EEZ as “High Seas” and Limits on Minor-Role Reductions under the MDLEA: Commentary on United States v. Vasquez (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit—captioned as United States v. Robles, United States v. Vasquez, and United States v. Pushiana, Nos. 23‑11483, 23‑11498, and 23‑11524 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025)—addresses three recurring issues in federal maritime drug prosecutions:

Whether the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) is constitutionally applicable to conduct occurring in another country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).
Whether the Due Process Clause and the Felonies Clause require a “nexus” between the offense and the United States for MDLEA prosecutions.
When maritime drug couriers are entitled to a “minor-role” reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

The defendants—Wilfredo Robles, Jonathan Vasquez, and Ruben Pushiana (collectively, “the appellants”)—were intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard on a go-fast vessel in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ, carrying roughly 400 kilograms of cocaine. The vessel bore no indicia of nationality, and none of the men identified a master or asserted a nationality for the vessel. They were indicted under the MDLEA, ultimately pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and received significant but differing prison terms.

On appeal, they launched two constitutional challenges to their convictions and one sentencing challenge:

An as-applied challenge to the MDLEA, arguing that the Dominican EEZ is not the “high seas” and therefore lies beyond Congress’s Felonies Clause power.
A due process and Felonies Clause “nexus” challenge, arguing that their conduct lacked any connection to the United States.
A challenge to the denial of a minor-role reduction at sentencing.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all fronts, relying heavily on its prior published precedents. Although the decision itself is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in that circuit, it is doctrinally important because it:

Reinforces the emerging Eleventh Circuit line treating foreign EEZs as the “high seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause and MDLEA jurisdiction.
Reaffirms that no U.S. nexus is required for MDLEA prosecutions of drug trafficking on stateless vessels.
Illustrates the continued strict approach to minor-role reductions for maritime drug couriers under § 3B1.2.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

In 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a go-fast vessel “within the waters of the Dominican Republic’s EEZ.” The key factual features were:

The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality (e.g., no flag, no registration number visible).
The occupants refused to answer questions; no one claimed to be the master or asserted any nationality for the vessel.
On that basis, the Coast Guard treated the boat as a vessel without nationality, bringing it within the jurisdictional reach of the MDLEA.
Approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine were seized from the vessel.

A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted all three defendants on:

One count of knowingly and intentionally possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and
One count of conspiracy to commit that offense.

They jointly moved to dismiss, arguing (1) the MDLEA could not constitutionally apply in a foreign EEZ and (2) due process and the Felonies Clause required a U.S. nexus that was lacking. The district court denied the motion. They then pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count, and the government dismissed the substantive possession count.

B. Sentencing

The Probation Office prepared separate PSRs. Each defendant sought a two-level minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), arguing that:

They were mere couriers or transporters.
They lacked knowledge of the full scope of the conspiracy.
Others—recruiters, organizers, owners of the drugs, and downstream distributors—were more culpable.

The government opposed the reductions, emphasizing that all three defendants:

Shared responsibility for operating the vessel,
Were “equally culpable,” and
Were held accountable for the same conduct and drug quantity.

The district court denied the minor-role reductions and imposed:

Robles and Vasquez: Below-guidelines sentences of 60 months’ imprisonment (guidelines range: 108–135 months), plus 2 years’ supervised release.
Pushiana: A within-guidelines sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment (guidelines range: 135–168 months), plus 5 years’ supervised release, due in part to prior drug offenses.

C. Issues on Appeal

The appeal raised three principal issues:

As-applied constitutional challenge to the MDLEA:
Is the MDLEA unconstitutional as applied to defendants interdicted in another nation’s EEZ because such waters are allegedly not the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause?
Due Process / Nexus challenge:
Does prosecuting foreign nationals under the MDLEA, where the underlying conduct lacks any nexus to the United States, violate the Due Process Clause or exceed Congress’s Felonies Clause authority?
Minor-role reduction:
Did the district court clearly err in denying the defendants a mitigating-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)?

D. Holdings

The panel rejected the as-applied constitutional challenge, holding that its prior published decision in United States v. Alfonso foreclosed any argument that Congress cannot reach conduct in an EEZ under the Felonies Clause.
The panel rejected the nexus-based due process and constitutional challenge, relying on a long line of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA cases that do not require a U.S. nexus.
The panel affirmed the denial of minor-role reductions, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding the defendants not “substantially less culpable” than other participants in the relevant conduct.
Accordingly, the defendants’ convictions and sentences were affirmed in full.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Constitutional Authority to Apply the MDLEA in a Foreign EEZ

1. The Constitutional Framework: The “Define and Punish” Clause

The defendants’ principal constitutional argument turned on the scope of Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the U.S. Constitution—the so-called “Define and Punish” Clause. As summarized in the opinion (quoting earlier circuit precedent), this clause contains three distinct grants of power:

The “Piracies Clause”: the power to define and punish piracies.
The “Felonies Clause”: the power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas.
The “Offences Clause”: the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.

