Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision by the Eleventh Circuit affirms the convictions of three codefendants—Ramon Santiago, Feyber Moncaris De Avila, and Wallyst Rochist Ulloa—under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction. The appeals targeted the constitutional foundation and reach of the MDLEA, particularly when interdictions occur within a foreign state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and where the vessel’s nationality is contested.

The defendants advanced three principal lines of attack:

• Felonies Clause scope in an EEZ: As‑applied constitutional challenge asserting that conduct in Colombia’s EEZ lies beyond the “high seas,” and thus outside Congress’s power under Article I, § 8, cl. 10 (the Felonies Clause).
• Stateless‑vessel definition: Facial and as‑applied challenges to 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C), arguing that the MDLEA’s definition of a “vessel without nationality” impermissibly sweeps in vessels that are not stateless under international law.
• Due process and nexus: Due Process and constitutional authority challenges predicated on the absence of a U.S. nexus to the offense.

The government moved for summary affirmance, contending that binding Eleventh Circuit precedent forecloses all arguments. The appellants did not respond to the motion. The Eleventh Circuit granted summary affirmance, relying on its prior decisions that squarely resolve each issue presented.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions by granting the government’s motion for summary affirmance. Applying its prior‑panel‑precedent rule, the Court held that:

• EEZs qualify as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes: Following United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), the Court reiterated that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority and that EEZs are considered part of the “high seas” for that constitutional provision.
• Statutory stateless‑vessel definition is constitutional: Also relying on Canario‑Vilomar, the Court rejected constitutional challenges to § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA, which treats a vessel as “without nationality” if the claimed flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality.
• No nexus required; no due process violation: Consistent with longstanding circuit precedent—United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); and United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003)—the Court reaffirmed that the MDLEA does not require a U.S. nexus for drug‑trafficking offenses on the high seas and that due process is not offended because there is clear notice that such conduct is universally condemned, particularly aboard stateless vessels.

Because these arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent, the Court concluded there was no substantial question as to the outcome and summarily affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969), adopted in the Eleventh Circuit by Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

  Establishes the standard for summary disposition: it is appropriate where the movant’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law or the appeal is frivolous. The Court applied Groendyke to conclude that the government’s position was clearly correct under existing Eleventh Circuit law.

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025).

  Two critical holdings controlled here: (1) international law does not limit Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause; and (2) EEZs are considered part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power. Alfonso also confirms de novo review for statutory interpretation and constitutional issues, aligning with the Court’s approach in this case.

• United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025).

  Reiterated Alfonso’s holdings and specifically rejected constitutional challenges to the MDLEA’s stateless‑vessel definition in § 70502(d)(1)(C). The court emphasized that because the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law, Congress’s broader statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” is valid for MDLEA purposes.

• United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003).

  These decisions collectively establish that the MDLEA validly applies to drug‑trafficking conduct on the high seas without a required nexus to the United States and that prosecuting foreign nationals captured on the high seas does not violate due process.

• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008).

  Articulates the prior‑panel‑precedent rule: a subsequent panel is bound by an earlier panel’s holding unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. This rule compelled the result here, as Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, and the line of MDLEA nexus/due‑process cases remain controlling.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds by applying the prior‑panel‑precedent rule to each issue, concluding that no substantial legal question remains:

1. Felonies Clause power in an EEZ:

   Defendants asserted that Colombia’s EEZ is not the “high seas,” depriving Congress of authority. The Court rejected this by citing Alfonso (and reaffirmed in Canario‑Vilomar), which holds that for Felonies Clause purposes the EEZ falls within the “high seas,” and international law does not restrict Congress’s power in this domain. Thus, regulating drug trafficking occurring there via the MDLEA is constitutionally sound.

2. Definition of “vessel without nationality” under § 70502(d)(1)(C):

   Defendants argued that the statutory definition improperly treats as stateless certain vessels that would not be stateless under international law. The Court again relied on Canario‑Vilomar to reject the challenge: because Congress’s Felonies Clause authority is not limited by customary international law, it may adopt a domestic definition for MDLEA purposes whereby a claimed nation’s failure to “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality results in a stateless‑vessel designation. As such, § 70502(d)(1)(C) is constitutional both facially and as applied.

3. No nexus requirement; due process satisfied:

   The defendants’ due process and “no nexus” arguments were foreclosed by a long line of Eleventh Circuit cases—Cabezas‑Montano, Hernandez, Campbell, and Rendon. The Court reiterated two propositions: (a) the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for high‑seas drug crimes; and (b) due process is not violated because there is clear, universal condemnation of drug trafficking at sea, especially on stateless vessels, providing sufficient notice of criminality.

4. Procedural posture and summary affirmance:

   Invoking Groendyke, the Court found the government “clearly correct as a matter of law,” as every challenge was resolved by existing precedent. The appellants’ failure to respond to the summary‑affirmance motion underscores the absence of any substantial legal question, though the result rests on binding law rather than default.

