EEZ Counts as “High Seas” and Defendants Bear the Rule 5 Burden: Eleventh Circuit Affirms MDLEA Convictions and Rejects Sub‑One‑Year Speedy‑Trial Claims

EEZ Counts as “High Seas” and Defendants Bear the Rule 5 Burden: Eleventh Circuit Affirms MDLEA Convictions and Rejects Sub‑One‑Year Speedy‑Trial Claims

Introduction

In United States v. Angel Gabriel Palanco (consolidated with appeals by Osvaldo Gonzalez and Humberto Vasquez Diaz), the Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam decision, affirmed MDLEA convictions arising from a U.S. Coast Guard interdiction of a “go-fast” vessel 130 nautical miles south of the Dominican Republic. The case squarely presented three recurring issues in maritime narcotics prosecutions:

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction and the constitutionality of applying the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) to conduct in a foreign nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);
  • Whether an 18-day delay between interdiction and presentment violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5’s “without unnecessary delay” (Rule 5(a)(1)(B)) and “promptly filed” complaint (Rule 5(b)) requirements; and
  • Whether a roughly seven-month interval from interdiction to the initial trial date violated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial under Barker v. Wingo.

The panel held that it was bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent published decision in United States v. Alfonso, which treats the EEZ as part of the “high seas” for MDLEA purposes under the Constitution’s Felonies Clause. It further held that the defendants failed to carry their evidentiary burden to establish a Rule 5 violation and that the sub-one-year delay did not trigger or sustain a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim. The convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

  • MDLEA constitutionality and jurisdiction: The court reaffirmed that the EEZ is part of the “high seas,” thus within Congress’s Felonies Clause power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. Alfonso controls; the defendants’ constitutional challenge failed.
  • Rule 5(a)(1)(B) presentment: The defendants did not meet their burden to prove the 18-day delay between interdiction and presentment was “unnecessary.” They offered no developed evidence addressing the Purvis factors (distance/logistics, treatment or improper interrogation, or reasons for delay). No abuse of discretion in denying dismissal on Rule 5(a) grounds.
  • Rule 5(b) prompt complaint: The complaint was “promptly filed” in the Southern District of Florida on the same day the defendants arrived in Puerto Rico and before presentment, given the high-seas interdiction and maritime transport context. The Fourth Amendment’s 48-hour probable cause rule does not apply to noncitizens arrested on the high seas.
  • Sixth Amendment speedy trial: Using the earliest possible start date (interdiction on July 8), the seven-month-and-five-day delay to the initial February 13 trial date was not presumptively prejudicial and did not trigger a full Barker analysis. In the alternative, even on full Barker review, ordinary government negligence did not weigh heavily against the government and the defendants failed to show actual prejudice.
  • Disposition: Convictions and sentences affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

I. Procedural and Factual Background

  • Interdiction and seizure: On July 8, 2022, the USCG interdicted a stateless go-fast vessel in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ (outside any state’s 12-mile territorial sea). The crew (defendants) declined to identify a master or nationality. After authorization to treat the vessel as “without nationality,” the USCG found approximately 972 kg of cocaine, transferred crew and contraband to the USS Wichita, and destroyed the vessel.
  • Complaint and presentment: On July 26, 2022 (18 days later), a criminal complaint was filed in the Southern District of Florida. The USCG delivered the defendants to Puerto Rico the same day, where DEA agents arrested and interviewed them and received the USCG’s evidence. Also that day, the defendants were presented by video to a magistrate judge in the District of Puerto Rico and appointed counsel.
  • Indictment and transfer: A Florida grand jury indicted the defendants on August 4, 2022, for MDLEA conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute. A Puerto Rico magistrate ordered detention and removal to Florida. Palanco was transported to Florida on September 22, and Gonzalez and Vasquez Diaz on November 29. New counsel were appointed in Florida in early January 2023, and arraignments followed.
  • Trial posture: The district court initially set a February 13, 2023 trial date. After a joint continuance, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rule 5 violations, and a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation. The district court denied the motion; after a later evidentiary hearing (limited to speedy-trial issues), it again denied dismissal. Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the court found defendants guilty and imposed concurrent 77-month sentences with credit for time served from July 8, 2022.

