EEZ Equals “High Seas” for MDLEA; § 70502(d)(1)(C) Constitutional; No Nexus Requirement: Eleventh Circuit Summarily Affirms in United States v. Feyber De Avila (Consolidated)

Introduction

In a consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision on the non-argument calendar, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed the MDLEA convictions of three codefendants—Ramon Santiago (No. 23-10311), Feyber Moncaris De Avila (No. 23-10312), and Wallyst Rochist Ulloa (No. 23-10347)—arising from a cocaine trafficking conspiracy aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction. The panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Branch, and Abudu) held that binding circuit precedent foreclosed all of the defendants’ constitutional and statutory challenges.

The core issues presented were:

Whether Congress lacks Felonies Clause authority to apply the MDLEA to conduct in a foreign state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) because an EEZ is not part of the “high seas.”
Whether 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)—which deems a vessel “without nationality” when the claimed flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality—is unconstitutional (facially or as applied) for diverging from international law’s conception of statelessness.
Whether a prosecution without a “nexus” to the United States violates the Due Process Clause or exceeds Congress’s Felonies Clause power.

The government moved for summary affirmance; the appellants filed no response. The court granted the motion, concluding that the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decisions—especially United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)—squarely control and defeat the defendants’ arguments.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying de novo review to the denial of the motions to dismiss, the court held:

EEZ-as-high-seas challenge foreclosed: Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar hold that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority and that the EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Therefore, as-applied challenges premised on EEZ location fail.
Stateless-vessel definition upheld: Canario‑Vilomar rejected arguments that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is unconstitutional for diverging from international law in defining a “vessel without nationality.” Congress is not constrained by customary international law when legislating under the Felonies Clause.
No nexus and no due process violation: Eleventh Circuit precedent (Cabezas‑Montano, Hernandez, Campbell, Rendon) holds that the MDLEA does not require a U.S. nexus and that prosecuting foreign nationals for high-seas drug trafficking does not violate due process where the MDLEA provides clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned.

Because these authorities are binding and directly dispositive, summary affirmance is warranted under Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), as adopted in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025)
Alfonso resolved a central question: whether the Felonies Clause limits Congress to the “high seas” in a way controlled by international law’s geographic categories. The court held that international law does not constrain Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause and expressly treated EEZ waters as part of the high seas for constitutional purposes (pp. 823, 826–27). Alfonso thus forecloses arguments that the MDLEA cannot reach conduct in a foreign EEZ.
United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
Building on Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar rejected the claim that § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition of a “vessel without nationality” (including when the claimed flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert nationality) is unconstitutional for conflict with international law. Because the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law, Congress may define “stateless” for MDLEA purposes without being cabined by international norms (pp. 1380–81). Canario‑Vilomar also reaffirmed that conduct in Colombia’s EEZ is within congressional reach under the Felonies Clause (pp. 1381–82).
United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003)
These cases collectively establish two pillars: (1) the MDLEA does not require proof of a “nexus” between conduct on the high seas and the United States; and (2) due process is not offended by prosecuting foreign nationals for high-seas drug trafficking, because the MDLEA supplies clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned—especially on stateless vessels. The panel here relied on this line to reject De Avila’s and Ulloa’s nexus and due process arguments.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)
Archer articulates the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: a prior panel’s published holding binds subsequent panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the court en banc. That rule is the backbone of this disposition: Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar control, so the panel could not entertain contrary arguments.
Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969) (adopted by Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc))
Groendyke provides the standard for summary affirmance: it is proper where one party’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law or the appeal is frivolous. With the appellants’ arguments squarely foreclosed by binding decisions, the panel deemed summary affirmance appropriate.

Legal Reasoning

The decision rests on three integrated strands of Eleventh Circuit law:

Felonies Clause scope and the EEZ: The Felonies Clause empowers Congress to “define and punish Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit has clarified that, for constitutional analysis, the “high seas” includes a foreign state’s EEZ, and that customary international law does not restrict Congress’s power in this domain (Alfonso; Canario‑Vilomar). Because the appellants’ conduct occurred in Colombia’s EEZ, their as-applied challenge fails.
Stateless vessel definition in § 70502(d)(1)(C): The MDLEA treats a vessel as “without nationality” if the master claims registry but the claimed flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert nationality. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld Congress’s choice to adopt this definition irrespective of whether it aligns with international law’s statelessness doctrine (Canario‑Vilomar). Thus, challenges to § 70502(d)(1)(C), facial or as-applied, do not succeed in this circuit.
No nexus requirement and due process satisfaction: The Eleventh Circuit does not graft a “nexus” element onto MDLEA offenses. Moreover, prosecuting foreign nationals for high-seas drug trafficking does not violate due process because the MDLEA supplies clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned (Cabezas‑Montano; Hernandez; Campbell; Rendon). The court reaffirmed these holdings in rejecting De Avila’s and Ulloa’s arguments.

