Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign EEZs and “Non‑Affirmation” Statelessness; Confirms No Nexus Requirement; Courier Minor‑Role Denial Upheld

Commentary on United States v. Adalberto Marmolejos (consolidated with United States v. Willi Ariel Mendez and United States v. Jose Felix Vasquez), No. 22-11633 et al., 11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025 (per curiam) (unpublished)

Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision from the Eleventh Circuit arises from a U.S. Coast Guard interdiction of a go‑fast vessel approximately 95 nautical miles off Aruba, resulting in the recovery of 226 kilograms of cocaine. The three defendants—Willi Ariel Mendez, Jose Felix Vasquez, and Adalberto Marmolejos—pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508. After the pleas, they moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, mounting constitutional challenges to the statute’s extraterritorial reach and the statutory definition of “vessel without nationality.” The district court denied the motions and imposed 75‑month sentences on each defendant. On appeal, all three challenged their convictions; Marmolejos separately challenged the denial of a minor‑role reduction at sentencing.

The panel affirms across the board. Relying on binding circuit precedent, it rejects three constitutional arguments: (1) that waters inside another nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are not the “high seas” within Congress’s Felonies Clause authority; (2) that Congress may not deem a vessel “without nationality” when the claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry; and (3) that due process and the Felonies Clause require a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions. As to sentencing, the panel upholds the denial of a U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 minor‑role reduction for Marmolejos in light of the large drug quantity, his critical role driving the boat, and the significant payment he was to receive.

Summary of the Opinion

• MDLEA jurisdiction and the Felonies Clause:
  • EEZ as “high seas”: The court holds that waters within another nation’s EEZ are part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s authority to “define and punish” felonies committed there. Enforcement of the MDLEA in an EEZ is proper (citing United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)).
  • Statelessness via non‑affirmation: Congress permissibly defined a “vessel without nationality” to include a vessel for which the claimed nation neither confirms nor denies registry (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)), and customary international law does not limit this definition (citing United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)).
  • No nexus requirement: Due process is not offended, and Congress’s Felonies Clause power is not exceeded, by prosecuting drug trafficking on stateless vessels without a specific nexus to the United States (citing United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)).
• Sentencing (minor‑role reduction):
  • Applying United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), the court affirms the denial of a § 3B1.2(b) reduction. Marmolejos’s transport of 226 kg of cocaine, his role driving the vessel, and the substantial promised payment support the finding that his participation was not “minor.”
• Standards of review:
  • De novo review of subject‑matter jurisdiction and constitutional challenges (citing Canario‑Vilomar).
  • Clear‑error review of the minor‑role determination (citing United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016)).
• Disposition: Convictions and sentence affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Background

The Coast Guard encountered a boat with no visible indicia of nationality in the Caribbean Sea. As the Coast Guard approached, occupants jettisoned packages later recovered and found to contain 226 kilograms of cocaine. The vessel eventually stopped, and three individuals—Mendez, Vasquez, and Marmolejos—were on board. Upon inquiry, Mendez claimed Dominican nationality. The Coast Guard contacted the Dominican Republic, which neither confirmed nor denied the vessel’s nationality. The Coast Guard therefore treated the boat as a “vessel without nationality” and subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.