The MDLEA is generally grounded in the Felonies Clause, which allows Congress to legislate regarding felonies committed on the “high seas.” The defendants argued that:

The Dominican Republic’s EEZ is not part of the “high seas.”
Therefore, Congress’s Felonies Clause power does not extend to their conduct.

2. Precedent: United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar

The panel emphasized that the defendants’ argument was “squarely foreclosed” by the Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024). In Alfonso, the court had already addressed and rejected the same EEZ-based challenge:

Alfonso held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.”
It further held that EEZs are part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause and the MDLEA.

The panel also cited United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), which reaffirmed Alfonso and again rejected the argument that Congress was constrained by international law in crafting the MDLEA, or that conduct in an EEZ lies beyond congressional reach.

Finally, the court invoked the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, as articulated in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008):

“[A] prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.”

The defendants contended that Alfonso was wrongly decided, but another prior case, United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2018), underscores that mere disagreement with prior precedent does not free a later panel from following it.

3. The Panel’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is terse but structurally straightforward:

Identify the controlling precedent: Alfonso addresses the same legal question (MDLEA’s application to conduct in an EEZ under the Felonies Clause).
Reaffirm the rule from that precedent: EEZs are considered “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and international law does not limit Congress’s constitutional power here.
Apply the prior-panel-precedent rule: Because Alfonso is published and has not been overruled by the Supreme Court or the en banc court, it is binding.
Reject the challenge as foreclosed: The appellants’ as-applied constitutional challenge fails, regardless of their arguments against Alfonso’s correctness.

Notably, the panel does not independently re-examine the merits of whether EEZs count as “high seas” or the role of international law. It instead treats those questions as definitively settled at the circuit level.

4. Impact on MDLEA Jurisdiction in EEZs

Although this particular opinion is unpublished, its practical significance in the Eleventh Circuit is considerable:

Reinforcement of the EEZ-as-high-seas doctrine:
By treating the Dominican Republic’s EEZ as indistinguishable from the high seas for Felonies Clause purposes, the Eleventh Circuit effectively grants Congress power to criminalize conduct on stateless vessels in any nation’s EEZ.
Insulation from international-law-based attacks:
The reliance on Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar confirms that would-be defendants cannot rely on alleged conflicts with international law to narrow the MDLEA’s reach, at least under the Felonies Clause theory used in this circuit.
Practical effect on interdiction strategy:
U.S. interdiction efforts in foreign EEZs—subject to whatever diplomatic or operational arrangements exist—can be backed by federal criminal prosecution even in the absence of a flag state’s express consent if the vessel is deemed stateless under the MDLEA.
Limited room for constitutional experimentation:
Future panels confronting identical challenges are functionally bound to reject them unless and until the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc revisits Alfonso.

B. The Nexus and Due Process Challenge

1. The Argument: No Connection to the United States

The defendants also argued that:

Because their conduct occurred on the high seas (or in an EEZ) and involved foreign nationals on a stateless vessel,
And because there was no evidence the drugs were bound for the United States,
Prosecuting them under the MDLEA violated the Due Process Clause and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause.

In many extraterritorial criminal contexts, courts look for some “nexus” between the conduct and the United States. The appellants argued such a nexus was constitutionally required here and absent in their case.

2. Precedents: Cabezas‑Montano and Campbell

The panel responded by reasserting a line of Eleventh Circuit cases that explicitly reject a nexus requirement for MDLEA prosecutions. The leading authorities cited are:

United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020)
The court held that:
- The MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause even for drug trafficking with no nexus to the United States.
- Due process is not violated by prosecuting foreign nationals captured on the high seas aboard stateless vessels engaged in drug trafficking.
United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
The court similarly held that:
- Congress may criminalize drug trafficking on stateless vessels without requiring proof of a U.S. nexus.
- The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not bar prosecution of foreign nationals under the MDLEA in such circumstances because there is clear international condemnation of maritime drug trafficking.

3. Legal Reasoning: Notice and Universal Condemnation

The panel succinctly reaffirms the reasoning from earlier cases:

No nexus requirement under the Felonies Clause:
For drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas (including EEZs as treated by the Eleventh Circuit), the MDLEA falls within Congress’s Felonies Clause authority even when the planned destination of the drugs is unknown or foreign.
Due process satisfied by “clear notice” and universal condemnation:
The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly reasoned that:
- Drug trafficking by stateless vessels on the high seas is widely condemned by the international community.
- The MDLEA clearly communicates that such conduct exposes participants to U.S. prosecution.
- Therefore, prosecuting foreign nationals in these circumstances does not violate “fundamental fairness,” the core concern of the Due Process Clause.

