Defining “Essential Employees” in Pandemic Workers’ Compensation: Commentary on Giuseppe Amato v. Township of Ocean School District

I. Introduction

The New Jersey Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Giuseppe Amato v. Township of Ocean School District, A‑31‑24 (Dec. 11, 2025), addresses an important question at the intersection of workers’ compensation law, emergency executive authority, and the COVID‑19 pandemic:

• Whether a public school teacher is an “essential employee” under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11 to ‑31.12, thereby qualifying for a rebuttable presumption that her contraction of COVID‑19 was work-related and fully compensable.
• Whether the Judge of Compensation properly decided that issue via a summary decision motion without affidavits, relying instead on public documents and statutory interpretation.

The case arises from the death of Denise Amato, a teacher in the Township of Ocean School District, who died of respiratory failure caused by COVID‑19. Her husband, petitioner Giuseppe Amato, sought workers’ compensation death benefits. The central dispute was not about the medical nature of her death, but about whether, under a specific statutory framework enacted during the COVID‑19 pandemic, she fell into the category of “essential employee” so that her infection would be presumed to be work-related.

The Supreme Court did not issue a full, independent opinion. Instead, it:

• Affirmed the Appellate Division’s published opinion at 480 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 2024) “substantially for the reasons stated” by Judge Puglisi.
• Added two targeted but significant clarifications:
  1. A broader explanation of how teachers were “deemed” essential employees under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4).
  2. A clarification of when affidavits are required under N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5 in summary decision practice in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.

Although concise, the opinion establishes important precedent about how “essential employees” are identified during a declared state of emergency, and how purely legal workers’ compensation issues can be resolved on motion practice using public documents and judicial notice.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court’s holding can be distilled into two key points.

A. Affirmance of the Appellate Division

The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment that:

1. Teachers were “essential employees” under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4) for purposes of the COVID‑19 workers’ compensation presumption because:
   • Governor Murphy, through Executive Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), declared a state of emergency and public health emergency.
   • The Governor delegated emergency management responsibilities to the Office of Emergency Management (OEM).
   • OEM adopted the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) list of essential employees, which expressly included teachers.
2. The Judge of Compensation properly granted summary decision on the “essential employee” issue without affidavits, because the question turned solely on statutory interpretation and public documents, not on case-specific factual disputes.

B. Two Additional Clarifications by the Supreme Court

The Court added two important clarifications to the Appellate Division’s reasoning:

1. Additional basis for “essential employee” status – DOH vaccination plans.
   The Court held that teachers were also deemed essential employees “by the public authority declaring the state of emergency” through:
   • The Governor’s delegation of authority to the New Jersey Department of Health (DOH); and
   • DOH’s issuance of two COVID‑19 vaccination plans that designated:
     • “Education and child-care workers” (Version 1, Oct. 16, 2020) and
     • “Teachers, staff, and childcare workers” (Version 2, Dec. 15, 2020)
     as “essential workers” or “essential employees.”
2. No affidavit requirement where motion relies only on public documents.
   Interpreting N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5(a)–(b), the Court held:
   • Petitioner satisfied N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5(a) by filing a notice of motion that included the factual and legal bases for the requested relief, plus public documents.
   • Under N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5(b), affidavits are required only if the motion “relies on facts not of record.”
   • Because this motion relied solely on public documents (executive orders, DOH plans) and legal interpretation, there were no “facts not of record,” and no affidavit was necessary.

With these additions, the Supreme Court fully endorsed the Appellate Division’s resolution of both the substantive and procedural issues.

III. Legal and Factual Background

A. The COVID‑19 Workers’ Compensation Presumption Statute

In response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, New Jersey enacted a specific statutory framework, codified at N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11 to ‑31.12, governing workers’ compensation claims by “essential employees” who contract COVID‑19.

While the opinion quotes only one piece of that statute, its core features (in broad terms) are:

• Definition of “essential employee.” N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11 includes several categories of essential employees. The case focuses on subsection (4), which defines an essential employee to include:

  any “employee in the public or private sector who, during a state of emergency, is deemed an essential employee by the public authority declaring the state of emergency.”

• Rebuttable presumption of work-relatedness. N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.12 (as summarized in the syllabus) provides that if an essential employee contracts COVID‑19 during the state of emergency, there is a rebuttable presumption that the illness is work-related and therefore fully compensable.
• Burden-shifting effect. Once an employee is found to be “essential,” the employer must rebut the presumption (for example, by proving the illness was more likely contracted outside of work).

