Domestic‑Violence Misdemeanor Conviction Suffices to Disarm: Kansas Upholds Five‑Year Firearm Ban Without Individual Dangerousness Finding

Introduction

In State v. McCray (Kan. Nov. 14, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a recurring post‑Bruen Second Amendment question: whether the Legislature may temporarily disarm persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence without an individualized finding that they are presently dangerous. The court answered “yes,” upholding K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18)—which bars firearm possession for five years by persons convicted of a misdemeanor domestic‑violence offense—as both facially valid and constitutional as applied to Yusuf T. McCray.

The decision synthesizes New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen’s analogical method with United States v. Rahimi’s guidance that government may disarm persons who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others. Importantly, the court holds that a recent misdemeanor domestic‑violence conviction is, as a matter of law, a sufficient proxy for dangerousness consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation—obviating any additional, bespoke judicial finding of future dangerousness.

Background and Procedural Posture

Police responding to a domestic‑disturbance call at McCray’s home observed a rifle box and recovered a Ruger AR‑556 and two loaded magazines after obtaining consent to search. McCray had pleaded guilty three months earlier to a misdemeanor domestic‑battery offense under Wichita Municipal Ordinance § 5.10.025(a)(1) and was on probation. He was charged with criminal use of a weapon under K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18).

McCray moved to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds, arguing the statute lacked historical pedigree under Bruen. The district court denied the motion; a jury convicted him. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review limited to his constitutional challenge.

Summary of the Opinion

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding:

K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) is constitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to McCray.
By its plain terms, the statute targets a combined and narrow category—persons convicted within the preceding five years of a misdemeanor domestic‑violence offense—reflecting legislative intent to reduce the risk of violence in domestic settings.
Applying Bruen’s “why and how” analogical framework, the statute aligns with the historical tradition embodied in surety and “going armed” laws that allowed temporary disarmament of individuals who threatened interpersonal violence.
A recent misdemeanor domestic‑violence conviction is sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the offender poses a threat of physical violence; the Second Amendment does not require an additional individualized, prospective dangerousness finding for such post‑conviction disarmament.
The statute’s five‑year limit imposes a narrower burden than the federal analogue (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)) and is comparably justified and tailored.

Detailed Analysis

1) Text, Structure, and Legislative Purpose

K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) makes it criminal to possess a firearm if, within the past five years, the possessor “has been convicted of a misdemeanor for a domestic violence offense.” “Domestic violence” is defined as the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force—or the threatened use of a deadly weapon—against a family or household member or someone in a dating relationship (K.S.A. 21‑6301[m][1]).

The court emphasizes two interpretive points:

The statute creates a single, integrated disqualification category—misdemeanor domestic‑violence convicts—rather than two freestanding bans (one for misdemeanants, another for domestic‑violence offenders). The Court of Appeals erred by treating it as two separate prohibitions.
The Legislature’s evident purpose, from the statute’s plain language, is to reduce lethal escalation in domestic settings by temporarily disarming those recently adjudicated to have used or threatened force against intimate partners or family members.

That policy objective matches the Supreme Court’s prior recognition that firearms combined with domestic strife is a “potentially deadly combination” (citing Hayes, Voisine, and Castleman).

2) Framework: Bruen’s Historical‑Tradition Test as Clarified by Rahimi

The court applies Bruen’s directive to uphold modern firearm regulations only if they are “relevantly similar” to historical analogues—meaning the modern law must be comparably justified (the “why”) and impose a comparable burden (the “how”).

Rahimi refined Bruen’s analogical reasoning by identifying founding‑era “preventive justice” regimes—surety laws and “going armed” prohibitions—that authorized disarmament or restraints on those credibly threatening violence. The Kansas Supreme Court reads Rahimi to confirm that:

Government may disarm individuals who present a credible threat to others’ physical safety.
Modern laws need not be historical twins; they must serve a similar purpose and burden the right comparably.

3) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Heller and McDonald: Recognize an individual right to keep and bear arms, incorporated against the states, but not unlimited; longstanding, status‑based restrictions persist.
Bruen: Requires analogical reasoning to historical tradition; focuses on “why” and “how” rather than exact replicas.
Rahimi: Holds § 922(g)(8) constitutional and catalogs surety and “going armed” analogues; reaffirms that disarming persons credibly threatening violence accords with tradition.
Castleman, Hayes, Voisine: Establish federal backdrop on the risks of domestic violence and firearms; validate legislative efforts to close the “misdemeanor loophole.”
Post‑Rahimi Circuits on § 922(g)(9): Gailes (6th Cir. 2024), Bernard (8th Cir. 2025), Nutter (4th Cir. 2025), Jackson (10th Cir. 2025), and Simmons (2d Cir. 2025) uphold the federal domestic‑violence‑misdemeanant ban. These cases reinforce the proposition that a domestic‑violence conviction evidences a propensity for violence justifying disarmament.
Kansas canons: Betts, Keys, Eckert, and Gonzalez supply the interpretive and constitutional review standards (plain meaning; presumption of constitutionality; unlimited review for constitutional questions).
Salerno and Washington State Grange: Supply the facial‑challenge standard (law must be unconstitutional in all applications to fail).

Collectively, these authorities guided the court to treat K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) as a historically grounded, temporary, status‑based restriction comparable to the founding‑era tools used to prevent violence.

4) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The “Why”: Preventing Interpersonal Violence

The court finds that K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) shares the same preventive objective as historical surety and “going armed” laws—minimizing the risk of violence by restricting weapons access by persons demonstrated to threaten others’ safety. A recent misdemeanor domestic‑violence conviction necessarily embodies a judicial determination that the individual used or threatened force in an intimate setting, which founding‑era regimes treated as a classic basis for preventive restraints.

b) The “How”: Narrow, Temporary Burden

Unlike permanent, categorical bans, the Kansas prohibition lasts only five years after conviction and then lapses automatically. The court underscores that this is narrower than the federal § 922(g)(9) prohibition, further situating the Kansas law within the acceptable “comparable burden” contemplated by Bruen and exemplified in Rahimi. The temporal limit tracks the heightened risk window following a domestic‑violence offense.

c) No Separate Finding of “Future Dangerousness” Required

Rejecting McCray’s argument that Rahimi demands a fresh judicial finding of present or future dangerousness, the court holds that a recent domestic‑violence conviction suffices. It reasons:

Rahimi’s holding validates disarmament when an individual presents a credible threat; a conviction for domestic violence is a legally reliable, judicially tested marker of such a threat.
Nothing in Rahimi limits disarmament to persons under restraining orders or to cases with contemporaneous dangerousness findings. Post‑conviction restrictions are constitutionally easier to justify than pre‑conviction restraints.

d) Facial and As‑Applied Validity

For a facial challenge, the statute need only have some constitutional applications; the court notes it clearly does (e.g., recent violent domestic assaults). As applied, McCray’s facts fit squarely within the statute’s core: a recent misdemeanor domestic‑battery conviction, probationary status with written notice, and possession of a rifle during a fresh domestic disturbance—all underscoring the precise public‑safety concern the Legislature addressed.

e) Preservation Clarified

The court corrects the panel’s framing error: K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) is not two separate bans but one combined category—misdemeanor domestic‑violence offenders—and McCray preserved that precise challenge. This clarification prevents future mischaracterizations of the statute’s scope on appeal.

5) Impact and Implications

a) Immediate Effects in Kansas

Prosecutions under K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) are on solid constitutional footing; routine as‑applied challenges predicated on the absence of individualized dangerousness findings will likely fail.
Trial courts need not conduct separate dangerousness hearings when the predicate conviction falls within the statute’s definition and timeframe.
Because the ban is temporary, defendants regain firearm rights by the statute’s own terms after five years, without extra proceedings.

b) Alignment with Federal Law and National Trend

Kansas law now squarely aligns with the post‑Rahimi federal consensus upholding § 922(g)(9). The court’s reliance on the same historical analogues suggests similar state‑law restrictions in other jurisdictions will be sustained if narrowly drawn and temporally limited.
The decision distinguishes Kansas’s measured approach (five‑year limit) from the federal statute’s generally permanent disqualification, enhancing defensibility under Bruen’s “comparable burden” inquiry.

c) Legislative Drafting Guidance

Statutes that target recent, judicially adjudicated violence (or threats) and that limit the duration of disarmament are most likely to survive Bruen review.
Express statutory definitions tethered to use, attempted use, or threatened use of force help courts apply Bruen’s “why and how” analysis.

d) Litigation Guidance

Defense counsel should focus on predicates that do not meet the statute’s domestic‑violence definition or that fall outside the five‑year window; generic attacks on the absence of historical “twins” are unlikely to prevail.
Prosecutors can rely on certified convictions and statutory definitions; evidence of recency and domestic context will be pivotal to as‑applied defenses.

e) What the Court Did Not Decide

No claim under Section 4 of the Kansas Bill of Rights was raised or decided.
The opinion does not address whether knowledge of prohibited‑status is required; the case turned on possession and the validity of the disqualification itself.
The court did not reach whether other misdemeanor‑based disqualifications (outside the domestic‑violence context) are constitutional; the opinion is carefully tailored to the domestic‑violence category.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Second Amendment “historical tradition” test: Modern gun laws are valid if they are relevantly similar to historical regulations in purpose and burden. Exact historical matches are unnecessary.
“Why and how” analysis: Courts compare the law’s purpose (why it restricts arms) and its burden (how it restricts) with historical analogues.
Surety laws: Founding‑era rules that required persons credibly suspected of breaching the peace to post a bond and sometimes limited their arms—aimed at preventing violence before it occurred.
“Going armed” laws: Early criminal prohibitions on carrying dangerous weapons in a manner that terrorized the public, often resulting in forfeiture of weapons.
Facial vs. as‑applied challenge: A facial challenge attacks a law in all its applications; an as‑applied challenge contests the law’s application to the particular defendant’s facts.
“Future dangerousness” vs. conviction proxy: Rahimi involved a restraining order with a judicial finding of danger. McCray holds that where there is a recent domestic‑violence conviction, that conviction itself is a sufficient, historically grounded proxy for dangerousness; no separate finding is required.

Key Takeaways

New Kansas rule: A recent misdemeanor domestic‑violence conviction is sufficient, as a matter of law, to justify temporary disarmament consistent with the Second Amendment—no individualized future‑dangerousness finding is required.
K.S.A. 21‑6301(a)(18) survives Bruen. Its preventive objective and limited duration are comparable to founding‑era analogues recognized in Rahimi.
Facial challenges to this statute will fail; as‑applied challenges are unlikely to succeed when the conviction is recent and fits the statutory definition.
Kansas joins a growing post‑Rahimi consensus that domestic‑violence misdemeanant disarmament lies within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Conclusion

State v. McCray is a significant post‑Bruen decision clarifying that Kansas’s five‑year firearm prohibition for misdemeanor domestic‑violence offenders accords with the Second Amendment. Relying on Rahimi’s recognition of historical preventive‑justice regimes, the court holds that a recent domestic‑violence conviction itself establishes the requisite threat profile and that a temporary, targeted disarmament imposes a comparable burden to founding‑era measures. The opinion provides durable doctrinal guidance for Kansas courts and litigants and aligns state law with the emerging federal consensus that status‑based domestic‑violence disqualifications are constitutionally sound when narrowly tailored and temporally constrained.