Introduction

In this consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of three defendants—Jose Yovanny Cueto‑Sanchez, Reinaldo Borbosa‑Guevara, and Carlos Guzman‑Javier—for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), and affirmed Guzman‑Javier’s sentence.

The appeal presented recurring jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the MDLEA that arise from interdictions in a foreign state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and from the statute’s definition of a “vessel without nationality.” Specifically, defendants argued that: (1) the United States lacked authority to prosecute conduct occurring in Venezuela’s EEZ because, in their view, an EEZ is not the “high seas”; and (2) Congress exceeded its power under the Felonies Clause by defining “vessel without nationality” more broadly than statelessness under international law. Individually, Guzman‑Javier argued that (3) the MDLEA violates Due Process and exceeds Felonies Clause authority absent a U.S. nexus, and (4) the district court clearly erred in denying him a minor‑role reduction at sentencing.

The Court, applying its prior‑panel‑precedent rule, rejected each challenge. It reiterated that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority or the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality”; that no U.S. nexus is required under the MDLEA; and that the district court did not clearly err in denying a minor‑role reduction.

Panel: Judges Newsom, Grant, and Marcus. Disposition: Affirmed. Date: September 24, 2025. Court: Eleventh Circuit (Non‑Argument Calendar). Docket Nos.: 23‑10175, 23‑10176, 23‑10236.

Summary of the Opinion

• EEZ‑as‑High‑Seas: Relying on United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied (2025), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), the Court held that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). Enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is therefore proper.
• MDLEA’s Statelessness Definition: The Court reaffirmed that Congress was not constrained by international law when defining “vessel without nationality,” including vessels whose claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry. See 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C).
• No Nexus Requirement: The Court again rejected Due Process and Felonies Clause arguments premised on the absence of a U.S. nexus, citing United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014), and Canario‑Vilomar.
• Sentencing—Minor Role: Applying De Varon’s two‑step framework and the non‑exhaustive factors in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C), the Court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying Guzman‑Javier a minor‑role reduction, emphasizing the large drug quantity, his promised compensation, his participation (including jettisoning cocaine), and parity of culpability with a co‑defendant.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24‑6177 (U.S. May 19, 2025)
  • Held that EEZs are “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause,” and that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.”
  • Upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power and approved MDLEA enforcement in EEZs.
  • Here, Alfonso foreclosed defendants’ EEZ‑based jurisdictional challenge and their argument that international law cabins Congress’s authority.
• United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
  • Reaffirmed Alfonso; rejected arguments that trafficking in a foreign EEZ is beyond Congress’s Felonies Clause reach.
  • Specifically addressed and rejected the claim that the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality”—covering vessels where the claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registration—is ultra vires.
  • Reiterated that no U.S. nexus is required under the MDLEA.
  • In this case, Canario‑Vilomar controlled the outcome on both the statelessness and no‑nexus questions.
• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
  • Rejected the argument that the MDLEA exceeds Felonies Clause authority absent a U.S. nexus; sustained extraterritorial reach based on universal and protective principles.
  • Here, Campbell underpinned the Court’s rejection of Guzman‑Javier’s Due Process and Felonies Clause nexus challenge.
• United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
  • Established a two‑step analysis for role reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2: (1) the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct; and (2) comparative culpability among identifiable participants in that conduct.
  • Important guideposts include the quantity of drugs and whether the defendant’s relevant conduct mirrors his actual conduct.
  • Here, De Varon supplied the framework for affirming the denial of a minor‑role reduction to Guzman‑Javier.
• United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020)
  • Applied the De Varon framework after the Sentencing Commission added five non‑exhaustive factors to § 3B1.2’s commentary.
  • Emphasized how large drug quantities, the importance of transportation roles, and expected compensation weigh against minor‑role reductions; also held courts need not consider unknown conspirators’ culpability absent evidence.
  • Here, the panel relied on Cabezas‑Montano on multiple points (e.g., promised payment, participation in jettisoning, and comparator analysis).
• United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015)
  • Reinforce the deferential clear‑error standard and the district court’s “considerable discretion” on role determinations; clarify that even if a defendant is less involved than others, a reduction is not automatic if none is minimal/minor.
• United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc); United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023)
  • Address the weight to give Guidelines commentary: it may be consulted where the Guideline is genuinely ambiguous; courts may rely on commentary where its validity is unchallenged.
  • Here, the panel recited and applied § 3B1.2’s commentary factors without a challenge to their validity.
• Prior‑panel‑precedent rule (as articulated in Canario‑Vilomar)
  • Binding effect of prior panel decisions absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation; no “overlooked argument” exception.
  • Here, it compelled adherence to Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, foreclosing renewed EEZ, Felonies Clause, and statelessness arguments.

Legal Reasoning

The Court began with standards of review: de novo for jurisdictional and constitutional challenges; clear error for denial of a minor‑role reduction, recognizing the district court’s “considerable discretion.”

On jurisdiction and the Felonies Clause, the panel reiterated the MDLEA’s operative provisions: it criminalizes knowing possession with intent to distribute controlled substances on covered vessels and conspiracies to do so; extends extraterritorially; and defines “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” to include “a vessel without nationality.” See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (b), (e)(1), 70506(b), 70502(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(C).

Applying Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the Court held that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power. The defendants’ contention that EEZs fall outside the high seas for constitutional purposes was squarely foreclosed. Equally foreclosed was the argument that Congress’s Felonies Clause power is constrained by customary international law; Alfonso had already held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.” The panel emphasized the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to recognize an “overlooked reason or argument” exception to its prior‑panel‑precedent rule.

