Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms State-Schedule Approach and Georgia Aggravated Assault as “Crime of Violence” for §2K2.1 Enhancements

Introduction

In United States v. Devontae Jammell Morris (No. 24-12270, Oct. 2, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, non-argument calendar, not for publication) affirmed a 115‑month federal sentence imposed on a defendant who pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). The appeal focused on two guideline issues that frequently recur in federal firearms sentencings:

• Whether a prior Georgia conviction for possession with intent to distribute (PWID) cocaine and methamphetamine qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(a)(1) when Georgia’s schedules at the time of the state conviction may have been broader than the federal schedules.
• Whether a prior Georgia aggravated assault conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the enumerated‑offenses clause of U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a), as incorporated by §2K2.1.

Morris also challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court insufficiently explained its selection of a top‑of‑Guidelines term and gave inadequate weight to mitigating circumstances, including youth and trauma.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full. It held that:

• The Georgia PWID conviction qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” for §2K2.1(a)(1) by application of binding circuit precedent holding that a drug offense is controlled if regulated by state law at the time of the state conviction—even if not federally scheduled or later descheduled at the time of federal sentencing. The Court relied on United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), later reinstated as Dubois II after a Supreme Court GVR.
• The Georgia aggravated assault conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the enumerated‑offenses clause. The Court applied United States v. Morales‑Alonso and United States v. Hicks, which establish that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16‑5‑21(a)(2) is not categorically broader than generic aggravated assault.
• The district court committed no procedural error in calculating the advisory range and no substantive error in selecting a 115‑month sentence at the top of the range. The court acknowledged the §3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments, could give substantial weight to criminal history, and was not required to provide a lengthy on‑the‑record explanation for choosing the top‑of‑range term.

Key Case Facts

• Offense: §922(g)(1) felon‑in‑possession (Glock 19 with an extended magazine).
• Guidelines: 2023 Manual; base offense level 26 under §2K2.1(a)(1) (semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large‑capacity magazine plus two qualifying priors).
• Priors used: 2019 Georgia aggravated assault; 2019 Georgia PWID methamphetamine and cocaine.
• Adjustments: −3 for acceptance of responsibility; total offense level 23; Criminal History Category VI (22 points—well above the threshold); range 92–115 months.
• Sentence: 115 months’ imprisonment and 3 months of supervised release.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s analysis is anchored in a line of Eleventh Circuit authorities that, together, resolve the two predicate‑offense questions and frame the reasonableness review:

• Controlled Substance Offense:
  • United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025), reinstated by United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): The Court reaffirmed that for §2K2.1/§4B1.2(b) purposes, a state drug conviction qualifies if the substance was regulated by state law at the time of the state conviction—even if the substance is not on the federal schedules or has since been descheduled by the state at the time of federal sentencing. The panel applies this rule to Georgia PWID involving cocaine and methamphetamine, both scheduled under O.C.G.A. § 16‑13‑26 at the relevant time.
• Crime of Violence:
  • United States v. Morales‑Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018): Held that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon contains substantially the same elements as generic aggravated assault and is therefore a “crime of violence” in the enumerated‑offenses clause context (there, §2L1.2).
  • United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024): Applied Morales‑Alonso’s reasoning to §4B1.2(a)’s definition of “crime of violence” and emphasized the binding nature of Morales‑Alonso’s conclusion that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is not categorically broader than generic aggravated assault. Hicks also reiterates the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel‑precedent rule.
• Use of PSI Facts and Preservation:
  • United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2013): A sentencing court may rely on undisputed PSI facts.
  • United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006): Unpreserved sentencing calculation arguments are reviewed for plain error; factual challenges to the PSI must be clear and specific; failure to object amounts to an admission.
  • United States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 2016): In the ACCA context, a defendant’s failure to object to particular PSI paragraphs renders those facts undisputed and available to the government, even where Shepard limitations might otherwise apply.
• Reasonableness Review:
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): Establish the framework for procedural and substantive reasonableness and the “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” standard.
  • United States v. Ortiz‑Delgado, 451 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): District courts need not explicitly address each §3553(a) factor on the record; an acknowledgment of consideration of the factors and arguments typically suffices.
  • United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Osorio‑Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016): District courts have broad discretion in weighing §3553(a) factors, including placing heavy weight on criminal history.
  • United States v. Muho, 978 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2020): Within‑Guidelines sentences and sentences below the statutory maximum are generally indicative of reasonableness.
• Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule:
  • United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016); Hicks, 100 F.4th at 1300: Panels are bound by prior published circuit decisions unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court; perceived analytical defects in the earlier decision do not free a later panel from adherence.

