Defining “Emergency Medical Service First Response Provider” Under KRS 311A.027: Fire Departments Without Ambulance Services May Impose Residency Requirements

Defining “Emergency Medical Service First Response Provider” Under KRS 311A.027: Fire Departments Without Ambulance Services May Impose Residency Requirements

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Nathan Torian, Individually, and as a Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons Comprising the Unincorporated Labor Organization, the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 168 v. City of Paducah, Kentucky, rendered December 18, 2025. The case addresses whether Kentucky’s EMS residency statute, KRS 311A.027(1), preempts a municipal residency requirement imposed on firefighters who are trained and certified as emergency medical personnel.

The dispute sits at the intersection of three regimes:

  • KRS Chapter 311A – governing emergency medical services;
  • KRS Chapter 95 – governing police and fire departments; and
  • Local employment and residency ordinances.

At its core, the case asks: when a city’s firefighters are trained, certified, and routinely dispatched as first responders to medical emergencies, are they – or is their department – a “publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider” under KRS 311A.027(1), such that the city is prohibited from imposing a residency requirement on them?

The majority, per Justice Conley, holds that Paducah’s fire department is not such a provider, because it does not operate an ambulance service and is not regulated as an EMS agency by the Kentucky Board of Emergency Medical Services (KBEMS). Accordingly, the city ordinance requiring firefighters to live within McCracken County or within forty-five minutes of Station 4 is not preempted.

Justice Keller, in dissent, argues that the statute’s plain text clearly protects Paducah’s firefighters as publicly funded medical first responders and that the majority’s construction unduly narrows the statute and undermines legislative purpose.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background and Parties

Paducah Ordinance § 2-304 (adopted in 1998) provides:

“All members of the fire department hired after October 1, 1998, shall reside within McCracken County or within forty-five minutes of Station 4 as measured by a recognized mapping program . . . as a condition of their continued employment with the fire department of the city.”

In addition, Paducah requires its firefighters, by ordinance, to obtain and maintain EMT certification through KBEMS (ord. § 2-315). Functionally, firefighters:

  • are KBEMS-certified emergency medical personnel;
  • are dispatched as first responders to medical 911 calls; and
  • often arrive at the scene before the privately run ambulance service.

KRS 311A.027(1) provides:

“No public agency, tax district, or other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider or licensed ambulance service shall have a residence requirement for an employee of or volunteer for the organization.”

Firefighter Nathan Torian, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated firefighters, sought a declaration that KRS 311A.027(1) invalidates the city’s residency ordinance and an injunction barring enforcement. He argued that the Paducah Fire Department, and its members, are “emergency medical service first response provider[s]” within the meaning of the statute.

The City of Paducah countered that:

  • KRS 311A.027(1) regulates employers, not individual employees;
  • its fire department is not an EMS first response provider but a firefighting department governed by KRS Chapter 95; and
  • any medical services provided by firefighters are ancillary, and the department is not an ambulance or EMS agency licensed under Chapter 311A.

The McCracken Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Paducah, finding that KRS 311A.027(1) was not intended to apply to firefighters. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review.

B. Holding and Disposition

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, but on different reasoning:

  • KRS 311A.027(1) applies to certain employers – public agencies, tax districts, and publicly funded EMS first response providers or licensed ambulance services – not to individual employees.
  • An “emergency medical service first response provider” in this statute is functionally equivalent to a “medical first response agency” as regulated under 202 KAR Chapter 7.
  • Such entities, at minimum, must maintain an ambulance and provide ambulance services, and be subject to KBEMS’s regulatory scheme.
  • The Paducah Fire Department does not operate an ambulance service and is not regulated as a medical first response agency, so it is not an “emergency medical service first response provider” under KRS 311A.027(1).
  • Therefore, KRS 311A.027(1) does not preempt Paducah’s firefighter residency ordinance.

The Court expressly declines to decide whether combined “fire and EMS” departments that do operate ambulances fall under KRS 311A.027(1), and it calls on the General Assembly to clarify the statutory scheme for such hybrid agencies.

C. The Dissent

Justice Keller dissents. She would:

  • Apply the plain text of KRS 311A.027(1) without resort to extrinsic aids;
  • Hold that Paducah’s fire department is a “publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider” because it is publicly funded and its firefighters are trained and dispatched as first medical responders; and
  • Conclude that the residency ordinance directly conflicts with KRS 311A.027(1) and must be invalidated.

