Doctrine of Immediacy in Use of Deadly Force: Verbal Warnings Not Required Under Imminent Threat Circumstances

Introduction

In April Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit addressed two core questions: (1) whether a police officer must issue a verbal warning before using deadly force when faced with an apparently armed suspect moving toward potential victims in a crowded public space; and (2) whether mall‐owner defendants owe a duty under Alabama law to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties or from improperly trained security personnel. Plaintiff‐Appellant April Pipkins, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Emantic Fitzgerald Bradford Jr., sued Officer David Alexander, the City of Hoover, and the owners and operators of Riverchase Galleria Mall. Bradford, a lawful permit‐holder and Good Samaritan, was shot and killed by Officer Alexander shortly after gunshots rang out in the shopping mall. The district court dismissed her state‐law claims and granted summary judgment on her § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive‐force claim. Pipkins appealed both rulings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed. On the § 1983 claim, the Court held that Officer Alexander’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Within mere seconds of hearing gunshots and observing a man (Bradford) running toward two injured patrons with a handgun at his side, the officer—acting behind Bradford—reasonably believed Bradford posed an immediate threat. Under settled precedent, no verbal warning was constitutionally required when split‐second decisions are forced by circumstance.

On the state‐law claims, the Court ruled that Alabama law imposes no general duty on premises owners to protect invitees from the unforeseeable criminal acts of third parties. Nor had Pipkins plausibly alleged special foreseeability or a special relationship. Her negligent/wanton hiring, training, and supervision claim likewise failed because she presented no factual allegations of prior incompetence by Officer Alexander or notice to the mall defendants.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): Established that deadly‐force seizures must meet the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard.
• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Instituted the “objective reasonableness” framework, focusing on the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.
• Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Authorized courts to view video evidence at summary judgment and to decide pure questions of law where facts are undisputed.
• Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014): Emphasized split‐second judgment calls and declined to impose rigid warning requirements where circumstances make warnings impractical.
• Perez v. Suszcynski, 908 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016): Recited the three‐part deadly‐force test—probable cause of serious threat, necessity, and feasible warning.
• Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2022): Held warnings not required when an 84,000‐pound truck posed an imminent threat and officers had no safe opportunity to warn.
• Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003): Contrasted scenarios where a warning was feasible before firing.
• Alabama premises‐liability precedents (Latham, Henley, Saccuzzo, Broadus, Moye, etc.): Uniformly hold no duty to protect invitees from unforeseeable third‐party crimes absent a special relationship or notice of specific past crimes rendering the conduct foreseeable.

Legal Reasoning

1. Fourth Amendment – Objective Reasonableness. Under Garner and Graham, use of deadly force is evaluated by balancing the intrusion on individual liberty against government interests, from the vantage of a reasonable officer on the scene. Here, within five seconds of the initial shots, Officer Alexander perceived Bradford—gun in hand—running toward two wounded men in a crowded mall. Bradford was between the officers and the victims and would have reached them first. Under Plumhoff and Kisela, split‐second decisions in tense, rapidly evolving situations excuse the absence of preround warnings when none is practically feasible.

2. Warning Requirement. Though generally a warning is required if feasible (Perez), the Court drew on Davis v. Waller and other circuit cases to affirm that when an immediate threat looms just feet away and only seconds remain, an officer need not risk his life or public safety to issue a warning. The video showed mere two to three seconds between sighting Bradford and the shots—too little time to warn effectively.

3. State‐Law Duty and Hiring/Training Claims. Alabama law imposes no general affirmative duty on mall owners to protect invitees from unforeseeable crimes by third parties (Latham, Henley, Saccuzzo). Special‐relationship exceptions require evidence that the owner knew of specific prior incidents that made the exact type of crime a probability (Moye). Pipkins pleaded no prior criminal incidents at the Galleria, no specialized knowledge by the mall defendants, and no direct dependence by Bradford on mall security (Young; Finley). Likewise, negligent‐hiring claims fail absent allegations that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s incompetence—Pipkins offered no such factual basis.

Impact

This decision clarifies two significant principles:

• Imminency Doctrine in Use‐of‐Force Law: Officers in crowded public settings who face armed individuals approaching victims need not provide verbal warnings when only split seconds are available and the risk of delay is irreducible. Future excessive‐force challenges in similar “active‐shooter” or rapidly unfolding scenarios will cite Pipkins to justify no‐warning applications of deadly force.
• Limits of Premises Liability in Alabama: Property owners and private security contractors cannot be held liable for injuries caused by unforeseeable third‐party criminal acts absent concrete evidence of prior substantially similar incidents or a legally recognized special relationship with the victim. This tightens the foreseeability standard and shields premises owners from expansive tort exposure tied to off‐duty law enforcement actions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Objective Reasonableness: Courts ask what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do, not with perfect hindsight, but under the same chaotic conditions.
• Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Belief: Probable cause exists when there is a substantial chance the suspect poses serious harm; reasonable belief tracks that standard for split‐second deadly‐force decisions.
• Invitee & Special Relationship: An invitee is a person invited onto property for business; a special relationship (creating extra protection duties) arises only when the owner has actual or constructive notice of very specific past dangers.
• Negligence vs. Wantonness: Negligence is failing to exercise ordinary care; wantonness requires knowing disregard of a substantial risk.
• Summary Judgment: A judge grants it when no genuine factual dispute remains and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Pipkins v. City of Hoover reaffirms that officers facing what they reasonably perceive as imminent threats in rapidly evolving, life‐or‐death scenarios are not constitutionally required to give verbal warnings when none can be given without sacrificing safety. It also underscores Alabama’s restrictive approach to premises liability and negligent‐hiring claims: property owners do not owe patrons general protection from unforeseeable third‐party criminal acts, nor liability for security guards’ errors absent notice of prior similar misconduct. Together, these rulings refine both federal excessive‐force doctrine and state tort standards, offering clear guideposts for law enforcement, property owners, and future litigants.