Discretion over Disclosure: FERPA‑Authorized Releases of Education Records Are Not Mandated Under the Texas Public Information Act

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in The University of Texas at Austin and Jay Hartzell, in His Official Capacity as Interim President of the University of Texas at Austin v. GateHouse Media Texas Holdings II, Inc., d/b/a Austin American-Statesman addresses a recurring and sensitive conflict: the tension between public access to information and student privacy in the context of campus sexual misconduct and other serious offenses.

At issue was whether the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) was required, under the Texas Public Information Act (“PIA”), to release the “final results” of disciplinary proceedings against students found responsible for crimes of violence or nonforcible sex offenses—information that the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”) permits (but does not require) institutions to disclose.

The case required the Court to harmonize:

FERPA’s federal privacy regime for “education records,” which generally forbids release of identifiable student information without consent, but contains a narrow exception allowing—but not mandating—disclosure of final disciplinary results in certain serious cases; and
Texas’ PIA, which broadly favors governmental transparency but recognizes extensive exceptions, including specific protections for education records and an explicit requirement that Texas law conform to FERPA.

The Austin American-Statesman sought these records to report on how UT disciplines students for serious offenses. UT refused, citing FERPA and the PIA, without first asking the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) for an advisory opinion. The newspaper sued for mandamus under the PIA, arguing that UT was legally obligated to disclose the records and had waived any right to withhold them by failing to timely seek an OAG decision.

The Supreme Court’s opinion resolves two central questions:

Does the PIA require a public university to disclose education records when FERPA merely authorizes, but does not require, disclosure?
Was UT obligated to seek an OAG decision before withholding the requested records, such that its failure triggered a presumption of openness under PIA Section 552.302?

By answering both questions in UT’s favor, the Court significantly strengthens institutional discretion in handling FERPA-governed records, particularly in the emotionally charged context of campus sexual misconduct, and sharply limits the PIA’s role whenever student education records are involved.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for the University, holding:

Discretion to disclose FERPA-authorized education records. Texas Government Code Section 552.026 provides that the PIA “does not require the release of information contained in education records … except in conformity with [FERPA].” Because FERPA’s “final results” provision for disciplinary proceedings (20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)) permits but does not require disclosure, UT had discretion to withhold the requested records; the PIA did not mandate disclosure of these records.
No duty to seek an Attorney General decision. The PIA’s requirement to seek an OAG decision (Section 552.301) applies only when a governmental body withholds information based on an exception in Subchapter C of Chapter 552. UT’s authority to withhold here derived from Section 552.026, which is in Subchapter B; thus, Section 552.301’s AG-request requirement did not apply.

Furthermore, even assuming Section 552.114 (a Subchapter C provision on student records) applied, Section 552.114(d) allows educational institutions to redact student-record information without asking the OAG for a decision. In light of a 2006 U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) letter forbidding disclosure of unredacted education records to the OAG, and the OAG’s own practice of declining to review such records, the Court held that an OAG decision was not required here.
No presumption of openness and no “compelling reason” analysis. Because UT was not required to seek an OAG decision under Section 552.301, the statutory presumption that information is public when no timely request is made (Section 552.302) never arose. There was therefore no need to determine whether UT had a “compelling reason” to withhold the records.

The Court adopted, in substance, the reasoning of the dissenting justice in the court of appeals (Justice Alley), rejected the majority’s reading of Section 552.114, and emphasized a textual, context-driven approach to statutory interpretation that resists policy-based expansions of disclosure obligations.

III. Background and Procedural History

A. FERPA and Its “Final Results” Exception

FERPA is a federal statute enacted to protect the privacy of student education records by conditioning federal funding on institutional compliance. It generally prohibits any “policy or practice of permitting the release of education records” without student consent, subject to numerous defined exceptions.

Key FERPA concepts relevant here:

“Education records.” Defined broadly to include any records, files, documents, or other materials maintained by an educational institution that contain information directly related to a student. Disciplinary records are expressly included.
General rule of non-disclosure. Without student (or parent, for minors) consent, institutions generally may not disclose personally identifiable information in education records, except to specified categories of recipients (e.g., other school officials, certain government entities).
“Final results” exception for serious offenses (20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)). For postsecondary institutions, FERPA provides that nothing in FERPA prohibits an institution from disclosing the final results of a disciplinary proceeding if:
- The proceeding involved an allegation that a student committed a “crime of violence” or nonforcible sex offense; and
- The institution determines, as a result of the proceeding, that the student violated institutional rules or policies regarding that crime or offense.
The “final results” may include only:
- the name of the student;
- the violation committed; and
- any sanction imposed.
The name of a victim or witness may be included only with their written consent.

