Electronic Right-to-Sue Notice and the 90-Day Filing Period under Title VII and the ADA: The García-Gesualdo Standard

Introduction

In García-Gesualdo v. Honeywell Aerospace of P.R., Inc., 23-1921 (1st Cir. Apr. 24, 2025), the First Circuit addressed a critical procedural question under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): when does the 90-day statute of limitations for filing suit commence when an EEOC right-to-sue notice is delivered electronically? Plaintiff-appellant Leika Joanna García-Gesualdo alleged employment discrimination against Honeywell and exhausted her administrative remedies before the EEOC. The EEOC e-mailed her counsel twice—on March 29 and April 6, 2022—informing them that a new or “important” document (the right-to-sue letter) was available via the EEOC Public Portal. Counsel was unable to access the document until April 11 due to a portal error. García-Gesualdo filed her complaint on July 7 (100 days after the March 29 email). The district court dismissed the suit as untimely. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, establishing the rule that mere electronic notification of a link to a right-to-sue letter, without attaching or explicitly summarizing that letter, does not constitute “receipt” of notice that triggers the 90-day filing window.

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit held that neither the March 29 nor the April 6 email sufficed to notify García-Gesualdo of her right to sue. Those emails simply alerted counsel that “a new document” or “an important document” was available; they did not attach the right-to-sue letter nor unambiguously state that EEOC had dismissed or otherwise terminated proceedings and that the claimant had 90 days to file suit. The court emphasized that an EEOC notice under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) must clearly communicate dismissal of the charge (or termination of EEOC processing) and the claimant’s 90-day deadline. Because timeliness was not apparent on the face of the complaint and accompanying records, the dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds was erroneous. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 694 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2012): Confirmed the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies and to receive an EEOC notice before filing suit.
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst., 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009): Held that the 90-day period begins upon receipt of the EEOC’s dismissal/termination notice.
Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556 (1st Cir. 2005): Clarified that “notice” refers specifically to termination of EEOC processing, not any investigatory action.
Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178 (7th Cir. 2021): Determined that an email attaching a right-to-sue letter and bearing the subject “Final Action” commenced the 90-day period—even if the attachment was opened later.
McDonald v. St. Louis University, 109 F.4th 1068 (8th Cir. 2024): Extended Lax to hold that an email linking to a right-to-sue letter triggered the deadline upon delivery of the link.

Legal Reasoning

The court began by reaffirming that Title VII and ADA actions require exhaustion of EEOC administrative processes, followed by a written notice of dismissal or non-conciliation. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), once a claimant “receives” such notice, the 90-day suit period begins. The First Circuit then carefully parsed the content of the March 29 and April 6 emails:

Neither email attached the right-to-sue letter itself.
Neither email unambiguously stated that the EEOC had dismissed the charge or terminated proceedings.
They merely directed counsel to log in and download some new or important document.

By contrast, the right-to-sue letter—once viewed on April 11—explicitly stated EEOC’s dismissal of the charge and the 90-day deadline. The court held that the statute’s notice requirement demands an unequivocal written communication of dismissal/termination plus the 90-day window. The mere existence of a link in an email, without further elaboration, does not satisfy that requirement. Because the complaint and the record did not show that García-Gesualdo “received” an unambiguous notice within the 90-day period prior to filing, the district court improperly granted dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) affirmative-defense basis.

Impact

The García-Gesualdo decision clarifies and limits earlier caselaw on electronically delivered right-to-sue notices. Key effects include:

EEOC Practice: Agencies must ensure that digital notifications either attach the right-to-sue letter or clearly inform recipients of dismissal/termination and the 90-day deadline.
Plaintiff Strategy: Claimants may contest the running of the 90-day clock if electronic notifications lack unambiguous reference to the right to sue, potentially invoking equitable tolling.
Lower Courts: Must examine the content of electronic notices, not just their delivery dates, before dismissing Title VII/ADA claims as untimely.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Before suing under Title VII or the ADA, a claimant must file a charge with the EEOC, let the agency investigate or conciliate, and receive a written “right-to-sue” notice.
Affirmative Defense of Untimeliness: Defendants can argue a claim is defeated by a statute of limitations. On a motion to dismiss, this defense must be clear on the face of the complaint and public records.
90-Day Filing Period: After an EEOC dismissal or non-conciliation notice, the plaintiff has exactly 90 days to file suit in federal or state court. Missing that deadline bars the claim.

Conclusion

García-Gesualdo v. Honeywell establishes that an email simply notifying a claimant or counsel that a “new” or “important” document is available online does not constitute the requisite “notice” to trigger Title VII’s or the ADA’s 90-day filing period. A valid digital notice must explicitly communicate EEOC dismissal or termination of proceedings and advise the claimant of the 90-day right-to-sue window. This ruling ensures that claimants receive clear, unambiguous written notice of their rights before their statutory deadline begins to run.