Procedurally, the court:

Reviewed de novo the denial of motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the constitutional/statutory questions (citing Alfonso).
Applied the prior-panel-precedent rule (Archer) to treat Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar as dispositive.
Granted summary affirmance (Groendyke) because the government’s position was “clearly right as a matter of law,” and the appellants offered no response to the motion.

Impact

Although unpublished and not precedential on its own, this decision has immediate practical significance by signaling how the Eleventh Circuit will handle a recurring suite of MDLEA challenges post‑Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar:

Streamlined disposition of EEZ-based defenses: Arguments that the EEZ is not part of the high seas (for constitutional purposes) will be summarily rejected in the Eleventh Circuit.
Stability of § 70502(d)(1)(C): Challenges premised on conflict with international law’s statelessness concepts are nonstarters under current circuit law. Congress’s definition controls for MDLEA prosecutions here.
No nexus requirement: Prosecutors need not prove a U.S. nexus for MDLEA offenses, and defense claims to the contrary are foreclosed.
Due process arguments narrowed: Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that MDLEA prosecutions of foreign nationals captured on the high seas comport with due process, particularly given the statute’s notice and the universal condemnation of maritime drug trafficking.
Procedural lever—summary affirmance: The court’s willingness to use Groendyke summary affirmance underscores that litigants pressing already-repudiated theories should expect rapid denial absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court authority.

For defense counsel, the opinion clarifies that future constitutional attacks on these MDLEA dimensions will likely require:

An intervening change in law from the Supreme Court or an Eleventh Circuit en banc decision; or
Case-specific arguments not foreclosed by precedent, such as factual disputes over whether a vessel satisfied the statutory jurisdictional predicates (for example, proof concerning a master’s claim of registry or the flag state’s response).

Complex Concepts Simplified

MDLEA (46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508): A federal statute criminalizing drug trafficking on vessels “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including “vessels without nationality.” It applies extraterritorially (46 U.S.C. § 70503(b)).
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Waters extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline. The coastal state has resource rights, but the waters remain international for navigation. The Eleventh Circuit treats the EEZ as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Grants Congress power to define and punish felonies on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit holds this power is not constrained by customary international law in crafting the MDLEA.
“Vessel without nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)): A vessel is stateless under U.S. law if the person in charge claims registry but the named flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert nationality. Congress may adopt this standard regardless of international law’s usage.
Prior-panel-precedent rule: Published decisions of earlier Eleventh Circuit panels bind later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc.
Summary affirmance (Groendyke): An appellate tool allowing the court to affirm without full briefing/argument when the law clearly favors one party or the appeal is frivolous.
No “nexus” requirement: The Eleventh Circuit does not require the government to prove a connection to the United States for MDLEA offenses on the high seas.
Due Process in MDLEA cases: Prosecution of foreign nationals for high-seas drug trafficking does not violate due process because the MDLEA gives clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned, particularly on stateless vessels.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the consolidated appeals led by United States v. Feyber De Avila reaffirms, with procedural efficiency, the circuit’s post‑Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar MDLEA doctrine:

The EEZ is treated as the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
Congress may define “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C) without being constrained by customary international law.
The MDLEA carries no “nexus” requirement and does not violate due process when applied to foreign nationals engaged in high-seas drug trafficking.
Where these principles squarely control, summary affirmance is appropriate.

While unpublished, the opinion sends a clear signal: in the Eleventh Circuit, constitutional challenges to MDLEA prosecutions premised on EEZ geography, international-law statelessness, or nexus/due-process theories are not viable absent an intervening change in controlling law. Prosecutors can rely on the circuit’s settled framework; defense counsel must pivot to case-specific statutory predicates or preserve broader constitutional arguments for potential en banc or Supreme Court review.