Legal Reasoning

1) Controlled Substance Offense under §2K2.1(a)(1)

Morris argued that his Georgia PWID conviction should not count because Georgia’s schedules at the time referenced substances (e.g., ioflupane, conformational isomers) not currently on the federal schedules. The Court rejected the argument as foreclosed by Dubois I (reinstated as Dubois II), which holds:

• “Controlled substance offense” in §4B1.2(b), as incorporated into §2K2.1, encompasses state drug convictions where the substance was regulated by state law at the time of the state conviction—even if it is not (or is no longer) federally regulated or has been later descheduled by the state by the time of federal sentencing.
• Because cocaine and methamphetamine were indisputably regulated by Georgia in 2019 (O.C.G.A. § 16‑13‑26), Morris’s PWID conviction qualifies.

The panel emphasized its obligation to follow published Eleventh Circuit precedent unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. Although Dubois I was GVR’d, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its holding in Dubois II, making it binding. Thus, the district court correctly treated Morris’s PWID conviction as a qualifying “controlled substance offense.”

2) Crime of Violence (Georgia Aggravated Assault) under the Enumerated‑Offenses Clause

The Sentencing Guidelines define “crime of violence” in §4B1.2(a) to include offenses that either meet an elements clause or are among enumerated offenses—such as aggravated assault. The §2K2.1 commentary cross‑references §4B1.2(a). Morris contended that Georgia aggravated assault is broader than generic aggravated assault because Georgia can be satisfied with a general‑intent or lower mens rea standard.

The Court held the argument foreclosed by Morales‑Alonso and Hicks. Those decisions conclude that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16‑5‑21(a)(2) is not categorically broader than generic aggravated assault and therefore qualifies under the enumerated‑offenses clause. Hicks further explains that this conclusion was a holding that binds future panels, not a passing assumption.

Morris also argued, for the first time on appeal, that the government failed to produce Shepard documents to establish the elements of his prior aggravated assault. The panel rejected that argument because:

• Unpreserved guideline‑calculation arguments are reviewed for plain error.
• A district court may rely on undisputed PSI facts in determining the guideline issues.
• Morris did not specifically object to the PSI’s factual description that he fired his firearm toward and into an occupied residence; under Bennett and McCloud, the failure to object renders those facts admitted and available to the court—even where Shepard constraints might otherwise be implicated.

With binding law and admitted facts, the district court did not err in treating the Georgia aggravated assault as a qualifying “crime of violence.”

3) Reasonableness of the Sentence

The panel applied Gall’s two‑step framework:

• Procedural reasonableness: No error in guideline calculation (as discussed above). The district court adopted the PSI’s calculations and stated that it considered the advisory range, the §3553(a) factors, and made an individualized assessment.
• Substantive reasonableness: The district court was permitted to give significant weight to Morris’s extensive criminal history—22 points, well above the threshold for Category VI—and to select a sentence at the top of the 92–115‑month range. The court addressed the parties’ arguments, including youth and brain‑development mitigation, yet reasonably concluded a top‑of‑range sentence was warranted. The sentence was far below the 15‑year statutory maximum in §924(a)(8), which further supports reasonableness.

The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that district courts need not mechanically recite every §3553(a) factor or exhaustively explain the choice of a specific point within the range. An acknowledgment of the factors and the parties’ arguments is typically sufficient, and the weight assigned to competing considerations lies within the court’s discretion.

