Eleventh Circuit Clarifies “Substantial Step” & § 3553(a) Balancing in Online Child-Enticement Cases – United States v. William Leonard

Introduction

United States v. William Leonard, No. 24-11435 (11th Cir. June 11, 2025) is a non-precedential opinion that nevertheless supplies robust guidance on two recurring issues in child-exploitation litigation: (1) what conduct constitutes a “substantial step” toward violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) when the putative victim is fictitious, and (2) when, and how, a district court may impose a large upward variance after calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range—especially where the defendant presents significant mental-health and military-service mitigation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both Leonard’s conviction and his 240-month sentence, thereby reinforcing prior circuit authority while elaborating on the weight to be accorded to unrelated bad acts and to disputed mitigation evidence at sentencing.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rosenbaum, Abudu, and Ed Carnes, JJ.) held:

1. The government presented ample evidence of Leonard’s specific intent to entice a minor and of his having taken a substantial step, including graphic e-mails, travel across several states, and possession of condoms. The jury reasonably rejected Leonard’s “suicide-by-sting” narrative.
2. The district court’s upward variance—doubling the top of the Guidelines range from 121 months to 240 months—was procedurally sound because the court expressly considered the § 3553(a) factors and Leonard’s mitigation, and substantively reasonable in light of his persistent pattern of predatory behavior toward minors.

Analytical Commentary

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019) – The backbone precedent for both specific-intent and substantial-step analyses involving fictitious minors. The Leonard panel quoted Gillis liberally to show that online chats plus travel suffice.
• United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) – Provided authority that detailed, explicit sexual descriptions toward a purported minor demonstrate criminal intent.
• United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) – The early 11th-Circuit case confirming that communication through an adult intermediary satisfies § 2422(b).
• United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904 (11th Cir. 2010) – Reiterated that even without fixed travel plans, lengthy explicit discussions may establish a substantial step; adopted in Leonard to show that Leonard’s completed travel is more than adequate.
• United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2012) & United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) – Both articulate the de novo standard for sufficiency-of-evidence reviews.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) – The controlling framework for substantive-reasonableness review and deference to district-court variances; pivotal in upholding the 240-month sentence.
• United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) – Cited for sentencing-review doctrines: burden on appellant, procedural vs. substantive reasonableness, and relevance of the statutory maximum.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of Evidence
   • Specific Intent: Leonard’s repeated confirmation of the “daughter’s” age, explicit sexual plans, and coordination with another minor (“Angela”) exceeded the mens rea threshold.
   • Substantial Step: Physical travel with condoms in hand, motel reservation, and real-time coordination with the undercover agent positioned Leonard “dangerously close” to completion; thus, more than “mere preparation.”
2. Sentencing
   • Procedural Reasonableness: The district court explicitly referenced the PSR, trial evidence, mental-health mitigation, and § 3553(a) factors. Incorporating evidence “by reference” is permissible when the record is clear.
   • Substantive Reasonableness: Upward variance justified by (i) pattern of grooming and coercing real minors (A.W.), (ii) calculated effort to involve “Angela,” (iii) refusal to accept responsibility, and (iv) need to protect the public. The 240-month term, well below the statutory maximum of life, sits comfortably within the range of reasonable sentences.

3. Potential Impact

Although unpublished, Leonard is instructive for practitioners in three respects:

• Clarification of “Substantial Step” – The opinion confirms that physical travel plus possessing sexual-paraphernalia almost inevitably cross the “substantial step” line, even if no minor actually exists.
• Weight of Mental-Health Mitigation – A defendant’s PTSD, depression, or military service will not preclude a substantial upward variance when the offense conduct is egregious and the defendant declines accountability.
• Use of Uncharged Conduct – Communication with other minors (A.W.) and threats of exposure can legitimately influence sentencing under § 3553(a)(1) (“history and characteristics” and “nature and circumstances”).

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 2422(b)

A federal statute criminalizing attempts to persuade or coerce a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. Even an attempt—where the minor is fictitious—triggers liability.

Specific Intent

The government must prove the defendant purposefully sought to induce the minor; reckless or negligent conduct is insufficient.

Substantial Step

An act that strongly corroborates intent and moves the defendant “dangerously close” to committing the substantive offense. Travel arrangements, bringing condoms, or showing up at a meeting spot all count.

Guidelines Range vs. Variance

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines produce an advisory imprisonment range. A variance is any sentence outside that range, justified under § 3553(a).

Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

Procedural: Did the court follow correct steps—calculate Guidelines, consider § 3553(a), and explain?
Substantive: Is the length of the sentence too high or too low in light of the facts and factors?

Conclusion

United States v. William Leonard reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent stance on online child-enticement. The court reiterated that explicit electronic communications followed by concrete travel arrangements unequivocally constitute a “substantial step,” and that extensive upward variances remain sustainable where the district court builds a record tying the § 3553(a) factors to the defendant’s real-world predation. Mental-health issues and honorable military service, while relevant, do not overshadow the imperative of protecting minors and deterring similar crimes. Going forward, defense counsel should anticipate that any tangible action toward meeting a purported minor will likely satisfy § 2422(b), and that mitigation arguments must be buttressed by genuine acceptance of responsibility to gain traction at sentencing.