A federal grand jury indicted the defendants for MDLEA conspiracy and substantive possession counts. Each pled guilty to the conspiracy count in exchange for dismissal of the possession count, but later moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting constitutional defects. The district court denied the motions and sentenced each to 75 months; in Marmolejos’s case, the court declined to apply a minor‑role adjustment.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
  • Holding: Other nations’ EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law.
  • Impact here: The appellants argued that because they were within Venezuela’s EEZ, they were not on the “high seas.” Alfonso squarely foreclosed that argument, allowing MDLEA enforcement in the EEZ.
• United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
  • Holding: Congress acted within its Felonies Clause authority when it defined “vessel without nationality” to include cases where the claimed nation neither confirms nor denies nationality (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)); customary international law cannot limit Congress’s statutory definition for MDLEA purposes.
  • Impact here: The appellants’ attack on the “non‑affirmation” statelessness clause was rejected as foreclosed by Canario‑Vilomar.
• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
  • Holding: No nexus to the United States is required to prosecute drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas; due process is not offended because the MDLEA provides clear notice that such conduct is prohibited and universally condemned.
  • Impact here: The appellants’ due process/nexus argument failed under Campbell’s rule.
• United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
  • Framework: Two‑step minor‑role analysis comparing (1) the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable and (2) his role relative to other participants in that same conduct, guided by commentary factors in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C).
  • Illustrative principle: Transportation of a large quantity of drugs can indicate a non‑minor role when the courier’s participation is central to the scheme.
  • Impact here: The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a minor‑role reduction to Marmolejos based on the size of the load, his role driving the vessel, and promised remuneration.
• United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019)
  • Holding: In maritime drug smuggling cases, it is possible that none of the participants aboard the vessel qualify as minor participants; denial of role reductions to all is consistent with De Varon.
  • Impact here: Undercut the argument that Marmolejos must be minor simply because others (e.g., alleged owners or organizers) were more culpable.
• United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016)
  • Standard of review: The minor‑role finding is reviewed for clear error; a district court’s permissible view of the evidence is rarely reversible.
• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)
  • Prior‑panel‑precedent rule: A panel is bound by earlier published panel decisions unless abrogated by the Supreme Court or the court en banc.
  • Impact here: The panel expressly relied on binding precedent to dispose of the constitutional challenges.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds from two pillars: (1) the statutory text of the MDLEA and (2) binding circuit precedent on constitutional scope.

First, the MDLEA criminalizes possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances “on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” and conspiracy to do so (46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1); 70506(b)). A “vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction” includes “a vessel without nationality” (§ 70502(c)(1)(A)), and a “vessel without nationality” includes the situation in which “the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and … the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality” (§ 70502(d)(1)(C)). The MDLEA’s prohibitions apply extraterritorially (§ 70503(b)).

Second, the constitutional challenges are foreclosed by published Eleventh Circuit decisions:

• EEZ/high seas: Although the defendants argued the relevant waters were not the “high seas” because they lay within Venezuela’s EEZ, Alfonso characterizes EEZs as part of the high seas for Felonies Clause purposes. The panel therefore treats Congress’s “define and punish” power as extending to the conduct at issue even if within a foreign EEZ.
• International law limits: The defendants framed their arguments in customary international law terms, but Canario‑Vilomar holds that customary international law does not narrow Congress’s statutory power under the Felonies Clause to define “statelessness” for MDLEA enforcement.
• Nexus/due process: Campbell squarely rejects a nexus requirement for stateless vessels and finds no due process violation where the MDLEA gives clear notice and targets universally condemned drug trafficking on the high seas.

On sentencing, the panel applies De Varon’s two‑step, fact‑intensive framework. The district court found Marmolejos’s role was not minor because:

• He knowingly transported a very large quantity of cocaine (226 kg),
• He was to receive a substantial payment ($30,000 of a promised $60,000 split), and
• He took shifts driving the boat—conduct central to the execution of the offense.

Comparisons to higher‑level organizers (e.g., “Fermin,” “Ezequiel,” “El Botti,” “Fabian”) were unavailing because the relevant conduct was the transport on that vessel, not the broader conspiracy. Likewise, the fact that co‑participants might be more culpable did not compel a role reduction; it remains possible that none of the vessel’s participants qualifies as “minor.” Given clear‑error review, and a record supporting the district court’s rationale, the panel affirmed. Notably, although the government urged application of a more deferential “manifest injustice” standard because defense counsel did not re‑assert the objection after pronouncement of sentence, the panel expressly declined to decide the preservation issue and affirmed even under the ordinary clear‑error standard.