The statute’s design reflects legislative concern that many essential workers, required to continue working during a deadly pandemic, would otherwise struggle to prove precisely where they were exposed to the virus.

B. Executive Order 103 and Delegation to OEM and DOH

On March 9, 2020, Governor Philip D. Murphy issued Executive Order No. 103, declaring both:

• a public health emergency, and
• a state of emergency

in New Jersey due to COVID‑19. That order did several things of relevance:

• Declared the state of emergency that triggers the statutory language in N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4).
• Authorized the State Office of Emergency Management (OEM) to take necessary actions to protect citizens.
• Delegated authority to DOH to implement public health measures, including vaccination planning.

The Supreme Court relies on this delegation to conclude that both OEM and DOH could act, on the Governor’s behalf, to “deem” certain categories of employees essential for purposes of the statute.

C. CISA Guidance and OEM Adoption

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, issued federal guidance during the pandemic identifying “critical infrastructure workers” and other “essential” workers.

OEM, acting under authority delegated by the Governor through Executive Order 103, adopted CISA’s guidelines. Importantly, those guidelines included teachers among essential workers.

The Appellate Division held, and the Supreme Court agreed, that:

• When OEM adopted the CISA list, it effectively “deemed” teachers to be essential employees on behalf of the Governor, the “public authority declaring the state of emergency” under the statute.

D. DOH Vaccination Plans

The Supreme Court added a further layer: the actions of the Department of Health (DOH).

DOH issued two versions of a COVID‑19 Vaccination Plan:

• Version 1 (Oct. 16, 2020) – identified “education and child-care workers” as “essential workers.”
• Version 2 (Dec. 15, 2020) – identified “teachers, staff, and childcare workers” as “essential workers.”

The Court reasoned that, because:

• the Governor had delegated authority to DOH in Executive Order 103, and
• DOH, exercising that delegated authority, explicitly labeled teachers as essential,

teachers were thereby deemed essential employees “by the public authority declaring the state of emergency” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4).

E. Factual and Procedural Posture

Within this legal framework, the relevant facts from the opinion are:

• Decedent: Denise Amato, a teacher in the Ocean Township School District.
• Injury: She died from respiratory failure caused by COVID‑19.
• Claim: Her husband, petitioner Giuseppe Amato, filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging that her COVID‑19 infection was work-related and compensable.

The litigation progressed as follows:

1. Division of Workers’ Compensation.
   • In March 2024, the Judge of Compensation issued a summary decision concluding that:
     • Under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11 to ‑31.12, Ms. Amato qualified as an “essential employee.”
     • Accordingly, there was a rebuttable presumption that her COVID‑19 infection was work-related.
   • The Judge relied on statutory interpretation and public documents (Executive Order 103, OEM actions, CISA guidance) without receiving personal affidavits.
2. Appellate Division.
   • The school district appealed, arguing:
     • Teachers were not “deemed” essential employees within the statute’s meaning; and
     • The Judge of Compensation’s summary decision without affidavits violated due process and N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5.
   • The Appellate Division (Judge Puglisi) rejected those arguments and affirmed the summary decision. It held that:
     • Teachers were deemed essential employees through the Governor’s delegation to OEM and OEM’s adoption of CISA’s essential employee list.
     • No affidavits were required because the issue was purely legal and based on public documents, not contested case-specific facts.
3. Supreme Court.
   • The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, indicating the issue was of statewide importance.
   • It ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, adding the two clarifications described above.

IV. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Interpretation of “Essential Employee” under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4)

1. Statutory Text and Its Central Phrase

The interpretive fulcrum is N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4), which defines “essential employee” to include:

“any employee in the public or private sector who, during a state of emergency, is deemed an essential employee by the public authority declaring the state of emergency.”

Two components are significant:

• “Public authority declaring the state of emergency.”
  In New Jersey, the Governor is the public authority that issues executive orders declaring states of emergency. Thus, the statute focuses on whom the Governor, directly or through lawful delegation, “deems” essential.
• “Deemed an essential employee.”
  The statute is intentionally flexible; it does not fix a static list of occupations. Instead, it ties the “essential” designation to the Governor’s emergency determinations, recognizing that different crises (e.g., pandemics vs. natural disasters) may require different workers.

