Disciplinary Surcharges on Pretrial Detainees as Potential Fourteenth Amendment “Punishment”: Commentary on Bass v. Swartwood (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in Bass v. Swartwood, No. 25‑503‑cv (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), in which the court:

Affirmed in part and vacated in part the sua sponte dismissal of a pro se pretrial detainee’s § 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B);
Held that, liberally construed, the complaint states a plausible Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim challenging disciplinary “surcharges” (monetary fines) imposed on a pretrial detainee as impermissible “punishment” under Bell v. Wolfish;
Clarified that a county pretrial detainee’s property‑deprivation claim cannot be dismissed at screening on the theory that the New York Court of Claims provides an adequate post‑deprivation remedy, because the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over counties and their employees; and
Reaffirmed that pretrial detainees’ conditions‑of‑confinement claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—not the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines or Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses.

Although the order is nonprecedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it is legally significant and likely to be treated as persuasive authority. It refines how lower courts should treat monetary sanctions in jail disciplinary systems imposed on pretrial detainees, and how they should analyze such claims at the PLRA screening stage.

The case involves plaintiff‑appellant Johann Alexander Bass, a former pretrial detainee at the Cayuga County Jail, who brought a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against several county jail officials alleging:

Equal protection violations;
Procedural due process violations arising from lockdowns and disciplinary measures; and
What he framed as Eighth Amendment “excessive fines” arising from disciplinary “surcharges” ( monetary fines assessed via misbehavior reports).

The district court (D’Agostino, J.) screened and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Bass declined to amend and instead appealed. The Second Circuit:

Affirmed dismissal of his equal protection and procedural due process claims;
But vacated the dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim tied to disciplinary surcharges and remanded for further proceedings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

Because the district court dismissed the complaint but granted 30 days to amend, the order was not initially “final” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However:

Bass did not amend within the 30‑day window;
He instead appealed directly.

Relying on Slayton v. American Express Co., Festa v. Local 3, and Salmon v. Blesser, the Second Circuit held that by failing to amend within the deadline and appealing, Bass effectively rendered the order final and appealable.

B. Standard of Review and Pro Se Construction

The court reviewed the sua sponte dismissal de novo, citing McEachin v. McGuinnis and Larkin v. Savage, and reiterated that:

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, especially in civil rights cases; and
The court must reverse a § 1915A dismissal whenever a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated. (Larkin, quoting Wynn v. Southward.)

C. Disposition of Bass’s Claims

Equal Protection (Fourteenth Amendment)
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that Bass failed to state an equal protection claim. The dismissal on this ground was affirmed.
Procedural Due Process – Lockdown (Fourteenth Amendment)
The court affirmed the dismissal of Bass’s procedural due process challenge to his placement on lockdown.
Procedural Due Process – Disciplinary Surcharges (Fourteenth Amendment)
The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the procedural due process claim related to surcharges, but on different reasoning:
- It accepted that Bass plausibly alleged the surcharges were imposed pursuant to an established state procedure (New York’s jail disciplinary regulations, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7006 et seq.);
- Nevertheless, even liberally construed, the complaint did not plausibly allege that the pre‑deprivation process afforded to Bass was constitutionally deficient, except to argue (incorrectly) that only a judge can impose a fine.
Substantive Due Process – Disciplinary Surcharges as “Punishment” (Fourteenth Amendment)
This is the critical portion of the opinion. The court:
- Recharacterized Bass’s “excessive fines” theory (originally pleaded under the Eighth Amendment) as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, because he was a pretrial detainee; and
- Held that, at the screening stage, the complaint plausibly alleges that the disciplinary surcharges were arbitrary, purposeless, and therefore potentially “punitive” within the meaning of Bell v. Wolfish and Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling.
The court vacated the dismissal of this claim and remanded.
Mootness of Injunctive/Declaratory Relief
The court noted, in a footnote, that Bass’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot upon his release from custody, citing Booker v. Graham. Only damages claims survive.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Appellate Jurisdiction and Finality

Slayton v. American Express Co., 460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006)
A dismissal with leave to amend is not ordinarily final, but a plaintiff can make it final by disclaiming any intention to amend. Bass effectively did so by not amending and filing a notice of appeal.
Festa v. Local 3 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 905 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1990)
A dismissal becomes final when a plaintiff fails to amend within a prescribed deadline. The court analogized Bass’s conduct to Festa.
Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2015)
Footnote 2 confirms that an appeal may be taken when the district court sets a deadline to amend and the plaintiff does not amend by the deadline.