Crucially, FERPA’s final-results provision is permissive: it allows institutions to disclose this subset of disciplinary information but does not compel them to do so. Institutions remain free, under FERPA, to withhold such information as well.

B. The Texas Public Information Act Framework

The PIA (Texas Government Code Chapter 552) embodies Texas’s commitment to governmental transparency. Its policy statement proclaims that the public is “entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government.” It must be “liberally construed in favor of granting a request for information.”

However, the PIA recognizes extensive limits and exceptions. Two core structural ideas are essential to understanding this case:

Three categories of information. Drawing in part on the Court’s earlier analysis in Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accts. v. Attorney General of Texas, the PIA creates three functionally distinct categories:
- Mandatorily disclosable information — must be released under Section 552.021.
- Information “excepted” from required disclosure — may be withheld, but the governmental body retains discretion to disclose under Section 552.007 (unless another law “expressly prohibits” disclosure or makes the information confidential).
- “Confidential” information — may not be disclosed; disclosure is prohibited and can trigger criminal penalties (Section 552.352). Section 552.101 covers information made confidential by constitutional, statutory, or judicial authority.
Special treatment of education records. The PIA directly acknowledges FERPA’s primacy over education records:
- Section 552.026 (Subchapter B): “This chapter does not require the release of information contained in education records of an educational agency or institution, except in conformity with [FERPA].”
- Section 552.114 (Subchapter C): Titled “Exception: Confidentiality of Student Records.” It:
  - Defines “student record” to include FERPA “education records.”
  - States in subsection (b), first sentence, that such information is “confidential and excepted” from Section 552.021.
  - Then adds in subsection (b), second sentence, that this subsection “does not prohibit the disclosure or provision of information included in an education record if the disclosure or provision is authorized by [FERPA] or other federal law.”
  - In subsections (c) and (e), identifies specific categories of requestors (such as the student, parents, certain investigators, and certain applicants) to whom disclosure must be made.
  - In subsection (d), allows an educational institution to redact information covered by subsection (b) from information disclosed under Section 552.021 “without requesting a decision from the attorney general.”

C. The OAG-Decision Procedure and the “Presumption of Openness”

When a governmental body wishes to withhold requested information based on an exception in Subchapter C, Section 552.301 generally requires it to:

request an OAG decision within 10 business days of receiving the request; and
identify the applicable exceptions and submit representative samples of the information, among other procedural steps.

If the governmental body fails to comply with these requirements:

Section 552.302 provides that the information “is presumed to be subject to required public disclosure and must be released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information.”
A “compelling reason” usually means that the information is confidential by law or implicates significant third-party interests, not merely that an exception gives the government discretionary authority to withhold.

Enforcement is via mandamus: Section 552.321 allows a requestor or the Attorney General to sue to compel disclosure if the governmental body either refuses to seek an OAG decision or refuses to supply information found to be public.

D. The Records Request and UT’s Refusal

In August 2019, the Statesman’s executive editor submitted a written request, expressly invoking the PIA, for the “final results” (as defined by FERPA) of all UT disciplinary hearings since January 1, 2014, in which:

a student was alleged to have committed a crime of violence (including forcible sex offenses) or a nonforcible sex offense; and
UT determined that the student violated university rules or policies regarding that offense.

The request tracked FERPA’s final-results provision and sought only:

the student’s name;
the violation committed (including essential supporting findings); and
any sanctions imposed (with description, date, and duration).

On September 16, 2019, UT’s open records coordinator responded that FERPA “does not require” the University to disclose such information and that UT declined to do so. UT did not request an OAG decision prior to this refusal.

E. Lower Court Proceedings

The Statesman filed a mandamus action under PIA Section 552.321 seeking to compel disclosure. Both parties moved for traditional summary judgment.

The trial court:

held that UT was required to seek an OAG decision and, by failing to do so, triggered the Section 552.302 presumption of openness;
found no “compelling reason” for UT to withhold the records; and
ordered UT to disclose the requested information.