2. Can the “Public Authority” Delegate the “Essential” Determination?

The Court accepts as a given that the Governor may act through delegated agencies—OEM and DOH—to implement the state of emergency. The crucial interpretive move is to treat:

• OEM’s adoption of the CISA list, and
• DOH’s designation of teachers as “essential workers” in vaccination plans

as equivalent to the Governor’s own act of “deeming” those workers essential for statutory purposes.

In other words, the Court reads the statute in light of:

• Administrative reality: Governors do not (and cannot) personally generate detailed lists of essential workers in complex emergencies; they rely on specialized agencies.
• Executive Order 103: The Governor expressly empowered OEM and DOH to manage aspects of the emergency response, including designating and prioritizing categories of workers.

Thus, the statutory requirement that the employee be “deemed an essential employee by the public authority declaring the state of emergency” is satisfied when:

Agencies acting under the Governor’s delegated authority identify and classify certain workers as “essential” in formal governmental documents (e.g., guidance, vaccination plans) issued in response to the same state of emergency.

3. OEM, CISA Guidance, and Teachers

The Appellate Division concluded—and the Supreme Court endorsed—that:

• OEM, empowered by Executive Order 103, adopted CISA’s federal guidance identifying “essential employees,” and
• CISA’s list explicitly included teachers.

The Court treats OEM’s adoption of the CISA list as the State’s operational choice of which workers should be considered “essential” for purposes of COVID‑19 response. Because OEM acted under the Governor’s delegated authority, this adoption:

• Counts as an act of the “public authority declaring the state of emergency.”
• Satisfies the statutory standard that teachers were “deemed” essential employees during the state of emergency.

4. DOH Vaccination Plans as an Independent Basis

The Supreme Court’s main doctrinal contribution is to add DOH vaccination plans as a second, independent basis for deeming teachers essential employees.

The Court notes that:

• Executive Order 103 delegated authority to DOH for health-related aspects of the emergency response.
• DOH’s Vaccination Plans (Versions 1 and 2) explicitly categorized:
  • “education and child-care workers,” and later
  • “teachers, staff, and childcare workers”
  as “essential workers” or “essential employees.”

From this, the Court concludes:

Teachers were also deemed essential employees “by the public authority declaring the state of emergency” through the Governor’s delegation of authority to DOH and DOH’s issuance of vaccination plans deeming them essential.

This is significant for two reasons:

1. Redundancy of proof.
   Even if one were to question OEM’s adoption of CISA or its sufficiency, DOH’s vaccination plans independently satisfy the statutory “deeming” requirement.
2. Broader interpretive rule.
   It establishes that:
   • Not just emergency management agencies (like OEM), but also health agencies operating under the Governor’s emergency delegation can identify “essential employees.”
   • Designations in vaccination plans—primarily public-health instruments—can carry legal significance for workers’ compensation.

The Court thereby confirms a broad, practical reading of N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4): any formal, emergency-related governmental designation of a class of workers as “essential” by an agency acting under the Governor’s delegated authority can satisfy the statute.

B. Summary Decision, Judicial Notice, and N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5

1. The Regulation: N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5(a)–(b)

N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5 governs motions for summary decision in workers’ compensation proceedings (analogous to summary judgment in civil court).

The Court focuses on two subsections:

• Subsection (a): Requires the moving party to submit a “notice of motion” that “shall include the factual and legal basis for the relief requested.”
• Subsection (b): Provides that:

  “If the notice of motion or responsive pleading relies on facts not of record, it shall be supported by affidavit made on personal knowledge setting forth facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify.” (emphasis added)

Respondent argued that petitioner was required to submit affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge—such as about Ms. Amato’s job duties, exposures, or working conditions—and that the failure to do so deprived them of due process.

2. The Court’s Reading: “Facts Not of Record” as Trigger for Affidavits

The Supreme Court rejects the school district’s position, emphasizing the qualifier in N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5(b): affidavits are required only when the motion “relies on facts not of record.”

Here:

• Petitioner’s motion:
  • Included a notice of motion.
  • Set forth the legal argument that Ms. Amato was an essential employee under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4).
  • Attached public documents (executive orders, CISA guidelines, DOH vaccination plans) of which judicial notice could be taken under N.J.R.E. 201.
• The motion did not rely on any disputed or case-specific factual assertions outside the existing record; the only question was a legal one: whether teachers, as a class, fell within the statutory definition of essential employees.

