Introduction

In Wickstrom v. Air Line Pilots Association, International, the Seventh Circuit addressed two recurring questions in labor litigation under the Railway Labor Act (RLA): when a duty-of-fair-representation (DFR) claim is ripe and what constitutes arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith union conduct when a union chooses among grievance and litigation strategies. The case arises from United Airlines’ COVID-19 vaccine mandate and the Air Line Pilots Association’s (ALPA) choices in responding to pilots’ objections and terminations under the United Pilot Agreement (UPA).

The plaintiffs—United pilots terminated under the mandate—alleged that ALPA breached its DFR by declining to support their “status quo” grievances, by not seeking a federal injunction, and by inadequately opposing the mandate. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, denying leave to amend as futile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, clarifying ripeness doctrine in the DFR context and reinforcing the strong deference owed to union strategy, particularly where the employer’s action is “arguably justified” by the collective bargaining agreement and therefore presents a “minor dispute” under the RLA.

Summary of the Opinion

• Ripeness: The DFR claim is ripe because the alleged harm—termination—has already occurred, even though termination grievances remained pending. The dispute is concrete, not hypothetical.
• Failure to State a Claim: The proposed amended complaint failed to plausibly allege that ALPA acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith:
  • Arbitrariness: Not plausibly alleged. ALPA’s decision not to seek a judicial injunction was reasonable because the dispute was at least arguably “minor” under the RLA, channeling it to arbitration rather than federal court. Its grievance-handling choices were within the union’s considerable discretion.
  • Discrimination: Not plausibly alleged. The complaint lacked facts showing intentional, severe discriminatory motive in adopting LOA 21-02 or in other conduct.
  • Bad Faith: Not plausibly alleged. Conclusory assertions of “collusion” are insufficient; seeking to avoid layoffs/pay cuts (linked to federal funding conditions) is a legitimate union objective; and any alleged change in position was not shown to be motivated by improper purposes.
• Leave to Amend: Properly denied as futile; even the proposed amended complaint failed to state a DFR claim.
• Limitations: The court noted the six-month limitations period for DFR claims and tolling during internal union remedies but did not resolve timeliness because it turned on undeveloped facts.

Case Background

Parties and Agreements

The plaintiffs are United Airlines pilots and ALPA members. The UPA governs their employment and outlines grievance processes, including:

• Nondisciplinary pilot grievances (initially to United’s Chief Pilot; appeal to a senior official; further appeal to the System Board of Adjustment only by ALPA; a Grievance Review Panel (GRP) can order advancement if ALPA declines).
• Master Executive Council (MEC) grievances (ALPA’s MEC can allege misinterpretation/misapplication of the UPA; appealable to the System Board).
• Termination grievances (challenge discharges, with “just cause” requirement).

Factual Timeline

• May 2020: ALPA warns United might attempt unilateral UPA changes in response to COVID-19 and calls for union solidarity.
• January 2021: ALPA states United may be contractually permitted to mandate vaccines.
• May 2021: United and ALPA adopt LOA 21-02, incentivizing vaccination and restricting certain routes to vaccinated pilots.
• August 6, 2021: United announces it will terminate LOA 21-02 and implement a vaccine mandate effective September 27, 2021.
• August 24, 2021: Several pilots file nondisciplinary grievances alleging an RLA “status quo” violation (the UPA had expired; imposing a mandate allegedly violated the obligation to maintain the status quo).
• ALPA does not support those grievances; United denies them; pilots appeal; United denies again; pilots seek GRP review; after a two-day hearing, the GRP finds the status quo claim “baseless,” citing UPA § 21-K permitting unilateral personnel policy changes.
• September 28, 2021 (day after mandate takes effect): ALPA files an MEC grievance arguing United lacked just cause to terminate unvaccinated pilots because vaccination status is a “pilot qualification” issue rather than a dischargeable offense. The System Board denies.
• Following terminations: ALPA files termination grievances on plaintiffs’ behalf; those remain pending at plaintiffs’ request.

