Introduction

In United States v. Anthony Bernard Carter (11th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed four sex‑trafficking convictions arising from a pimp’s transport of an adult and a minor from Atlanta to Miami during the lead‑up to the 2020 Super Bowl. The appeal presented three principal questions:

• Whether a minor victim’s statements made during a police sting were “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause (and, separately, admissible under the hearsay rules);
• Whether jury instructions for two counts constructively amended the superseding indictment in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and
• Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the transportation counts.

Writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Branch, and Kidd), Judge Kidd rejected all three challenges. The opinion is most notable for applying the Supreme Court’s “primary purpose/ongoing emergency” framework to sex‑trafficking sting operations and holding that a minor victim’s spontaneous statements during the sting were nontestimonial. The panel also found that instruction errors that broadened two transportation counts were constructive amendments, but not reversible under plain‑error review, and it reaffirmed that the government need only show that prostitution was one of the dominant purposes of interstate transportation under the Mann Act.

Summary of the Opinion

• Confrontation Clause: The minor victim’s spontaneous, highly distressed statements during a police sting were nontestimonial because they were made amid an ongoing emergency—an at‑large trafficker and at least one other known victim—and in the absence of formal interrogation. No Confrontation Clause violation occurred.
• Hearsay: Even if the statements were erroneously admitted as excited utterances, any error was harmless given the “mountain of evidence” supporting guilt and the peripheral role of the challenged statements.
• Constructive Amendment: Two jury‑instruction formulations—(i) adding “debauchery” to the § 2421(a) transportation‑for‑prostitution instruction and (ii) defining “prostitution” in the § 2423(a) minor‑transportation count as “any lewd act”—improperly broadened the charges. But because the defense did not object, the court reviewed for plain error and held the errors did not affect substantial rights: the record overwhelmingly showed prostitution as a dominant purpose.
• Sufficiency: Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, a reasonable jury could find that one of Carter’s dominant purposes in transporting both victims to Miami was to engage in commercial sex, including based on an explicit “Sweet Double Trouble” ad posted before travel.

Detailed Background

A jury convicted Carter on four counts: (1) sex trafficking of an adult victim by force/coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591); (2) transportation with intent that an adult engage in prostitution (18 U.S.C. § 2421(a)); (3) sex trafficking of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 1591); and (4) transportation of a minor with intent that she engage in a sexual activity for which a person can be charged (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)). The evidence showed Carter self‑identified as a pimp, controlled victims’ phones, posted a pre‑trip ad offering “Sweet Double Trouble,” and transported the pair in a black Toyota Corolla from Georgia to Florida. A police sting intercepted the minor victim; during the sting she blurted that she had been forced to come and pointed to her flip phone, which contained contemporaneous instructions to “get extra for your daddy.” Carter fled when police approached the car he had driven to the drop‑off, which later crashed and contained identifying items linking him to both victims.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Confrontation Clause and Testimonial Statements

• Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004): Bars admission of testimonial statements of an absent witness unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross‑examine.
• Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006): Introduces the “primary purpose” test—statements are nontestimonial if their primary purpose is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency; testimonial if to establish past events for prosecution.
• Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011): Emphasizes an objective, context‑rich assessment and that threats to police and the public can sustain an ongoing emergency.
• Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015): Non‑law‑enforcement questioners (teachers) seeking to protect a child from an at‑large abuser were addressing an ongoing emergency; statements were nontestimonial.
• Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009): Recognizes that volunteered statements can be testimonial in some contexts; relevant to drawing limits but not controlling here.
• United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc): Distress and spontaneity suggest nontestimonial character.
• United States v. Graham, 47 F.4th 561 (7th Cir. 2022): Closely analogous; statements about ongoing sex trafficking at a motel were nontestimonial because they were aimed at enabling police to respond to unfolding events.
• United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006): Earlier broad language about all police “interrogations” being testimonial is cabined by later Supreme Court cases; the panel expressly relies on Bryant’s clarification that not all police questioning triggers the Clause.

Hearsay and Harmlessness

• Fed. R. Evid. 803(2): Excited‑utterance exception.
• United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010): Abuse‑of‑discretion framework for hearsay rulings.
• United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2015): Hearsay errors reviewed for harmlessness; error harmless if no effect or only very slight effect on the verdict given the whole record.