B. Screening Standard and Pro Se Pleadings

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)
These provisions require courts to screen prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss those that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from immune defendants.
McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004)
Establishes that dismissals under §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) are reviewed de novo.
Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
Holds that appellate courts must reverse a § 1915A dismissal whenever a liberal reading of a pro se complaint suggests any viable claim might be stated.
Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001)
Emphasizes the obligation to construe pro se civil rights pleadings liberally.
Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2001)
Quoted in Larkin for the proposition that screening dismissal must not occur if any valid claim might be inferred.

C. Procedural Due Process and Property Deprivations

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
Distinguishes between:
- “Random and unauthorized” deprivations (for which adequate post‑deprivation remedies may satisfy due process); and
- Deprivations pursuant to established state procedures, where pre‑deprivation process is generally required and post‑deprivation remedies do not suffice.
The Second Circuit uses Hudson to explain that Bass’s allegation that surcharges were imposed under 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7006 et seq. situates his claim in the “established procedure” category.
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 7006 et seq.
A New York regulatory framework governing jail disciplinary procedures. Bass alleges that jail officials imposed surcharges pursuant to this regulatory scheme, not as random acts.
Mooraty v. State, No. 136658, 2021 WL 6428182 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Dec. 22, 2021)
Cited for the proposition that the New York Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over counties, county agencies, and their employees. This directly undermines the district court’s reasoning that a Court of Claims action was an adequate post‑deprivation remedy for Bass’s surcharges.

D. Procedural Due Process in Jail Discipline

Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1996)
Holds that an inmate facing a disciplinary hearing is entitled to an impartial hearing officer, but that hearing officer need not be external to the prison or jail. This refutes Bass’s argument that only a judge (external judicial officer) could impose a fine.
Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2001)
Recognizes that pretrial detainees facing discipline are entitled to basic procedural safeguards: written notice, adequate time to prepare, a written statement of reasons, and limited rights to present evidence and witnesses.
Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017)
Reaffirms and applies Benjamin, and serves as a key precedent here for both:
- The procedural due process baseline for pretrial detainees subjected to discipline; and
- The substantive “punishment” analysis under Bell v. Wolfish (discussed below).

E. Substantive Due Process and Pretrial “Punishment”

City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983)
Clarifies that pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, because they have not been convicted.
Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005)
Cited for the same proposition: pretrial detainees’ rights arise under the Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
The foundational case on conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees. It holds that:
- Under the Due Process Clause, a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt;
- Measures that are reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives (such as security, order, and efficient administration) are not “punishment,” even if they are burdensome;
- If a condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—courts may infer it is punishment and therefore unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
Provides a set of “useful guideposts” to assess whether a measure is punitive in nature, including:
- Whether it involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
- Whether it has historically been regarded as punishment;
- Whether it turns on a finding of scienter (intent);
- Whether it advances traditional aims of punishment (retribution and deterrence);
- Whether it applies to behavior that is already criminalized; and
- Whether it is excessive in relation to its purported nonpunitive purpose.
Bell incorporates these factors into the pretrial detention context, and the Second Circuit quotes them in a footnote.
Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017)
Applies Bell to a pretrial detainee’s restrictive confinement and underscores that:
- Restrictions that are arbitrary or purposeless and not reasonably related to a legitimate goal may be deemed impermissible punishment;
- Deference to jail officials in matters of security does not eliminate the Due Process requirement that restrictions be rationally related to legitimate purposes.
The Second Circuit uses Almighty as the principal framework for assessing whether Bass’s surcharges could be “punitive.”

F. Mootness of Injunctive/Declaratory Relief

Booker v. Graham, 974 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2020)
Holds that release from custody generally moots requests for injunctive and declaratory relief relating to conditions of confinement at a particular facility, because the plaintiff is no longer subject to those conditions.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction: When a Dismissal with Leave to Amend Becomes Final

The Second Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction, given that the district court had dismissed the complaint but granted 30 days to amend. It explained:

Ordinarily, such a dismissal is not a “final decision” under § 1291 because it leaves the door open to further proceedings;
However, when a plaintiff fails to exercise the right to amend within the set period and opts to appeal instead, he effectively signals that he “stands on” his complaint as pleaded;
In that situation, consistent with Slayton, Festa, and Salmon, the dismissal becomes final and appealable.

Thus, the Second Circuit treated the district court’s order as final and proceeded to the merits.