On this basis, the panel held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss for lack of nexus.

4. Impact and Comparative Note

Within the Eleventh Circuit, the implications are clear:

MDLEA prosecutions remain viable even with zero U.S. nexus so long as jurisdiction under the statute (e.g., a stateless vessel) is established.
Defendants cannot successfully raise Due Process or Felonies Clause challenges based solely on an absence of connection to the U.S. or U.S.-bound markets.
The opinion illustrates the circuit’s firm alignment with the view that certain forms of extraterritorial conduct—particularly maritime drug trafficking on stateless vessels—may be prosecuted by the United States without a specific nexus showing.

While some other jurisdictions and academic commentators have been more receptive to due process limits on extraterritorial prosecutions, the Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA line remains notably expansive and deferential to congressional power.

C. Sentencing: Minor-Role Reductions for Maritime Couriers

1. The Guideline: U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)

Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines allows for offense-level reductions based on a defendant’s mitigating role:

4-level decrease for a “minimal participant.”
2-level decrease for a “minor participant.”

Under § 3B1.2(b), a “minor participant” is someone who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity but whose role is not minimal.

The Application Notes to § 3B1.2 (particularly Note 3(C)) list a set of non-exhaustive factors that courts must consider in deciding whether to grant a mitigating-role reduction, including:

The defendant’s understanding of the scope and structure of the criminal activity.
The degree of participation in planning or organizing.
The degree of decision-making authority or influence.
The nature and extent of the defendant’s participation and discretion.
The degree to which the defendant stood to benefit.

The panel notes that both parties relied on the guideline commentary and did not challenge its validity in light of recent case law (e.g., United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc), and United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023)). Accordingly, the court treated the commentary as applicable here.

2. The De Varon / Valois Framework

The panel applied the longstanding Eleventh Circuit framework for minor-role determinations developed in United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), and reaffirmed in United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019).

Under this framework, a court considers two “guiding principles”:

The defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable at sentencing.
The inquiry is not whether the defendant was a small player in the entire conspiracy, but whether he was minor in the specific conduct used to determine his guideline range.
The defendant’s role compared to other participants in that relevant conduct.
Comparisons to “unknown” or uncharged participants in the broader scheme may be of limited or no relevance.

Importantly, as the panel reiterates (quoting Valois), the question is:

“[W]hether the defendant played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [he] has already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy.”

3. Standard of Review

The panel reviewed the district court’s factual determination of role in the offense for clear error (see De Varon, Boyd, and Cruickshank). Under this deferential standard:

A district court’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence is rarely disturbed on appeal.
Reversal requires a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

4. The Defendants’ Arguments and the Panel’s Response

The appellants contended that the district court erred by:

Measuring their culpability only against one another rather than against more culpable, unindicted co-conspirators.
Failing to give adequate weight to their allegedly mere courier status, lack of decision-making authority, and limited knowledge of the broader plan.

They argued there were more culpable actors, such as:

Organizers and planners of the smuggling trip.
Owners of the drugs.
Downstream distributors.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected these arguments for several reasons:

Relevant conduct is limited:
Under De Varon and Valois, the appropriate question is whether each defendant was minor in the conduct for which he was held accountable, not in the larger conspiracy. Thus, the district court was “not required to consider the culpability of any unknown conspirators” (quoting Cabezas‑Montano).
Comparison among co-defendants was appropriate:
The record showed that:
- All three defendants knowingly transported a large quantity of cocaine (approximately 400 kg).
- All shared responsibilities for operating the vessel.
- Each was to receive payment for his involvement.
- All were held accountable for the same drug quantity and substantive conduct.
These facts supported the district court’s conclusion that they were “equally culpable” within the relevant conduct and not substantially less culpable than most other participants in that conduct.
Totality of the circumstances considered:
The panel found that the district court did consider the defendants’ arguments and the relevant factors under § 3B1.2, and simply reached a different, permissible view of the evidence.

Hence, there was no clear error in denying the minor-role reductions.

