Drug-Quantity Estimates in § 3582(c)(2) Motions: Inconsistencies ≠ Incredibility; No Barnes Parity; Amendment 821 Relief Requires a Lowered Range

Introduction

This Seventh Circuit nonprecedential order in United States v. Byron Blake affirms the denial of a sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The appeal follows a long procedural history involving the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act, as well as the Sentencing Commission’s retroactive Amendment 821 (Part A) to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, which can reduce criminal history scores. Blake sought a reduced sentence based on his lowered criminal history category after Amendment 821 and his asserted drug-quantity exposure (which, he argued, should be fixed below 8.4 kilograms of crack cocaine). The district court instead found that the record supported approximately 10.5 kilograms of crack attributable to Blake, keeping his total offense level high enough that—even after the criminal history reduction—his guidelines range remained unchanged at 360 months to life.

On appeal, Blake principally contended that: (1) the district court failed to resolve inconsistencies in a cooperating witness’s testimony (his co-defendant Ivory); (2) the court impermissibly shifted the government’s burden to him; and (3) the court should have applied United States v. Barnes to ensure parity with the lower drug quantity attributed to Ivory. The Seventh Circuit rejected all three arguments and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The court reviews uncharged drug-quantity findings for clear error and holds that the district court permissibly relied on testimony with inconsistencies so long as it had “indicia of reliability.”
Using Ivory’s testimony (weekly 4.5-ounce “usually crack” deliveries, sometimes multiple per week over approximately 19 months), confidential informant buys, PSR information, and an agent’s testimony, the district court reasonably estimated at least 8.4 kilograms of crack attributable to Blake—indeed approximately 10.5 kilograms.
Because that quantity fixes the base offense level at 36 (8.4–25.2 kg), the leadership (+4) and obstruction (+2) enhancements produce a total offense level of 42. Even after Amendment 821’s reduction of Blake’s criminal history category from III to II, the guidelines range remains 360 months to life; thus, there is no range reduction to support relief under § 3582(c)(2).
The government met its burden by pointing to reliable testimony and corroborating evidence; the burden then shifted to Blake to show inaccuracy or unreliability, which he did not do beyond noting inconsistencies.
Barnes does not compel parity here: intervening case law need not be applied in sentence-reduction proceedings of this type, and, in any event, Blake and Ivory were not similarly situated (supplier versus downstream distributor).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Freeman, 815 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2016): Confirms clear-error review of drug-quantity determinations at sentencing. The panel applied this deferential standard, emphasizing that where two permissible views of the evidence exist, a district court’s choice between them stands unless clearly erroneous.
United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2016): Inconsistencies in testimony do not automatically render a witness incredible. This directly undercut Blake’s primary attack on Ivory’s testimony.
United States v. Bozovich, 782 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2015): District courts may make reasonable, even if imprecise, estimates of drug quantity when supported by reliable information. This supported the use of a multiplication method and approximation.
United States v. Helding, 948 F.3d 864 (7th Cir. 2020): Reinforces that sentencing information must bear indicia of reliability. The panel found Ivory’s testimony, corroborated by informants and an agent, crossed that reliability threshold.
United States v. Agbi, 84 F.4th 702 (7th Cir. 2023), citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): If the record supports two reasonable interpretations, an appellate court will not displace the fact-finder’s choice. This frames why the court could affirm even if the testimony could also support a lower quantity.
United States v. Fleming, 676 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2012): Authorizes estimating drug quantity by multiplying the minimum quantity per transaction by the number of transactions. The opinion applies this arithmetic expressly to the “4.5-ounce” weekly pattern.
United States v. Rollerson, 7 F.4th 565 (7th Cir. 2021), and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3: Permits inclusion of other acts within the same course of conduct or common scheme as “relevant conduct.” The district court reasonably added quantities attributable to Blake’s other distributors.
United States v. Gibbs, 26 F.4th 760 (7th Cir. 2022): The government must first establish a reliable evidentiary basis for drug quantity; the burden then shifts to the defendant to show inaccuracy or unreliability. The court found the government met its initial burden and Blake did not carry his responsive burden.
United States v. Barnes, 602 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010): Addresses parity in drug-quantity findings between a cooperator and a co-conspirator when the record is the same. The panel held Barnes inapplicable here, both because intervening case law need not be applied in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings and because Blake and Ivory were not similarly situated (supplier vs. buyer/distributor).
United States v. Fowowe, 1 F.4th 522 (7th Cir. 2021): In First Step Act resentencing, district courts are not required to apply intervening judicial decisions. The panel signaled the same principle in the § 3582(c)(2) context and, in any event, resolved Barnes on the merits because the defendants were not similarly situated.
United States v. Blake, 286 F. App’x 337 (7th Cir. 2008): The earlier appeal affirming the conviction and sentence, while flagging discrepancies in Ivory’s testimony and noting that, at the time, only 1.5 kilograms was needed to trigger the highest base offense level under the older drug table. This history frames the evolving guideline thresholds through the Fair Sentencing Act and later amendments.
United States v. Blake, 22 F.4th 637 (7th Cir. 2022): The court’s prior remand under the First Step Act to address whether the record supported at least 2.8 kilograms for purposes of determining the applicable guidelines range under the Fair Sentencing Act regime. On remand, the district court found more than 2.8 kilograms, and later, for the Amendment 821 motion, found more than 8.4 kilograms.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeds in three principal steps.

