EEZs Are “High Seas,” Nationality Equals Registry Under the MDLEA, and No Nexus Is Required: Eleventh Circuit’s Summary Affirmance in United States v. Puello

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Juan Rincon Puello and United States v. Rai Martinez (consolidated), No. 22-12914 and No. 22-12981 (Sept. 25, 2025), affirming two convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The panel (Judges Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Brasher) granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance on the non-argument calendar.

Defendants Puello and Martinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction on the high seas. They later sought to withdraw and vacate their pleas and to dismiss the indictment on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds. Their challenges targeted the MDLEA’s reach into a foreign Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the statute’s definition of “vessel without nationality,” the sufficiency of the government’s jurisdictional showing when a master makes only a claim of “nationality” (rather than “registry”), and an asserted due-process “nexus” requirement.

The court held that all four challenges are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, and it summarily affirmed. Although designated “Not for Publication,” the decision is a crisp reaffirmation of the Eleventh Circuit’s recent MDLEA jurisprudence, especially United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed.

Summary of the Opinion

The court granted the government’s motion for summary disposition under Groendyke Transportation, concluding that the government’s position was “clearly right as a matter of law” and that there was “no substantial question” as to the outcome. The panel reaffirmed that:

A foreign nation’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for purposes of the Constitution’s Felonies Clause; Congress may criminalize conduct there via the MDLEA (Alfonso; Canario‑Vilomar).
The MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality,” including the clause in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) for vessels whose claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality, is valid; circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied challenges premised on customary international law (Alfonso; Canario‑Vilomar).
Under the MDLEA, “nationality” and “registry” are interchangeable terms; a master’s verbal claim of nationality triggers § 70502(d)(1)(C) and permits statelessness to be established when the claimed nation cannot confirm nationality (Gruezo; Alfonso).
No “nexus” to the United States is required for MDLEA prosecutions on the high seas (Cabezas‑Montano).

Applying those principles, the court affirmed the convictions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969). Establishes the standard for summary disposition when a party’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law or where the appeal is frivolous. The Eleventh Circuit relied on this to summarily affirm without oral argument, reflecting the strength of the governing precedents.
United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied (2025). A foundational modern MDLEA case in the Eleventh Circuit. Alfonso held that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law and that “high seas,” as understood at the Founding, includes waters beyond a nation’s territorial sea, which today encompasses EEZs. It also treated a verbal claim of “Colombian nationality” that could not be confirmed as sufficient to render the vessel stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(C). Alfonso further rejected, under plain-error review, a constitutional attack on § 70502(d)(1)(C) premised on international-law notions of statelessness.
United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed. Reinforced Alfonso and went an extra step: it directly rejected arguments that Congress was constrained by international law in defining a “stateless vessel” and in setting the “high seas” boundaries for MDLEA purposes. It also made explicit that EEZs count as “high seas” and that the MDLEA’s statelessness definition—including the “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” clause—is not ultra vires.
United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 178 (2023). Clarified that the MDLEA uses “nationality” and “registry” interchangeably. This matters because § 70502(d)(1)(C) refers to a “claim of registry”; defendants argued that a mere “claim of nationality” did not trigger the clause. Gruezo forecloses that semantic distinction.
United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020). Held that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power and does not require a U.S. “nexus” for high-seas prosecutions.
Standards and constraints on review:
- United States v. Alfonso (2024) for de novo review of statutory constitutionality and subject-matter jurisdiction; plain-error standard when constitutional claims are raised for the first time on appeal.
- United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Lejarde‑Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003), explaining plain error and the need for directly on-point precedent.
- United States v. Golden, 854 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2017); In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2015); Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001): the prior-panel-precedent rule and rejection of any “overlooked arguments” exception.
- In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2016), and Gissendaner v. Commissioner, 779 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015): a grant of certiorari does not change the law; lower courts must apply binding precedent until the Supreme Court says otherwise.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is straightforward and firmly anchored in the prior-panel-precedent rule. The court identified each of the defendants’ arguments and matched it to an on-point Eleventh Circuit decision:

EEZs as “high seas” under the Felonies Clause. Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar control. The court again embraced an original-public-meaning approach to the term “high seas,” concluding that it means waters beyond the territorial sea. Since an EEZ lies beyond territorial seas, Congress can reach conduct there via the Felonies Clause. The panel emphasized that the Eleventh Circuit has “repeatedly upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise” of this power and that enforcement “in EEZs is proper.”
Validity of § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s statelessness definition. Defendants argued that § 70502(d)(1)(C) sweeps beyond customary international law by deeming a vessel “without nationality” whenever the claimed nation fails to “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality. Relying on Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the panel held that the challenge is foreclosed: international law does not limit Congress’s definition of statelessness for MDLEA purposes, and the statute’s text controls.
Claim of “nationality” equals claim of “registry”. Attempting to avoid § 70502(d)(1)(C), defendants argued that they made only a claim of nationality, not registry. The panel cited Gruezo to reiterate that the MDLEA treats nationality and registry as interchangeable. Accordingly, a verbal claim of nationality suffices to trigger § 70502(d)(1)(C); if the claimed state cannot confirm nationality, the vessel is stateless under the MDLEA.
No “nexus” requirement. Cabezas‑Montano forecloses any contention that due process imposes a nexus requirement for high-seas MDLEA prosecutions. The court again held that the MDLEA can reach drug-trafficking conduct on the high seas without a U.S. connection.
Procedural posture and standard of review. To the extent any issues were unpreserved, Alfonso, Moriarty, and Lejarde‑Rada make plain that there can be no “plain error” without controlling precedent to the contrary. But the court did not need to dwell on preservation because prior published decisions squarely resolve the legal questions against the defendants.