5. Impact for Maritime Couriers

Although the facts are case-specific, the decision illustrates broader themes in Eleventh Circuit sentencing jurisprudence:

High bar for couriers seeking minor-role reductions:
In large maritime drug trafficking cases, defendants who physically transport the drugs and share in key operational responsibilities are often found to be “integral” to the criminal activity, which weighs against a minor-role finding.
Limited weight to distant or unknown conspirators:
References to unidentified organizers, financiers, and distributors are of limited help to defendants when those individuals are not part of the specific relevant conduct used to calculate the guideline range.
Strong deference to district courts’ fact-finding:
Given the deferential clear-error standard, defendants face an uphill battle on appeal; unless a district court applies an incorrect legal standard or ignores required factors, its sentencing determinations are usually affirmed.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA)

The MDLEA (primarily codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508) is a federal statute allowing the United States to prosecute drug trafficking on:

U.S.-flagged vessels anywhere in the world.
Vessels registered in foreign nations when the foreign nation consents.
Vessels without nationality (“stateless vessels”) on the high seas.

A vessel can be deemed “without nationality” if:

It displays no indicia of nationality (no flag, no registration, etc.), and
No one on board claims a nationality or identifies a master who might make such a claim.

In this case, because the crew refused to answer questions and the vessel showed no indicia of nationality, it was treated as a stateless vessel and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.

B. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) vs. High Seas

Under modern law of the sea (e.g., the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS), a coastal state has:

Territorial sea: Generally up to 12 nautical miles from the coast, where the coastal state exercises full sovereignty (subject to innocent passage).
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Generally 12–200 nautical miles from the coast, where the coastal state has special rights over natural resources but does not have full sovereignty like in the territorial sea.
High seas: Waters beyond the territorial seas of all states, where all nations enjoy freedom of navigation.

The key constitutional question was whether the EEZ counts as “high seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause. The Eleventh Circuit, via Alfonso and reaffirmed here, treats EEZs as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, allowing Congress to legislate there under that power.

C. The Felonies Clause and International Law

The Felonies Clause gives Congress the power to “define and punish ... Felonies committed on the high Seas.” Defendants sometimes argue that:

The meaning of “high Seas” must track international law concepts.
International law limits U.S. jurisdiction, especially in foreign EEZs.

The Eleventh Circuit has rejected these arguments, holding that:

International law does not limit Congress’s constitutional authority under the Felonies Clause when Congress legislates extraterritorially.
In any event, EEZs are treated as high seas for these purposes.

D. “Nexus” Requirement in Extraterritorial Criminal Law

A nexus requirement means the government must show a sufficient connection between the defendant’s conduct and the United States to justify applying U.S. law. Some statutes or circuits require such a connection to satisfy due process.

For the MDLEA in the Eleventh Circuit:

No nexus is required when the case involves a stateless vessel engaged in drug trafficking on the high seas.
Due process is satisfied because such conduct is universally condemned and the MDLEA provides clear notice that the United States may prosecute it.

E. Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

In the Eleventh Circuit, the prior-panel-precedent rule means:

Once a published panel decision resolves a legal issue, all later panels are bound by that decision.
Only the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc can overrule that precedent.

This rule explains why the panel in Vasquez was constrained to follow Alfonso, even though the appellants argued Alfonso was wrongly decided.

F. Minor-Role Reduction

The minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) is a way to lower a defendant’s guideline level if he is:

Less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity,
But not among the least culpable (which would be a “minimal” role).

Courts look at the totality of the circumstances, including:

How much the defendant knew about the broader scheme.
Whether the defendant helped plan, organize, or direct others.
The extent and importance of the tasks he performed.
How much he stood to gain.

In maritime courier cases, courts frequently deny minor-role reductions where:

The defendant physically transports a large quantity of drugs.
He shares operational responsibilities (e.g., navigation, lookout, engine work).
He is essential to the success of the smuggling venture.

That pattern is reflected in the outcome here.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Vasquez (consolidated with Robles and Pushiana), though unpublished, is a clear reaffirmation of three important strands of circuit doctrine in maritime drug enforcement:

MDLEA jurisdiction in foreign EEZs:
By relying squarely on Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the court reinforces that foreign EEZs are treated as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and that international law does not constrain Congress’s power to criminalize drug trafficking there on stateless vessels.
No nexus requirement for MDLEA prosecutions:
The decision once again confirms that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Felonies Clause requires a U.S. nexus in MDLEA cases involving stateless vessels on the high seas. Universal condemnation of drug trafficking, coupled with clear statutory notice, suffices for due process.
Restrictive approach to minor-role reductions for couriers:
Applying the De Varon and Valois framework, and giving substantial deference to the district court, the panel underscores that maritime couriers who jointly transport large quantities of drugs and share vessel responsibilities are unlikely to qualify as minor participants, even if unknown organizers and financiers exist elsewhere in the chain.

For practitioners, this opinion signals continuity rather than novelty: the Eleventh Circuit remains firmly committed to a broad reading of congressional power under the MDLEA, minimal due process constraints on its extraterritorial use against stateless vessels, and a demanding standard for mitigating-role adjustments in maritime trafficking cases.