However, the trial court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees under Section 552.323(a), finding that UT had relied on a plausible interpretation of the PIA.

A divided court of appeals:

Affirmed the judgment requiring disclosure, concluding:
- UT was required to seek an OAG decision under Section 552.301;
- because UT failed to do so, Section 552.302 created a presumption that the information was public; and
- UT lacked a “compelling reason” to withhold, as Section 552.114(b) did not create an absolute prohibition but only an exception from mandatory disclosure, displaced by FERPA’s authorization of disclosure.
Reversed the denial of attorney’s fees, holding that the Statesman was entitled to recover them as a substantially prevailing party.

Justice Alley dissented, emphasizing:

the interplay of Sections 552.026 and 552.114;
that FERPA does not require disclosure of final-results information to the press; and
that prior OAG guidance and DOE communications indicated an OAG decision was not required and, practically, could not be obtained for unredacted FERPA records.

The Supreme Court granted UT’s petition for review.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accts. v. Attorney General of Texas

The Court relies on earlier analysis (particularly Justice Wainwright’s dissent, which has since been widely cited) recognizing that the PIA creates three distinct categories of public information:

Mandatorily disclosable information (must be released);
Information excepted from mandatory, but not voluntary, disclosure (the governmental body may withhold, but may also disclose under Section 552.007); and
Confidential information, which is prohibited from disclosure and whose unauthorized release carries criminal penalties.

This tripartite framework is critical in understanding how the Court spatially locates:

FERPA-governed education records; and
UT’s discretion versus obligation with respect to such records under Texas law.

2. Public Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Luminant Energy Co.

The Court cites Luminant as part of its articulation of interpretive method: statutory text must be read in context, harmonizing provisions within the broader statutory scheme. This underpins the Court’s insistence that Section 552.114(b) cannot be read in isolation but must be reconciled with Section 552.026 and the PIA as a whole.

3. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

The Court quotes Scalia and Garner to underscore that:

preambles and purpose clauses may guide interpretation where text is ambiguous;
but they cannot expand statutory duties “beyond [the text’s] permissible meaning.”

This is directed at the Statesman’s (and the court of appeals’ majority’s) reliance on the PIA’s policy statement of liberal construction and favoring disclosure. The Court emphasizes that this policy cannot override or reshape clear statutory language.

4. U.S. Department of Education Letter (2006) and OAG Public Information Handbook

A 2006 DOE letter to the Texas Attorney General plays a pivotal role. DOE informed the OAG that:

FERPA prohibits Texas educational institutions from disclosing education records—without parental (or student) consent—to the OAG for purposes of PIA compliance review; and
the OAG therefore cannot examine unredacted education records to assess whether a governmental body’s redactions or withholdings comply with FERPA.

Following this letter, the OAG:

adopted a practice of refusing to review unredacted FERPA records; and
announced in its Public Information Handbook that determinations under FERPA “must be made by the educational authority in possession of the education records,” not by the OAG.

The Supreme Court treats this federal guidance and resulting OAG practice as a crucial contextual “clue” supporting its conclusion that UT was not obliged to seek an OAG decision under Section 552.301 and could rely directly on its own FERPA determinations, coupled with Section 552.114(d)’s redaction authority.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Does the PIA require UT to disclose FERPA-authorized final-results information?

The central interpretive conflict was over the meaning of Section 552.114(b) and its interaction with Section 552.026.

a. Section 552.114(b): Two sentences, competing readings

Section 552.114(b) states, in substance:

First sentence: information in a student record at a state-funded institution is “confidential and excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021.”
Second sentence: “[t]his subsection does not prohibit the disclosure or provision of information included in an education record if the disclosure or provision is authorized by [FERPA] or other federal law.”

The court of appeals majority read the second sentence as functionally carving out from confidentiality (and the exception) any education-record information whose disclosure is authorized by FERPA. In its view, once FERPA permits disclosure, Section 552.114(b) no longer “prohibits” release, and the general disclosure command of Section 552.021 re-attaches, making release mandatory.

The Supreme Court notes that:

This reading gives the PIA the effect of requiring disclosure whenever FERPA merely allows it, i.e., it turns “authorized” under FERPA into “mandated” under the PIA.
Both the Statesman and UT concede that the first sentence, standing alone, would make student-record information confidential and not subject to public disclosure.