Procedural History

• Pilots sue ALPA for breach of the DFR. ALPA moves to dismiss for lack of ripeness and failure to state a claim.
• The district court denies the ripeness challenge but grants the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and denies leave to amend as futile.
• The Seventh Circuit affirms.

Issues Presented

• Ripeness: Is a DFR claim ripe when termination has occurred, even though termination grievances remain pending?
• DFR Merits: Do ALPA’s choices—declining to seek an injunction, declining to advance certain grievances, choosing different grievance theories—constitute arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct?

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991), and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953): Establish the deferential “wide range of reasonableness” standard for union conduct and frame DFR claims within fiduciary-like duties. The court anchored its arbitrariness analysis in this deference.
• Bishop v. ALPA (Bishop I), 900 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2018) and Bishop II, 5 F.4th 684 (7th Cir. 2021): Clarify that arbitrariness is an objective inquiry, while discrimination and bad faith demand subjective intent with improper motive; discriminatory impact alone is insufficient. Wickstrom follows this bifurcated approach.
• Sullers v. Int’l Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 141 F.4th 890 (7th Cir. 2025); Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 1995); Neal v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 349 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2003): Emphasize a union’s considerable discretion in managing grievances, including resource allocation and membership-wide interests. This supports deference to ALPA’s grievance strategy and its choice not to advance status-quo claims.
• RLA Major/Minor Disputes:
  • Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Republic Airways Inc., 127 F.4th 688 (7th Cir. 2025): Major disputes concern creation of contractual rights; minor disputes concern interpretation/application; federal courts have jurisdiction over major disputes; minor disputes go to arbitration.
  • Consolidated Rail Corp. v. RLEA, 491 U.S. 299 (1989): The “arguably justified” test and strong presumption in favor of classifying disputes as minor, channeling them to arbitration.
  • BLET GCA v. Union Pac. R.R., 879 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2017) and 988 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2021): Reinforce the “large thumb on the scale” for minor disputes and caution against treating importance as a proxy for major status. These cases undergird the court’s view that ALPA was not irrational in concluding a federal injunction was unlikely because United could arguably justify its mandate under UPA § 21-K.
• Ripeness:
  • Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125 (2020); Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998): Teach that ripeness avoids adjudicating abstract disagreements contingent on uncertain future events.
  • Mathis v. MetLife, 12 F.4th 658 (7th Cir. 2021); Jennings v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2007): Provide examples of unripe, hypothetical harms that may never materialize. Wickstrom distinguishes these because the harm—termination—has already occurred.
• Discrimination and Bad Faith:
  • Amalgamated Ass’n v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971): Requires “intentional, severe” discrimination unrelated to legitimate union objectives to sustain a DFR discrimination claim.
  • Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2013): Demands “subsidiary facts” for allegations of bad faith; conclusory assertions of state of mind are insufficient.
  • Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976): Improper motive includes acting solely to favor a politically stronger faction over a minority group. Wickstrom found no such motive plausibly alleged.
• Limitations/Tolling:
  • United Indep. Flight Officers, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1985): Six-month limitations period for DFR claims.
  • Frandsen v. BRAC, 782 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1986): Tolling while pursuing internal union remedies. Wickstrom flags these rules but eschews decision due to undeveloped facts.

Legal Reasoning

1) Ripeness

The court held the case ripe because the alleged injury—termination—had already occurred. ALPA’s reliance on cases where harm was contingent or speculative fell short, as those cases involved harms that might not materialize (e.g., pending PTO decisions or foreign arbitration law choices). Here, by contrast, termination was a completed event, and the plaintiffs’ claim that ALPA contributed to that harm through its representation choices was concrete and justiciable.

2) Failure to State a DFR Claim

The court applied the three familiar DFR prongs—arbitrary, discriminatory, and bad faith—and found the complaint, even as amended, did not plausibly allege any.

