Diagnosis-Based Accrual and Good-Cause Excusal for Minor Delay in GML § 207‑c Applications

Matter of Babcock v. Village of Walton (2025 NY Slip Op 05734, App Div, Third Dept)

Introduction

In Matter of Babcock v. Village of Walton, the Appellate Division, Third Department, clarified how timeliness provisions in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) interact with the remedial protections of General Municipal Law § 207‑c when a police officer’s claimed disability is a mental health condition—here, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising from a line-of-duty fatal shooting. The court held that, where the CBA requires application within a fixed period after an officer “reasonably should have known” of an illness that will give rise to a claim, the clock runs from the date of a professional diagnosis on this record, not from earlier subjective symptoms, absent substantial evidence to the contrary. The court also emphasized that denying benefits for a brief, non-prejudicial delay—particularly where the employer’s own mailing practices made timely submission nearly impossible—was unsupported by substantial evidence, and that § 207‑c must be construed liberally in favor of officers.

The parties were Frederick Babcock, a Village of Walton police officer (petitioner), and the Village of Walton and its mayor (respondents). After an internal, non-binding arbitration recommended excusing any untimeliness and granting § 207‑c benefits, respondents rejected that recommendation and denied the application solely as untimely. Supreme Court dismissed Babcock’s Article 78 petition. On appeal, the Third Department reversed, annulled the determination, granted the petition, and remitted to the Village for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Summary of the Opinion

• Transfer error cured: Supreme Court should have transferred the Article 78 proceeding to the Appellate Division under CPLR 7804(g) because substantial evidence review applied. The Appellate Division treated the case as if properly transferred and proceeded to the merits.
• Liberal construction of § 207‑c: Reaffirming that § 207‑c is remedial and must be construed liberally in favor of law enforcement personnel, and that procedures for applying may be the subject of collective bargaining.
• Accrual for timeliness under the CBA: On this record, timeliness ran from the date of diagnosis (June 29, 2022), not earlier. Respondents’ contention that the officer “should have known” before diagnosis was speculative and lacked substantial evidence.
• Good cause and substantial evidence: The officer notified the chief and submitted a letter and medical report within seven business days, and the formal two-page application followed 12 business days after diagnosis—two days late. Given the Village’s mailing timing, the looming deadline, absence of prejudice, and the fact that the form only formalized already timely information, the denial for untimeliness was unsupported by substantial evidence.
• Disposition: Judgment reversed with costs; determination annulled; petition granted; matter remitted to the Village for further proceedings not inconsistent with the decision (i.e., to process the application without the untimeliness bar).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Matter of Sullivan County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Sullivan, 224 AD3d 972 (3d Dept 2024)
  The court relied on Sullivan County PBA for two key propositions: (1) § 207‑c is remedial and must be construed liberally in favor of law enforcement; and (2) while § 207‑c offers no statutory application procedure, those procedures can be addressed by CBA and/or local law. The opinion also uses Sullivan County PBA to support the conclusion that denying a § 207‑c application for a minor procedural lapse without prejudice can be improper, and to frame the “good cause” inquiry and substantial evidence review that ultimately favored the officer.
• Matter of Baker v Clinton County, 134 AD3d 1218 (3d Dept 2015)
  Cited to underscore § 207‑c’s purpose: to ensure salary continuation for officers disabled by line-of-duty injuries during the disability period. This reinforced the remedial lens through which timeliness and “good cause” should be assessed.
• Matter of Alverson v Albany County, 186 AD3d 956 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 36 NY3d 901 (2020); Matter of Cornelius v City of Oneonta, 71 AD3d 1282 (3d Dept 2010)
  These cases guided the transfer analysis under CPLR 7804(g). Alverson supports transfer where the substantial evidence standard applies; Cornelius provides a contrast when transfer is not required. The opinion held Supreme Court erred by not transferring.
• Matter of Smith v Coughlin, 111 AD2d 503 (3d Dept 1985); Matter of Marinelli Constr. Corp. v State of New York, 200 AD2d 294 (3d Dept 1994)
  Invoked for the principle that, when a transfer should have occurred, the Appellate Division proceeds as if the case had been properly transferred and is not bound by Supreme Court’s findings.
• Matter of C & C Tobacco/Chuck’s Gas Mart, Inc. v Tompkins County Whole Health, 233 AD3d 1237 (3d Dept 2024)
  Establishes that, following an evidentiary hearing, judicial review is under the substantial evidence standard.
• Matter of Rice v New York State Gaming Commn., 217 AD3d 1098 (3d Dept 2023); Matter of Site Acquisitions v Town of New Scotland, 2 AD3d 1135 (3d Dept 2003)
  These decisions define “substantial evidence” as a minimal yet meaningful threshold—more than a scintilla—consisting of relevant proof a reasonable person would accept. The court used this framework to find respondents’ untimeliness determination lacking.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in two main steps: procedural posture and merits.