However, the Court deliberately avoids definitively resolving the exact scope and mechanics of Section 552.114(b). Instead, it holds that another provision—Section 552.026—already dictates the outcome.

b. Section 552.026: “Except in conformity with FERPA”

Section 552.026 provides:

“This chapter does not require the release of information contained in education records of an educational agency or institution, except in conformity with [FERPA].”

The Statesman argued that “except in conformity with FERPA” should be read as “except where FERPA allows disclosure.” In other words, whenever FERPA authorizes release, the PIA must be read as requiring it.

The Court rejects that reading and instead gives “in conformity with” its ordinary meaning: “in harmony, agreement, or congruity with.” Under this understanding:

If FERPA prohibits disclosure of certain education records, a state law that requires disclosure would not be “in conformity with” FERPA and is therefore forbidden by Section 552.026.
If FERPA permits but does not require disclosure (as with the final disciplinary results at issue), then either choice—disclose or withhold—is “in conformity with” FERPA, because FERPA allows either outcome.

From this, the Court draws the key conclusion:

Because FERPA’s final-results provision permits, but does not require, disclosure, an educational institution’s choice to either release or withhold those records is itself “in conformity with FERPA.” Therefore, Chapter 552 “does not require the release” of such information.

Put differently:

The PIA cannot be read as mandating disclosure in situations where FERPA merely allows—but does not compel—release, because such a state-law mandate is not to be “in conformity” with FERPA and would effectively convert a federal permission into a state-law requirement.
Instead, Section 552.026 confers discretion on educational institutions: where FERPA authorizes disclosure, the institution may choose to release or to withhold without violating the PIA’s transparency mandate.

The Court therefore holds:

“We hold that Section 552.026 grants an educational institution discretion whether to disclose information in an education record if the disclosure is authorized by FERPA. The court of appeals thus erred by construing the PIA to require mandatory disclosure of such information.”

c. Relationship to Section 552.114(b)

The Court acknowledges that Section 552.114(b) must be read in harmony with Section 552.026; “whatever Section 552.114(b) means precisely, it cannot be read to conflict with Section 552.026.” Given the holding that Section 552.026 itself gives institutions discretion over FERPA-authorized disclosures, Section 552.114(b) cannot be interpreted in a way that strips institutions of that discretion by turning FERPA permissions into PIA mandates.

On one plausible harmonized reading (which the Court hints at but does not finally adopt):

Education records are generally “confidential” under the first sentence of Section 552.114(b);
But insofar as FERPA affirmatively authorizes disclosure of those records (e.g., to parents, to the student him- or herself, or under the final-results provision), the second sentence removes the state-law confidentiality barrier, making disclosure permissible under the PIA (i.e., within UT’s discretion) but not mandatory.

Critically, the Court does not hold that the PIA ever requires a public university to disclose FERPA-governed records simply because FERPA permits disclosure. Any such duty must come from FERPA itself, and FERPA contains no such requirement regarding the final results at issue.

d. Policy arguments rejected

The Statesman and the court of appeals majority argued that:

The PIA’s policy of liberal construction in favor of disclosure should push the Court toward a reading that maximizes openness whenever federal law allows it.
Public interest in transparency around campus sexual misconduct discipline is particularly strong, supporting a more expansive construction of the PIA’s student-record provisions.

The Court firmly rejects using policy or general purpose to override the clear text, emphasizing that:

Phrases like “liberally construed” and “policy of openness” cannot expand the statute beyond its permissible textual meaning.
Courts must give effect to clear statutory language, even where important public-policy considerations might support a broader disclosure rule; any adjustment of that balance is the Legislature’s role, not the judiciary’s.

2. Was UT required to seek an OAG decision before withholding the records?

Having held that UT had discretion to withhold the requested records under Section 552.026, the Court next addressed whether UT’s failure to request an OAG decision (under Section 552.301) nonetheless triggered the Section 552.302 presumption of openness and a need to show a “compelling reason” to withhold.

a. Section 552.301 applies only to Subchapter C exceptions

Section 552.301(a) requires a governmental body that “wishes to withhold information from public disclosure under an exception in Subchapter C” to ask for an OAG decision. Because Section 552.026 is located in Subchapter B, the Court holds that:

Withholding based solely on Section 552.026 does not trigger the OAG-decision requirement of Section 552.301; and
Consequently, the failure to seek an OAG decision does not activate the Section 552.302 presumption that the information is public.