Finally, invoking Groendyke, the panel concluded that the government was “clearly right as a matter of law,” warranting summary affirmance without oral argument.

Impact

Although unpublished, this decision fortifies the Eleventh Circuit’s now-settled MDLEA framework in several practical respects:

Operational certainty for maritime interdiction. The Coast Guard and DOJ can confidently prosecute interdictions occurring in foreign EEZs contiguous to the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico—areas frequently implicated in drug-smuggling routes—without needing to prove a U.S. nexus or obtain foreign consent, provided statutory jurisdiction is established (e.g., because the vessel is stateless).
Litigation economy. By embracing summary affirmance where binding precedent forecloses arguments, the court signals that repeat constitutional and jurisdictional challenges to the MDLEA will not warrant protracted litigation absent a material change in the law (e.g., an intervening Supreme Court decision or en banc overruling).
Clarity on “nationality” vs. “registry”. The opinion, citing Gruezo and Alfonso, eliminates a common defense strategy premised on a textual distinction between “nationality” and “registry.” Masters’ verbal claims of nationality—and the claimed state’s inability to confirm—trigger § 70502(d)(1)(C).
Constitutional posture stabilized. With Alfonso cert. denied and Canario‑Vilomar pending before the Supreme Court on a cert petition, the Eleventh Circuit remains steadfast: customary international law does not limit the scope of the Felonies Clause or the MDLEA’s definition of statelessness. Until the Supreme Court speaks, this is the governing rule in the Eleventh Circuit.
Guidance for defense counsel. In this circuit, future constitutional attacks on MDLEA prosecutions based on EEZ location, statelessness definitional limits drawn from international law, or nexus requirements are foreclosed. Counsel should focus on fact-specific challenges (e.g., contesting the sufficiency of the government’s proof that the vessel meets a statutory jurisdictional category, or the voluntariness and factual basis of a plea) and preserve issues for potential higher-court review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

MDLEA jurisdiction. The statute criminalizes drug trafficking aboard a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” One such category is a “vessel without nationality.” The MDLEA expressly applies extraterritorially.
Vessel without nationality (stateless). Under § 70502(d)(1)(C), a vessel is stateless when the master claims a national registry, but the named nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert that the vessel is of that nationality. In practice, when the claimed state cannot confirm or denies nationality, the vessel is deemed stateless for MDLEA purposes.
Nationality vs. registry under the MDLEA. Although international law can distinguish “nationality” and “registry,” the Eleventh Circuit reads the MDLEA to use these terms interchangeably. Thus, a verbal claim of nationality operates as a claim of registry for § 70502(d)(1)(C).
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under modern international law, an EEZ is a zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a nation’s coast where the coastal state has resource rights. Critically, the EEZ is not the same as “territorial sea.” The Eleventh Circuit treats EEZs as part of the “high seas” for constitutional purposes, meaning Congress can regulate felonies there under the Felonies Clause.
Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). Gives Congress power to define and punish felonies committed “on the high seas.” The Eleventh Circuit interprets “high seas” by its historical, original public meaning—waters beyond territorial seas—without being constrained by modern customary international law in defining the constitutional term.
No nexus requirement. Defendants often argue due process requires a substantial connection between the offense and the United States. In the Eleventh Circuit, there is no nexus requirement for MDLEA prosecutions on the high seas.
Prior-panel-precedent rule. Panels are bound by prior published Eleventh Circuit decisions unless overruled by the Eleventh Circuit en banc or by the Supreme Court. Perceived flaws or new arguments do not permit later panels to depart.
Summary affirmance. An appellate court may summarily affirm without full briefing or oral argument when the outcome is clear as a matter of law, conserving judicial resources.

Conclusion

United States v. Puello is a succinct but potent reaffirmation of the Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA framework:

EEZs are treated as “high seas” for the Felonies Clause, enabling MDLEA enforcement in such waters.
“Nationality” and “registry” are interchangeable terms under the MDLEA; a master’s claim of nationality triggers § 70502(d)(1)(C).
Section 70502(d)(1)(C)’s statelessness definition stands; customary international law does not constrain Congress’s choices here.
No U.S. nexus is required to prosecute high-seas drug-trafficking under the MDLEA.
Where binding precedent squarely controls, summary affirmance is appropriate.

While unpublished, the decision consolidates and applies the Eleventh Circuit’s published MDLEA precedents to a familiar fact pattern—interdiction in a foreign EEZ with a disputed claim of nationality—leaving little room for recurring constitutional and jurisdictional challenges at the panel level. Unless and until the Supreme Court intervenes or the Eleventh Circuit sits en banc to revisit its modern MDLEA jurisprudence, this case confirms that maritime drug prosecutions in the Caribbean and adjacent EEZs will proceed unfettered by nexus requirements or by international-law limitations on the meaning of “high seas” or statelessness in § 70502(d)(1)(C).