In her view, the majority improperly creates a “latent ambiguity” where none exists and rewrites the statute to require that first response providers also be licensed ambulance services – a limitation that appears nowhere in the statutory text.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

1. KRS 311A.027(1)–(2)

KRS 311A.027(1)–(2) is designed to constrain residency requirements while preserving operational response-time rules:

  • Subsection (1) – forbids certain employers from having residence requirements for employees or volunteers.
  • Subsection (2) – allows those employers to impose response-time requirements for “an employee or volunteer who is off duty but on call.”

The Legislature thus drew a deliberate line: no employer-level residency mandates, but yes to operational response expectations.

2. Chapter 311A vs. Chapter 95

  • KRS Chapter 311A governs EMS, including ambulance services, medical first response agencies, licensing and certification of EMS personnel, and KBEMS oversight.
  • KRS Chapter 95 governs municipal fire and police departments, their organization, powers, and employment matters.

The trial court and city relied heavily on Chapter 95 to argue that firefighters are governed separately from EMS providers. The Supreme Court majority does not rest its holding on Chapter 95 per se, but instead on how the undefined term “emergency medical service first response provider” functions within Chapter 311A and its implementing regulations.

3. KBEMS Regulations – 202 KAR Chapter 7

The majority turns to the regulatory scheme promulgated by KBEMS to determine what counts as an “emergency medical service first response provider” in practice. Key regulations include:

  • 202 KAR 7:501 – sets licensure requirements for “ambulance providers and medical first response agencies.”
  • 202 KAR 7:545 – license classifications.
  • 202 KAR 7:550 – equipment and vehicle standards.
  • 202 KAR 7:555 – regulation of ground agencies.
  • 202 KAR 7:560 – staffing for ground vehicles.
  • 202 KAR 7:565 – clinical pilot programs.
  • 202 KAR 7:575 – fee schedules.

Throughout these regulations, the phrase “ambulance providers and medical first response agencies” is treated as a unitary category subject to a comprehensive regulatory framework. From this, the Court infers that:

  • An “emergency medical service first response provider” in KRS 311A.027(1) is synonymous, at least functionally, with a “medical first response agency” under KBEMS regulations.
  • Such agencies are understood as entities that, among other things, maintain an ambulance and provide ambulance services, and are licensed/regulated by KBEMS.

Because Paducah Fire Department:

  • is not licensed or regulated as a medical first response agency;
  • does not maintain an ambulance; and
  • does not operate an ambulance service (that function is privately provided by hospital-based services),

the majority concludes that it falls outside the statutory category.

B. Interpreting “Emergency Medical Service First Response Provider”

1. Employer-Focused Statutory Text

The majority first rejects Torian’s premise that KRS 311A.027(1) directly confers status or rights on individual providers based on their certifications. The statute, the Court emphasizes, speaks to the status of employers:

“No public agency, tax district, or other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider or licensed ambulance service shall have a residence requirement for an employee or volunteer for the organization.”

The nouns in this series – “public agency,” “tax district,” “other publicly funded [EMS] first response provider,” and “licensed ambulance service” – are all institutional in character. The Court points out that Torian is “not a public agency, tax district, or licensed ambulance service unto himself,” so he cannot be “a provider” for purposes of this statute.

Accordingly:

  • The statute prohibits certain employer-entities from imposing residency requirements.
  • Liability or preemption turns on whether the employer fits within the covered categories, not on whether the individuals perform EMS functions or hold EMS certifications.

2. What Kind of “Provider” – Individual or Institution?

The term “provider” is undefined in KRS 311A.027(1), and other provisions in Chapter 311A use the word “provider” in varying ways. The majority walks through several of these:

  • KRS 311A.010(4) – defines “ambulance service” and “ambulance provider” as “any individual or private or public organization” licensed to provide transport-level medical services.
  • KRS 311A.080(1) – forbids any unlicensed “person” (defined broadly in KRS 446.010(33)) from operating an ambulance service or advanced life support emergency medical first response program.
  • KRS 311A.010(13)(a) – defines “emergency medical services personnel” (AEMT, EMR, EMT, paramedic, and related instructors) and notably does not include “ambulance provider” as a form of personnel.
  • KRS 311A.015(2)(g), (h) – require that one “licensed or certified emergency medical services field provider” from the Kentucky Professional Fire Fighters and one from the Kentucky Association of Fire Chiefs sit on the EMS Board – here “provider” plainly refers to individuals.