Thus:

• There were no “facts not of record” that would trigger the affidavit requirement of subsection (b).
• Compliance with subsection (a) (notice + factual and legal basis) was sufficient.

The Court also notes that:

The legal question of whether teachers were essential employees under the statute required no specific facts regarding decedent’s duties.

That is, Ms. Amato’s particular job tasks were irrelevant to whether the category “teachers” had been “deemed” essential by the public authority.

3. Judicial Notice of Public Documents: N.J.R.E. 201

The Court underscores that petitioner supported his motion with public documents of which judicial notice could be taken under N.J.R.E. 201. Judicial notice allows a tribunal to accept certain facts without formal proof because they are:

• Generally known within the jurisdiction, or
• Capable of accurate and ready determination from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

Public documents such as:

• Executive Order 103,
• DOH vaccination plans,
• Official state or federal guidance documents

are classic candidates for judicial notice. Since their content and existence are not reasonably disputable, there is no need for:

• affidavits attesting to their authenticity, or
• live testimony to prove their contents.

This reinforces the Court’s conclusion that the absence of affidavits did not impair respondent’s due process rights.

4. Rejection of the Due Process Challenge

The school district argued it was deprived of due process because the Judge of Compensation:

• granted summary decision without requiring affidavits, and
• allegedly relieved the petitioner of the burden to produce evidence from witnesses with personal knowledge.

The Supreme Court, echoing the Appellate Division, rejects that framing:

• There was no factual dispute requiring evidentiary development; the controversy was purely about legal interpretation of statutory and executive materials.
• Due process does not guarantee an evidentiary hearing when there is no genuine issue of material fact.
• The parties had an opportunity to brief and argue the legal question and to contest the use or interpretation of public documents.

The Court therefore confirms that:

It is proper for a Judge of Compensation to decide a purely legal question—such as whether a class of workers is “essential” under a statute—on a summary motion supported only by public documents and legal argument, without affidavits, so long as N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5(a) is satisfied and no “facts not of record” are relied upon.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Supreme Court’s opinion is notably concise and cites few cases. Its primary external authorities are statutory, regulatory, and executive. Nonetheless, these sources, and the Appellate Division opinion it adopts, form important precedents and interpretive guides.

A. The Appellate Division’s Opinion (480 N.J. Super. 239, App. Div. 2024)

The Supreme Court expressly affirms “substantially for the reasons stated” in Judge Puglisi’s “thorough and thoughtful opinion” at 480 N.J. Super. 239. While the full content of that opinion is not reproduced in the Supreme Court text, its status as a published, affirmed opinion means:

• It is binding appellate precedent on the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4) and the application of N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5 in workers’ compensation summary decisions.
• The Supreme Court’s affirmance, with only limited additions, effectively elevates the Appellate Division’s reasoning to statewide authority.

In particular, the Appellate Division:

• Found that teachers were “deemed” essential employees through the Governor’s delegation to OEM and OEM’s adoption of CISA’s essential list.
• Held that affidavits were not required because the issue was grounded in statutory construction and public documents rather than case-specific fact disputes.

The Supreme Court seals that interpretation and supplements, rather than displaces, the Appellate Division’s analysis.

B. Statutes

• N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11 to ‑31.12.
  These provisions establish:
  • The definition of “essential employee,” including those “deemed” essential by the public authority during a state of emergency.
  • The rebuttable presumption that COVID‑19 contracted by essential employees is work-related and compensable.
  The Court’s interpretation of subsection 31.11(4) is now a leading authority on:
  • how “deemed” essential employees are identified; and
  • the role of executive and administrative designations in implementing that statute.

C. Regulations

• N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5 (Summary Decision).
  The Court clarifies:
  • Subsection (a) is satisfied by a notice of motion that sets forth the factual and legal basis, even if the facts are limited to public documents.
  • Subsection (b)’s affidavit requirement is triggered only when a motion relies on “facts not of record” (i.e., facts outside the existing record and not reflected in public documents susceptible to judicial notice).

D. Rules of Evidence

• N.J.R.E. 201 (Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts).
  The Court notes that the public documents attached to the motion—executive orders, DOH vaccination plans—could be judicially noticed under this rule. This underscores:
  • Courts and administrative tribunals may rely on official governmental publications without evidentiary affidavits.
  • Such reliance is compatible with summary decision procedures and due process.