In other words, when an educational institution relies directly on Section 552.026 (which governs all of Chapter 552’s application to education records), it is not operating within the “exception” framework that necessitates OAG review.

b. The alternative path: Section 552.114(d) and the impossibility of effective OAG review

UT and the court of appeals dissent also argued that, even if Section 552.114(b) is treated as the operative exception (since it appears in Subchapter C and specifically addresses student records), Section 552.114(d) independently relieves educational institutions of the obligation to seek an OAG decision when redacting or withholding education-record information.

Section 552.114(d) states:

“[A]n educational institution may redact information covered under Subsection (b) from information disclosed under Section 552.021 without requesting a decision from the attorney general.”

The Statesman argued that:

“Redact” presupposes that some non-redacted information is actually disclosed under Section 552.021.
If UT discloses nothing but blacked-out pages—or nothing at all—it is not “redacting” under subsection (d); thus, UT should have been required to seek an OAG decision if it wanted to withhold wholesale under Section 552.114(b).

The Court acknowledges the intuitive force of this argument at the level of dictionary definition, but finds it untenable when the entire statutory and regulatory context is considered:

Section 552.301(e) requires a governmental body requesting an OAG decision to submit the records (or samples) at issue.
The DOE’s 2006 letter, however, precludes Texas institutions from disclosing unredacted FERPA records to the OAG for review, absent consent.
In response, the OAG has refused to review such records and has formally taken the position that FERPA determinations must be made by the educational institutions themselves.

Against this backdrop, the Court reasoned:

Even if UT had sought an OAG decision, the OAG would have refused to review the unredacted records or to opine on FERPA’s application.
This renders the OAG-review mechanism practically inoperative with respect to FERPA-governed student records.
Section 552.114(d)’s express authorization to redact (including, in practice, to redact everything) without seeking an OAG decision must be understood in light of this structural reality; otherwise, the statute would demand a futile step that federal law and OAG policy make impossible to complete as designed.

Thus, the Court holds that, even apart from Section 552.026:

Section 552.114(d) negates any obligation to seek an OAG decision before withholding or redacting education records covered by Section 552.114(b); and
UT was therefore not required to ask the OAG for a decision before refusing to disclose the requested final-results information.

c. No presumption of openness, no “compelling reason” inquiry

Because UT was not statutorily obliged to seek an OAG decision, Section 552.302’s presumption of openness never came into play. As a result:

There was no shift in the burden to UT to show a “compelling reason” to withhold.
The court of appeals erred in reaching and applying the “compelling reason” test at all.

The Supreme Court therefore did not address whether, had the presumption applied, FERPA and Section 552.114(b) would constitute a “compelling reason” to withhold. It resolved the case at the threshold: no duty to seek an OAG decision, no presumption, and thus no need for further analysis.

C. Impact of and Rationale Behind Rejection of the Court of Appeals Majority

The Supreme Court’s opinion effectively adopts Justice Alley’s dissent and rejects the majority’s analytical path in three key respects:

On Section 552.026: The majority virtually ignored Section 552.026, treating Section 552.114(b) as the primary student-record provision. The Supreme Court instead makes Section 552.026 the linchpin of its analysis, holding that the entire PIA “does not require the release” of education records except where FERPA itself mandates disclosure (which is rare).
On Section 552.114(b): The court of appeals majority read the second sentence of Section 552.114(b) to require disclosure whenever FERPA authorizes it, thereby converting permissive federal authority into a state-law mandate. The Supreme Court finds this incompatible with Section 552.026 and with the text of “does not prohibit,” which more naturally signals removal of a barrier to discretionary disclosure, not the creation of a compulsory duty to disclose.
On OAG procedures and Section 552.302: The majority treated UT’s failure to seek an OAG decision as triggering the Section 552.302 presumption and, once triggered, treated UT’s reliance on merely discretionary exceptions as insufficiently “compelling” to overcome it. The Supreme Court holds that the presumption never arose, both because Section 552.026 is outside Subchapter C and because Section 552.114(d) eliminates the need for OAG review of FERPA-governed records.

Taken together, the Supreme Court decisively reorients Texas law toward institutional discretion and away from a default of mandated disclosure whenever FERPA allows it.

