Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision addresses two recurring issues in immigration removal practice: (1) how federal courts review “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” determinations in cancellation-of-removal cases under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), and (2) what showing is necessary to reopen proceedings based on new mental-health evidence.

Petitioner, Maria Virginia Rodriguez Robles, a Mexican national who entered the United States without inspection in 2002, sought cancellation of removal based on alleged hardship to her U.S.-citizen children, focusing primarily on the mental health history of her teenage daughter, Amy. After an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed—also denying a motion to remand—Rodriguez Robles moved to reopen with new psychological assessments. The BIA denied reopening as unlikely to change the outcome. She petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review of both BIA decisions.

The Court affirms across the board, offering two important clarifications for practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) following the Court’s recent decision in Lopez‑Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General, the application of the statutory hardship standard to the facts is reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard (a highly deferential inquiry), and (2) when hardship is premised on a qualifying relative’s health, it is proper—indeed required by agency precedent—to evaluate whether adequate medical care is reasonably available in the country of removal (the Matter of J‑J‑G‑ two‑part test), as part of the cumulative hardship analysis.

Summary of the Opinion

• Cancellation denial affirmed: Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner failed to show her U.S.-citizen children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if removed to Mexico with her, considering their ages, health, language skills, potential to adapt, available family support in Mexico, and the generalized nature of any differences in educational or economic opportunities.
• Legal standard correctly applied: The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the agency “added” an extra-statutory requirement by considering the availability of mental-health care in Mexico. Under Matter of J‑J‑G‑ (BIA 2020), adopted in the Eleventh Circuit via Lopez‑Martinez, health-based hardship requires showing both a serious condition and that adequate care is not reasonably available in the country of removal—an inquiry the BIA properly conducted as part of the cumulative hardship analysis.
• Motion to reopen properly denied: Applying the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard (Abudu; Coelho), the Court holds that the BIA reasonably found the new mental-health evaluations unlikely to change the outcome, particularly because they did not demonstrate unavailability of adequate mental-health care in Mexico and, viewed in the aggregate, still did not meet the elevated hardship threshold.

Case Background

Rodriguez Robles conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and sought non-LPR cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)). The IJ designated Mexico as the country of removal.

Her hardship claim centered on Amy, then 16, who had experienced an adjustment disorder, depression, and anxiety after two incidents at age 12: inappropriate touching by a cousin and peer bullying after she sent pressured photographs. Amy underwent therapy for several months and, later, one session three years afterward; she had no ongoing mental-health treatment or medication regimen and was active in her church. The family testified that the children had limited Spanish proficiency, but could become proficient, and would move with their mother to her small hometown in Mexico, where they believed services were less accessible. No child had a chronic medical condition.