II. Standards of Review

  • Rule 5-based dismissal (non-constitutional): abuse of discretion.
  • Constitutionality and subject-matter jurisdiction: de novo.
  • Sixth Amendment speedy trial: mixed question; legal conclusions reviewed de novo; factual findings for clear error.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • MDLEA and Felonies Clause:
    • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024) (EEZ is part of the “high seas”; international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power; MDLEA enforcement in EEZs is proper).
    • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025) (applies Alfonso; rejects similar challenges for interdictions in Panama’s and Colombia’s EEZs).
    • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014) (MDLEA constitutionality on the high seas).
  • Rule 5 “unnecessary delay” and “promptly filed”:
    • United States v. Purvis, 768 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1985) (four-factor framework for assessing “unnecessary delay” in presentment).
    • Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 591–93 (defendant bears burden; 49-day maritime presentment delay not shown “unnecessary” without proof of mistreatment, improper interrogation, or lack of logistical explanation).
    • United States v. Hurtado, 89 F.4th 881 (11th Cir. 2023) (no contact with family, attorneys, or a judge for 48 days; humane treatment; factor weighs against defendant; no Rule 5 violation shown).
    • United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018) (Martin, J., concurring) (19-day maritime presentment delay noted).
    • United States v. Macrina, 109 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2024) (appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record).
    • United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) (outrageous government conduct doctrine—assuming it exists—does not apply to post-offense, pre-indictment detention-related conduct).
    • County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (48-hour probable cause rule for domestic, warrantless arrests; inapplicable on the high seas to noncitizens per Cabezas-Montano).
  • Sixth Amendment speedy trial:
    • Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor balancing test).
    • Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay “approaching one year” is presumptively prejudicial).
    • United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1996) (eight months insufficient to trigger full Barker analysis).
    • United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2003) (“approaching one year” threshold).
    • United States v. Vargas, 97 F.4th 1277 (11th Cir. 2024) (negligence does not weigh heavily against the government; considers length and reason together).
    • United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2024) (first factor’s triggering function; actual prejudice required if first three factors do not weigh heavily against the government).
    • United States v. Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2018) (negligent delays weigh against the government but not heavily).
    • United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2018) (actual prejudice requires more than conclusory assertions).
    • United States v. Villareal, 613 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (Barker test in Eleventh Circuit practice).
  • Other Eleventh Circuit guideposts:
    • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (prior panel precedent rule—panel is bound by published circuit precedent).
    • United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2009) (Rule 48(b) dismissal tied to Sixth Amendment analysis).
    • United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2017) (passing references insufficient to preserve arguments).

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. MDLEA Jurisdiction in the EEZ

The court reaffirmed that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power, which authorizes punishment of felonies “on the high Seas.” Bound by United States v. Alfonso, the panel treated the EEZ as part of the “high seas,” rejecting any argument that international law narrows Congress’s domestic constitutional authority under the Felonies Clause. The parties conceded the vessel was “without nationality,” bringing it within MDLEA coverage, and conceded their conduct occurred within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ. Under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent, those facts sufficed to sustain jurisdiction and constitutionality.

B. Rule 5(a)(1)(B): Presentment “without unnecessary delay”

The Rule 5(a) inquiry is functional and burden-shifting: defendants must prove the delay was “unnecessary.” Under Purvis and Cabezas‑Montano, courts consider:

  • Distance and logistics between interdiction point and U.S. port;
  • Time from arrival at the U.S. port to presentment;
  • Evidence of mistreatment or improper interrogation during the delay; and
  • Reasons for delay, such as exigencies or emergencies.

Here, defendants relied only on the length of delay (18 days), offering no developed evidence on distance/logistics, mistreatment, or reasons. Their reliance on a 2017 news article about other detainees’ conditions was not evidence; they conceded the actual conditions here were “unknown.” The court declined to speculate or shift the burden to the government. Citing Hurtado and Cabezas‑Montano, which involved longer maritime presentment intervals (48 and 49 days, respectively) without proof of abusive treatment or improper interrogation, the court held defendants failed to establish an “unnecessary” delay.