E. Executive and Administrative Authorities

• Executive Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020).
  Declared the COVID‑19 emergency and delegated authority to OEM and DOH. It is the foundational executive act that:
  • triggers the statutory reference to “the public authority declaring the state of emergency,” and
  • enables OEM and DOH to function as instruments for deeming workers essential.
• DOH COVID‑19 Vaccination Plans (2020 Versions 1 and 2).
  These plans are treated not just as public-health guidelines, but also as legally relevant designations of “essential workers,” including teachers, for purposes of N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4).
• CISA Essential Worker Guidance.
  Adopted by OEM, this federal guidance becomes a key interpretive tool in defining which categories of workers the State regarded as “essential.”

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Consequences for Teachers and School Districts

The most immediate practical impact is on:

• Teachers and their families.
  Public and private school teachers in New Jersey who contracted COVID‑19 during the covered emergency period stand on firmer ground in claiming workers’ compensation benefits. The Court’s decision confirms that:
  • Teachers are “essential employees” under the statute.
  • They are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that their COVID‑19 infections are work-related.
• School districts (public employers) and their insurers.
  The ruling likely:
  • Increases potential liability exposure for COVID‑19 related claims by teachers and school staff.
  • Shifts the burden to school districts to rebut the presumption (for example, by showing the infection likely occurred in a non-work setting).

Furthermore, the decision may influence:

• Settlement strategies in pending or future COVID‑19 workers’ compensation claims brought by educators.
• Risk assessment and insurance pricing, recognizing that educators are presumptively covered as essential employees for COVID‑19 exposure.

B. Beyond Teachers: Other Essential Workers

Although the case centers on teachers, the Court’s reasoning is generalizable:

• Any category of worker:
  • Identified as “essential” in CISA guidance adopted by OEM, or
  • Labeled as “essential” or “critical” in DOH or other emergency-related governmental documents,
  may fall within N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4)’s definition of essential employee.
• This likely includes a wide variety of workers in healthcare, transportation, food supply, childcare, and other critical infrastructure sectors, depending on how OEM and DOH designated them during the emergency.

Thus, the decision legitimizes the use of:

• Federal guidance (e.g., CISA), as adopted by state agencies, and
• State public-health planning documents (e.g., vaccination plans)

as central references in determining essential-employee status for workers’ compensation purposes in future pandemics or emergencies.

C. Emergency Powers and Delegation

On a structural level, the decision confirms that:

• The phrase “public authority declaring the state of emergency” in a statute can include:
  • Not only the Governor personally, but also
  • Agencies to which the Governor has formally delegated emergency authority.
• Executive and administrative actions (OEM adoption of CISA guidance, DOH vaccination plans) can carry downstream legal consequences in statutory schemes that reference the declaring authority’s determinations.

This may influence how future legislatures draft emergency-related statutes, and how courts interpret statutory language that ties legal rights to emergency declarations or classifications made during a crisis.

D. Workers’ Compensation Procedure and Motion Practice

Procedurally, the Court’s clarification of N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5 will affect how Judges of Compensation:

• Handle motions for summary decision in cases involving:
  • Pure questions of law, or
  • Application of public documents and judicially noticeable materials.
• Assess when affidavits are required.
  • Affidavits are now clearly reserved for disputes involving “facts not of record.”
  • They are not mandatory where all relevant facts are contained in public, judicially noticeable documents, and the dispute is legal, not factual.

This should:

• Streamline resolution of legal threshold issues in workers’ compensation (e.g., statutory classifications, coverage questions).
• Reduce unnecessary evidentiary proceedings where no genuine factual dispute exists.

E. Questions Left Open

While the decision is important, it leaves several issues for future litigation or legislative action:

• Scope and duration of the presumption.
  The opinion does not address how long into the pandemic the presumption applies, or how it interacts with changing workplace conditions (e.g., remote work, hybrid schedules).
• Rebuttal standards.
  The case focuses on whether the presumption applies, not on what is required for an employer to rebut it in a particular factual scenario.
• Other types of emergencies.
  The reasoning is rooted in COVID‑19 documents, but the statute is not limited to pandemics. Future cases may address:
  • Natural disasters,
  • Terrorism-related emergencies, or
  • Other public health crises,
  and which workers are essential in those different contexts.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Several legal concepts in the opinion are central to understanding its significance. The following non-technical explanations may help.

