mandatory minimum, but only “to reflect” the assistance; § 3553(a) factors cannot justify further reductions beyond that cooperation-based level.

VIII. The Concurring Opinion: Asymmetry and Due Process Concerns

Judge Abudu fully joins the majority but writes separately to highlight structural consequences of the current legal framework.

A. “One-Directional” Sentencing Regime

He observes that:

  • Judges have broad discretion to increase sentences above the Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors—e.g., seriousness, deterrence—so long as they stay under the statutory maximum.
  • But when a statutory minimum applies, judges have almost no ability to decrease sentences below that floor based on the same § 3553(a) considerations.
  • The only real escape hatches downward are:
    • Substantial assistance, as governed by § 3553(e), or
    • Safety valve relief under § 3553(f).

This creates an asymmetry: upward flexibility vs. downward rigidity.

B. Discretion Shifted from Judges to Prosecutors

Because only the government may file motions under § 3553(e) or Rule 35(b), and because § 3553(a) cannot trump mandatory minimums, much of what used to be judicial sentencing discretion is effectively relocated to:

  • Prosecutorial charging decisions (e.g., whether to charge quantity thresholds that trigger mandatory minimums); and
  • Prosecutorial decisions on whether to file cooperation motions and on how to characterize and value the assistance.

Judge Abudu references scholarly critiques and a prior judicial concurrence (Kikumura) suggesting that such a shift raises due process and fairness concerns: outcomes hinge heavily on prosecutorial discretion, which is less transparent and less subject to appellate review than judicial sentencing decisions.

C. Individualized Sentencing vs. Mandatory Minimums

The concurrence also highlights tension with Booker and its progeny:

  • Booker aimed to make the Guidelines “effectively advisory” to preserve individualized sentencing and avoid mechanical, one-size-fits-all outcomes.
  • Yet statutory mandatory minimums—unchanged by Booker—rigidly constrain the low end of sentencing regardless of individual differences in:
    • Culpability,
    • Personal characteristics,
    • Rehabilitation prospects.
  • Cooperation becomes the primary, and sometimes only, way to escape that rigidity—leading to situations where a more culpable cooperator might receive a lower sentence than a less culpable, but non-cooperating, co-defendant.

Judge Abudu does not suggest that the panel can alter this structure; he simply underscores that the consequences should give policymakers and higher courts pause.

IX. Conclusion: Significance of United States v. Perez & Rivera Rodriguez

This decision is doctrinally straightforward but practically important. It does three main things:

  1. Clarifies and “squarely holds” the rule in the Eleventh Circuit:
    When the government files a § 3553(e) motion, the district court’s authority to go below a statutory minimum is limited to what is necessary to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance. The court may not stack on additional downward reductions based on general § 3553(a) considerations.
  2. Aligns the Eleventh Circuit with nationwide consensus:
    Every numbered circuit has now adopted this cooperation-only interpretation of § 3553(e), reinforcing a uniform federal rule across most of the country.
  3. Exposes structural tensions in federal sentencing:
    Judge Abudu’s concurrence emphasizes that the regime of mandatory minimums, read in harmony with § 3553(a), § 3553(e), and § 3553(f), creates a system where:
    • Judicial discretion is broad when it comes to increasing sentences, but tightly constrained when it comes to reducing them below statutory floors;
    • Prosecutors wield significant power over whether and how a defendant can escape a mandatory minimum; and
    • Individualized justice is often subordinated to formal thresholds, except where cooperation is involved.

From a doctrinal standpoint, Perez and Rivera Rodriguez will serve as the leading Eleventh Circuit authority on the narrowness of § 3553(e) departures and the non-availability of § 3553(a) as a tool to undercut mandatory minimums. From a policy standpoint, the case adds to the growing body of judicial commentary urging Congress and perhaps the Supreme Court to revisit the balance between mandatory minimums, cooperation incentives, and the ideal of individualized, just sentencing.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Comments