Eleventh Circuit Adopts Defendant‑Specific Reading of § 922(g)(1) and Limits “Imprisonment” to Actual Incarceration

Introduction

In United States v. Joshua Eugene Gaines, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a felon‑in‑possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and directed entry of a judgment of acquittal. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Newsom held that § 922(g)(1)’s predicate—“convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—must be applied in a defendant‑specific manner and that “imprisonment” means actual confinement in a jail or prison, not alternatives such as community corrections or probation. Because Alabama’s then‑applicable statutory scheme barred the imposition of prison time for Gaines’s Class D felony given his record, his prior conviction did not qualify as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

The case presents a clean statutory holding with significant practical consequences: it narrows the class of state convictions that can serve as § 922(g)(1) predicates by tying eligibility to the actual incarceration exposure of the particular defendant at the time of the prior conviction, and it clarifies that non‑carceral sanctions are not “imprisonment.”

Parties and posture: The United States prosecuted Gaines in the Northern District of Alabama on two counts—(1) possession of a firearm by a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (§ 922(g)(1)) and (2) possession of an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)). A jury acquitted on the registration count but convicted on § 922(g)(1). The district court denied Rule 29 motions for acquittal. On appeal, Gaines argued the government’s proof was insufficient because his Alabama Class D felony was not a qualifying predicate. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and vacated.

Summary of the Opinion

Text at issue: § 922(g)(1) applies to persons convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
Core holding 1 (defendant‑specific): Relying on Supreme Court precedent (Carachuri‑Rosendo and Moncrieffe), the court held that “punishable by” is constrained by “convicted” and therefore must be assessed with reference to the actual sentencing exposure of the particular defendant, not the abstract statutory maximum of the offense category in the abstract.
Core holding 2 (meaning of imprisonment): “Imprisonment” means real jail or prison time. It does not include community corrections, probation, drug court, pretrial diversion, or similar “alternative to incarceration” sanctions, nor hypothetical post‑revocation imprisonment.
Application to Alabama Class D: Under Alabama’s then‑effective § 15‑18‑8(b) (2019 version), Gaines—lacking specified prior felony counts—could not be imprisoned for his Class D conviction; only non‑carceral sanctions were authorized. Therefore, his predicate was not a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
Result: Evidence was insufficient as a matter of law on the § 922(g)(1) element. Conviction vacated; remanded with instructions to enter judgment of acquittal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s analysis turns on two Supreme Court immigration decisions that interpret similarly structured statutory language:

Carachuri‑Rosendo v. Holder (560 U.S. 563): Addressed whether a noncitizen’s prior drug conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” where the statutory scheme looked to whether the offense was a “felony punishable” under federal law. The Court rejected a “hypothetical felony” (offense‑specific) approach that imagines aggravating facts not established in the actual conviction; it emphasized the word “convicted” as the textual anchor requiring attention to the conviction itself.
Moncrieffe v. Holder (569 U.S. 184): Reaffirmed that the “punishable by” inquiry is conviction‑specific. Where the Controlled Substances Act created mutually exclusive misdemeanor and felony tracks depending on small‑amount/no‑remuneration facts, the government had to show the record of conviction necessarily established the felony track.

The Eleventh Circuit found § 922(g)(1)’s structure materially identical to the INA provisions in Carachuri and Moncrieffe: it targets those “convicted” of a crime “punishable” in a particular way. That alignment compelled a defendant‑specific reading here.

The court also canvassed post‑Carachuri circuit law: jurisdictions that had earlier used offense‑specific readings of § 922(g)(1) or similar language switched after Carachuri—Fourth Circuit (Simmons), Eighth (Haltiwanger), Ninth (Valencia‑Mendoza), and Tenth (Brooks). The panel flagged the D.C. Circuit’s Schrader as an outlier that did not reckon with Carachuri.

To define “imprisonment,” the court drew on:

General federal interpretive principles: Taylor v. United States (federal terms are interpreted under federal law absent a clear state‑law incorporation).
Beecham v. United States: § 921(a)(20)’s “choice‑of‑law clause” concerns what counts as a “conviction,” not the definition of “imprisonment.”
Dictionaries and ordinary usage: Contemporary sources define “imprison” as confining someone in jail or prison; the “im‑” prefix denotes being placed in the thing named (here, “prison”).
Guidelines caselaw: Then‑Judge Alito’s opinion in United States v. Pray and other circuits uniformly understand “imprisonment” to mean physical confinement, not probation/parole/home detention.
BOP statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621–3624 treat “imprisonment” as confinement in an institution, with limited transitional allowances (e.g., community facilities at the tail end under § 3624(c)), reinforcing the ordinary meaning.