1) Procedural posture: Transfer under CPLR 7804(g)

Because the Village’s denial followed an evidentiary hearing (arbitration that produced a record and a written recommendation), substantial evidence review applied. Under CPLR 7804(g), such cases must be transferred to the Appellate Division. Supreme Court erred by retaining and deciding the petition. Under established Third Department practice, the Appellate Division treated the matter as if properly transferred and decided it on the merits.

2) Merits: Timeliness, accrual, and good-cause discretion under a remedial statute

• Accrual from diagnosis for mental health injuries: The CBA required a written application “within ten (10) business days of when the police officer reasonably should have known” that the illness or injury would give rise to a § 207‑c claim. On this record, the Third Department fixed that date as the PTSD diagnosis (June 29, 2022), not the earlier onset of non-specific feelings of not being “right” or “normal” at work. The court rejected as “pure speculation” the Village’s assertion that Babcock should have known earlier; speculation cannot satisfy the substantial evidence standard.
• Officer’s diligence and the Village’s role: Within three business days of diagnosis, Babcock texted the Chief requesting to be placed on § 207‑c leave. By seven business days, he submitted the signed request letter and the social worker’s medical report, as the Chief directed. Only after that did the Village mail its “official” two-page application form, which Babcock returned on July 18—12 business days after diagnosis, thereby exceeding the 10-day period by two business days. The court observed that mailing the form at that late point made on-time compliance “virtually impossible” and that the Village suffered no prejudice because the form merely formalized information the officer had already timely supplied.
• Good-cause discretion and substantial evidence review: Although the CBA made timeliness mandatory, it also vested the Village with discretion to excuse untimeliness “upon good cause shown.” In light of the officer’s prompt notice and documentation, the Village’s own mailing delay, the trivial nature of the two-day lapse, and the absence of prejudice, the Third Department held that respondents’ determination that good cause was lacking was unsupported by substantial evidence. The opinion expressly agreed with the arbitrator’s characterization that denying benefits here would be “a travesty.”
• Remedial purpose of § 207‑c: The court anchored its reasoning in the statute’s remedial aim—to provide salary continuation for officers disabled in the line of duty—and in the command to construe § 207‑c liberally in favor of officers. This interpretive lens weighs against rigid, technical denials where the record shows compliance in substance and prompt officer action.
• Remedy and remand: The determination was annulled; the petition was granted; and the matter was remitted for proceedings consistent with the court’s decision. Because the Village denied solely on timeliness, remand allows the Village to process the application on the merits without the untimeliness bar.