Constructive Amendment and Plain Error

• Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960): A defendant may not be tried on charges broadened beyond the indictment.
• United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711 (11th Cir. 2014): Constructive amendment occurs when an essential element is effectively broadened at trial.
• United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2013): A constructive amendment satisfies the first two prongs of plain‑error review (error and plainness).
• United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001): Unpreserved constructive‑amendment claims are reviewed for plain error.
• United States v. Gray, 94 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2024): Confirms de novo review when preserved; not at issue here due to lack of objection.
• United States v. Doak, 47 F.4th 1340 (11th Cir. 2022): Best practice to instruct the jury on the specific state offense referenced by “sexual activity for which any person can be charged,” but failure to do so is not per se error if the indictment and record adequately inform the jury.
• United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Leon, 841 F.3d 1187 (11th Cir. 2016): Substantial‑rights analysis on plain error focuses on whether the correct verdict was likely without the error, considering the whole record and the parties’ theories.

Sufficiency and the Mann Act Intent Standard

• Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944): At times read to require prostitution be the “dominant motive” of travel, but limited to its facts.
• Forrest v. United States, 363 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1966), adopted in the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): The government need only prove that prostitution was one of the dominant purposes of interstate transportation.
• United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 2012): Reaffirms Forrest.
• United States v. Gaudet, 933 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2019): Similar approach in another circuit (intent as one among several motives).
• United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2024): Governs sufficiency review—evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Legal Reasoning

1) Confrontation Clause: Applying the Ongoing‑Emergency Doctrine to a Sex‑Trafficking Sting

The panel conducted the Supreme Court’s context‑driven “primary purpose” inquiry. Several facts anchored the nontestimonial finding:

• Ongoing threat to victim(s) and public: Police knew from the “Sweet Double Trouble” ad that at least one other victim existed. The trafficker (Carter) was at large and in communication with the minor. That constellation of risks fit squarely within Clark and Bryant, which treat at‑large perpetrators and potential additional victims as markers of an ongoing emergency.
• Temporal immediacy and spontaneity: Within 30 seconds of officers entering, the minor spontaneously exclaimed she had been forced to come; she then, while “talking over” officers, pointed to her phone. These were not the product of formal, structured interrogation.
• Declarant’s distress: The minor was bawling, extremely emotional, and unable to follow basic instructions—factors supporting the view that these were cries for help rather than prosecutorial narratives.
• Objective context controls: Although an officer mentioned calming the minor “to investigate further,” the court emphasized the objective circumstances, not a subjective investigatory motive, as Bryant requires.

In this posture, the court aligned with the Seventh Circuit’s Graham, treating sex‑trafficking stings as unfolding, rapidly evolving events where victim statements aim to enable immediate police action—rescue of victims and apprehension of traffickers—rather than to memorialize past crimes for trial. The panel also clarified that earlier Eleventh Circuit dicta suggesting that all police “interrogations” yield testimonial statements cannot survive the Supreme Court’s later clarifications.

2) Hearsay: Excited Utterance Debated, But Harmlessness Controls

The district court admitted the minor’s statements as excited utterances under Rule 803(2). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit sidestepped a definitive ruling on whether each statement satisfied Rule 803(2) because any error was harmless under the whole‑record test:

• Neither statement was central to counts involving the adult victim.
• Coercion was not an element of the § 1591 minor count as charged and instructed, diminishing the statements’ necessity.
• The record independently demonstrated Carter’s knowledge and control of the minor’s commercial sex activities (e.g., pre‑trip ad, contemporaneous phone command to “get extra for your daddy,” Carter’s presence and flight from the drop‑off).
• The prosecution’s “Gold Standard” comment in closing encompassed a suite of corroborating facts; the statements were not singled out as linchpins.

3) Constructive Amendment: Errors Found, But No Plain‑Error Reversal

Two instruction choices broadened the charges beyond the superseding indictment and statutes:

• Count 2 (§ 2421(a)): The court told the jury that a dominant purpose could be “prostitution or debauchery.” “Debauchery” is not part of the statute or the indictment.
• Count 4 (§ 2423(a)): In defining “prostitution,” the court used “any lewd act,” a broader phrase than the statutory “prostitution” or “sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.”

The defense did not object—indeed, it affirmatively stated “no objection” to the Count 2 instruction. Reviewing for plain error, the panel agreed prongs one and two were met (error, and plainness) but held the errors did not affect substantial rights:

• Across the trial, the government’s theory, evidence, and the jury’s other verdicts (Counts 1 and 3) all focused on commercial sex acts—i.e., prostitution—not some amorphous “debauchery” or “lewd acts.”
• Given the overwhelming evidence of prostitution as a dominant purpose, it is likely the jury would have convicted even with correct instructions; thus, the third prong (effect on substantial rights) was not satisfied.
• Additionally, the instruction that limited Count 4 to “prostitution” (rather than any criminal sexual activity) arguably narrowed liability, not broadened it, and the court found no error in the failure to spell out the specific state offense under Doak because the record made the proscribed conduct clear.