From this mixed usage, the Court acknowledges that “provider” sometimes means an individual and sometimes an organization. But in KRS 311A.027(1), context controls: “public agency,” “tax district,” and “licensed ambulance service” are institutional employers; the catchall “other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider” therefore must be read as another form of employer-entity, not an individual.

3. Meaning of “Public Agency” and the Role of Context

The Court then considers the term “public agency.” It declines to import the expansive definition from Kentucky’s Open Records Act (KRS 61.870(1)), reasoning that:

  • Open Records Act definitions serve a very different policy and functional purpose.
  • Those definitions extend to entities (e.g., local libraries, parks departments) with no relation to EMS, which the Legislature plainly did not intend to sweep into KRS 311A.027(1).

Instead, reading the statute “in its own context” and using the fact that covered entities must be able to impose employment conditions, the Court defines “public agency” here as:

“a local government or department of government that provides emergency medical services.”

The phrase “or other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider” then functions as a bridge category:

  • “or other” signals a category similar in kind to “public agency” and “tax district,” but not necessarily a governmental body; and
  • “publicly funded” ensures the statute does not reach privately financed EMS providers.

4. Use of the Regulations to Resolve “Latent Ambiguity”

The Court characterizes the statute’s definitional gap as a “latent ambiguity”: the language admits a facially clear reading but becomes uncertain when applied to the specific facts (fire departments that provide some medical response but are not licensed EMS agencies).

To resolve this, the Court:

  • Relies on Whitley Whiz, Inc. v. Whitley County, 812 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1991), and Erie Ins. Exch. v. Johnson, 713 S.W.3d 149 (Ky. 2025), for the principle that latent ambiguity permits consideration of surrounding law and canons of construction.
  • Recognizes, consistent with Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), that extrinsic materials may be consulted only insofar as they reliably illuminate ambiguous terms.
  • But reiterates, citing Owen v. Univ. of Ky., 486 S.W.3d 266 (Ky. 2016), that the statutory text remains “supreme.”

Under this approach, the EMS regulations become an interpretive aid in determining what an “emergency medical service first response provider” represents as a category of entity.

5. Functional Equivalence: EMS First Response Provider = Medical First Response Agency

After surveying the regulatory scheme, the Court draws a key equivalence:

“There is no substantial difference in meaning between an ‘emergency medical service first response provider’ and ‘medical first response agencies.’”

From that premise, the Court then articulates the critical minimum criteria:

  • Such a provider is an entity that maintains an ambulance and provides ambulance services;
  • Is subject to KBEMS licensing and regulatory oversight as either an ambulance provider or medical first response agency; and
  • Operates within the comprehensive regulatory regime of 202 KAR Chapter 7.

Finding no evidence that the Paducah Fire Department fits within that regime, the Court concludes:

“The Paducah Fire Department does not maintain an ambulance and it does not provide ambulance services. It is not a ‘medical first response agency’ under the regulations, therefore, we conclude it is not an ‘emergency medical first response provider’ under KRS 311A.027(1) since the two phrases are functionally equivalent.”

6. The “Fire-Based EMS” Departments and the Unresolved Question

Amicus Kentucky Professional Fire Fighters highlighted that several Kentucky jurisdictions operate combined “Fire & EMS” departments that:

  • Perform both firefighting and EMS functions; and
  • Do maintain and operate ambulances (e.g., Winchester Fire and EMS; Frankfort Fire and EMS, as noted by the Court via KBEMS agency listings).

These entities are often described as “fire-based EMS” providers. The majority stresses that:

  • There is no statutory or regulatory category called “fire-based EMS” in Chapter 311A or 202 KAR Chapter 7.
  • Any department maintaining ambulances and providing ambulance services is, by definition, within the KBEMS regulatory structure and therefore analytically distinct from a pure fire department.

Crucially, however, the Court refuses to decide whether such combined service departments are covered by KRS 311A.027(1), calling that issue beyond the case’s scope:

“In plain terms, this decision does not answer the question of whether combined service departments that function as both fire departments and EMS providers are subject to KRS 311A.027(1).”

Instead, invoking separation-of-powers doctrine (and citing Ky. State Bd. of Elections v. Faulkner, 591 S.W.3d 398 (Ky. 2019) and Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790 (Ky. 2009)), the Court urges the General Assembly to clarify the governing statutes:

“It exceeds the authority of this Court to fill gaps in the applicable legislation or regulations. ‘Shaping public policy is the exclusive domain of the General Assembly.’”

