District Courts’ Broad Discretion to Apply Uniform Percentage Reductions in Section 1988 Fee Awards

Introduction

In Franco v. Gunsalus, 24-2061 (2d Cir. May 1, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the extent of a district court’s discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to adjust attorneys’ fees when a civil-rights plaintiff achieves only partial success. Plaintiff-appellant Mario Franco sued Syracuse police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution arising from a July 4th block-party dispersal. After a jury awarded him nominal and modest compensatory damages and this Court affirmed the verdict, Franco sought attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court granted fees but reduced the lodestar by 25% across both pre-verdict and post-verdict phases to reflect limited success. Franco appealed, arguing that fees incurred in defending the judgment post-trial and on appeal should not be subject to the same reduction. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court’s summary order addressed whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply a uniform twenty-five-percent reduction to the entire § 1988 fee award. Reiterating that a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff “is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,” the Court held:

The district court properly exercised its discretion under Hensley v. Eckerhart by focusing on the “overall relief obtained” in relation to hours expended.
Limited success—plaintiff sought $300,000 but obtained only $5,001—justified a 25% across-the-board reduction.
No binding precedent requires segregating fees by litigation phase; uniform percentage cuts are permissible under § 1988.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983): Established the lodestar method and allows either line-by-line reductions or percentage cuts when a plaintiff’s success is limited.
Weyant v. Okst, 198 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1999): Clarified that § 1988 fees include work on post-judgment motions and appeals.
Green v. Torres, 361 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2004): Affirmed broad discretion to reduce fees by a percentage to align with a plaintiff’s degree of success.
Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2014) & Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012) & Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2019): Emphasized deference to district courts on fee determinations.
District-court decisions like Legg v. Ulster County and Monsour v. OPWDD have sometimes segregated pre- and post-verdict work, but no binding Second Circuit authority mandates that approach.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, recognizing that district judges are “much closer to the details of each individual case.” Under § 1988 and Hensley, when a plaintiff’s victory is partial—here, nominal and minimal damages compared to large claims—courts may proportionately reduce fees. The district court chose a 25% uniform reduction rather than parsing hours by phase, explaining that the overall result “pales in comparison to the amount sought.” The Second Circuit agreed that focusing on “the significance of the overall relief obtained” permits an across-the-board cut.

Impact

This decision reaffirms that:

District courts enjoy broad discretion under § 1988 to adjust fee awards for partial success, including post-judgment work.
No rigid formula requires separate calculation for trial, post-trial motions, and appeal phases.
Litigants should anticipate that a significant disparity between relief sought and relief obtained can yield uniform percentage reductions of fees.

Future § 1983 plaintiffs and defense counsel will structure fee petitions and defenses with these principles in mind, possibly advocating phase-specific analyses or alternative reduction methodologies based on case complexity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 1983 Lawsuit: A civil action for violations of constitutional rights by state actors.
§ 1988 Fee Shifting: A law allowing prevailing civil-rights plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.
Lodestar Method: Calculating fees by multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate; adjustments follow for success level.
Abuse of Discretion: A deferential appellate standard—reversal only if the district court’s decision was irrational or arbitrary.

Conclusion

Franco v. Gunsalus solidifies the principle that district courts possess broad discretion to impose uniform percentage reductions on § 1988 fee awards when a plaintiff’s success is limited, encompassing all phases of litigation. By affirming the 25% cut without requiring phase segregation, the Second Circuit underscores flexibility in fee-shifting jurisprudence and alerts practitioners to the importance of tying fee requests closely to the relief ultimately secured.