A. “Essential Employee” (for COVID‑19 Workers’ Compensation)

• An “essential employee” under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11 is someone whose work was considered critical during the state of emergency, and who was expected to continue working despite the risks.
• For this case, the focus is on employees:
  • “deemed an essential employee” during the emergency by the Governor (or agencies acting under his authority).
• Being an essential employee matters because:
  • It triggers a presumption that COVID‑19 was caught at work.

B. “Rebuttable Presumption”

• A presumption is a rule that says:

  “If certain basic facts are established, the law will automatically assume another fact, unless someone proves otherwise.”

• A rebuttable presumption means this assumption is not final:
  • The employer can present evidence to show the opposite (for example, that the employee was probably infected outside the workplace).
• In this statute:
  • Once an employee is deemed “essential” and has COVID‑19 during the emergency, the law presumes the infection is work-related and compensable.
  • The employer must then prove otherwise to avoid liability.

C. “Summary Decision” in Workers’ Compensation

• A summary decision is like a summary judgment in civil litigation:
  • It allows a case (or a specific issue in a case) to be decided without a full evidentiary hearing when there is no genuine dispute about key facts and one side is clearly entitled to win under the law.
• N.J.A.C. 12:235‑3.5 sets out the rules:
  • You must file a motion explaining the facts and law that justify the decision.
  • You must attach affidavits only if you rely on new, disputed facts that are not already in the record or in judicially noticeable documents.

D. “Judicial Notice” (N.J.R.E. 201)

• Judicial notice lets a court accept certain facts without formal proof because they are:
  • Commonly known, or
  • Verifiable from unquestionable sources (like official government publications).
• In this case, the court took judicial notice of:
  • Executive Order 103,
  • DOH vaccination plans,
  • Official definitions of essential workers.
• No witness needed to testify, “Yes, Executive Order 103 says X.” The document speaks for itself.

E. “Public Authority Declaring the State of Emergency”

• This phrase refers to:
  • The government actor who formally declares a state of emergency. In New Jersey, that is the Governor acting by executive order.
• The Court interprets this to include:
  • Agencies like OEM and DOH when they act under formal delegations of authority from the Governor during the emergency.

F. “Amicus Curiae”

• Amicus curiae means “friend of the court.”
• Groups that are not direct parties can file briefs to:
  • Offer broader perspectives or expertise,
  • Highlight policy implications.
• In this case, amici included:
  • The New Jersey Education Association (NJEA),
  • The New Jersey Association for Justice, and
  • The Council on Safety and Health.
• Their participation underscores the importance of the case for education workers and worker-safety advocates.

VIII. Conclusion

Giuseppe Amato v. Township of Ocean School District is a concise but influential decision in New Jersey’s pandemic-related workers’ compensation jurisprudence. It accomplishes several things:

• Substantively, it confirms that teachers are “essential employees” under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑31.11(4) by virtue of:
  • OEM’s adoption of CISA’s essential employee list under Executive Order 103, and
  • DOH’s COVID‑19 vaccination plans that explicitly designate teachers and related workers as “essential.”
  This entitles teachers who contracted COVID‑19 during the emergency period to a rebuttable presumption that their illness was work-related and compensable.
• Procedurally, it clarifies that:
  • Motions for summary decision in the Division of Workers’ Compensation need not be supported by affidavits when they rely solely on public, judicially noticeable documents and present purely legal questions.
  • Affidavits are required only for “facts not of record,” preserving efficiency without sacrificing due process.
• Structurally, it affirms a broad reading of how emergency powers and delegations operate:
  • Agencies acting under the Governor’s authority can “deem” categories of workers essential for purposes of statutes that reference the “public authority declaring the state of emergency.”
  • Public-health planning documents, like vaccination plans, can have significant legal consequences beyond their immediate policy function.

In the broader legal context, the decision underscores that statutory references to “essential employees” during emergencies must be interpreted against the backdrop of the actual, practical responses to those emergencies—executive orders, agency actions, and federal guidance—as implemented by the State. It strengthens protections for workers who continued to serve the public in dangerous conditions during the COVID‑19 pandemic, and it offers a framework for analyzing similar issues in future crises.