Because the movants did not meet their burden, the court did not reach whether dismissal (as opposed to suppression) is the proper remedy for a Rule 5 violation (a question other cases have raised but need not be decided when no violation is shown).

C. Rule 5(b): Complaint “promptly filed”

Rule 5(b) requires a complaint with probable cause to be “promptly filed” if a defendant is arrested without a warrant. The MDLEA also authorizes filing in “any district” for high-seas interdictions (46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2)), calling into question the textual requirement to file “in the district where the offense was allegedly committed” when offenses occur on the high seas. The panel did not resolve that textual interaction, because, on these facts, the complaint filed on July 26 (the same day the defendants arrived in Puerto Rico and before presentment) was “promptly filed.”

The court also rejected defendants’ invocation of a 48-hour rule derived from domestic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As Cabezas‑Montano holds, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to noncitizens arrested by the United States on the high seas or in a foreign country. Accordingly, the 48-hour probable cause yardstick from Gerstein/McLaughlin does not govern Rule 5(b) in this maritime context.

D. Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial (Barker v. Wingo)

The district court and the panel analyzed the Barker factors, emphasizing the triggering role of the first factor—length of delay. Even using the earliest start date urged by defendants (interdiction on July 8), the pretrial delay to the initial February 13 trial setting was seven months and five days—shorter than the eight-month delay held insufficient to trigger full Barker analysis in Derose. Thus, no full Barker balancing was required.

In the alternative, the court conducted the full Barker analysis:

  • Length of delay: Short of the “approaching one year” threshold noted in Doggett and Dunn; if it weighed against the government at all, it did not weigh heavily.
  • Reason for delay: Government negligence—largely U.S. Marshals’ logistical and communication mistakes regarding transfers from Puerto Rico to Florida—must weigh against the government, but not heavily, per Oliva and Vargas.
  • Assertion of the right: Even assuming this factor favored defendants, the first two did not weigh heavily against the government.
  • Actual prejudice: Required where the first three do not weigh heavily against the government. Defendants showed neither oppressive conditions nor impairment of the defense. The DEA task force officer established that the evidence collection was complete by the time of the Mirandized Puerto Rico interviews on August 26, 2022; the case evidence was “rock solid” (972 kg of cocaine on a stateless vessel). Defendants identified no lost witnesses, stale investigative leads, or strategic impairment. The district court also found defendants would have remained detained pretrial regardless, and it credited time served from July 8.

With no Sixth Amendment violation, the related request for dismissal under Rule 48(b) necessarily failed.

V. Impact and Implications

  • MDLEA jurisdiction in the EEZ is settled (in this circuit): By applying Alfonso, the panel reinforces that, in the Eleventh Circuit, the EEZ is part of the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause, and MDLEA prosecutions arising in EEZs remain constitutionally sound. This remains subject to potential Supreme Court review (a certiorari petition was noted in Alfonso), but for now is binding circuit law.
  • Rule 5 burdens in maritime cases: The opinion underscores that defendants must marshal evidence addressing the Purvis factors to prevail on a Rule 5(a) claim. Length alone, without proof of mistreatment, improper interrogation, or concrete logistical alternatives, will not suffice—particularly given the unique complexities of high-seas interdictions and maritime transport.
  • “Promptly filed” complaints after interdictions: Filing the complaint on the day of arrival and before presentment meets Rule 5(b) in this context. The Fourth Amendment’s 48-hour “probable cause determination” rule for domestic arrests does not control high-seas MDLEA arrests of noncitizens.
  • Sixth Amendment threshold remains near one year: Delays under eight months generally do not trigger full Barker analysis in this circuit. Even when a court proceeds to full balancing, negligent bureaucratic delay typically will not weigh heavily against the government, and actual prejudice will be required—and is often difficult to show in interdiction cases with closed evidentiary records.
  • Operational reforms and best practices: The record revealed U.S. Marshals Service logistical and communication errors during transfers from Puerto Rico to Florida, later addressed by internal system changes. Agencies should continue to document transport constraints and corrective steps to preempt or rebut future Rule 5/Barker claims.
  • Unpublished but instructive: While “Do Not Publish” and thus not precedential, the decision harmonizes and applies binding Eleventh Circuit precedent in a fact pattern common to MDLEA prosecutions, making it practically important for litigants, investigators, and trial courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA (46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508): A federal statute criminalizing drug trafficking on vessels “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including stateless vessels on the high seas.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Waters extending up to 200 nautical miles from a nation’s coastline, beyond the 12-mile territorial sea. For MDLEA/Felonies Clause purposes in the Eleventh Circuit, the EEZ is part of the “high seas.”
  • Vessel without nationality: A vessel that lacks valid registration or whose claimed nationality is denied or unverified, making it subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.
  • Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Grants Congress power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit holds that international law does not limit this domestic constitutional power in the MDLEA context.
  • Rule 5(a)(1)(B) “unnecessary delay” in presentment: Requires bringing an arrested person before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” Courts assess logistics, treatment/interrogation, and reasons for delay. The defendant bears the burden to prove any delay was unnecessary.
  • Rule 5(b) “promptly filed” complaint: For warrantless arrests, a complaint establishing probable cause must be promptly filed. In high-seas MDLEA cases, filing on the day of arrival and before presentment is generally adequate; the 48-hour domestic Fourth Amendment rule does not apply to noncitizens arrested on the high seas.
  • Barker v. Wingo factors (Sixth Amendment): (1) Length of delay (triggers analysis if “approaching one year”); (2) Reason for delay (intentional vs. negligent vs. valid); (3) Assertion of the right; and (4) Actual prejudice (oppressive incarceration, anxiety, or impairment of the defense). If the first three factors do not weigh heavily against the government, actual prejudice must be shown.

