Disfavoring Token-Efforts-Only Terminations in Private Petitions and Rejecting Admissions by Silence: Nevada Supreme Court’s Guidance in In re Parental Rights as to S.A.T.

Introduction

In In the Matter of the Parental Rights as to S.A.T. (141 Nev., Adv. Op. 46, Oct. 2, 2025), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s denial of a mother’s private petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The case presented a recurring but sensitive scenario: a custodial parent sought to sever the other parent’s rights after years without contact, notwithstanding that the child was safe and well cared for. The Court addressed three central issues:

Whether the father’s lack of contact and intermittent child support triggered abandonment, neglect, or “only token efforts” under NRS Chapter 128;
Whether, in a private termination action, a court may sever rights based solely on a parent’s token efforts to support or communicate with the child; and
Whether a defending parent’s failure to specifically deny allegations in a response operates as an admission under NRCP 8(b)(6).

The Court’s opinion (by Justice Stiglich, with Chief Justice Herndon and Justice Parraguirre concurring) articulates two important clarifications in Nevada termination jurisprudence: (1) in private termination actions, terminating parental rights based solely on the token-efforts-to-communicate/support ground is disfavored, particularly where the child is safe and stable; and (2) a parent does not admit a parental-fault ground merely by failing to oppose it in a written response because a responsive pleading is not required under the termination statutes and allegations are therefore deemed denied.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the district court’s order denying the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights because the mother failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, any ground of parental fault under NRS 128.105(1)(b). Specifically:

Abandonment: Although a statutory presumption arose due to prolonged lack of support and communication (NRS 128.012(2)), the father rebutted it. He showed no “settled purpose” to forgo all parental rights (NRS 128.012(1)), citing his mental health crisis, an extended TPO he understood to bar contact until evaluation and counseling, indigence that impeded legal navigation, repeated attempts to obtain free legal help, efforts to mediate through the child support action, and subsequent compliance and payments when financially able.
Neglect: Neglect must be judged during periods of the parent’s custody. Because the child was in the mother’s care and there was no showing that the child lacked necessary care, neglect was not established (NRS 128.014; Chapman v. Chapman).
Only token efforts: While long gaps in contact could suggest “only token efforts” to communicate (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6)(I)), the Court held that, in private actions, termination based solely on this ground is disfavored. The record reflected the mother’s efforts that hindered contact and the father’s later remedial steps; the lack of contact alone, without another ground such as neglect, unfitness, or risk of harm, was insufficient.
No admissions by silence: The father’s failure to specifically deny token-efforts allegations in a written response did not admit them. Because the termination statutes do not require a responsive pleading, allegations are deemed denied or avoided under NRCP 8(b)(6), and the petitioning party still bears the clear-and-convincing burden at hearing (NRS 128.090(2)).
Mootness: Any argument over compliance with the extended TPO’s counseling requirements was moot because the order expired by its own terms in 2017.

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties divorced in 2014 with joint legal custody and the mother having primary physical custody. In 2016, the father experienced a serious mental health crisis culminating in an incident prompting an extended temporary protective order (TPO) prohibiting contact until a psychological evaluation and counseling were completed or until one year passed. The father, indigent and pro se, believed he could not safely or lawfully initiate contact without risking contempt.

The mother took steps to restrict the father’s access, including not updating her address in the child support case (leading to its closure), discontinuing the children’s bus use, cutting off contact with the paternal grandmother, and moving residences. Years later, after receiving an inheritance, the father retained counsel, paid arrears, obtained the required evaluation and counseling, and sought to reestablish visitation. Shortly thereafter, the mother filed to terminate; the district court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. The mother appealed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Parental Rts. as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418 (2006) and In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914 (2014): Reaffirm that termination requires clear and convincing proof of (a) parental fault and (b) best interests. The Court focused on fault and applied de novo review to legal questions and substantial evidence review to factual findings.
NRS 128.012 (Abandonment): Requires a “settled purpose” to relinquish all parental claims; subsection (2) creates a presumption after six months without support or communication.
In re Parental Rts. as to Montgomery, 112 Nev. 719 (1996): Emphasizes that intent controls abandonment and may be inferred from circumstances.
Greeson v. Barnes, 111 Nev. 1198 (1995): Maintaining contact and/or providing support negates abandonment; failure to pay support alone should not be dispositive.
In re Parental Rts. as to L.R.S., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d 1175 (2024): An indigent, pro se parent’s inability to navigate the system cannot be used to support abandonment; NRS 128.109 presumptions apply only in Chapter 432B (state involvement) cases.
NRS 128.014 (Neglect) and NRS 128.106(1): Define neglect and list considerations bearing on parental suitability.
Chapman v. Chapman, 96 Nev. 290 (1980): Neglect must be based on conduct while the parent has custody; leaving a child in an environment known to be safe and properly cared for does not prove neglect.
Champagne v. Welfare Div., 100 Nev. 640 (1984): Termination is reserved for serious and persistent fault; the Court reads “token efforts” alongside abandonment, neglect, unfitness, or abuse, and cautions against using certain grounds as sole bases for termination.
In re Parental Rights as to R.A.S., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 20, 567 P.3d 337 (2025): Highlights the distinct posture of private petitions, where the child is typically safe, requiring heightened judicial caution to avoid improper severance based on motivations not tied to safety.
In re Parental Rts. as to T.M.R., 137 Nev. 262 (2021): Reiterates that termination is akin to a “civil death penalty,” warranting close scrutiny.
In re Parental Rts. as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422 (2004); Drury v. Lang, 105 Nev. 430 (1989); Pyborn v. Quathamer, 96 Nev. 145 (1980): Earlier cases discussed lack of communication within broader findings of abandonment, neglect, or unfitness—supporting the Court’s view that “token efforts” typically operates with, not instead of, another substantive fault ground.
NRCP 8(b)(6); NRS 128.060 and 128.090: The rules/statutes frame how allegations are treated procedurally in termination cases, confirming that responsive pleadings are not required and allegations are deemed denied or avoided; clear and convincing evidence is always required.
Estate of LoMastro v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 124 Nev. 1060 (2008): Addresses default admissions generally in civil litigation; contrasted here with the termination statutes’ special framework.
Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev. 100 (1990); Bauwens v. Evans, 109 Nev. 537 (1993): Nevada’s elevated policy favoring decisions on the merits—especially in domestic relations—counsels against terminating parental rights by procedural default.
Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599 (2010): Applied to the mootness of the TPO compliance issue—later events obviated any live controversy because the TPO had expired years earlier.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Abandonment: Presumption Rebutted; No “Settled Purpose” to Relinquish

