Defining “Reasonable Time” For Rule 60(b)(6) Motions in Capital Habeas Cases: Ritchie v. Neal

Introduction

Benjamin Ritchie v. Ron Neal presents a late-stage attempt by a death-row inmate to reopen his federal habeas corpus proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Ritchie, convicted and sentenced to death in Indiana for the 2000 murder of Officer William Toney, exhausted state and federal collateral remedies by 2017. In May 2025, with execution looming, newly appointed counsel filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion invoking the Martinez-Trevino exception for procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance claims and sought a stay of execution. The district court denied the stay as based on an untimely Rule 60(b)(6) motion; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. A dissent argued that conflicted prior counsel excused delay and stressed the importance of conflict-free representation in capital habeas proceedings.

Key issues:

The proper starting point for measuring the “reasonable time” requirement under Rule 60(b)(6) in federal habeas cases.
Whether conflict-of-interest by prior habeas counsel and the appointment of new counsel can reset the Rule 60(b)(6) clock.
The balance between finality and the equitable purpose of Rule 60(b)(6) in capital litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit, in a non-precedential per curiam decision with a dissent by Judge Jackson-Akiwumi, affirmed the district court’s denial of Ritchie’s motion to stay execution. The court held:

Rule 60(b)(6) motions in habeas proceedings must be filed “within a reasonable time.”
The “reasonable time” began no later than February 1, 2017—the date Brown v. Brown (2017) extended Martinez-Trevino to Indiana prisoners—or, alternatively, April 17, 2017, when certiorari was denied.
Ritchie’s 2025 motion, filed more than eight years later, was “extremely belated.” Even measured from October 2024 when new counsel entered, a seven-month delay was unreasonable given earlier state-court litigation of similar claims in November 2024.
Because the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was unlikely to succeed, the Nken v. Holder stay factors were not satisfied and the stay was properly denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Martinez v. Ryan (566 U.S. 1, 2012) and Trevino v. Thaler (569 U.S. 413, 2013): Established exception to procedural default for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims when first postconviction counsel was ineffective or absent.
Brown v. Brown (7th Cir. 2017): Held Martinez-Trevino applies to Indiana capital habeas petitioners.
Clark v. Davis (5th Cir. 2017): Treated the date of decisive case law as the starting point for Rule 60(b)(6) timeliness in a materially similar context.
Nken v. Holder (556 U.S. 418, 2009): Set forth four-factor test for stays of execution.
Christeson v. Roper (574 U.S. 373, 2015): Recognized statutory right to conflict-free federal habeas counsel through all collateral stages.
Gonzalez v. Crosby (545 U.S. 524, 2005): Emphasized Rule 60(b)’s role as an exception to finality, especially in habeas contexts.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning centered on the “reasonable time” requirement of Rule 60(b)(6). Drawing on Clark v. Davis, the court identified the date on which the Martinez-Trevino doctrine became clearly available to Indiana petitioners—February 1, 2017—as the earliest reasonable trigger. Alternatively, the certiorari-denial date served similarly. Filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion eight years later was “extremely belated” and could not satisfy Rule 60(c)(1). The district judge further found that after new counsel’s appointment in October 2024, nothing prevented an earlier motion—particularly since Ritchie’s state public defender had pressed the same arguments in November 2024. Under Nken’s strong-likelihood-of-success prong, the motion was unlikely to prevail; thus the stay was properly denied.

The dissent stressed that conflicted prior counsel—who had represented Ritchie in state postconviction proceedings—created an excuse for delay. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) and Christeson, death-penalty habeas petitioners are entitled to conflict-free representation “through all available post-conviction process.” Jackson-Akiwumi argued that Rule 60(b)(6) should not be measured against delay caused by a conflict concealed from the client, and that new, conflict-free counsel needed adequate time to investigate before filing. The dissent also suggested the district court overemphasized finality at the expense of equity and the irreparable harm of execution.

Impact

While non-precedential, Ritchie v. Neal illustrates the rigor with which courts measure Rule 60(b)(6) timeliness in capital habeas cases. Practitioners must:

Track decisional developments (e.g., Martinez-Trevino extensions) to determine the earliest trigger for “reasonable time.”
Be alert to conflicts of interest and, if necessary, seek appointment of fresh counsel promptly.
Understand that delays—even those arising from new counsel’s investigation—may be deemed unreasonable if substantially later than the operative date of controlling precedent.

Future litigants will likely cite Ritchie for its application of the Clark framework in the Seventh Circuit and for its holding that subsequent counsel’s appointment does not automatically reset the timeliness clock indefinitely.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 60(b)(6) “Reasonable Time”: Federal courts can relieve a party from final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but such motions must be filed within a “reasonable time” measured from when the grounds for relief become—or should become—known.
Martinez-Trevino Exception: Normally, federal habeas petitioners who default procedural rules in state court cannot raise some claims on federal review. Martinez and Trevino carved out an exception for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel when that counsel provided no meaningful assistance.
Conflict-Free Counsel under § 3599(e): Statutory and constitutional principles guarantee capital habeas petitioners the right to lawyers without conflicts of interest throughout state and federal collateral review, including stays of execution.
Nken Stay Test: To obtain a stay of execution, a petitioner must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm without a stay, (3) no substantial injury to others, and (4) that a stay serves the public interest.

Conclusion

Ritchie v. Neal clarifies that Rule 60(b)(6) motions in capital habeas proceedings must be filed within a “reasonable time” after controlling precedent is issued or after certification of the underlying judgment, and that appointing new counsel does not indefinitely toll this deadline. Although the dissent underscores the critical importance of conflict-free representation, the majority’s ruling highlights courts’ emphasis on balancing finality against equitable relief. Going forward, counsel must vigilantly monitor legal developments and potential conflicts, and act swiftly to file Rule 60(b)(6) motions in capital cases.