Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Good-Cause Requirement for Late Suppression Motions and Harmless-Error Review of Guideline Miscalculations

Commentary on United States v. Kenneth Ingram, No. 23-11251 (11th Cir. July 8, 2025) (unpublished)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Kenneth Ingram, the Eleventh Circuit confronted three recurring trial-and-sentencing questions:

1. When does a district court abuse its discretion in refusing to entertain an out-of-time suppression motion?
2. How does the court evaluate alleged guideline errors in light of the harmless-error doctrine?
3. What is the proper procedural vehicle—and timing—for seeking relief under the November 2023 “zero-point offender” Amendment 821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines?

Kenneth Ingram, a first-time federal offender convicted by jury of cocaine-trafficking conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, appealed on those three grounds. The panel (Pryor, J.; Kidd and Wilson, JJ.) affirmed across the board, generating useful clarifications even in an unpublished disposition.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Out-of-time suppression motion: The district court acted within its discretion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3) in refusing to extend the expired 2019 motion deadline. Subsequent appointment of new counsel, pandemic delays, and withdrawal of a guilty plea did not constitute “good cause.”
• Guideline issues:
  • Zero-Point Offender (§ 4C1.1): No error (plain or otherwise) in not applying the yet-to-be-effective amendment at the March 2023 sentencing. The proper mechanism was a later § 3582(c)(2) motion, which Ingram had already filed—and lost—below.
  • Firearm enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(1)): The district court’s factual finding that a loaded handgun was connected to the drug crime was not clearly erroneous, and any potential misapplication would have been harmless because the court expressly adopted the same 70-month sentence irrespective of guidelines.
• Constitutional claims (Due Process, Sixth & Second Amendments): Raised for the first time on appeal, reviewed only for plain error, and found unavailing.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2013) – “Good cause” is absent when a defendant possessed the necessary information to file a Rule 12(b) motion on time.
• United States v. Andres, 960 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2020) – Standard of review for denial of untimely suppression motions is “abuse of discretion.”
• United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) – Guideline error is harmless if the district court would have imposed the same sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
• Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992) – Foundation for harmless-error analysis in sentencing.
• United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017) – Burden-shifting framework for § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement.
• United States v. Masferrer, 514 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2008) – Sentencing court must apply the manual in effect at time of sentencing absent ex post facto concerns.
• United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015) – District courts lack inherent power to modify sentences; § 3582 provides the exclusive route.

Drawing from these cases, the panel reiterated that neither strategic decisions by prior counsel nor later “buyer’s remorse” supplies good cause for missing a suppression deadline; and that a would-be Guidelines error does not require reversal if the district court’s alternative statutory analysis under § 3553(a) is explicit and reasonable.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 12(c)(3) Good Cause:
   The panel required “diligence plus new information.” Because the warrant affidavit and other discovery had been in the defense’s possession since 2019, later-appointed counsel’s tactical change did not move the needle. Andres and Curbelo furnished the analytical backbone.
2. Plain-Error Framework for Late-Raised Constitutional Claims:
   Without binding precedent establishing a due-process or Sixth-Amendment right to successive suppression motions, no “plain error” could be found (Morales principle: silence in Supreme Court/11th Circuit caselaw forecloses plain error).
3. Guideline Calculations and Harmless Error:
   • The firearm enhancement was justified by the proximity of a loaded handgun and drug paraphernalia plus testimonial evidence of weapon use on drug trips.
   • Even if erroneous, the enhancement was harmless because the sentencing judge stated the 70-month term rested principally on § 3553(a) factors and would stand regardless of the guideline disputes, satisfying Keene.
4. Amendment 821 Timing:
   Applying Masferrer, the panel held that the November 2021 manual governed the March 2023 sentencing. Retroactive amendments must be pursued through § 3582(c)(2) motions, not on direct appeal from a pre-amendment judgment.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although unpublished, the opinion strengthens two doctrinal threads that district courts and practitioners confront daily:

• Timeliness discipline: Courts in the Eleventh Circuit may confidently deny late suppression motions where the evidentiary record has long been available, even if counsel changes or plea negotiations collapse.
• Guideline harmless-error insulation: Parties should expect that a well-articulated alternative § 3553(a) sentence will insulate most guideline miscalculations on appeal, reinforcing the importance of clear sentencing records.
• Amendment 821 procedural roadmap: Defendants sentenced before 1 Nov 2023 must seek zero-point offender benefits through § 3582(c)(2) (or a pending direct appeal from a post-amendment sentencing), not by retrofitting the issue onto an older judgment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 12(c)(3) “Good Cause”: Think of Rule 12 deadlines like a statute of limitations for motions. To file late, a defendant must show a good reason—new evidence or an external obstacle—not simply a change of mind or lawyer.
• Plain Error Review: On appeal, if you didn’t object below, the court will not reverse unless the error is (1) obvious, (2) affects substantial rights, and (3) seriously affects the fairness of proceedings. Lack of precedent usually defeats “obviousness.”
• Harmless Guideline Error: Even if the sentencing math is wrong, an appellate court will affirm if the judge says, and the record confirms, she would have imposed the same term using statutory factors.
• § 3582(c)(2) Retroactive Relief: Congress allowed sentence reductions when the Sentencing Commission makes certain amendments retroactive. A prisoner must file a motion in district court; it is not automatic and is distinct from a direct appeal.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Kenneth Ingram may not be precedential, yet it crisply synthesizes the Eleventh Circuit’s existing rules on late suppression motions, guideline harmlessness, and post-sentencing amendments. The opinion delivers three practical lessons:

1. Defense counsel must vet all suppression theories early; subsequent counsel cannot rely on a second bite absent genuinely new information.
2. A sentencing judge who explains—in the record—that she would impose the same sentence under § 3553(a) will likely survive appellate review even if guideline computations are later questioned.
3. Amendment 821 relief travels through § 3582(c)(2); defendants should not repurpose direct appeals to litigate retroactive guideline changes.

Taken together, these holdings promote procedural efficiency, reinforce respect for district-court scheduling orders, and delineate the proper channels for sentence modification in the post-sentencing landscape.