D. Complex Concepts and Terminology Simplified

1. FERPA “education records”

An “education record” is generally any record maintained by an educational institution that directly relates to a student—grades, disciplinary files, transcripts, counseling notes (if shared), etc. It does not include:

purely personal notes kept by a teacher and not shared;
law-enforcement unit records created for law-enforcement purposes; or
certain employment records where the student is an employee unrelated to student status.

Disciplinary records, including those about sexual misconduct, are unquestionably “education records” for FERPA purposes, and are therefore tightly regulated.

2. “Final results” under FERPA

“Final results” of a disciplinary proceeding, as used in FERPA, is a term of art and is narrow:

It is limited to three elements: student name, violation, and sanction.
It applies only when an institution has actually determined that a student violated institutional rules or policies regarding a crime of violence or nonforcible sex offense.

It does not encompass full investigative files, witness statements, or internal deliberations; those remain generally protected education records.

3. “Confidential” vs. “excepted from mandatory disclosure” under the PIA

The PIA draws a critical distinction:

Confidential information: Information that cannot be released at all under the PIA (and often under other law). Unauthorized disclosure may be criminal (Section 552.352). For example, sensitive crime scene images, certain law-enforcement information, or information protected by other statutes or court orders.
Information “excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021”: This information is not required to be disclosed, but the governmental body may choose to disclose it if no law expressly prohibits disclosure and it is not deemed “confidential” by law. Section 552.007 preserves substantial voluntary-disclosure discretion in this category.

Section 552.114(b)’s first sentence labels student-record information “confidential and excepted,” but its second sentence, along with Section 552.026, ensures that when FERPA authorizes disclosure, institutions may, without violating state law, choose to disclose such records.

4. “In conformity with FERPA”

The phrase “in conformity with FERPA” is central. It does not mean “whenever FERPA permits disclosure, Texas law must require it.” Rather, it means:

The PIA’s rules about education records must be consistent with FERPA’s requirements and permissions.
If FERPA allows multiple options (disclose or not), then each permissible option remains “in conformity” with FERPA, and Section 552.026 leaves the choice to the institution.

5. OAG decisions and the “presumption of openness”

Under the PIA, when a governmental body:

wants to withhold information based on an exception in Subchapter C; but
fails to request an OAG decision in a timely way;

the law presumes the information is public (Section 552.302). The government can then withhold it only for a “compelling reason” (typically, legal confidentiality or strong third-party rights).

In this case, however, the Court holds:

UT was not relying solely (or primarily) on a Subchapter C exception because Section 552.026 is in Subchapter B; and
even if Section 552.114(b) is implicated, Section 552.114(d) means no OAG decision is required where FERPA records are concerned.

So the presumption of openness never arose, and the “compelling reason” analysis was inapplicable.

6. Mandamus under the PIA

A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a governmental body to perform a clear legal duty. Under Section 552.321, a requestor can seek mandamus if:

the governmental body refuses to seek an OAG decision; or
the governmental body refuses to disclose information that the OAG or a court has determined is not excepted from disclosure.

Here, because the Supreme Court determined that UT had no legal duty to produce the records (and no duty to seek an OAG decision), the Statesman’s mandamus action necessarily failed.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Public Universities and School Districts

The decision materially strengthens institutional control over education records in Texas, particularly where FERPA provides permissive exceptions:

Discretion over FERPA-authorized disclosures. When FERPA allows, but does not require, release of education records (including final results of certain disciplinary proceedings), Texas educational institutions now have clear confirmation that the PIA does not independently mandate release. The institution’s choice—release or withhold—is protected so long as it remains within FERPA’s bounds.
Reduced procedural burden with respect to OAG. Educational institutions are not obligated to seek OAG decisions when withholding FERPA education records under Section 552.026, and, practically, Section 552.114(d) coupled with the DOE letter means OAG review is unlikely or impossible. Institutions become the primary interpreters of FERPA’s application to records in their possession.
Risk allocation and internal policy importance. Because the OAG will not “bless” or “veto” FERPA compliance decisions, institutions bear full responsibility for correct interpretation of FERPA. Internal policies and legal counsel advice become more critical, particularly when navigating public controversy over student discipline.