The IJ denied cancellation, reasoning that: (1) no family separation would occur (the children would accompany their mother), (2) the children’s youth, prior exposure to Spanish, and family support in Mexico would facilitate adjustment, (3) educational or economic differences alone do not establish the statutory hardship, and (4) Amy’s mental-health history, absent ongoing treatment or medication and a showing of unavailability of adequate care in Mexico, did not meet the very high hardship threshold. The BIA affirmed and denied a motion to remand based on new records regarding a son’s purported learning issues, noting the records were available earlier and did not substantiate the alleged conditions. A later motion to reopen supplied two mental-health evaluations (one for Amy and one for the mother); the BIA denied reopening as the new evidence was unlikely to change the outcome.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Lopez‑Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23‑10105, 2025 WL 2234162 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025): The Eleventh Circuit characterized application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard as an “irreducibly mixed” question that is “primarily factual.” The Court therefore reviews for substantial evidence whether the found facts “add up” to statutory hardship, and treats the agency’s determination as “conclusive” if so supported. This decision anchors the standard of review applied here.
• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): The Supreme Court clarified that while mixed questions of law and fact can be reviewable as “questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), the underlying factual determinations remain unreviewable. The Eleventh Circuit leverages Wilkinson to explain the limited judicial role in second‑guessing factual underpinnings of hardship findings.
• Matter of Monreal‑Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001): Foundational BIA precedent defining “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as hardship “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected” from removal; emphasizes a cumulative, fact-intensive, and very demanding standard.
• Matter of Andazola‑Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002): Reinforces that the hardship threshold is “very high,” reserved for “truly exceptional” circumstances.
• Matter of J‑J‑G‑, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808 (BIA 2020): Establishes the two‑part framework for health‑based hardship: the applicant must show (1) a serious medical condition in the qualifying relative and (2) that, if accompanying the applicant, adequate care for that condition is not reasonably available in the country of removal. The Eleventh Circuit expressly endorses this framework through Lopez‑Martinez and applies it here.
• Flores‑Panameno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 2019): Confirms the Eleventh Circuit reviews BIA decisions, and the IJ’s reasoning only insofar as adopted by the BIA.
• I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988): Governs motions to reopen; courts accord “even greater” deference to the BIA’s reopening decisions in the immigration context to avoid “endless delay.”
• Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1992): A party seeking reopening bears a “heavy burden” to show the new evidence would likely change the result if the case were reopened.
• Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009): Articulates the abuse‑of‑discretion standard (arbitrary or capricious) for reviewing denials of motions to reopen.
• Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008): Legal determinations within a denial of reopening are reviewed de novo.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of review—substantial evidence for hardship application: Relying on Lopez‑Martinez, the Court frames the dispositive issue as whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner’s children would not suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if they accompany her to Mexico. The Court emphasizes deference to agency fact‑finding and weighing: while mixed questions are technically reviewable after Wilkinson, in this context the “application” is primarily factual, so the BIA/IJ’s aggregate hardship judgment stands if supported by the record.

2) Proper use of the J‑J‑G‑ two‑part test in health‑based hardship: The petitioner argued the BIA impermissibly “added” a requirement by asking whether adequate mental-health care exists in Mexico. The Court rejects that view. Matter of J‑J‑G‑ expressly requires this inquiry when hardship is premised on health. Critically, the Court clarifies that this is not an extraneous threshold test that supplants the totality analysis; it is an integral part of how the agency weighs health‑related hardship within the cumulative assessment. The BIA’s reasoning here—considering both the seriousness of Amy’s condition and the record’s failure to show unavailability of adequate care in Mexico—was legally correct.

3) Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s hardship determination: The IJ and BIA emphasized non‑separation (the children would accompany their mother), the children’s ages and adaptability (including potential to develop Spanish proficiency), the availability of family support in Mexico, the lack of ongoing medical or mental‑health treatment for the children (no medications, long gap since substantive therapy), and the principle that generalized differences in schooling or economic opportunity do not by themselves constitute statutory hardship. In light of Monreal‑Aguinaga and Andazola‑Rivas, those findings support the agency’s conclusion that the circumstances are not “substantially different from” hardships ordinarily incident to removal. Under the substantial‑evidence lens, the Court affirms.

4) Motions to remand and reopen—heavy burdens and deference: The BIA denied the initial remand request because the son’s learning‑disability records were available at the merits hearing and did not substantiate the alleged cognitive impairments. Later, the BIA denied reopening despite new psychological evaluations, finding they were unlikely to change the outcome, particularly because they did not establish the unavailability of adequate mental-health care in Mexico and did not move the aggregate hardship evidence across the very high statutory threshold. Applying Abudu and Coelho, the Court finds no abuse of discretion: the BIA’s determination has a rational connection to the record and rests on accepted legal standards.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

