Defining “Particularly Serious Crime” and CAT Standards: Insights from Jimenez v. Bondi

Introduction

Jimenez v. Bondi arises from consolidated petitions for review of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions denying relief to Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez, a Brazilian national convicted of second-degree strangulation in Connecticut. Jimenez sought asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). After an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his requests—declining to grant a continuance, finding his crime “particularly serious,” and rejecting his CAT claim—the BIA affirmed or dismissed multiple motions to remand, reopen, and reconsider. On April 10, 2025, the Second Circuit issued a summary order denying three petitions for review and dismissing a fourth. Key issues include:

Whether a state-law conviction for second-degree strangulation constitutes a “particularly serious crime” barring withholding of removal;
The standard for deferral of removal under the CAT, including “more likely than not” and “acquiescence”;
The scope of appellate jurisdiction over questions of law, constitutional claims, and CAT relief;
The procedural prerequisites for continuance, remand, reopening, and ineffective-counsel claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, sitting through Judges Leval, Bianco, and Nardini, denied Jimenez’s consolidated petitions (Nos. 23-6005, 23-6143, 23-6895) and dismissed the fourth (No. 24-665). It held:

Jimenez’s conviction for second-degree strangulation under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-64bb is a “particularly serious crime” within INA § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal.
On his CAT claim, substantial-evidence review supported the BIA’s finding that he failed to prove torture “more likely than not” by or with acquiescence of Brazilian officials.
The IJ did not abuse discretion in denying a continuance, and even if error occurred, Jimenez showed no prejudice.
The BIA properly denied remand, reopening, and reconsideration—Jimenez’s new evidence was untimely or foreclosed, and his ineffective-assistance claims failed for noncompliance with Matter of Lozada.
The petition to reopen and administratively close was time-barred, and no exception applied.

All motions for in forma pauperis, summary reversal, and stays were denied or vacated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005): Framework for reviewing IJ decisions as modified by the BIA.
Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): Similar principles on record supplementation.
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020): Jurisdictional limits on review of withholding of removal vs. CAT claims.
Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021): “More likely than not” standard for CAT relief and “acquiescence.”
Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152 (2d Cir. 2022): Two-step analysis for particularly serious crime determinations.
In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007): Agency factors for particularly serious crime review.
Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008): Aggravated felony convictions against the person are likely “particularly serious.”
Lanferman v. BIA, 576 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009): Collateral attacks on state convictions are not permitted in removal proceedings.
Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021): Credibility and adverse-evidence rule in withholding/CAT cases.
Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354 (BIA 1983); Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2006): Standards for continuances, prejudice requirement.
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1998): Procedural prerequisites for ineffective-assistance claims.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Overruling Chevron deference but preserving prior case holdings.

Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D), the court reviews legal and constitutional claims de novo, CAT factual findings for substantial evidence, and discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion.

2. Particularly Serious Crime
The court applied the two-step analysis from Ojo and In re N-A-M-: (a) the statutory elements of second-degree strangulation inherently target a person’s breathing or blood circulation, triggering potential seriousness; (b) sentencing and factual circumstances (suspended sentence notwithstanding) confirm it is particularly serious. Reliance on Nethagani emphasized crimes against persons are more likely to be serious. The court rejected collateral challenges under Lanferman and affirmed that “imprisonment” includes suspended time (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)).

3. CAT Relief
The applicant must show torture “more likely than not” by officials or with their acquiescence. The BIA’s adverse-credibility inference (Ming Dai) for omissions in the written application and the lack of recent, targeted threats supported the denial. General country-condition evidence was deemed insufficient to compel a contrary finding (Mu Xiang Lin).

4. Procedural Motions
Requests for continuance, remand, reopening, and reconsideration were reviewed for abuse of discretion. Even if the continuance denial were error, no prejudice ensued because the BIA considered the late evidence and found it would not change the outcome (Gurung). Remand/reopening failed for untimeliness (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)) and lack of material new evidence. Ineffective-counsel claims were forfeited for non-compliance with Matter of Lozada.

Impact

Jimenez v. Bondi reaffirms and clarifies several critical points in immigration jurisprudence:

A conviction for a violent offense—here, strangulation—is apt to meet the “particularly serious” threshold even with a suspended sentence.
The two-step INA analysis and enumerated factors from In re N-A-M- remain binding absent a Supreme Court directive to the contrary.
Candid disclosure in CAT applications is vital: omissions may justify adverse credibility findings.
Procedural safeguards (continuances, remands) require showing of diligence and prejudice; ineffective-counsel claims demand strict compliance with Lozada.
The decision underscores the narrow scope of judicial review over BIA factual determinations and discretionary rulings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Particularly Serious Crime: A violent or dangerous offense that, by its nature or sentencing, bars withholding of removal under INA § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
Withholding of Removal vs. CAT Deferral: Withholding under the INA requires a >50% risk of persecution; CAT deferral requires a >50% risk of torture with official acquiescence.
Substantial Evidence Review: The court upholds the agency’s factual findings unless no reasonable factfinder could reach the same conclusion.
Abuse of Discretion: Discretionary rulings (continuances, reopening) are reversed only if legally flawed or outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
Matter of Lozada Requirements: To claim ineffective assistance, a petitioner must (a) detail counsel’s agreement, (b) give counsel notice to respond, and (c) show a disciplinary complaint or explain why none was filed.

Conclusion

Jimenez v. Bondi consolidates key principles governing removal relief for criminal noncitizens and asylum-related protections. It cements the stringent bar imposed by “particularly serious crime” designations, clarifies the evidentiary and procedural rigor required for CAT claims, and underscores the limited scope of appellate review over BIA factual and discretionary rulings. Going forward, practitioners and applicants must pay close attention to the INA’s two-step test for serious crimes, maintain full and accurate disclosure in CAT applications, and adhere strictly to procedural prerequisites when seeking continuances, remands, or alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.