Eleventh Circuit solidifies substantial-evidence review of §1229b(b)(1)(D) hardship and endorses J-J-G-’s two-part health-care test

Introduction

In this consolidated, unpublished decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rulings concerning Maria Virginia Rodriguez Robles: (1) the dismissal of her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), and (2) the denial of her motion to reopen based on new mental-health evaluations. The case turns on the demanding “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard applicable to certain nonpermanent residents seeking cancellation of removal when deportation would harm a U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child.

The petitioner argued that removing her to Mexico would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her U.S.-citizen children, with particular emphasis on her teenage daughter’s mental-health history. She also challenged the BIA’s use of a health-care availability inquiry—i.e., whether adequate care exists in the country of removal—as adding an impermissible extra requirement to the statute. Finally, she argued the BIA abused its discretion in denying reopening in light of new psychological evaluations.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. Importantly, building on its recent decision in Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General (Aug. 6, 2025), the court reiterated that applying the hardship standard to found facts is a “primarily factual” mixed question reviewed for substantial evidence. The court also endorsed the BIA’s two-part framework from Matter of J-J-G- for health-based hardship claims, which requires both a serious medical condition and a showing that adequate treatment is not reasonably available in the country of removal when the qualifying relative will accompany the applicant.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of review: Relying on Lopez-Martinez and Wilkinson v. Garland, the court held that whether established facts amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question “primarily factual,” and thus the BIA/IJ’s hardship determination stands if supported by substantial evidence. The underlying found facts remain unreviewable.
Merits (cancellation of removal): Substantial evidence supported the IJ and BIA’s conclusion that petitioner failed to establish the requisite hardship to her U.S.-citizen children, considered cumulatively. Key factors included lack of family separation (children would accompany petitioner to Mexico), availability of family support in Mexico, children’s youth and language facility, absence of ongoing medical needs, and the general rule that diminished educational and economic opportunities do not, standing alone, satisfy the high hardship standard.
Legal challenge to the “adequate care” inquiry: The court rejected petitioner’s argument that the BIA impermissibly added a requirement concerning the availability of care abroad. Citing Matter of J-J-G- and Lopez-Martinez, the court explained that for health-based hardship claims, it is proper to assess whether adequate medical or mental-health care is reasonably available in the country of removal when the qualifying relative will accompany the applicant.
Motion to reopen: Applying the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard (Abudu), the court held the BIA acted within its discretion to deny reopening because the new psychological evaluations were unlikely to change the outcome. The evaluations did not show that adequate mental-health services would be unavailable in Mexico, and the record as a whole remained insufficient to meet the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” threshold.
Prior remand request: The BIA had also denied an earlier motion to remand during the direct appeal, finding that purportedly new evidence regarding a son’s learning issues was available earlier and did not substantiate the claimed impairments. That denial was left undisturbed.

Analysis

Procedural posture and factual context

Petitioner, a Mexican national who entered without inspection in 2002, conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). She sought cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents under § 1229b(b), centering her hardship claim on her U.S.-citizen children, particularly her 16-year-old daughter, Amy, who had experienced depression and anxiety following incidents at age 12. The IJ found the record did not establish the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required by statute and BIA precedent, emphasizing that petitioner planned to take the children with her to Mexico, that they had family support there, that the children were healthy and not in ongoing treatment, and that any comparative disadvantages in education or standard of living are generally insufficient.

The BIA affirmed, denied a contemporaneous motion to remand for consideration of a son’s learning issues (concluding the evidence was available earlier and not supportive), and later denied a motion to reopen predicated on new mental-health assessments of the mother and Amy. The court consolidated petitioner’s two petitions for review and affirmed.