4) Sufficiency: “One of the Dominant Purposes” Reaffirmed

Relying on Forrest and Lebowitz, the court reaffirmed that the government need only show that prostitution was one of the dominant purposes of the interstate transportation. The pre‑departure “Sweet Double Trouble” ad—featuring both victims and soliciting sex for value—together with Carter’s control of the logistics, communications, and proceeds, allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that prostitution was a dominant purpose of the trip to Miami, notwithstanding Carter’s argument that he also intended the adult victim to work at a club.

Impact and Practical Significance

Confrontation Clause in Trafficking Stings

• Clear guidance for sex‑trafficking prosecutions: Statements from victims made during sting operations will often be nontestimonial when an at‑large trafficker and potential additional victims create an ongoing emergency, especially where statements are spontaneous and the declarant is distressed.
• Alignment with national trend: The decision harmonizes Eleventh Circuit practice with Seventh Circuit precedent (Graham) and the Supreme Court’s child‑protection line (Clark), signaling that courts will not lightly require live testimony where quick‑moving rescue contexts predominate.
• Law‑enforcement practices: Officers should minimize structured questioning and document contextual markers—spontaneity, distress, at‑large perpetrators, and contemporaneous safety concerns—to support nontestimonial character.

Jury Instructions in Mann Act Cases

• Avoid archaic or overbroad terms: “Debauchery” and “any lewd act” are problematic. Instructions should track statutory language—“prostitution” and “sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense”—and, when feasible, identify the pertinent state offense (best practice per Doak).
• Plain‑error realities: Even real constructive‑amendment missteps may not yield reversal without a persuasive showing that the error probably caused an incorrect verdict. Defense counsel should preserve objections to maximize appellate leverage.
• Definition coherence: Where § 1591 and Mann Act counts are tried together, definitions (e.g., “commercial sex act”) should be harmonized and carefully mapped to the statutory elements to avoid inadvertent broadening.

Intent Standard for Transportation Counts

• One dominant purpose suffices: The court re‑endorsed Forrest and Lebowitz, limiting Mortensen to its facts. Prosecutors need not show prostitution was the sole or principal motive; parallel purposes (e.g., club work) do not defeat liability where sex for value was a dominant purpose.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Confrontation Clause/Testimonial: The Sixth Amendment blocks out‑of‑court statements only if they are “testimonial,” meaning their primary purpose is to create evidence for trial. Statements made amid an emergency to allow police to respond are generally nontestimonial.
• Ongoing Emergency: A situation where a threat persists—to the victim, other potential victims, the police, or the public. In trafficking, an at‑large pimp and additional victims are classic markers.
• Excited Utterance (Rule 803(2)): A hearsay exception for statements made under the stress of a startling event. Even if a court errs by admitting such a statement, the conviction stands if the error did not meaningfully affect the verdict.
• Constructive Amendment: When trial proceedings (often instructions) effectively alter an essential element or broaden the charge beyond the indictment. If unobjected to, reversal requires showing a likely effect on the verdict (plain error).
• Plain Error: A four‑part test for unpreserved errors: (1) error; (2) clear/obvious; (3) affected substantial rights (probably caused a wrong verdict); and (4) seriously affects the fairness/integrity of proceedings.
• Mann Act Intent: For transporting a person for prohibited sexual activity, the government must prove that causing prostitution/criminal sexual activity was one of the dominant purposes of the interstate travel.
• Commercial Sex Act: As used in § 1591, any sex act for which anything of value is exchanged. Courts may equate “prostitution” with “commercial sex act” in appropriate instructions.

Conclusion

United States v. Carter is a consequential application of the Supreme Court’s “primary purpose” framework to the realities of sex‑trafficking investigations. The Eleventh Circuit held that a minor victim’s spontaneous, distressed statements during a sting were nontestimonial because they were made in the context of an ongoing emergency marked by an at‑large trafficker and known additional victims. The court also tightened the reins on imprecise jury instructions in Mann Act prosecutions—recognizing constructive‑amendment errors—but underscored the rigor of plain‑error review in the absence of preserved objections. Finally, it reaffirmed the longstanding rule that prostitution need only be one of the dominant purposes of interstate transport.

The decision provides concrete, practical guidance for police, prosecutors, and trial courts handling trafficking cases and sting operations, while offering defense counsel a roadmap for preserving and presenting Confrontation Clause and instruction issues. Its core message is two‑fold: context is king for Confrontation analysis, and precise, statute‑tracking instructions matter—but unpreserved errors will rarely undo a verdict where the record overwhelmingly points to guilt.