Practical Takeaways

  • For the defense:
    • Develop a factual record for Rule 5(a) claims: distance, transport options, weather, port availability, agency communications, and any specific mistreatment or improper interrogation.
    • In speedy-trial challenges, be prepared to demonstrate concrete prejudice (lost witnesses, degraded evidence, impaired strategy) beyond generic anxiety or detention hardships.
  • For the government:
    • Document maritime logistics, including the necessity of ship-to-shore transfers, flight constraints, and coordination among agencies, to explain any presentment delay.
    • Continue reforms to transport tracking and inter-agency notification to avoid bureaucratic delays. Where delays occur, candidly acknowledge negligence and show remediation.
  • For trial courts:
    • Anchor Rule 5 and Sixth Amendment analyses in the Eleventh Circuit’s burden frameworks: the movant’s evidentiary burden for Rule 5, and the near-one-year threshold triggering Barker’s full balancing.
    • Make specific findings on the reasons for delay and probable effects on defense impairment to facilitate appellate review.

Conclusion

This decision reinforces three core propositions for maritime drug prosecutions in the Eleventh Circuit. First, under binding circuit law, the EEZ is part of the “high seas” for MDLEA purposes; constitutional challenges premised on international-law limits are foreclosed by Alfonso. Second, Rule 5 challenges require defendants to come forward with evidence; length alone—especially amid the logistical realities of high-seas interdictions—will rarely suffice. Third, a sub-one-year delay to trial will ordinarily not be presumptively prejudicial under Barker, and where government negligence is the chief cause, defendants must show actual prejudice—a high bar they did not clear here.

By applying and harmonizing recent MDLEA, Rule 5, and Sixth Amendment precedents, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed straightforward convictions supported by overwhelming evidence and clarified the evidentiary and analytical burdens that will govern similar maritime interdiction cases going forward.

Case Timeline (At a Glance)

  • July 8, 2022: USCG interdiction; 972 kg cocaine seized; crew detained.
  • July 26, 2022: Complaint filed in S.D. Fla.; defendants delivered to Puerto Rico; arrested and interviewed by DEA; presented to magistrate judge; counsel appointed.
  • August 4, 2022: Indictment (conspiracy and possession under MDLEA).
  • Sept. 22 / Nov. 29, 2022: Transfer to Florida (Palanco; then Gonzalez and Vasquez Diaz).
  • Jan. 3–5, 2023: New counsel appointed in Florida; arraignments.
  • Feb. 13, 2023: Initial trial date (seven months and five days after interdiction).
  • Post-motions: Bench trial on stipulated facts; guilty verdicts.
  • Sentencing: 77 months each; credit from July 8, 2022.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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