Drug-quantity finding (clear error review):
- The district court could credit Ivory’s testimony notwithstanding internal inconsistencies (Tate). Credibility is not nullified by inconsistency; the only question is whether the testimony has indicia of reliability (Helding), particularly when corroborated.
- Using the Fleming multiplication method, weekly deliveries of 4.5 ounces (“usually crack”), sometimes more than once per week, over approximately 19 months supports an estimate of at least 8.4 kilograms. Arithmetic confirms this: 4.5 oz ≈ 127.57 g; 66 such deliveries ≈ 8.42 kg. Nineteen months is roughly 82–83 weeks; even one 4.5-oz delivery per week for that period yields ≈ 10.5 kg, matching the district court’s estimate. The record also included multiple buys via informants totaling ~0.46 kg and testimony that Blake supplied numerous other distributors, which can be counted as relevant conduct (Rollerson; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3).
- Because the record supports more than one reasonable quantity estimate, the district court’s choice among permissible views cannot be clearly erroneous (Agbi; Bessemer City).
Burden of proof at sentencing:
- The government satisfied its initial burden (Gibbs) by pointing to reliable segments of Ivory’s testimony and corroborating evidence (informants and an agent). The burden then shifted to Blake to demonstrate inaccuracy or unreliability. He did not meet that burden by merely highlighting inconsistencies; he did not persuasively show that the testimony was unreliable or false.
Guideline consequence and Amendment 821:
- Under current U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), at least 8.4 kilograms but less than 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base sets a base offense level of 36. With +4 for a leadership role (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)) and +2 for obstruction (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1), the total offense level is 42.
- Even after Amendment 821 (Part A) reduces Blake’s criminal history category from III to II, a total offense level of 42 with CHC II still yields a guidelines range of 360 months to life. The range is therefore unchanged.
- Because § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a reduction only when a retroactive amendment lowers the applicable guideline range, there was no basis to reduce Blake’s sentence on the record as found by the district court.

The court also rejected Blake’s Barnes argument. Although Barnes cautions against attributing different drug quantities to similarly situated co-defendants on the same record, two reasons foreclosed relief here: (1) intervening decisions like Barnes need not be applied in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings (consistent with the approach in Fowowe for First Step Act resentencings), and (2) Blake and Ivory are not similarly situated; Blake was a supplier to Ivory and to at least eight other distributors, making higher quantities attributable to him under relevant conduct principles.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, this order meaningfully clarifies several practical points for future § 3582(c)(2) motions predicated on Amendment 821 and for drug-quantity determinations generally:

Amendment 821 relief is range-dependent: A lowered criminal history score does not by itself warrant a reduction. If the total offense level keeps the range at 360-to-life, no relief is authorized or warranted.
“Inconsistencies ≠ incredibility” is alive and well: Defendants should anticipate that cooperating-witness testimony, even if internally inconsistent, may be credited if corroborated and otherwise reliable.
Multiplicative estimates are endorsed: Courts may approximate drug quantities by multiplying the minimum purchase amount by the frequency over the relevant period, especially when the pattern is consistent and supported by the record.
Relevant conduct broadens exposure: Quantities attributable through other distributors tied to the same course of conduct may push a defendant over key thresholds (e.g., 8.4 kg for base level 36).
PSR weight and the importance of objections: Uncontested PSR facts can be used extensively. Defense counsel should contest PSR drug-quantity paragraphs with specificity during original sentencing and preserve objections; later attempts to relitigate without stronger counter-evidence are unlikely to succeed.
Limited traction for Barnes parity in sentence-modification proceedings: Parity arguments are strongest when defendants are truly similarly situated and rely on the same record; supplier-distributor hierarchies often defeat parity claims, and intervening decisions are not automatically imported into § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction: Allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment if the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the guideline range that was applied. If the applicable range is unchanged, no reduction is permitted.
Amendment 821 (Part A): A 2023 Sentencing Commission amendment that, among other things, reduces “status points” and can lower a defendant’s criminal history category. It is retroactive, but it matters only if the change lowers the defendant’s overall guideline range.
Base offense level and thresholds: For cocaine base, the guidelines assign base levels by weight bands. In this case, at least 8.4 kg but less than 25.2 kg corresponds to base level 36; at least 2.8 kg but less than 8.4 kg corresponds to base level 34; at least 25.2 kg corresponds to base level 38.
Total offense level: The base offense level plus adjustments for role (e.g., organizer/leader +4) and obstruction (+2). Here, the total offense level was 42 (36 + 4 + 2).
Relevant conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): Includes acts that are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction. Courts may count drug quantities beyond the precise transactions of conviction if they are part of the same drug-distribution activity.
Clear error standard: Appellate courts defer to district courts’ factual findings unless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. If two views are permissible, the district court’s choice stands.
Indicia of reliability: Sentencing evidence need not meet the trial standard; rather, it must bear sufficient reliability (e.g., corroboration, consistency with other evidence) to support factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence.
Fleming multiplication method: A practical way to estimate drug quantity by multiplying the minimum quantity per transaction by the number of transactions. For example, 4.5 oz ≈ 127.57 g; multiplied by 66 deliveries ≈ 8.42 kg.
Barnes parity principle (limited here): Courts should avoid attributing different drug quantities to similarly situated co-defendants on the same record. But the principle does not apply if defendants are not similarly situated, and intervening decisions like Barnes are not automatically imported into § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to reduce Byron Blake’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2) in light of Amendment 821 (Part A). The linchpin was drug quantity. Crediting reliable aspects of Ivory’s testimony, corroborated by informants and an agent and reinforced by uncontested PSR facts, the district court reasonably found more than 8.4 kilograms (indeed about 10.5 kilograms) of crack attributable to Blake. That finding secures a base offense level of 36 and, with role and obstruction enhancements, a total offense level of 42. Even with Blake’s criminal history reduced from III to II, the guidelines range remains 360 months to life. Because Amendment 821 did not lower the applicable range, § 3582(c)(2) relief was unavailable.

Beyond its immediate result, the opinion underscores several durable principles: inconsistencies do not render cooperators’ testimony incredible; sentencing judges may make reasonable, supported estimates of drug quantity using multiplicative methods; relevant conduct can materially increase attributable quantities; and Amendment 821’s benefits are contingent on producing a lower guideline range. Finally, Barnes-style parity arguments will not carry the day in sentence-modification proceedings where defendants are not similarly situated or where intervening case law need not be applied. The decision offers a practical roadmap for how courts in this circuit will evaluate Amendment 821 and drug-quantity challenges in § 3582(c)(2) motions.