Turning to the MDLEA’s statelessness definition, the Court relied on Canario‑Vilomar’s explicit holding that Congress was not constrained by international law when defining “vessel without nationality” to include vessels for which the claimed nation neither confirms nor denies registry. The panel reasoned that if international law does not limit the Felonies Clause itself (Alfonso), it likewise cannot limit Congress’s authority to define statelessness in the MDLEA.

On Due Process and nexus, the Court pointed to longstanding Eleventh Circuit precedent, including Campbell and Canario‑Vilomar, rejecting the argument that the MDLEA requires a U.S. nexus. The panel reiterated that universal and protective principles of jurisdiction justify the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach, even as applied to foreign nationals interdicted in a foreign EEZ.

Finally, on sentencing, the panel applied De Varon’s two‑step analysis, informed by the five non‑exclusive § 3B1.2 factors. At step one (role in relevant conduct), the district court held Guzman‑Javier accountable only for the drugs he transported; he likely knew the boat carried cocaine; he actively participated in jettisoning the cargo; and he was promised substantial payment (approximately $15,000). These facts weighed against a minor‑role reduction under the nature/extent and expected benefit factors. At step two (comparative culpability), the district court reasonably found that Guzman‑Javier and Borbosa‑Guevara were equally culpable, while Cueto‑Sanchez, by his own admission, operated the vessel and received an enhancement. Consistent with Cabezas‑Montano, the court was not required to consider unknown conspirators’ culpability absent evidence. On this record, denying the reduction was not clear error.

Impact

• MDLEA Jurisdiction in EEZs is settled in the Eleventh Circuit. This decision further cements that, within the Eleventh Circuit, EEZ‑based challenges will fail. Alfonso’s holding—now reaffirmed repeatedly—means Coast Guard interdictions in foreign EEZs remain legally supported under the Felonies Clause.
• Congress’s broad “stateless vessel” definition stands. By confirming Canario‑Vilomar, the panel ensures that traffickers cannot evade MDLEA coverage by invoking ambiguous or non‑responsive flag‑state claims. The statutory “no affirmative and unequivocal confirmation” rule in § 70502(d)(1)(C) remains fully effective.
• No U.S. nexus required persists. The Eleventh Circuit’s “universal/protective principles” rationale continues to foreclose Due Process and Felonies Clause nexus arguments, enabling prosecutions of foreign nationals interdicted far from U.S. territory.
• Practical sentencing guidance for maritime crews. The opinion underscores that large drug quantities, active participation (e.g., jettisoning contraband), and significant expected payment generally weigh against minor‑role reductions. Defendants must present concrete evidence that they are substantially less culpable than identifiable co‑participants; absence of such proof is dispositive.
• Litigation posture going forward. Defense counsel should anticipate swift reliance on Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar to dispose of EEZ and statelessness arguments. Sentencing advocacy should focus on record‑based distinctions among identifiable participants and on limiting the scope of relevant conduct; generalized references to shadowy organizers will not suffice.
• Inter‑circuit and Supreme Court context. Alfonso’s certiorari denial diminishes the likelihood of near‑term Supreme Court intervention on the EEZ/high‑seas question. Within the Eleventh Circuit, only en banc reconsideration or Supreme Court abrogation could alter this trajectory.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A coastal state’s EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from its coast. The coastal state has sovereign rights to exploit natural resources and certain regulatory powers there, but the waters remain international for navigation and other purposes. For Felonies Clause analysis in the Eleventh Circuit, an EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas.”
• High Seas: Waters not part of any nation’s territorial sea. The Eleventh Circuit treats EEZs as high seas for constitutional purposes under the Felonies Clause.
• Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Grants Congress power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” The Eleventh Circuit holds that this power is not limited by customary international law.
• MDLEA: The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act criminalizes drug trafficking conduct aboard vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including stateless vessels, and applies extraterritorially. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508.
• Vessel Without Nationality: Under the MDLEA, includes a vessel whose master claims a registry, but the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm that nationality. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). The Eleventh Circuit permits Congress’s broader definition, even if it extends beyond international law’s statelessness concept.
• No Nexus Requirement: The Eleventh Circuit does not require that MDLEA conduct have a specific connection to the United States. The statute’s reach is justified by universal and protective principles of jurisdiction.
• Minor‑Role Reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A defendant who is substantially less culpable than the average participant can receive a 2–4 level reduction. Courts consider factors like knowledge of the scheme, planning or decision‑making role, nature and extent of participation, and expected benefit. The De Varon two‑step analysis focuses first on the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct and then compares that role to identifiable co‑participants.
• Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a panel is bound by prior panel decisions unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. There is no exception for “overlooked arguments.”

Conclusion

This decision fortifies the Eleventh Circuit’s now‑settled MDLEA jurisprudence on three fronts: (1) EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, authorizing MDLEA enforcement in foreign EEZs; (2) Congress may define “vessel without nationality” beyond international law’s limits, including where a claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry; and (3) no nexus to the United States is required to prosecute MDLEA offenses. On sentencing, the Court reaffirmed the De Varon/Cabezas‑Montano framework and the district court’s broad discretion in denying minor‑role reductions to maritime couriers involved with substantial drug quantities and significant expected compensation.

Although unpublished and therefore not binding precedent, the opinion is a clear, practical application of Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar. For prosecutors, it offers a roadmap to withstand jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to high‑seas interdictions in EEZs. For defendants, it underscores the evidentiary burden to establish a minor role and the futility—within the Eleventh Circuit—of EEZ, international law, and nexus arguments against MDLEA prosecutions. The case confirms a robust extraterritorial enforcement posture in maritime drug interdiction and provides concrete guidance for sentencing advocacy in maritime trafficking cases.