Defining “Marital Status” under the NYCHRL: Limiting Discrimination to Legal Condition, Not Spousal Identity

Introduction

In Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC, 24-1229 (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed whether the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) bars employment discrimination not merely on the basis of an employee’s general marital condition (e.g., married, single, divorced) but also on the basis of the identity of the spouse or former spouse. Plaintiff-Appellee Kelvin Hunter, the long-time executive producer of The Wendy Williams Show, alleged that Debmar-Mercury LLC and its principals terminated him solely because Wendy Williams filed for divorce. Hunter invoked the NYCHRL’s prohibition against “marital status” discrimination. The district court denied appellants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the Second Circuit granted review.

The core issue on appeal was: does “marital status” under the NYCHRL encompass an employee’s particular marital relationship (for example, being married to Wendy Williams) or is it confined to the broader legal status of being married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed? In a panel decision vacating the district court, the Second Circuit concluded that “marital status” refers only to the legal condition of marriage, not to the identity or specifics of one’s spouse.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) review standards—accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drawing all inferences in Hunter’s favor—the Court held that controlling New York precedents constrain “marital status” to the legal condition of marriage. It rejected Hunter’s claim that the NYCHRL reaches conduct motivated by the identity of one’s spouse.

Although an intermediate New York Appellate Division decision (Morse v. Fidessa Corp., 165 A.D.3d 61 (1st Dept. 2018)) suggested that post-2005 and 2016 amendments broadened “marital status,” the Second Circuit found that the New York Court of Appeals settled the issue in McCabe v. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp., — N.Y.3d —, 2024 WL 5126078 (Dec. 17, 2024). McCabe held unequivocally that “marital status” under the NYCHRL denotes one’s marriage participation (single, married, divorced, widowed, separated), and does not extend to discrimination because of one’s relationship to a specific individual.

Hunter’s suit was distinct from traditional marital-status discrimination claims: he did not allege that his divorce itself was disfavored, but that he was targeted on account of whom he was married to. Under McCabe, that claim falls outside the statutory scope. The panel accordingly vacated the denial of Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. NY State HR Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506 (1980). The Court of Appeals held under the NY State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) that “marital status” prohibits discrimination because one is married or single, not because of whom one marries.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733 (1983). Reinforced the Manhattan Pizza Hut interpretation under both NYCHRL and NYSHRL in the housing context.
Levin v. Yeshiva University, 96 N.Y.2d 484 (2001). Reaffirmed the distinction between the complainant’s marital status and the identity of the spouse for housing discrimination.
Morse v. Fidessa Corp., 165 A.D.3d 61 (1st Dept. 2018). Concluded that amendments (2005, 2016) broadened the NYCHRL, but remained in tension with New York Court of Appeals authority.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., — N.Y.3d —, 2024 WL 5126078 (Dec. 17, 2024). The Court of Appeals held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL denotes the legal condition of marriage participation (single, married, etc.) and excludes discrimination based on the identity or characteristics of the spouse or former spouse.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s reasoning flows from binding New York Court of Appeals decisions interpreting the identical statutory term in both state and city human rights laws. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Hudson View, and Levin consistently treated “marital status” as the binary or categorical legal condition of being married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed. Discrimination “because of whom one has married” was expressly excluded.

Although the NYCHRL’s liberal-construction mandate (N.Y.C. Local L. 85 of 2005; Local L. 35 of 2016) directs courts to interpret the statute broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose, the Court of Appeals in McCabe reaffirmed that broad remedial power does not re-write statutory language. McCabe emphasized that interpretive amendments aimed at liberal construction did not supplant decades of appellate authority fixing “marital status” as a legal condition. It rejected any distinction between housing and employment contexts, noting that statutory terms bear uniform meaning across NYCHRL provisions.

By adopting McCabe’s holding, the Second Circuit maintained statutory fidelity and avoided creating a new cause of action based solely on an employee’s relationship to a particular individual. Hunter’s allegation—that he was fired because his spouse filed for divorce—fell outside the statutory scope because the statute does not protect the marital tie itself as a relationship to a named person.

Impact

This decision clarifies that NYCHRL marital-status claims must allege adverse treatment because of one’s legal condition (e.g., being married versus single), not because of whom one married or divorced. Employers and practitioners now have clear guidance that “marital status” discrimination under the NYCHRL does not extend to protection of spousal identity. Employees alleging spousal-identity discrimination must rely on other theories (e.g., sex, association, or caregiver status), or look to federal laws in circumstances where those cover the complaint.

The ruling may prompt legislative action if the New York City Council intends to extend protection to spousal identity. Absent such amendment, district courts will dismiss NYCHRL marital-status claims styled on this theory at the pleading stage. It also underscores the continuing authority of the New York Court of Appeals’ interpretations, even under a regime of liberal construction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

NYCHRL vs. NYSHRL: The NYCHRL is New York City’s human rights statute; the NYSHRL is the state’s counterpart. Both use the same term “marital status,” interpreted identically by the New York Court of Appeals.
Interlocutory Appeal (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)): A district court can certify a non-final order for appeal if it involves “controlling question of law” where immediate appellate review may materially advance the litigation.
Liberal Construction Mandate: The NYCHRL must be construed “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs,” but courts may not ignore clear statutory text or binding appellate precedent.
Marital Status: Legally defined categories—single, married, separated, divorced, widowed. Does not include discrimination directed at a particular spouse or former spouse.

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC reaffirms that under the NYCHRL, “marital status” protects against discrimination based on one’s general legal condition of being married or not, but does not extend to the identity or circumstances of one’s spouse. By aligning with McCabe, the Second Circuit solidifies a uniform interpretation of “marital status” across New York’s human rights laws. Employers gain predictability; plaintiffs must craft marital-status claims that track the statute’s categorical language. Should New York City wish to protect spousal-identity discrimination, legislative amendment will be required. This clarifies pleading standards, preserves statutory boundaries, and underscores the enduring influence of the New York Court of Appeals on human rights jurisprudence.