Finally, in applying the rule to Alabama law, the court closely read:

Ala. Code § 13A‑5‑6(a)(4) (2019) (as it then incorporated § 15‑18‑8(b)): Made Class D sentencing subject to § 15‑18‑8(b)’s non‑prison mandates for defendants without specified repeat‑felony records.
Ala. Code § 15‑18‑8(b), (e) (2019): Precluded actual prison/jail time for eligible Class D offenders; authorized probation, drug court, pretrial diversion, or participation in a community corrections program.
Ala. Code § 15‑18‑170 et seq. (Community Punishment and Corrections Act): Repeatedly describes community corrections as an “alternative to incarceration,” lists non‑carceral programming, and requires additional findings before revocation can lead to prison, all confirming it is not “imprisonment.”

Legal Reasoning

1) Defendant‑Specific Reading of “Convicted … of a crime punishable by”

Although § 922(g)(1)’s grammar (“punishable by …” postpositively modifying “crime”) could suggest an offense‑specific look at the statute of conviction in the abstract, Carachuri and Moncrieffe instruct courts to start with “convicted,” not hypothesized enhancements or possibilities outside the conviction record. Words ending in “‑able/‑ible” (e.g., “punishable”) often denote capacities or qualities in the abstract, but where Congress tethers that abstraction to a completed fact (“convicted”), the inquiry becomes defendant‑specific: what term of imprisonment was this defendant actually eligible to receive given the legally operative facts of his case (including recidivism statutes and statutory constraints in effect at the time)?

Thus, the court rejected the government’s offense‑specific approach and aligned with the Supreme Court’s directive that courts may not imagine aggravating circumstances not established by the conviction itself to transform a non‑qualifying predicate into a qualifying one.

2) “Imprisonment” Means Actual Jail or Prison Confinement

The court adopted the ordinary meaning of “imprisonment”: physical confinement. It declined to incorporate state‑law glosses that expand the term to include community corrections, emphasizing:

Federal statutes are construed by federal law absent a “plain indication” to the contrary (Taylor); nothing in § 922(g)(1) supplies such an indication.
Section 921(a)(20)’s choice‑of‑law clause governs what counts as a “conviction,” not the meaning of “imprisonment” (Beecham).
Dictionary definitions at the time of enactment (1961) and legal usage confine “imprisonment” to jail/prison.
Guidelines cases uniformly treat imprisonment as custody, not community‑based sanctions; and BOP statutes use the term consistently with confinement in an institution (with narrow, transitional exceptions).

The government’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (allowing pre‑release placement in community facilities for “a portion of the final months” of a “term of imprisonment”) backfired: the statute presupposes a custodial term in an institution and permits only its end‑stage to be served in community settings. That structure reinforces, rather than undermines, the custodial meaning of “imprisonment.”

3) Application to Alabama’s Class D Felonies (2019 regime)

For a defendant like Gaines, Alabama law did not authorize any jail or prison time for a Class D felony absent the qualifying recidivist triggers. The sentencing alternatives were non‑carceral: probation, drug court, pretrial diversion, or community corrections. The Alabama Community Punishment and Corrections Act repeatedly classifies community corrections as an “alternative to incarceration” and distinguishes it from prison or jail; revocation leading to actual prison requires additional judicial findings after a violation, underscoring that the original sentence is not “imprisonment.”

Because Gaines could not be sentenced to more than one year of actual imprisonment—and, indeed, could not be sentenced to any imprisonment at all for the Class D offense—the predicate did not satisfy § 922(g)(1). The government’s proof on that element necessarily failed.

Impact

1) Immediate effects in the Eleventh Circuit

Prosecutors must now prove, for § 922(g)(1), that the particular defendant’s prior conviction exposed him to more than one year of actual incarceration given the operative state sentencing scheme and his personal recidivist profile at the time. It is no longer sufficient to show that the offense category is labeled a “felony” or carries an abstract statutory maximum exceeding one year.
Non‑carceral sentences (probation, community corrections, drug court, suspended sentences without custodial exposure) will not qualify unless the defendant was actually eligible for more than one year in jail/prison under applicable law at the time of the prior conviction.
Alabama Class D felonies under the pre‑2023 framework will frequently fall outside § 922(g)(1) when the defendant lacked the specified prior‑felony counts that would have permitted incarceration. Similar analyses will be required across Alabama Class C and D structures where alternatives to incarceration are mandated.