B. Equal Protection Claim

Bass’s equal protection allegations are briefly treated. The court simply states that it agrees with the district court that the complaint fails to state a cognizable equal protection claim. There is no discussion of:

A suspect classification;
Intentional, differential treatment compared to similarly situated individuals; or
Any rational basis problem.

The brevity suggests Bass’s pleadings lacked even minimal factual content connecting the alleged surcharges or lockdowns to a protected class or irrational group‑based discrimination. That portion of the dismissal is affirmed without further analysis.

C. Procedural Due Process – Lockdown

The Second Circuit also summarily affirms the dismissal of the procedural due process claim associated with Bass’s placement on lockdown. Although specifics are sparse in the summary order, the likely rationale (consistent with Second Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine) is that:

Not all restrictions or lockdowns create a protected liberty interest;
Absent “atypical and significant hardship” (in the sense of Sandin v. Conner, though not cited here), or absent denial of basic procedural safeguards, such routine disciplinary measures generally do not violate procedural due process.

The court does not find any plausible procedural defect on the facts alleged.

D. Procedural Due Process – Disciplinary Surcharges

Here the court’s reasoning is nuanced and corrective of the district court.

1. Established Procedure vs. Random and Unauthorized Acts

Bass alleged the surcharges were imposed pursuant to New York’s jail disciplinary regulations, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7006 et seq. The court emphasizes that this matters under Hudson v. Palmer:

If officials act pursuant to established state procedures, post‑deprivation remedies do not satisfy due process; pre‑deprivation process is required.
If the act is random and unauthorized, the state generally cannot provide pre‑deprivation process, and adequate post‑deprivation remedies may suffice.

By characterizing the surcharges as imposed under a regulatory framework, Bass’s claim falls into the “established procedure” category. Thus:

The district court erred in treating Bass’s claim as one where post‑deprivation remedies alone would satisfy due process; and
The adequacy of New York’s post‑deprivation remedies (such as a Court of Claims action) is not dispositive if the process given before the surcharge was deficient.

2. Court of Claims is Not an Adequate Remedy for County Jail Officials

The Second Circuit further notes that even if the surcharges were considered “random and unauthorized,” the district court’s reliance on the New York Court of Claims as an adequate state remedy was incorrect:

Mooraty v. State holds that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over counties, their agencies, and their employees;
Because the defendants in Bass’s case are county jail officials (not state officers), the Court of Claims is simply not available as a remedial forum.

The panel expressly states:

“Thus, counter to the District Court’s conclusion, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims against hearing officers at a county jail. We express no opinion as to whether other adequate post‑deprivation remedies exist under New York state law.”

This is a significant clarification for district courts screening claims involving deprivations at county facilities in New York.

3. No Plausible Allegation of Defective Pre‑Deprivation Process

Despite acknowledging these doctrinal points in Bass’s favor, the court still affirms dismissal of the procedural due process component of his surcharge claim because, even liberally read, the complaint does not plausibly allege a defect in the process he actually received.

The only process-related allegation the court identifies is Bass’s assertion that:

Only judges can impose monetary fines.

The court rejects this as a matter of law:

Allen v. Cuomo confirms that disciplinary hearing officers can be prison (or jail) officials; they need not be judges or outside the institution;
Benjamin and Almighty define the core procedural rights for detainees facing discipline:
- Written notice;
- Time to prepare a defense;
- A written statement of reasons for the decision; and
- A limited ability to present witnesses and evidence.
The Due Process Clause does not require a judicial officer to impose every monetary sanction in a custodial setting.

Because Bass did not plausibly allege denial of these Benjamin/Almighty procedural elements, his procedural due process claim fails, and that portion of the district court’s judgment is affirmed.

E. Substantive Due Process – Are the Surcharges “Punishment” of a Pretrial Detainee?

The heart of the opinion lies here.

1. Reframing from Eighth Amendment to Fourteenth Amendment

Bass labeled his surcharge claim as an “excessive fines” claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit correctly reframes it:

Because Bass was a pretrial detainee, he had not been convicted;
City of Revere and Slade make clear that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments (including the Excessive Fines Clause) applies after conviction;
Accordingly, the relevant constitutional protection here is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, particularly its substantive dimension as interpreted in Bell v. Wolfish.

The court thus treats Bass’s allegations as asserting that the surcharges constitute impermissible punishment of a pretrial detainee.