C. Impact and Implications

This opinion does not create new law; rather, it cements the practical effect of recent and longstanding Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence for MDLEA prosecutions:

• EEZ enforcement is firmly within reach: Interdictions occurring up to 200 nautical miles from a nation’s coast (i.e., in the EEZ) remain within Congress’s Felonies Clause power, as construed in Alfonso and confirmed in Canario‑Vilomar. Defendants cannot avoid MDLEA liability by arguing that an EEZ is distinct from the “high seas.”
• Statelessness determinations are robust under U.S. law: Challenges grounded in customary international law to the MDLEA’s stateless‑vessel definition will fail in the Eleventh Circuit. Litigants must focus on the factual application of § 70502(d)(1)(C)—for example, contesting whether a claimed nation actually failed to “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert nationality—rather than attacking the statute’s constitutionality.
• No nexus requirement persists: The absence of any nexus requirement continues to be a hallmark of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA jurisprudence. Prosecutors need not prove intended U.S. destination or effects; defense arguments to inject a nexus element are foreclosed.
• Due process arguments remain uphill: The circuit’s view that maritime drug trafficking is universally condemned and plainly proscribed continues to defeat due process challenges by foreign nationals interdicted at sea.
• Summary affirmance as a case‑management tool: Where controlling precedent resolves the issues, the Eleventh Circuit will use Groendyke to summarily affirm. Counsel should realistically assess whether any argument survives Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, and the circuit’s nexus/due‑process line before appealing.
• Stability after certiorari denial: The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Alfonso reinforces the durability of these holdings within the circuit, reducing prospects for near‑term doctrinal change.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ):

  Under international law, an EEZ is a maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline, where that state holds sovereign rights to natural resources but not full sovereignty. For Eleventh Circuit constitutional analysis under the Felonies Clause, however, the EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas,” enabling Congress to legislate conduct like maritime drug trafficking there.

• Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10):

  Grants Congress authority to “define and punish” felonies committed on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit holds that this power is not constrained by customary international law and that it supports the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application.

• “Vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA:

  MDLEA jurisdiction includes stateless vessels. One statutory route to statelessness, § 70502(d)(1)(C), applies where the person in charge claims a nationality but the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” that nationality. The Eleventh Circuit endorses this definition even if it is broader than some international‑law conceptions of statelessness.

• Facial vs. as‑applied constitutional challenge:

  A facial challenge claims a law is invalid in all applications; an as‑applied challenge claims it is unconstitutional in the challenger’s specific circumstances. Here, both types were rejected because controlling precedent validates the statute and its application in EEZ interdictions.

• “Nexus” requirement:

  A “nexus” would require a meaningful connection to the United States (e.g., intended U.S. destination). The Eleventh Circuit consistently holds that the MDLEA does not require such a nexus for high‑seas drug crimes, including those on stateless vessels or within foreign EEZs.

• Due Process in extraterritorial prosecutions:

  Due process requires fair notice and fundamental fairness. The Eleventh Circuit reasons that the universal condemnation of high‑seas drug trafficking—especially on stateless vessels—provides sufficient notice, defeating due process claims by foreign defendants interdicted at sea.

• Prior‑panel‑precedent rule:

  Within the Eleventh Circuit, a published panel decision controls subsequent panels absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention. This ensures uniformity and explains why these appeals were resolved by reference to Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, and earlier MDLEA cases.

• Summary affirmance (Groendyke):

  A procedural mechanism allowing the appellate court to affirm without full briefing when existing law makes the outcome clear, or when the appeal is frivolous. It conserves judicial resources where precedent squarely forecloses the issues.

Conclusion

United States v. Wallyst Rochist Ulloa (with Santiago and De Avila) is a straightforward but consequential confirmation of the Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA jurisprudence. Three pillars emerge, each resting on robust circuit precedent:

1. EEZ equals “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes: Congress can criminalize drug trafficking in a foreign EEZ through the MDLEA, unimpeded by alleged international‑law limits.
2. MDLEA’s stateless‑vessel rule stands: Section 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition is constitutional even if it exceeds a narrower customary international‑law conception of statelessness.
3. No nexus and no due process barrier: The MDLEA requires no U.S. nexus for high‑seas drug crimes, and prosecuting foreign nationals interdicted at sea does not violate due process because the conduct is universally condemned and plainly proscribed.

Although unpublished and issued on the Non‑Argument Calendar, the opinion’s significance lies in its reinforcement of recent controlling decisions—especially Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar—foreclosing a suite of constitutional challenges often advanced in maritime drug prosecutions. For practitioners within the Eleventh Circuit, the message is clear: EEZ‑based and stateless‑vessel challenges to MDLEA jurisdiction, nexus, and due process are settled against defendants absent en banc or Supreme Court reconsideration.