Distinct Acts, Distinct Prosecutions: People v. Harris and the Narrowing of “Same Criminal Transaction” Under CPL 40.40

Introduction

In People v. Harris (2025 NY Slip Op 03419) the Fourth Department confronted the perennial tension between New York’s single-transaction joinder statute (CPL 40.40) and prosecutorial discretion to proceed in separate indictments. The defendant, Jamien Harris, first pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal possession of a firearm stemming from a police response to her grandmother’s home, where the victim had been fatally shot. Months later, the People secured a murder indictment based on the same event. County Court dismissed the murder indictment, holding that CPL 40.40 barred a second prosecution because both offenses were part of a single criminal transaction.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the murder indictment and, in doing so, crystallised a new principle: possession of a weapon and the later use of that weapon to commit homicide may constitute separate “acts,” and therefore separate “criminal transactions,” allowing successive prosecutions when the People could have joined the charges but elected not to.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department (Lindley, J.P., Curran, Greenwood & Hannah, JJ.) reversed County Court’s dismissal, denied the motion to dismiss, reinstated the murder indictment, and remitted the case for further proceedings.
The majority held that Harris’s post-homicide constructive possession of the revolver was distinct from the homicidal act, thereby falling outside the “same criminal transaction” definition of CPL 40.10(2).
Because the offenses were not part of a single transaction, CPL 40.40 did not compel joinder, and a subsequent murder prosecution was permissible even after the guilty pleas to firearm possession.
Dissent (Lindley, J.P.) argued the opposite: the possession and the homicide were “so closely related … as to constitute a single incident,” and the prosecution had possessed legally sufficient evidence to charge murder at the time of the first indictment; therefore CPL 40.40(2) mandated dismissal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning is anchored in several key authorities:

People v. DeProspero, 91 AD3d 39 (4th Dept 2011), aff’d 20 NY3d 527 (2013) – carved out the policy rationale behind CPL 40.40 as safeguarding against “equity-based” double jeopardy concerns despite technical separateness of offenses.
People v. Brown, 21 NY3d 739 (2013) – held that a defendant can receive consecutive sentences for firearm possession and a subsequent shooting if the possession predates formation of homicidal intent; the Harris majority imported Brown’s “separate-acts” logic into the joinder context.
People v. Tabor, 87 AD3d 829 (4th Dept 2011) – a precedential illustration of when the People’s possession of legally sufficient evidence does bar successive prosecutions; cited by the dissent to show Harris should be dismissed.
People v. Clinton, 222 AD3d 1427 (4th Dept 2023) and People v. Batista, 282 AD2d 825 (3d Dept 2001) – support carving possession and later crime into separate transactions where factual differentiation is apparent.
Older authorities such as Matter of Auer v. Smith, 77 AD2d 172 (4th Dept 1980) and People v. Lindsly, 99 AD2d 99 (2d Dept 1984) emphasised the danger of “piecemeal” prosecutions, buttressing the dissent.

Legal Reasoning of the Majority

Statutory Structure. The court parsed CPL 40.40 in conjunction with CPL 200.20(2)(a) and CPL 40.10(2). The lynchpin is whether the offenses arise from the “same criminal transaction.”
Distinct Temporal/Intentional Acts. Citing Brown, the majority stressed that a firearm can be possessed in a legally culpable manner without murderous intent and then later be used homicidally. Because the firearm possession charges here were predicated on Harris’s post-homicide constructive possession (when police entered on 21 Nov 2021), the homicide (20 Nov) and the possession (21 Nov) were “separate in time and circumstance.”
Policy Considerations. The court downplayed “equities” arguments, focusing on statutory language: where the statutory definition is not satisfied, concerns of fairness cannot override legislative text. Hence, no bar to successive prosecution.
Legally Sufficient Evidence Prong. Even if the People had enough evidence to indict for murder earlier, CPL 40.40(2)(b) only becomes relevant once “same transaction” is first established; because the majority found no single transaction, the sufficiency issue was academic.

The Dissent’s Counter-Analysis

Judge Lindley underscored the continuous nature of constructive possession. From the instant Harris fired the revolver until police arrival, she possessed it. Therefore, the homicide and possession overlapped temporally and circumstantially; they were, he argued, “a single criminal incident.”
He also warned that the majority’s rule permits prosecutors to sever weapon and homicide charges routinely, defeating CPL 40.40’s purpose of avoiding piecemeal litigation.

Potential Impact

Charge-Sequencing Flexibility. Prosecutors statewide now possess clearer authority to proceed first on a weapons charge and later on a homicide or assault, provided they can articulate temporal or purposive separation of acts.
Narrowing of CPL 40.40. Harris constrains the “single-transaction” doctrine; mere overlap of location or connected narrative is insufficient. Future defendants will need to demonstrate tight temporal and purposive linkage and simultaneous possession and use to secure dismissal.
Litigation of Constructive Possession. The decision invites granular argument over when possession begins and ends—a fact-intensive inquiry that may influence grand-jury presentation strategy and police timelines.
Sentencing vs. Joinder. By importing Brown’s sentencing framework into joinder analysis, Harris blurs the analytic lines, signalling that courts may use sentencing precedents to resolve joinder/double-jeopardy disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Criminal Transaction” (CPL 40.10[2]). A package of conduct so closely connected by time or purpose that it counts as one event for joinder purposes. Think of it as a single “episode.” If two offenses arise from the same episode, they must ordinarily be tried together.
CPL 40.40 (Transactional Joinder Bar). Prevents the People from prosecuting separately offenses that (1) are joinable because they come from the same transaction, and (2) could have been charged together when the first case was resolved.
Constructive Possession. Ownership or control over an object without physically holding it—e.g., having dominion over a gun inside one’s residence.
Legal Sufficiency. A threshold question: With evidence viewed favorably to the People, would a rational juror find every element of the crime proven? It is much lower than “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Conclusion

People v. Harris recalibrates the CPL 40.40 landscape by holding that a defendant’s possession of a firearm and her later (or earlier) use of that firearm to commit a violent crime can constitute separate criminal transactions when there is even modest separation in time, intent, or circumstance. The majority’s reliance on the “separate acts” logic of Brown moves the law toward a more act-specific, less equity-based reading of the joinder bar, thereby broadening prosecutorial discretion to stagger indictments.

Practitioners should expect increased litigation over the boundaries of constructive possession and over temporal framing in grand-jury proceedings. At a higher level, Harris illustrates a deeper judicial trend: statutory double jeopardy safeguards in New York are being interpreted less expansively, with courts requiring precise statutory conformity before they will preclude a successive prosecution. Whether the Court of Appeals will embrace or cabin this trend remains an open—and critical—question.