Arbitrariness

• Standard: A union acts arbitrarily only if its conduct is irrational—outside the “wide range of reasonableness”—considering the factual and legal landscape when it acted.
• No injunction: ALPA’s decision not to seek a federal injunction against United’s mandate was within reason because, under the RLA’s major/minor framework, the dispute was at least arguably minor. UPA § 21-K, which permits unilateral modification of personnel policies, arguably justified United’s mandate. Given the “large thumb on the scale” for minor disputes (reserved for arbitration), it was sensible to avoid a likely jurisdictional defeat.
• Grievance triage and process: ALPA’s choices not to back the pilots’ RLA status quo grievances, not to advance them to the System Board, and to pursue instead an MEC grievance challenging discharge-as-a-remedy (arguing vaccination status was a qualification issue) were rational strategic decisions. The GRP afforded a two-day hearing and deemed the status-quo theory “baseless” in light of § 21-K. ALPA also filed termination grievances on the pilots’ behalf. These steps belie any “perfunctory” handling and fall squarely within the union’s discretion to allocate resources and balance the interests of all members.
• Forfeiture/Waiver: The court noted plaintiffs failed to timely engage with ALPA’s § 21-K argument (and raised counterarguments too late, in reply), reinforcing the conclusion that ALPA’s reading stood unrebutted on appeal.

Discrimination

• Standard: Requires proof of improper subjective motive; discriminatory impact alone is insufficient. Conduct must be intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.
• Application: Plaintiffs’ contention that LOA 21-02 discriminated against unvaccinated pilots lacked factual allegations showing ALPA intended to target them. Being a minority faction adversely affected by a policy does not, standing alone, establish discriminatory intent. No plausible discriminatory motive was alleged.

Bad Faith

• Standard: A subjective inquiry, requiring an improper motive supported by subsidiary facts, not conclusory assertions.
• Application:
  • “Collusion”: The complaint’s labels lacked supporting facts.
  • Federal funding: Plaintiffs alleged ALPA acted to preserve federal funds for United. The complaint acknowledged funding was conditioned on avoiding layoffs/furloughs; seeking to protect members from layoffs or pay cuts is a legitimate union objective, not bad faith.
  • Change of position: Plaintiffs argued ALPA shifted from warning against unilateral changes (May 2020) to accepting vaccine permissibility (January 2021). The court observed the May 2020 statement was not vaccine-specific; in any event, no facts suggested an improper motive for any shift. And ALPA’s invocation of UPA § 21-K undercut the premise that a mandate was necessarily a unilateral change forbidden by the status quo.