Precedents cited and their influence

Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001): Established that the hardship standard is “very high” and limited to scenarios “substantially different from, or beyond” the ordinary consequences of removal. The Eleventh Circuit relied on Monreal’s aggregate-factor approach and its admonition that poorer country conditions or lesser opportunity do not, by themselves, satisfy the standard.
Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002): Reinforced that “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is reserved for truly uncommon cases, underscoring the demanding threshold applied here.
Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808 (BIA 2020): Articulated a two-part framework for health-based hardship: the qualifying relative must (1) have a serious condition, and (2) if accompanying the applicant abroad, lack “reasonably available” adequate treatment in the country of removal. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly approved the use of this framework, rejecting petitioner’s legal challenge.
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): The Supreme Court clarified that the application of the statutory hardship standard is a reviewable mixed question, even while underlying factual findings remain unreviewable. The Eleventh Circuit invoked Wilkinson to delineate the scope of its review.
Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-10105, 2025 WL 2234162 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025): The Eleventh Circuit’s recent, controlling decision characterizing the hardship application as a “primarily factual” mixed question subject to substantial-evidence review. This opinion applies Lopez-Martinez to assess the BIA/IJ’s hardship determination and to emphasize that the court cannot reweigh evidence.
Flores-Panameno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 2019): Confirmed that the Eleventh Circuit reviews the BIA’s decision, not the IJ’s, except to the extent of express adoption. Guided the court’s focus on the BIA’s reasoning.
Farah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2021): Reiterated that whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard is reviewed de novo. The court used this principle when addressing petitioner’s legal challenge to the “adequate care” inquiry.
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) and Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009): Established the highly deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard for motions to reopen, emphasizing the need to avoid “endless delay” and the requirement that agency decisions not be arbitrary or capricious. These cases informed the court’s deference to the BIA’s reopening denial.
Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008): Clarified that legal determinations embedded in reopening decisions are reviewed de novo—used here to address the alleged legal error concerning the hardship standard.
Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1992): Set the “heavy burden” on the movant to show that new evidence would likely change the result if proceedings were reopened. The court relied on this principle in affirming the denial of reopening.

Legal reasoning

1) The hardship determination and substantial-evidence review

Framing the hardship application as a primarily factual mixed question under Lopez-Martinez, the court asked whether substantial evidence supported the BIA/IJ’s conclusion that the aggregated circumstances did not meet the exceptionally high standard. The court highlighted six findings: (i) no family separation because the children would accompany their mother to Mexico; (ii) extended family support in Mexico; (iii) children’s youth and language adaptability; (iv) absence of ongoing medical needs or treatment; (v) the insufficiency of comparative educational disadvantages; and (vi) the insufficiency of adverse economic effects alone. On this record, the BIA’s determination was “conclusive.”

2) The J-J-G- two-part framework for health-based hardship

Petitioner argued the agency unlawfully added a requirement by considering whether adequate health care exists in the country of removal. The court disagreed. Under Matter of J-J-G-, where hardship is premised on a qualifying relative’s health and the relative will accompany the applicant abroad, the adjudicator must weigh both the seriousness of the condition and whether adequate care is reasonably available in the destination country. The court clarified that this is not an “extra hurdle” beyond the statutory standard; rather, it is a principled way to weigh health-related hardship factors within the statute’s cumulative analysis. Because the BIA engaged in a holistic assessment that included—but did not hinge solely on—foreign care availability, no legal error occurred.

3) Motion to reopen: deference and likelihood of a different result

On reopening, the BIA determined that new mental-health evaluations of petitioner and Amy would not likely change the outcome. The court noted two tethered reasons: (1) the evaluations did not demonstrate that Amy could not obtain adequate mental-health care in Mexico, and (2) considering the full record, the evidence still fell short of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” threshold. Applying Abudu’s highly deferential standard and Coelho’s “heavy burden” for reopening, the court held there was no arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion and declined to reweigh the evidence.