2) Convergence with other circuits and national uniformity

The decision harmonizes Eleventh Circuit law with post‑Carachuri shifts elsewhere (Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth Circuits), reducing interstate disparity about who is a prohibited person under § 922(g)(1). The D.C. Circuit’s contrary reading in Schrader now stands isolated and, as the panel notes, did not grapple with Carachuri.

3) Litigation and evidentiary considerations

Proof at trial: The government will often need to introduce state sentencing statutes/regulations in effect at the time of the prior conviction and the defendant’s qualifying record to show actual exposure to >1 year of incarceration. Certified judgment documents alone may be insufficient if they do not establish exposure.
Jury instructions and Rule 29: Defense counsel should request instructions tracking the defendant‑specific standard and move for judgment of acquittal if the government fails to prove actual imprisonment exposure beyond a year.
Charging decisions: U.S. Attorney’s Offices may pivot toward alternative predicates (e.g., § 922(g)(9) misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, § 922(g)(8) restraining orders, or recent qualifying felonies) where defendant‑specific incarceration exposure is clear.

4) Retroactivity and collateral review

The ruling is a matter of statutory interpretation, not a new constitutional rule. Its applicability on collateral review will depend on procedural posture. Defendants on direct appeal can invoke the holding. For final convictions, relief via 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be constrained by timing and successive‑petition rules; however, some defendants may argue “actual innocence” of the § 922(g)(1) offense if their predicate never qualified. Litigants should evaluate deadlines, procedural defaults, and the implications of Jones v. Hendrix on the saving clause before proceeding.

5) Interactions with other federal statutes

The panel distinguished the Armed Career Criminal Act case United States v. Gardner (11th Cir. 2022), which addressed what counts as the “maximum term of imprisonment … prescribed by law” for ACCA’s serious drug offense definition. Gardner’s categorical method remains intact in its ACCA context and does not alter this case’s defendant‑specific reading for § 922(g)(1) predicates. The court’s careful parsing of § 921(a)(20) also clarifies the limited function of the “choice‑of‑law” clause—resolving what is a “conviction,” not redefining “imprisonment.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Offense‑specific vs. defendant‑specific: Offense‑specific asks, “What is the maximum punishment theoretically attached to this statute?” Defendant‑specific asks, “Given this person’s situation at the time—recidivist status, statutory constraints—what punishment could he actually have received?” The Eleventh Circuit chose the latter for § 922(g)(1).
Imprisonment (as used here): Time in a jail or prison. Not included: probation, community corrections, home confinement, drug court, or similar non‑custodial sanctions. Transitional placements (e.g., halfway houses) are part of a custodial term only at the tail end of an already‑imposed imprisonment, not substitutes for imprisonment.
Community corrections (Alabama): A set of community‑based sanctions expressly described by state law as an “alternative to incarceration,” including day reporting, electronic monitoring, treatment programs, and supervised residential options—distinct from jail/prison.
Suspended sentence: A sentence pronounced but not executed so long as the defendant complies with conditions (often probation). A suspended sentence that cannot be executed as imprisonment (because state law forbids incarceration for that offense and defendant profile) does not make the offense “punishable by imprisonment.”

Conclusion

United States v. Gaines establishes two important rules of federal firearms law in the Eleventh Circuit. First, § 922(g)(1) is defendant‑specific: whether a prior conviction qualifies turns on the particular defendant’s actual exposure to imprisonment for that prior offense, not the abstract maximum for the offense class. Second, “imprisonment” means what lay speakers and the criminal justice system ordinarily mean—custody in jail or prison—not community‑based alternatives or speculative post‑revocation confinement.

By anchoring its interpretation in Supreme Court guidance (Carachuri‑Rosendo and Moncrieffe), federal interpretive norms (Taylor, Beecham), and ordinary meaning, the court narrowed § 922(g)(1)’s reach to the class of persons Congress actually described. The decision will recalibrate federal charging and proof in felon‑in‑possession cases, particularly in jurisdictions like Alabama that have created offense classes and offender categories for which incarceration is statutorily off‑limits. Its careful textual analysis also provides a roadmap for assessing other federal statutes that hinge on predicate offenses “punishable by” specified terms of “imprisonment.”