B. For Requestors (Media, Advocates, Public)

For journalists and public advocates, especially those focused on campus sexual misconduct, the ruling has sobering implications:

No state-law “lever” to force disclosure where FERPA is permissive. The PIA cannot be used to compel disclosure of FERPA-permitted records (like final disciplinary results) where the institution chooses nondisclosure. Litigation strategies seeking to convert FERPA’s permissions into PIA mandates will almost certainly fail after this decision.
Greater variance across institutions. Different universities may adopt different disclosure policies regarding final disciplinary results and other FERPA-permitted information. Some may choose robust transparency; others may maintain near-complete confidentiality. This patchwork will be driven by institutional policy, not by uniform state-law mandates.
Strategic focus shifts. Transparency advocates may now need to:
- lobby institutions directly to adopt more open policies; and/or
- seek legislative change to alter Sections 552.026 and 552.114(b) if broader mandatory disclosure is desired.

C. For the Office of the Attorney General

The decision confirms and entrenches the OAG’s limited role with respect to education records:

No obligation—and little ability—to decide FERPA issues. Given FERPA’s constraints and the DOE’s directive, the OAG will not typically review unredacted FERPA records, nor interpret FERPA’s application to those records. The Court’s reasoning endorses this posture as consistent with both federal law and the PIA’s design.
Narrowed scope of PIA advisory authority. The OAG remains central to interpreting the PIA for non-education records, but its reach is significantly curtailed wherever records qualify as FERPA “education records.” Agencies and requestors alike must recognize this structural limit.

D. For the Legislature

If the Legislature disagrees with this allocation of discretion, it must amend the governing statutes. Possible legislative responses might include:

Revisiting Section 552.026. The Legislature could:
- narrow the phrase “does not require the release” or change “in conformity with FERPA” to clarify when FERPA-permitted disclosures should be mandatory under Texas law; or
- explicitly require disclosure of final-results information under state law, while ensuring that such a requirement remains permissible under FERPA.
Clarifying Section 552.114(b). The Legislature could:
- expressly state whether FERPA-authorized disclosures are merely permitted or are mandated under the PIA; or
- distinguish between categories of FERPA-authorized disclosures, mandating some (e.g., final results) while leaving others discretionary.

Until then, the Court’s decision governs, and institutional discretion remains paramount.

E. Broader Doctrinal Themes

Beyond education records, the decision reinforces several broader interpretive trends in Texas law:

Textualism over policy in PIA cases. The Court reiterates that, even in an open-government statute expressly favoring transparency, clear statutory text governs over generalized policy rhetoric. Courts will not read mandatory disclosure obligations into the PIA based on its “spirit” where the language does not support them.
Harmonization of overlapping provisions. The Court insists on reading Sections 552.026 and 552.114 together, rather than using one to effectively negate the other. This approach will influence future PIA cases where multiple sections appear to address similar subject matter.
Recognition of federal constraints on state open-records regimes. The deference to FERPA, buttressed by the DOE letter, exemplifies how federal privacy statutes can structurally limit state transparency laws, both substantively (what can be released) and procedurally (how state agencies and the OAG can operate).

VI. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in the UT–Statesman case firmly establishes a clear rule: when FERPA merely permits disclosure of education records, the Texas Public Information Act does not convert that permission into a mandate. Section 552.026 ensures that the PIA “does not require” the release of education records except as FERPA itself requires, and thus preserves institutional discretion over FERPA-authorized disclosures.

The Court further holds that Texas educational institutions are not obligated to seek OAG decisions before withholding FERPA-governed records, both because Section 552.026 lies outside the Subchapter C exception framework and because Section 552.114(d), coupled with federal constraints and OAG practice, effectively precludes meaningful OAG review of such records.

As a result, public universities in Texas now have definitive guidance that:

they may, but are not required to, disclose the final results of disciplinary proceedings for crimes of violence or nonforcible sex offenses under FERPA;
the PIA does not give requestors a tool to compel such disclosure; and
their own policies and judgments will largely determine the transparency of their disciplinary systems in this sensitive domain.

For open-government advocates and the media, this decision represents a significant constraint on the use of the PIA to obtain student disciplinary information. For legislators and policymakers, it highlights a deliberate state choice—cemented by judicial interpretation—to prioritize FERPA-aligned institutional discretion over mandatory transparency, absent a clear federal command to the contrary.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion underscores Texas courts’ commitment to rigorous textual interpretation, careful statutory harmonization, and deference to federal privacy regimes where state transparency laws and federal funding conditions intersect. Any recalibration of that balance in the context of higher-education discipline will now have to come from the Legislature or Congress, not from the courts.