Egregious Firearm Use and Combined Permanent–Life-Threatening Injury Take § 924(c) Cases Outside the Guidelines Heartland, Justifying Major Upward Variances

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Malik Motley (No. 24-5733, Oct. 16, 2025), a not-for-publication opinion affirming a 303-month sentence for a Hobbs Act robbery coupled with a firearm discharge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The decision is notable for its treatment of a substantial upward variance on the § 924(c) count—doubling the statutory 120-month mandatory minimum to 240 months—based on the “extremely egregious” manner of firearm use and the victim’s extraordinary combination of permanent and life-threatening injuries.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion clarifies two recurring sentencing issues in the Sixth Circuit: (1) how “outside-the-heartland” facts justify significant variances above the Guidelines benchmark and statutory minimums, especially in § 924(c) cases, and (2) why the label (departure versus variance) is less important than the district court’s on-the-record § 3553(a) reasoning. The panel also reaffirms that the third level of acceptance-of-responsibility credit under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) requires the government’s agreement.

Case Overview

In October 2021, Malik Motley entered a Dollar General store in Memphis, Tennessee, produced a handgun, pointed it at an employee’s face, and shot her at close range during a robbery. The victim survived but suffered devastating, permanent, and life-threatening injuries—requiring a tracheostomy and oxygen support, multiple recurring surgeries, a pacemaker, and resulting in speech, hearing, neurological, and psychological impairments.

Motley pleaded guilty to one count of robbery affecting commerce (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and one count of use, carry, brandish, and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The district court imposed 63 months on the robbery count (the high end of the Guidelines range) and 240 months on the § 924(c) count (an upward variance from the 120-month mandatory minimum), to run consecutively, for a subtotal of 303 months, plus five years of supervised release.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full. The court held that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable:

• Procedural reasonableness: The district court properly calculated the Guidelines, recognized the advisory nature of the Guidelines, considered the § 3553(a) factors, addressed acceptance of responsibility consistently with U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (withholding the third level because the government did not agree), and adequately explained the above-Guidelines variance on the § 924(c) count.
• Substantive reasonableness: The panel deemed this an outside-the-heartland case due to the combination of the victim’s permanent and life-threatening injuries and the manner of firearm use (gun held to the face, discharged inches away), warranting a significant upward variance on the § 924(c) sentence. The court emphasized that while the robbery Guidelines already added six levels for “permanent or life-threatening injury” (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C)), those enhancements did not fully capture the extraordinary harms and circumstances here. The panel afforded the district court’s variance the “greatest respect” and upheld the 240-month consecutive sentence on Count II and the within-Guidelines, high-end 63-month sentence on Count I.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Informed the Decision

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007): Establish abuse-of-discretion review and the twin concepts of procedural and substantive reasonableness. The panel applied Gall’s requirement that variances be supported by a sufficiently compelling explanation tied to § 3553(a).
• United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007): Emphasize the need for an adequate explanation for the sentence, including any deviation. The district court’s detailed discussion of the victim’s injuries and the offense’s egregious manner satisfied this requirement.
• United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 2009): Confirms that reversal is appropriate only for procedural or substantive unreasonableness. No such error appeared.
• United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2008): Frames substantive reasonableness as proportionality to the offense and offender under § 3553(a). The panel endorsed the district court’s proportionality assessment given the extraordinary harm.
• United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213 (6th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823 (6th Cir. 2010): Identify when a sentence is substantively unreasonable (arbitrary, impermissible factors, ignoring relevant factors, or over-weighting a factor). None applied.
• United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020) and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): Explain that the Guidelines reflect a rough approximation for ordinary cases, that variances require compelling justification proportional to the degree of deviation, and that courts should explain why a case differs from the “mine-run” heartland. The panel found this case outside the heartland and accorded the variance the “greatest respect.”
• United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019) and Gall: Clarify there is no presumption of unreasonableness for above-Guidelines sentences, even though within-Guidelines sentences receive a presumption of reasonableness.
• United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Jordan, 544 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2008): Stress that appellate review focuses on reasonableness, not formal labels; whether a deviation is called a departure or variance is less important than the substantive § 3553(a) analysis. The panel treated the sentence as a variance because the district court’s explanation was rooted in § 3553(a), even though it referenced U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.2 and 5K2.6.
• United States v. Zabel, 35 F.4th 493 (6th Cir. 2022) and Zobel: Caution against reweighing § 3553(a) factors on appeal. The defendant bears a heavy burden to show the court gave an unreasonable weight to a factor; Motley did not meet that burden.
• United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2008): When a court correctly calculates the Guidelines, it is assumed to have considered national disparity concerns (§ 3553(a)(6)), even if not explicitly stated.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural Reasonableness