2. The Bell v. Wolfish Punishment Framework

The opinion emphasizes the central principle from Bell:

“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a [pretrial] detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.”

The court then explains the two‑step inquiry:

Intent to Punish
If officials expressly intend to punish, their action is unconstitutional.
Reasonable Relationship to Legitimate Goals
Absent explicit punitive intent, the question becomes whether the measure is:
- Reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective (like security, order, discipline, or cost recovery); or
- So arbitrary or purposeless that a punitive intent can be inferred.

The court quotes Bell (via Almighty):

“[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”

3. Application to Disciplinary Surcharges

The court notes key factual allegations:

Bass alleged that surcharges were imposed even where there were no allegations of injury, loss of, or damage to jail property;
He claimed that one surcharge was imposed merely for saying “I love you” to his fiancée.

On these allegations, and giving the complaint a liberal reading as required for a pro se litigant, the court concludes:

Bass has plausibly alleged that the surcharges were “arbitrary or purposeless” within the meaning of Bell and Almighty;
At the screening stage, that suffices to state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, because the surcharges may amount to impermissible punishment of a pretrial detainee.

The court is careful not to decide that the surcharges are in fact unconstitutional; rather, it holds that the claim should not have been dismissed sua sponte at the pleading stage under §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).

Thus, the court:

Vacates the dismissal of the substantive due process claim relating to surcharges; and
Remands for further proceedings, allowing factual development and potential defenses (e.g., legitimate penological or administrative objectives, proportionality, regulatory justifications).

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Pretrial Detainee vs. Prisoner

Pretrial detainee: Someone held in custody while awaiting trial, not yet convicted.
Prisoner/convicted inmate: Someone serving a sentence after conviction.

This distinction matters because:

Pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause from punishment before conviction;
Prisoners are protected by the Eighth Amendment from cruel and unusual punishments, including excessive fines, as part of their sentence.

B. Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process

Procedural due process focuses on the fairness of the procedures used before the government deprives someone of life, liberty, or property:
- Notice of the charges;
- Opportunity to be heard;
- Impartial decision maker;
- Explanation of the decision.
Substantive due process limits the substance of what government can do regardless of procedure. For pretrial detainees, it prohibits the government from imposing conditions or restrictions that amount to punishment before conviction, unless they are reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose.

In Bass:

The procedural due process claim related to surcharges failed because Bass did not plausibly allege that notice, hearing, or impartiality was denied (beyond the incorrect “only a judge can fine me” theory).
The substantive due process claim survived because the nature of the surcharges themselves—as allegedly arbitrary penalties for nonharmful conduct—may be punitive in violation of Bell.

C. “Random and Unauthorized” vs. “Established State Procedure”

When government officials deprive inmates of property, due process analysis turns on whether:

The deprivation is “random and unauthorized” (e.g., a rogue guard stealing property), or
The deprivation results from an “established state procedure” (e.g., a regulation requiring automatic charges or confiscations).

If it is random and unauthorized, the state generally cannot offer pre‑deprivation process, and courts ask whether there is an adequate post‑deprivation remedy (such as a tort action for damages). If it flows from established procedures, the Constitution usually requires pre‑deprivation process.

Bass alleged that the surcharges were imposed under New York’s jail regulations, not by rogue acts. Thus, his case implicates the “established procedure” category and triggers scrutiny of the procedures and substantive justification for the surcharges themselves.

D. Mootness of Injunctive and Declaratory Claims

A case (or a particular claim) is “moot” when events have so changed that the court can no longer grant meaningful relief. For a prisoner or detainee:

If the plaintiff is released or transferred, claims seeking changes to policies at the original facility usually become moot because he no longer lives under those conditions.

Bass was released from custody. Therefore:

His requests for injunctive or declaratory relief concerning conditions at Cayuga County Jail are moot;
His requests for damages for past violations, however, remain live.

E. Nonprecedential Summary Orders

The Second Circuit labels this disposition a “SUMMARY ORDER” and states that such orders:

Do not have precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1;
May nevertheless be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, as long as the citation indicates “SUMMARY ORDER” and copies are provided to any pro se parties.

In practice, nonprecedential orders often guide district courts as persuasive authority, particularly when they apply existing Supreme Court and circuit precedents to new fact patterns, as here.