C. Precedents and Interpretive Canons Relied Upon by the Majority

1. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review

The Court reiterates conventional principles regarding summary judgment:

  • Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444 (Ky. 2010) – summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Ins. Corp., 706 S.W.3d 120 (Ky. 2024) – when summary judgment turns on a pure question of law, appellate review is de novo.

Here, the dispute is purely over statutory interpretation, so the Court reviews de novo and gives no deference to the lower courts’ legal conclusions.

2. Textual Primacy and Statutory Interpretation

The Court reaffirms a textualist baseline:

  • Util. Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Pike Cty. Fiscal Court, 531 S.W.3d 3 (Ky. 2017) and Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542 (Ky. 2011) – statutory interpretation seeks to effectuate legislative intent, with primary reliance on the statutory language as generally understood in context.
  • Owen v. Univ. of Ky., 486 S.W.3d 266 (Ky. 2016) – the “first rule of statutory interpretation is that the text of the statute is supreme.”

The majority’s move to recognize a “latent ambiguity” in an otherwise textually straightforward statute is itself a significant interpretive choice, and it becomes the central fault line between the majority and the dissent.

3. Latent Ambiguity and Extrinsic Aids

To justify consulting regulations and related statutes, the Court invokes:

  • Whitley Whiz, Inc. v. Whitley Cty., 812 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1991) – recognition that some statutes become ambiguous only upon application to specific facts.
  • Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2010) and Erie Ins. Exch. v. Johnson, 713 S.W.3d 149 (Ky. 2025) – in such cases, courts may consider “all of the relevant accompanying facts, circumstances, and laws, including time-honored canons of construction.”
  • Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) – extrinsic materials are used only to clarify, not to supplant, the legislature’s understanding of ambiguous terms.

4. Semantic Canons – Last Antecedent and Contextual Meaning

The majority leans on classic semantic canons:

  • Last-antecedent canon, drawing from Scalia & Garner, Reading Law and Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) – the limiting phrase “publicly funded” modifies the immediately preceding noun phrase “emergency medical service first response provider,” not the earlier “public agency” or “tax district.” This reading ensures that “or other publicly funded [provider]” is understood as a distinct, narrower class, excluding privately funded EMS entities.
  • Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004), quoting United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001) – while identical words in a statute are presumed to carry the same meaning, that presumption is not rigid; the meaning may vary based on context and purpose. This supports reading “provider” differently in KRS 311A.015 (individual field providers) and KRS 311A.027 (employer-entities).

5. Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint

The majority’s refusal to answer the “fire-based EMS” question is grounded in:

  • Ky. State Bd. of Elections v. Faulkner, 591 S.W.3d 398 (Ky. 2019) – courts may not “fill gaps” in legislation; doing so exceeds judicial authority.
  • Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790 (Ky. 2009) – “Shaping public policy is the exclusive domain of the General Assembly.”

This explains the Court’s explicit call to the Legislature to clarify the statutory regime for hybrid fire–EMS departments, combined with its narrow, case-specific holding.

D. The Dissent’s Competing Interpretive Model

1. Plain Meaning as Both Starting and Ending Point

Justice Keller’s dissent is a strong reaffirmation of plain-meaning textualism. She emphasizes:

  • Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2005) – the plain meaning of statutory language is presumed to represent legislative intent.
  • Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2002) and McCracken Cnty. Fiscal Court v. Graves, 885 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1994) – when words are clear and unambiguous, “there is no room for construction.”
  • KRS 446.080(4) – directs that words be given their ordinary meaning unless the statute provides otherwise.
  • Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541 (Ky. 2000) and Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Com., Revenue Cabinet, 689 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1985) – courts are not permitted to add words, subtract words, or supply omissions in unambiguous statutes.
  • Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2010) – canons of interpretation are unnecessary when the statutory meaning is clear.
  • Merritt v. Catholic Health Initiatives, Inc., 612 S.W.3d 822 (Ky. 2020) and Dept. of Revenue v. Wyrick, 323 S.W.3d 710 (Ky. 2010) – reiterating that courts must apply clear statutory text and cannot manufacture meaning outside what is reasonably ascertainable.

From this baseline, she rejects the majority’s resort to latent ambiguity:

“The text speaks with clarity; therefore, the task before us is one of application, not construction.”