The mother invoked the statutory presumption of abandonment (NRS 128.012(2)) based on over six months without support or communication. The Court agreed the presumption applied but held it was rebutted. The father explained he believed the extended TPO barred contact unless and until he completed evaluation and counseling; he feared contempt if he attempted contact prematurely. He was indigent, repeatedly attempted to obtain free legal assistance, tried mediation through the child support enforcement action, and, upon receiving an inheritance, retained counsel, paid arrears, and completed the TPO’s conditions. These facts negated any “settled purpose” to forego all rights (NRS 128.012(1)), especially in light of L.R.S.’s admonition that a pro se indigent parent’s inability to navigate the legal system cannot support abandonment. The Court also noted that efforts to provide financial support—even if imperfect or delayed—cut against abandonment under Greeson.

b. Neglect: No Evidence of Harm While in Father’s Custody

Neglect requires proof that, due to the parent’s fault or habits, the child lacked necessary care (NRS 128.014(1)-(2)). Citing Chapman, the Court emphasized that neglect must be evaluated while the parent has custody. Here, the child was in the mother’s care; the father believed she was meeting all needs; and there was no evidence the child was deprived of necessities. Champagne’s insistence that neglect be serious, persistent, and sufficiently harmful weighed against a neglect finding on these facts.

c. “Only Token Efforts” in Private Petitions: Disfavored as the Sole Ground

NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6) lists “only token efforts” as a parental-fault ground, including subcategory (I): token efforts to support or communicate with the child. The Court carefully distinguished this subcategory from the others—token efforts to prevent neglect, avoid being an unfit parent, or eliminate risk of serious harm—which directly track other substantive grounds (neglect, unfitness, risk) elsewhere in the statute. By contrast, token efforts to communicate or support are not a proxy for child safety.

The Court offered two policy-driven insights:

Token communications vs. abandonment: Abandonment requires a “settled purpose” to relinquish all parental claims; making even token efforts contradicts that intent. Thus, token efforts to communicate/support cannot establish abandonment.
Private-petition caution: In private actions, children are often already safe. As R.A.S. recognized, such petitions may be driven by motivations other than immediate child protection, so courts must be vigilant. Because what counts as “only token efforts” varies with parental capacities and the dynamics between parents, the ground is “rife for abuse” if used alone to sever rights. Consistent with Champagne and D.R.H., token efforts should ordinarily operate in conjunction with another substantive fault ground, not as a stand-alone basis.

Applying this framework, the Court held that termination based solely on token efforts to communicate/support is disfavored in private termination cases. Here, the mother’s own conduct made contact difficult (moving without notice to the court or support agency, restricting access routes, severing ties with paternal relatives, and otherwise hindering the father’s ability to locate or contact the child). The father’s later steps to comply and reengage underscored the inappropriateness of severing rights on token efforts alone.

d. No Admissions by Silence: NRCP 8(b)(6) in the Termination Context

Although parental-rights proceedings are civil and generally governed by the NRCP, termination statutes (NRS 128.060, 128.090) do not require a responsive pleading. Under NRCP 8(b)(6), when no response is required, allegations are “considered denied or avoided.” The mother’s theory that the father admitted token efforts by failing to deny them in a written opposition was rejected. The Court stressed that clear and convincing evidence remains essential at a hearing, and the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits is heightened in termination cases (Price; Bauwens). Termination cannot rest on procedural technicalities or defaults.

e. Mootness of TPO Compliance

Because the extended TPO expired in 2017, any dispute over compliance was moot (Personhood Nevada). The Court declined to opine on that issue.

3. Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Private termination petitions face a higher functional bar when premised only on lack of contact. Petitioners must ordinarily prove a substantive parental fault ground—abandonment (with intent), neglect, unfitness, or risk of serious harm—rather than rely solely on token-efforts-to-communicate/support. Courts will scrutinize the broader context, including whether the custodial parent impeded contact.
Reinforces the bifurcation between state-initiated and private petitions. R.A.S. underscores different state interests and risks in private cases. S.A.T. operationalizes that distinction by disfavoring token-efforts-only claims in private actions where the child is safe.
Clarifies procedural rigor and evidentiary burdens. Silence in a response does not admit fault; a hearing on the merits with clear-and-convincing evidence remains mandatory. This forecloses attempts to obtain termination by default or pleading technicalities.
Alignment with poverty and access-to-justice considerations. Following L.R.S., courts should not interpret indigence or pro se confusion as abandonment. Obstacles to legal access and confusion over protective orders will bear on intent and token-efforts analysis.
Litigation strategy recalibration. Petitioners should marshal evidence of substantive fault tied to child safety and parental unsuitability; respondents should document efforts, obstacles, financial limitations, and any custodial interference. Alternatives to termination (e.g., custody/visitation modifications, supervised visitation, family therapy) may be more appropriate when safety is not at issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear and convincing evidence: A high civil standard requiring that the evidence make the claim highly probable—not just more likely than not.
Parental fault (NRS 128.105(1)(b)): Statutory grounds include abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure of parental adjustment, risk of serious harm, and only token efforts.
Abandonment (NRS 128.012): Requires a “settled purpose” to give up all parental rights. A six-month gap without support and contact creates a presumption, but it can be rebutted by evidence negating that intent (e.g., legal impediments, indigence, efforts to reengage).
Neglect (NRS 128.014): Focuses on lack of proper parental care due to the parent’s fault/ habits, assessed during periods when the parent has custody. It must be serious and persistent (Champagne).
Only token efforts (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6)): Minimal efforts to communicate or support, or to prevent neglect/avoid unfitness/eliminate risk. In private actions, using token efforts to communicate/support as the sole ground for termination is disfavored.
Private vs. state petitions: State petitions focus on child safety and permanency planning; private petitions often arise where the child is already safe, so courts guard against improper motivations and overreach (R.A.S.).
NRCP 8(b)(6) and admissions: If a response is not required, allegations are considered denied. Termination cannot be based on a parent’s failure to file a pleading denying fault.
Standard of review: Legal questions are reviewed de novo; factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
Civil death penalty: A metaphor recognizing termination’s permanence and severity, warranting exacting judicial care (T.M.R.).
Mootness: Courts will not decide issues where intervening events eliminate the live controversy (Personhood Nevada).

Practice Pointers

For Petitioners in Private Termination Actions

Do not rely solely on token-efforts-to-communicate/support. Build your case around substantive fault grounds tied to child safety (neglect, unfitness, risk of harm) or abandonment proven by intent.
Anticipate scrutiny of your own conduct: if you restricted or impeded contact, courts will weigh that against a token-efforts-only theory.
Consider less drastic remedies—custody adjustments, supervised visitation, parenting plans—when the child is safe and the issue is contact frequency/quality.
Do not assume defaults: a defending parent’s silence does not satisfy your burden of clear and convincing evidence.

For Respondents (Defending Parents)

Document obstacles to contact (protective orders, lack of address, custodial interference) and your efforts to reengage (seeking counsel, mediation, mental health compliance).
Show good-faith support efforts, even if imperfect. Evidence of paying arrears, reopening support cases, or making payments when financially able can defeat abandonment.
Cite L.R.S. if indigence or pro se status contributed to lapses; courts will not treat inability to navigate the system as abandonment.
Insist on a hearing on the merits; oppose attempts to sever rights via procedural shortcuts.

Conclusion

In re Parental Rights as to S.A.T. significantly refines Nevada termination jurisprudence in the private-petition context. The Court articulates two durable rules. First, severing parental rights solely on the basis of “only token efforts” to communicate or support is disfavored in private actions—especially where the child is safe and stable—because that ground is susceptible to misuse and is not tethered to safety concerns the way other token-efforts categories are. Second, a defending parent’s failure to deny specific allegations does not admit them; the termination statutes do not require a responsive pleading, and allegations are deemed denied under NRCP 8(b)(6).

The decision reinforces that abandonment turns on intent, neglect must be evidenced during periods of custody and be serious and persistent, and termination demands clear and convincing proof of genuine parental fault—not mere non-ideal parenting or contact lapses shaped by poverty, confusion, or custodial obstruction. By calibrating doctrine to the realities of private petitions, S.A.T. promotes careful, merits-based adjudication commensurate with the profound consequences of termination—the “civil death penalty”—and aligns Nevada law with child-centered, safety-driven principles.