VI. Likely Impact on Future Cases and the Law

A. Increased Scrutiny of Monetary Sanctions Against Pretrial Detainees

Bass underscores that monetary penalties can be “conditions of confinement” subject to Bell’s punishment analysis for pretrial detainees. Going forward:

District courts should recognize that fines, surcharges, or deductions from commissary/inmate accounts may be punitive if imposed on pretrial detainees absent a legitimate, nonpunitive rationale;
Regulatory frameworks (such as 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7006 et seq.) that authorize monetary sanctions must be applied in a way that is reasonably related to legitimate objectives (e.g., restitution for damage, cost recovery, deterrence) and proportionate.

The allegation that a surcharge was imposed simply for saying “I love you” to a fiancée, if borne out, would be hard to justify as anything other than punishment or arbitrary discipline, which is constitutionally suspect for pretrial detainees.

B. Guidance for PLRA Screening of Pro Se Detainee Claims

The opinion is a reminder—particularly for district courts in the Second Circuit—that:

At the § 1915A / § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening stage, courts must err on the side of allowing potentially viable claims to proceed when pro se pleadings, liberally construed, hint at a constitutional violation;
Courts must be careful to distinguish between:
- Procedural due process challenges (focusing on notice, hearing, impartiality); and
- Substantive due process / Bell “punishment” challenges (focusing on the nature and justification of the sanction itself).

Bass shows that even when a procedural claim fails (as it did here), a substantive punishment claim may still be viable and should not be dismissed sua sponte without careful Bell analysis.

C. Clarification About the New York Court of Claims

The Second Circuit’s reliance on Mooraty has concrete consequences:

District courts in New York should not assume that a Court of Claims action is an adequate post‑deprivation remedy for county jail or county agency deprivations; it is not available in that context;
This removes an oft‑cited ground for early dismissal of property-deprivation claims arising from county jails or local facilities.

Although the court did not decide whether other state remedies might be adequate, it signals that such questions must be addressed with more precision.

D. Reinforcing the Distinction Between Pretrial and Post‑Conviction Claims

By explicitly recharacterizing Bass’s “excessive fines” claim as a Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee claim, the court reinforces an important doctrinal line:

Pretrial detainees cannot be subjected to punishment—monetary or otherwise—unless it is reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose;
Excessive fines doctrine under the Eighth Amendment, while closely related in spirit, is conceptually distinct and generally applies post‑conviction.

For practitioners, this means that challenges to disciplinary fines imposed before conviction should be framed primarily under Bell and Fourteenth Amendment due process, not purely as Eighth Amendment claims.

E. Institutional Implications for Jail Discipline Policies

If, on remand, Bass’s claim survives summary judgment or results in a finding that certain surcharges are unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees, it may:

Prompt jails to review their disciplinary policies to ensure that:
- Monetary sanctions are tied to actual damage or legitimate cost recovery; and
- Sanctions are not imposed for minor or expressive behaviors that pose no security risk;
Encourage clearer documentation of the nonpunitive rationales for disciplinary fines (e.g., restitution rather than pure punishment).

Even without a precedential holding, the reasoning in Bass will likely be cited in district courts as they handle similar claims.

VII. Conclusion

Bass v. Swartwood is a nonprecedential summary order, but it provides a careful and instructive application of established due process principles to a modern jail disciplinary practice—monetary surcharges imposed on pretrial detainees.

The Second Circuit:

Confirmed its jurisdiction over dismissals with leave to amend where a plaintiff foregoes amendment and appeals;
Reaffirmed liberal construction of pro se prisoner civil rights complaints at the PLRA screening stage;
Clarified that New York’s Court of Claims is not an available post‑deprivation remedy for property losses inflicted by county jail officers, undermining a common ground for early dismissal;
Rejected the notion that only judges may impose disciplinary monetary sanctions, reaffirming that impartial hearing officers may be institutional staff;
Distinguished between procedural and substantive due process: while Bass’s procedural claim failed, his substantive claim under Bell v. Wolfish survived;
Held that, at least at the pleading stage, disciplinary surcharges imposed without any connection to property damage or injury, and for trivial conduct (like a declaration of affection), can plausibly be “arbitrary or purposeless” and thus unconstitutional punishment of a pretrial detainee.

In the broader legal landscape, Bass underscores that financial penalties are not immune from constitutional scrutiny when imposed on pretrial detainees. Jail officials must be prepared to demonstrate that such sanctions are reasonably related to legitimate, nonpunitive objectives and applied through fair procedures. District courts, in turn, are reminded to scrutinize both the procedural and substantive aspects of such sanctions before dismissing detainee complaints at the screening stage.