The district court carefully calculated the Guidelines, including acceptance of responsibility. After initially crediting Motley with full acceptance in a PSR addendum, the court removed the third level under § 3E1.1(b) because that reduction requires the government’s agreement, which was withheld at sentencing. The court then walked through the § 3553(a) factors in detail, complete with findings about the offense’s gravity, the victim’s injuries, the defendant’s background (including mental health history), his conduct while incarcerated (e.g., obtaining shanks), and the need for incapacitation, deterrence, and promoting respect for law. The appellate panel found no procedural error in any of these steps, nor in the adequacy of the explanation for the upward variance on Count II.

2) Substantive Reasonableness

The centerpiece of the court’s analysis is its outside-the-heartland determination. The panel highlighted the confluence of features that set this case apart from the mine-run robbery-and-discharge scenario: the firearm was held to the victim’s face; it was discharged at inches’ distance; and it caused both permanent and life-threatening injuries, not merely one or the other. Although the robbery guideline already captured “permanent or life-threatening injury” with a six-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C), the court reasoned that enhancement did not fully account for the extremity of these facts, allowing a sizable variance on the separate § 924(c) sentence.

Applying Perez-Rodriguez and Kimbrough, the panel recognized that the larger the variance, the stronger the justification must be. It held the district court’s justification sufficient and extended the “greatest respect” to the upward variance. The 63-month high-end term on Count I was within the Guidelines and presumptively reasonable; Motley did not overcome that presumption.

3) Variance versus Departure

Although the district court mentioned U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.2 (physical injury) and 5K2.6 (weapon use), the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the label does not control. Because the district court’s explanation was grounded in § 3553(a), the panel treated the deviation as a variance and reviewed it for substantive reasonableness. This reinforces existing Sixth Circuit law that appellate review centers on the quality of the explanation and fit with § 3553(a), not the taxonomy of “departure” versus “variance.”

4) Acceptance of Responsibility and § 3E1.1(b)

The opinion underscores a recurring sentencing point: the third level of acceptance under § 3E1.1(b) requires the government’s motion. When the government declined to agree, the court properly withheld that third point while still awarding the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a). This recalibration moved Count I’s offense level from 23 to 24 and yielded a 51–63 month range, of which the court selected the high end (63 months).

5) Disparity and Mental Health Arguments

The panel rejected the defendant’s § 3553(a)(6) disparity argument, noting that correct Guidelines calculations presumptively account for national disparity concerns and that Motley’s comparators were inapt (none involved a discharge striking and permanently injuring a victim). The court also rejected the contention that the district judge insufficiently credited mental and physical illness, stressing that the judge discussed those factors at length but rationally concluded that the offense’s nature, seriousness, and public-safety concerns dominated the analysis in this case.

Impact and Implications

1) § 924(c) Sentencing After Motley

• Confirmation that district courts may impose substantial upward variances above the § 924(c) mandatory minimum where the manner of firearm use is egregious and the resulting harm is extraordinary. The key is a fact-specific, well-explained analysis under § 3553(a).
• Expect greater emphasis on qualitative distinctions that separate “mine-run” cases from the “outside-the-heartland”—for instance, point-blank discharges to the victim’s face and the combined presence of permanent and life-threatening injuries.
• Prosecutors can cite Motley to support upward variances in § 924(c) cases with extreme facts; defense counsel should be prepared to rebut “outside-the-heartland” characterizations or propose mitigating distinctions, such as lesser injury, absence of gratuitous violence, or compelling mental-health mitigation with a strong treatment plan.

2) Injury Enhancements and “Double Counting” Concerns

Motley implicitly recognizes that facts used to enhance the robbery count (e.g., § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C)) can also inform a § 3553(a)-based variance on the separate § 924(c) count without constituting impermissible “double counting,” because the § 924(c) term is tethered to a statutory minimum and its Guideline (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4) does not itself incorporate injury gradations. When the combined facts exceed what the robbery enhancement contemplates, they can independently justify varying above the § 924(c) floor.