Impact and Significance

• Ripeness Clarity for DFR Claims: The court’s holding that DFR claims are ripe upon termination—even with pending termination grievances—removes a procedural hurdle unions sometimes invoke. Plaintiffs need not await the outcome of arbitration to sue the union, though practical considerations may still counsel coordination with ongoing internal processes.
• Deference to Union Strategy under the RLA: Wickstrom reinforces the protective buffer around union decision-making where the employer’s action is “arguably justified” by the CBA. When the RLA’s major/minor framework channels disputes to arbitration, unions are not irrational for forgoing federal injunction efforts. This will shape counsel’s litigation triage in fast-moving policy disputes.
• Pleading Standards for Discrimination and Bad Faith: The opinion reiterates that plaintiffs must plead specific facts showing improper motive; mere disagreement with union strategy, disparate impact on a minority sub-group, or conclusory allegations of “collusion” will not suffice.
• Internal Review as Evidence of Non-Perfunctory Handling: ALPA’s use of the GRP process, a two-day hearing, and pursuit of alternate grievance avenues helped defeat an allegation of perfunctory processing. Unions that build a paper record of reasoned deliberation and multi-pronged advocacy strengthen their defenses.
• Contractual Clauses Authorizing Employer Action: Provisions like UPA § 21-K that grant employers unilateral authority over “personnel policies” can be decisive in converting disputes into “minor” ones, demarcating the boundary between federal-court litigation and arbitration. Contract drafting and bargaining over such clauses carry substantial downstream litigation consequences.
• Practical Litigation Lessons:
  • Plaintiffs should engage the union’s contract interpretation arguments early and directly; failure to do so risks forfeiture.
  • To plead bad faith, provide concrete “subsidiary facts” demonstrating improper motive, not labels.
  • When arguing a “major” dispute, tie the argument to text and structure of the CBA rather than the real-world importance of the controversy; “importance” is not the test.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): The legal obligation of a union, as the exclusive representative, to represent all members of the bargaining unit fairly. A breach occurs only if union conduct is arbitrary (irrational), discriminatory (intentional, severe, improper motive), or in bad faith (improper motive proved with facts).
• RLA Major vs. Minor Disputes:
  • Major disputes: Concern creation of new contractual rights or changes to agreements; federal courts can grant injunctive relief.
  • Minor disputes: Involve interpreting or applying existing agreements; must be arbitrated before the System Board of Adjustment. If the employer’s position is “arguably justified” by the CBA, the dispute is minor.
• Status Quo Obligation: Under the RLA, when a CBA has expired and a new one is being negotiated, parties must maintain the “status quo” and not unilaterally alter rates of pay, rules, or working conditions related to the agreement—unless the agreement itself arguably authorizes the action (which channels the dispute as “minor”).
• UPA § 21-K (as discussed): A provision allowing United to unilaterally modify “personnel policies.” The GRP and ALPA viewed this as at least arguably authorizing the vaccine mandate, making the dispute “minor.”
• MEC Grievance: A union-level grievance asserting misinterpretation/misapplication of the CBA, distinct from individual grievances.
• GRP (Grievance Review Panel): An internal union/contractual panel that can order advancement of a grievance to arbitration if ALPA declines; its robust process can evidence non-perfunctory handling.
• Perfunctory Processing: A union violates the DFR if it ignores a meritorious grievance or processes it in a cursory, indifferent manner. Evidence of hearings, reasoned decisions, and alternative advocacy undermines perfunctory-processing claims.
• “Wide Range of Reasonableness”: The deferential standard under which courts review union choices, acknowledging competing interests, resource constraints, and strategic judgments.
• Ripeness: A justiciability doctrine asking whether a dispute is sufficiently concrete to be litigated. If the harm has already occurred (e.g., termination), the case is usually ripe even if further internal or arbitral proceedings remain pending.

Unresolved or Not Decided

• Limitations and Tolling: The court flagged the six-month limitations period for DFR claims and tolling during internal union remedies but declined to apply them here due to factual uncertainties in the pleadings.
• Merits of UPA § 21-K: The court did not definitively interpret § 21-K; rather, it relied on plaintiffs’ forfeiture and on the premise that § 21-K at least “arguably” justified the mandate for purposes of the RLA’s minor-dispute channeling.

Conclusion

Wickstrom v. ALPA clarifies that DFR claims are ripe once the alleged injury—here, termination—occurs, notwithstanding ongoing termination grievances or arbitration. On the merits, the opinion robustly reaffirms the deference courts afford union decision-making, especially under the RLA’s major/minor framework. Where the employer’s conduct is “arguably justified” by the CBA, union choices not to seek federal injunctions and to triage grievances are typically within the “wide range of reasonableness,” absent well-pled facts showing discriminatory or bad-faith motives.

The decision provides concrete guidance for future pandemic-related and policy-mandate disputes, for pleading standards in DFR actions, and for the strategic posture unions may take when contract language arguably authorizes employer policies. Its key takeaways: ripeness turns on actual harm, not procedural posture; arbitrariness requires more than disagreement with strategy; and claims of discrimination or bad faith must be supported by specific, motive-revealing facts. In the broader labor-law landscape, Wickstrom underscores the central role of contract text (like UPA § 21-K) in channeling disputes to arbitration and in insulating union strategy from second-guessing.