Impact and Significance

Although unpublished and therefore non‑precedential, the decision is significant in several respects:

• Consolidation of recent MDLEA jurisprudence: It applies the Eleventh Circuit’s latest published authorities—Alfonso (EEZ as high seas) and Canario‑Vilomar (statelessness via non‑affirmation)—to a common interdiction scenario. Practitioners should expect similar constitutional challenges to be rejected summarily as foreclosed in this circuit.
• Operational clarity for interdictions: Coast Guard practice that treats a vessel as stateless when a claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry is reaffirmed as sufficient to establish MDLEA jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C), so long as the Coast Guard properly seeks verification.
• Defense strategy recalibration: In the Eleventh Circuit, MDLEA attacks premised on customary international law, EEZ location, and nexus/due process are not viable short of en banc or Supreme Court review. Defense efforts may be better directed at factual disputes over statelessness, procedural compliance with verification protocols, or at sentencing mitigation.
• Sentencing practice for maritime couriers: The ruling underscores that large drug quantity, a hands‑on transport role (e.g., piloting), and substantial expected compensation weigh heavily against minor‑role reductions, even where the defendant is not an organizer/leader and lacks proprietary interest in the drugs. Presenting robust, case‑specific evidence of limited knowledge, minimal decision‑making authority, and modest benefit remains critical, but will often be insufficient when the load is large and the transport role is central.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline within which a coastal state has sovereign rights for resources and certain economic activities. It is not the state’s “territorial sea.” For Felonies Clause purposes in the Eleventh Circuit, the EEZ remains part of the “high seas.”
• Vessel Without Nationality (Stateless): Under the MDLEA, a vessel is “without nationality” if, among other situations, the master claims a nationality but the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert that nationality in response to a U.S. inquiry (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)). Stateless vessels are subject to U.S. jurisdiction on the high seas.
• Felonies Clause: U.S. Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 authorizes Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit interprets this authority broadly for MDLEA enforcement.
• Nexus Requirement: A rule that some offenses committed abroad must have a connection to the United States. The Eleventh Circuit does not require a nexus for MDLEA prosecutions involving stateless vessels on the high seas.
• Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a panel must follow earlier published panel decisions unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the court en banc.
• Minor‑Role Reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A 2‑level reduction for a “minor participant,” i.e., one less culpable than most other participants in the relevant conduct. Courts assess the totality of the circumstances, focusing on knowledge, decision‑making authority, participation scope, and expected benefit.
• Standards of Review:
  • De novo: The appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions (e.g., constitutional issues, subject‑matter jurisdiction).
  • Clear error: The appellate court defers to factual findings unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred (e.g., minor‑role determinations).

Additional Observations

• Unpublished Disposition: Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion signals how the Eleventh Circuit will apply its recent published decisions in routine MDLEA interdiction cases and sentencing disputes.
• Preservation of Sentencing Objections: The panel noted, but did not resolve, whether failing to renew a sentencing objection after pronouncement alters the standard of review. Practitioners should continue to renew objections after pronouncement to avoid any potential forfeiture arguments.
• Downward Variance: The district court varied downward from a calculated guideline range of 108–135 months to 75 months for Marmolejos, yet still denied the minor‑role reduction—highlighting that variances and role reductions are distinct inquiries.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Marmolejos reaffirms the circuit’s robust view of MDLEA jurisdiction and the limited role of customary international law in constraining Congress’s Felonies Clause power. Within this framework, waters in a foreign EEZ are treated as the “high seas,” and a vessel is “without nationality” when the claimed nation neither confirms nor denies registry, enabling U.S. enforcement without a U.S. nexus. On sentencing, the decision underscores that maritime couriers entrusted with transporting large quantities of narcotics—especially those who pilot the vessel and expect substantial compensation—will rarely qualify for a minor‑role reduction, consistent with De Varon’s fact‑intensive analysis and the deferential clear‑error standard. The opinion thus consolidates the Eleventh Circuit’s post‑Alfonso and post‑Canario‑Vilomar landscape, providing clear guidance for interdiction prosecutions and sentencing advocacy in MDLEA cases.