3) Mental Health as Mitigation

The case underscores a perennial theme: documented mental illness and seizures will be weighed under § 3553(a)(1), but they will not necessarily outweigh public-safety concerns and the seriousness of the offense, especially where the violent conduct and its consequences are extreme. Defense presentations that connect diagnoses to criminogenic risk and realistic treatment plans may carry more influence than diagnosis alone.

4) Acceptance-of-Responsibility Practice

Motley is a practical reminder that the third acceptance point under § 3E1.1(b) is not within the court’s unilateral control. Absent government agreement, the court cannot award it. Plea agreements should address the government’s intent to move for § 3E1.1(b) and the conditions that could cause the government to withhold the motion (e.g., late plea timing, contested factual issues requiring resource-intensive litigation, post-plea misconduct).

5) Sentencing Explanations and Appellate Deference

When a district court provides a detailed, case-specific explanation for an upward variance grounded in § 3553(a) and distinguishes the case from the Guideline “heartland,” the Sixth Circuit will give the sentence the “greatest respect,” even for substantial variances. Conversely, where a case looks mine-run, variances warrant closer appellate scrutiny. Motley illustrates how careful on-the-record reasoning strengthens a sentence against substantive reasonableness challenges.

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

• Prosecutors: Develop a record that explains why the case is outside the heartland, focusing on the manner of firearm use, proximity, victim vulnerability, and lasting harms. Consider referencing policy statements (e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.2, 5K2.6) while framing the ultimate request as a § 3553(a) variance.
• Defense Counsel: Anticipate “outside-the-heartland” arguments and prepare to narrow the case to the mine-run by distinguishing injury severity, intent, or circumstances. Build a comprehensive mitigation package (treatment history, risk-reduction plan, expert reports) that concretely links mental health treatment to reduced recidivism.
• District Judges: Make explicit findings that explain why the Guidelines do not fully capture the harm and how the facts differ from the ordinary case. Address key § 3553(a) factors in a balanced fashion; even if not necessary, a brief nod to § 3553(a)(6) disparity helps fortify the record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural focuses on the sentencing process (correct Guidelines, consideration of § 3553(a), and explanation). Substantive asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable under § 3553(a) given the facts of the offense and the offender.
• Variance vs. Departure: A departure uses the Guidelines’ own policy provisions to move off-range; a variance relies on § 3553(a) to set a sentence outside the advisory range. Appellate courts review both for reasonableness, and the label often does not change the outcome if the explanation is sound.
• Heartland/Mine-Run: The Guidelines aim to cover the “ordinary” case. When facts are unusually aggravated (or unusually mitigated), the case can be “outside the heartland,” justifying a variance. Outside-the-heartland variances receive the “greatest respect” on appeal if well explained.
• § 924(c) Sentencing: For using, carrying, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking, Congress sets mandatory consecutive minimums (e.g., 10 years for discharge). The applicable Guideline (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4) generally mirrors the statutory minimum; sentences above that require a justified deviation.
• Acceptance of Responsibility (§ 3E1.1): The first two levels (subsection (a)) are awarded by the court for accepting responsibility. The third level (subsection (b)) requires a government motion, typically premised on a timely plea that conserved resources.
• Permanent or Life-Threatening Injury (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C)): Adds six levels to robbery offenses when the victim suffers permanent or life-threatening injuries. Motley recognizes that when both are present, and combined with uniquely egregious firearm use, the case may warrant further variance elsewhere (e.g., on a consecutive § 924(c) sentence).

Conclusion

United States v. Motley affirms a severe but carefully reasoned sentence for a particularly brutal robbery and firearm discharge. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis underscores that extraordinary facts—point-blank discharge to the victim’s face resulting in both permanent and life-threatening injuries—take a case outside the Guidelines heartland and can justify a substantial upward variance above the § 924(c) mandatory minimum. The decision also reinforces practical principles: precise § 3553(a) explanations matter more than the label (variance vs. departure); the third acceptance-of-responsibility point requires government consent; and correct Guidelines calculations generally address disparity concerns. For future § 924(c) cases, Motley signals that where injury and firearm use are extraordinarily aggravated, district courts may meaningfully exceed the statutory minimums if they thoroughly explain why the case is no mine-run offense.