Impact and Implications

• State‑Schedule Rule Is Settled in the Eleventh Circuit: Dubois II’s reinstatement cements the Eleventh Circuit’s approach: for guideline purposes under §2K2.1/§4B1.2(b), state drug convictions qualify if the substance was controlled by state law when the conviction occurred. Defendants cannot defeat qualification by pointing to later descheduling or mismatches with the federal schedules at the time of federal sentencing.
• Georgia Aggravated Assault Remains a Qualifying Enumerated Offense: Hicks and Morales‑Alonso continue to foreclose mens‑rea‑based challenges to Georgia aggravated assault as a categorical match for generic aggravated assault. Unless reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court, Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon will count as a “crime of violence” for guideline enhancements.
• Preservation Matters—Object to PSI Facts: The panel’s reliance on Philidor, Bennett, and McCloud is a practical reminder: if the defense does not specifically dispute the PSI’s factual paragraphs, those facts are effectively admitted and can be used to establish the nature of a prior conviction. Where the modified‑categorical approach and Shepard documents might otherwise constrain the inquiry, undisputed PSI facts can fill the evidentiary gap.
• Top‑of‑Guidelines Sentences Need Not Be Accompanied by Lengthy Explanations: A district court’s acknowledgment that it considered §3553(a) and the parties’ arguments, coupled with a within‑guidelines term well below the statutory maximum, will typically withstand substantive reasonableness review—even when a defendant presents mitigation grounded in youth, trauma, or developmental science.
• Practical Takeaways for Practitioners:
  • Defense counsel should preserve Shepard‑based objections and specifically identify and dispute PSI paragraphs that describe the facts of prior convictions.
  • Challenges to Georgia PWID priors or aggravated assault priors face steep headwinds in the Eleventh Circuit given Dubois II, Hicks, and Morales‑Alonso.
  • Prosecutors and probation officers can rely on undisputed PSI narratives to establish predicate offense conduct; ensure the PSI thoroughly and accurately describes the underlying facts.
  • At sentencing, presenting mitigation on youth and trauma may be considered, but courts retain broad discretion to prioritize criminal history and public‑safety considerations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Controlled Substance Offense (Guidelines): A prior conviction for drug trafficking or distribution‑related conduct that counts toward enhancements under §2K2.1. In the Eleventh Circuit, it suffices that the drug was controlled by state law at the time of the state conviction, regardless of federal scheduling status at federal sentencing.
• Crime of Violence (Guidelines): Certain prior offenses qualify either because they have as an element the use/attempted/threatened use of violent force (elements clause) or because they match an enumerated offense (e.g., aggravated assault). Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies under the enumerated‑offenses clause.
• Enumerated‑Offenses Clause: A part of the guideline definition listing specific crimes (like aggravated assault). If the state offense’s elements are not categorically broader than the “generic” version of the listed offense, it qualifies.
• Shepard Documents: A limited set of records (e.g., charging instruments, plea colloquies) courts may consult to determine which variant of a divisible statute formed the basis of a prior conviction under the modified‑categorical approach. In the Eleventh Circuit, undisputed PSI facts may be used at sentencing even where Shepard might otherwise apply, if the defendant does not specifically object.
• Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: An Eleventh Circuit panel must follow earlier published circuit decisions unless they are overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
• Plain Error Review: A highly deferential standard applied to arguments not raised below; the appellant must show an error that is clear or obvious and affects substantial rights as well as the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• §3553(a) Factors: Statutory considerations for sentencing (e.g., seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, history and characteristics of the defendant). Courts need not recite each factor but must show they considered them.
• Within‑Guidelines Sentence: A sentence that falls within the advisory range. In the Eleventh Circuit, such sentences—particularly those below the statutory maximum—are generally reasonable and require no elaborate explanation.
• Large‑Capacity Magazine (Guidelines): Under §2K2.1(a)(1), possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large‑capacity magazine, combined with two qualifying priors, sets a higher base offense level (26 in the 2023 Manual).

Conclusion

United States v. Morris underscores and operationalizes two settled Eleventh Circuit rules in the firearms‑sentencing context. First, state drug convictions qualify as “controlled substance offenses” if the substance was controlled by state law at the time of the state conviction, irrespective of later scheduling changes or federal schedules at the time of federal sentencing (Dubois II). Second, Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon remains a categorical match for generic aggravated assault and thus a “crime of violence” under the enumerated‑offenses clause (Morales‑Alonso; Hicks).

The decision also offers clear guidance on sentencing practice: undisputed PSI facts can establish predicate offense conduct, Shepard arguments must be preserved, and district courts are afforded broad discretion to weigh §3553(a) factors. A top‑of‑Guidelines sentence—especially one well below the statutory maximum—will generally be upheld where the court acknowledges the factors and engages with the parties’ positions.

Although unpublished, Morris is a comprehensive application of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent that will inform district courts and practitioners alike when litigating §2K2.1 enhancements and reasonableness challenges in felon‑in‑possession cases.