Impact

• Accrual standard clarified for mental health claims: For CBAs using the “reasonably should have known” trigger, this decision endorses, on this record, a diagnosis-based accrual point for PTSD arising from line-of-duty incidents. Employers cannot rely on conjecture about earlier awareness to defeat timeliness.
• Good-cause safety valve strengthened: Where a minor, non-prejudicial delay occurs—especially if employer practices (like mailing a required form late in the period) impede compliance—municipalities must exercise good-cause discretion consistent with § 207‑c’s remedial purpose. Determinations rejecting good cause must be supported by substantial evidence; conclusory or speculative rationales will not suffice.
• Procedural design and best practices for municipalities:
  • Provide prompt, accessible application mechanisms (e.g., electronic forms) to avoid mailing delays.
  • Treat timely letters and medical reports as substantial compliance with notice obligations, especially when official forms merely formalize existing information.
  • Document any prejudice caused by delay if denial is based on timeliness; absent prejudice, denial risks annulment.
  • Train administrators on liberal construction of § 207‑c and proper use of good-cause discretion.
• Litigation posture and judicial review: Where an evidentiary hearing precedes a § 207‑c determination, agencies should anticipate substantial evidence review and that Article 78 proceedings will be transferred under CPLR 7804(g). Trial courts should transfer; if they do not, the Appellate Division will review the record de novo on the substantial evidence question.
• Union advocacy and arbitration: Even if arbitration is non-binding, a well-reasoned recommendation favoring excusal can be persuasive on judicial review. Unions can bolster the record by documenting officer diligence, diagnosis dates, and employer-caused barriers to timely filing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• General Municipal Law § 207‑c: A New York statute ensuring that eligible law enforcement personnel disabled due to line-of-duty injury or illness receive continued salary and related benefits during the period of disability. It is “remedial,” meaning courts interpret it broadly to achieve its protective purpose.
• Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA): A negotiated contract between the employer and the union setting terms and procedures, including how and when to apply for § 207‑c benefits. Here, the CBA imposed a 10-business-day application period but also allowed the Village to excuse late filings for “good cause.”
• “Reasonably should have known” trigger: A timing rule that starts the filing clock when an officer objectively should recognize that an illness or injury will support a benefits claim. In mental health contexts, diagnosis often provides the first clear, objective confirmation that triggers the period.
• Good cause: A flexible standard allowing late filings to be excused where fairness warrants it—e.g., short delays, no prejudice to the employer, and circumstances beyond the applicant’s control (such as employer-caused delay).
• Article 78 proceeding: A special New York procedure to challenge actions of state or local agencies. The court reviews whether the agency acted lawfully and, after a hearing, whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.
• Substantial evidence: Enough relevant proof that a reasonable person would accept to support a conclusion. It is a “minimal” standard but requires more than speculation or a “mere scintilla.”
• CPLR 7804(g) transfer: When an Article 78 case turns on substantial evidence after an evidentiary hearing, Supreme Court must transfer the case to the Appellate Division for determination on the record. If it doesn’t, the Appellate Division proceeds as if the transfer occurred.
• Presumed receipt by mail (CPLR 2103[b][2]): As a general rule, a document served by mail is presumed received within five days. The court invoked this to show that mailing the form after July 11 likely made a July 14 deadline impractical.

Conclusion

Matter of Babcock v. Village of Walton establishes two consequential guideposts for § 207‑c administration and review. First, when a CBA starts the application deadline from when an officer “reasonably should have known” of an illness or injury, mental health disabilities like PTSD may, on this record, be measured from the date of diagnosis rather than earlier subjective symptoms—especially where the employer’s earlier-knowledge argument is speculative. Second, the remedial nature of § 207‑c and the CBA’s good-cause clause require municipalities to excuse minor, non-prejudicial delays, particularly when employer practices hinder timely filing; agency determinations rejecting good cause must rest on substantial evidence, not conjecture.

Procedurally, the decision reinforces the transfer mandate under CPLR 7804(g), ensuring that substantial-evidence questions after evidentiary hearings are decided in the Appellate Division on a full record. Substantively, it advances a pragmatic and humane approach to PTSD-related claims, aligns administrative discretion with § 207‑c’s protective purpose, and offers clear operational guidance to municipalities and unions. The immediate effect is to vacate the Village’s timeliness denial and require processing of Babcock’s application on the merits; the broader legacy is a clear signal that technicalities cannot eclipse fairness and statutory purpose in § 207‑c adjudication.