Impact and implications

Standard of review crystallized: This opinion, consistent with Lopez-Martinez, confirms that in the Eleventh Circuit the application of § 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s hardship standard is reviewed under the substantial-evidence lens as a primarily factual mixed question. Practically, this narrows appellate avenues by insulating the agency’s hardship determinations from reversal absent a clear evidentiary deficiency.
Health-based hardship claims: The court’s explicit endorsement of J-J-G-’s two-part framework cements the importance of country-of-removal care evidence. For claims anchored in mental or physical health, applicants should expect adjudicators to ask not only “how serious is the condition?” but also “will adequate care be reasonably available if the qualifying relative accompanies the applicant?” Mere comparative advantage in U.S. care, or generalized concerns about foreign health systems, will rarely suffice.
Family unity and “ordinary” consequences: Where the applicant intends to take qualifying relatives abroad, separation-based hardships are minimized. Combined with Monreal/Andazola’s admonitions, this decision signals that language acquisition challenges, inferior schools, and reduced economic prospects—common consequences of relocation—will typically be inadequate alone or in combination unless paired with unusual, well-documented aggravators.
Motions to reopen: The decision underscores the “heavy burden” to show that new evidence would likely change the result. Evaluations or reports should be both genuinely new or previously unavailable and specifically tied to the statutory standard. In health-based claims, practitioners should marshal evidence demonstrating the unavailability or inaccessibility of adequate care abroad (for example, specialist shortages in the relevant region, prohibitive costs relative to the family’s circumstances, waiting lists, lack of therapeutic modalities, or safety barriers restricting access).
Practical evidentiary guidance: Effective records in the Eleventh Circuit will often include current treatment histories, expert opinions on the necessity and continuity of care, country- and locality-specific provider availability, documentation of cost and insurance barriers in the destination region, and concrete evidence of risk of decompensation without continuity of care. Absent such proof, hardship claims premised on mental health can falter even when sympathetic.
Precedential weight: While unpublished and non-precedential, the decision is a clear application of binding Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court authority. It is therefore a persuasive indicator of how panels will approach similar hardship and reopening disputes.

Complex concepts simplified

Cancellation of removal (§ 1229b(b)): A discretionary form of relief for certain nonpermanent residents who have maintained continuous presence, good moral character, and no disqualifying convictions, and who can show that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying U.S.-citizen or LPR relative. This case concerns only the hardship prong.
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A very high bar. The cumulative assessment looks at age, health, educational and special needs, country conditions, family ties, and more. But “ordinary” hardships of relocation—lower income, weaker schools, language barriers—rarely suffice without uncommon, compounding factors.
Mixed question; substantial-evidence review: After Wilkinson, courts can review whether established facts meet the legal standard, but in the Eleventh Circuit (per Lopez-Martinez), that review is highly deferential. If a reasonable factfinder could reach the BIA’s conclusion on the record, the court will not disturb it.
Matter of J-J-G- two-part framework (health-based hardship): When hardship rests on a qualifying relative’s health and the relative will accompany the applicant, the applicant must show (1) a serious condition and (2) that adequate treatment is not reasonably available in the destination country. Adequate does not mean identical to U.S. care; it means reasonably sufficient care is accessible in practice.
Motion to remand vs. motion to reopen: A motion to remand (filed while an appeal is pending) and a motion to reopen (filed after a final BIA decision) both seek consideration of additional evidence. Both require showing that the new evidence was previously unavailable and would likely alter the outcome. The BIA can deny if the evidence was available earlier or is immaterial, cumulative, or insufficient to change the result.
Abuse of discretion (reopening): A highly deferential standard. The court asks whether the BIA acted arbitrarily or capriciously. It does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency’s.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Robles confirms and operationalizes two key doctrines in the cancellation-of-removal context. First, consistent with Lopez-Martinez and Wilkinson, it applies substantial-evidence review to the application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, emphasizing that courts will not reweigh the agency’s cumulative assessment when the record reasonably supports it. Second, it embraces the BIA’s J-J-G- two-part framework for health-based hardship, making clear that when qualifying relatives accompany the applicant, the actual availability of adequate care in the country of removal is a central consideration.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores the evidentiary rigor required to meet § 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s demanding threshold—particularly in mental-health-based claims—and the formidable hurdles facing motions to reopen. For the law, it signals the Eleventh Circuit’s continued adherence to a deferential, evidence-focused approach that limits appellate intervention to clear misapplications of law or unsupported agency determinations.