• Review posture in the Eleventh Circuit is now settled and highly deferential: Post‑Wilkinson and Lopez‑Martinez, applicants should expect that the “application” of the hardship standard to the facts will be reviewed only for substantial evidence. Appeals arguing that the BIA misweighed evidence are unlikely to prevail absent clear legal error or a lack of record support.
• Health‑based hardship must address care availability abroad: The Court’s endorsement of the J‑J‑G‑ framework requires concrete, localized proof that adequate care is not reasonably available in the designated removal destination. General assertions about country conditions, bare claims of rural scarcity, or antiquated/unsupported descriptions of infrastructure will usually be insufficient.
• Mental health evidence must be robust, current, and consequential: Evaluations that lack a treatment plan, do not reflect ongoing therapy/medication, or do not explain the consequences of disrupted care, especially vis‑à‑vis availability and affordability in the country of removal, will often fail to carry the “very high” hardship burden.
• Strategic use of remand/reopening is constrained: Evidence that existed or could have been obtained at the time of the merits hearing will rarely justify remand or reopening. New evidence must be material, previously unavailable despite diligence, and likely to change the result.
• Family‑unity arguments require precision: Where the applicant testifies that minor children will accompany the parent, the agency will likely discount “separation” hardship and focus on adaptability and support in the destination country. Counsel should carefully consider evidentiary strategy around children’s residence decisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cancellation of removal (non‑LPR): A form of discretionary relief that allows certain nonpermanent residents to avoid removal if they meet strict criteria, including 10 years’ continuous presence, good moral character, and showing that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative (U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child).
• “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A very demanding standard. Hardship must be substantially beyond what families ordinarily experience when a member is removed. The agency looks at all relevant factors together (health, education, age, special needs, support networks, country conditions), but generalized economic or educational disadvantages rarely suffice by themselves.
• Qualifying relative: Only the U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child counts. The noncitizen applicant’s own hardship is legally relevant only insofar as it directly affects the qualifying relative’s hardship.
• Health‑based hardship and J‑J‑G‑: To rely on a relative’s health, the applicant must show (1) a serious medical condition and (2) that adequate care is not reasonably available in the removal destination. “Adequate” includes considerations of availability, accessibility, and reasonableness in context.
• Substantial‑evidence review: A highly deferential standard under which the court asks only whether the record contains enough evidence that a reasonable adjudicator could reach the agency’s conclusion. The court does not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency’s.
• Abuse‑of‑discretion review (motions to reopen/remand): Another deferential standard. The Board abuses its discretion only if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law. To reopen, the applicant must show new, previously unavailable, material evidence that would likely change the outcome.
• Wilkinson’s division of labor: Courts may review legal and certain mixed questions, but cannot revisit or second‑guess the agency’s raw fact‑finding. In the hardship context, this keeps appellate review narrow.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

• Build the health record early and thoroughly:
  • Document diagnoses, severity, functional limitations, and the current treatment plan (frequency, duration, medications, therapy modalities).
  • Obtain expert opinions on prognosis and the likely consequences of treatment interruption.
  • For the J‑J‑G‑ prong two, gather localized evidence on service availability: provider directories, wait‑list data, travel distances, specialist scarcity (e.g., child psychiatry), costs, insurance/coverage, and affidavits from providers in the specific region of removal.
• Show cumulative hardship across domains: Education (IEPs, learning disabilities), mental health, special needs services, language acquisition challenges, safety concerns, and economic realities—tie them together to show how they compound beyond the ordinary.
• Be precise about children’s residence plans: If separation hardship is central, the record must support that the children will remain in the United States and why. If they will accompany the applicant, focus on adaptation barriers and the unavailability of critical services abroad.
• For motions to reopen: Explain diligence, unavailability at the prior hearing, and materiality. Articulate concretely why the new evidence would likely change the outcome under the very high hardship standard.

Conclusion

Although unpublished, this decision consolidates two important strands of Eleventh Circuit immigration law. First, in the wake of Wilkinson and Lopez‑Martinez, the application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is reviewed for substantial evidence—an approach that preserves reviewability of the mixed question but maintains a highly deferential posture toward the agency’s aggregate assessment of hardship. Second, the Court reaffirms the BIA’s J‑J‑G‑ framework for health‑based hardship: applicants must substantiate both the seriousness of the qualifying relative’s condition and the unavailability of adequate care in the country of removal, as part of the cumulative analysis.

For future cases, the message is clear: success on cancellation will often turn on rigorous, contemporaneous medical and educational documentation, coupled with granular, region‑specific proof that essential services cannot reasonably be accessed in the country of removal. In the absence of such evidence, and given the elevated hardship bar, the BIA’s determinations will typically withstand judicial review.