2. Functional Application of the Text

Keller emphasizes what firefighters in Paducah actually do:

  • The city requires KBEMS EMT certification for all firefighters.
  • Firefighters are dispatched to medical emergencies and often arrive before the ambulance.
  • They render medical aid consistent with their training and certification.

On these facts, she concludes that Paducah’s fire department is plainly:

  • “publicly funded”;
  • providing “emergency medical services”;
  • as “first response providers.”

Thus, under ordinary language, the department is a “publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider,” independent of whether it also runs an ambulance service or holds KBEMS agency licensure.

3. The Disjunctive “Or” and Surplusage

A key textual dispute centers on the phrase:

“other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider or licensed ambulance service.”

The dissent stresses the Legislature’s deliberate use of the disjunctive “or”:

  • This creates two independent categories of covered entities:
    1. publicly funded EMS first response providers; and
    2. licensed ambulance services.
  • By collapsing those two categories into essentially one (“those that operate ambulances under KBEMS regulation”), the majority:
    • Reads “or” as “and,” contrary to Harrelson; and
    • Violates the anti-surplusage canon by depriving “first response provider” of independent effect.

Keller argues that the Legislature’s use of “other publicly funded [EMS] first response provider or licensed ambulance service” shows an intention to cover EMS entities that provide direct, first-responding medical care even when they do not operate transport vehicles or hold ambulance licenses.

4. Statutory Structure and Purpose

The dissent places KRS 311A.027(1)–(2) within the broader statutory context:

  • The statute aims to prevent residency requirements from impeding recruitment and retention of EMS personnel, especially in areas where such constraints could worsen staffing shortages.
  • Subsection (2) shows that the Legislature contemplated maintaining emergency-readiness by allowing time-based response requirements for on-call personnel, even as it prohibited domicile-based restrictions.

From this structure she infers:

  • The Legislature expected to protect all publicly funded EMS first responders from residency mandates, regardless of whether their employer also ran an ambulance service.
  • The majority’s narrowed construction undermines that purpose by allowing municipalities to label EMS first responders as “firefighters” and thus sidestep the statute.

5. Ambiguity Threshold and McPeek

Keller also invokes:

  • Normandy Farm, LLC v. Kenneth McPeek Racing Stable, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. 2024) – reinforcing that interpretive tools beyond text are only employed once ambiguity is found.
  • City of Fort Wright v. Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 635 S.W.3d 37 (Ky. 2021) – discussing the hierarchy of interpretive tools and the doctrinal requirement of ambiguity before recourse to extrinsic aids.
  • Secondary authority (Congressional Research Service report, R45153) – summarizing interpretive tools and emphasizing that courts first exhaust intrinsic methods (ordinary meaning, structure, context) before turning to extrinsic sources.

Her bottom line:

“Because KRS 311A.027 means exactly what it says—that is enough.”

She would reverse and remand with directions to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Torian and the firefighter class.

E. Doctrinal Impact and Likely Future Developments

1. Immediate Consequences for Fire Departments Without Ambulances

Under the majority’s holding:

  • Purely firefighting departments that:
    • do not operate ambulances;
    • are not licensed or regulated as EMS agencies by KBEMS; and
    • even if their members hold EMS certifications and respond to medical emergencies,
    are not “emergency medical service first response providers” under KRS 311A.027(1).
  • Such departments (or their municipalities) remain free to impose residency requirements, unless constrained by some other statute, local ordinance, or collective bargaining agreement.

For many Kentucky municipalities with separate private or hospital-based ambulance services and publicly funded fire departments, this decision effectively insulates firefighter residency ordinances from challenge under KRS 311A.027.

2. Hybrid “Fire & EMS” Departments: The Open Question

For combined fire–EMS agencies that:

  • maintain ambulances;
  • provide transport-level EMS; and
  • are licensed or recognized by KBEMS as ambulance providers or medical first response agencies,

the decision intentionally leaves the question unresolved: does KRS 311A.027(1) bar those employers from imposing residency requirements on their employees and volunteers?

Future litigation is likely to focus on:

  • Proving that the agency is in fact a “medical first response agency” or “ambulance provider” under KBEMS regulations.
  • Determining whether a single organizational entity that carries both fire and EMS functions must treat all of its staff as protected under KRS 311A.027(1), or only those assigned to EMS operations.

Given the Court’s invitation to the Legislature to clarify the law, one can expect legislative proposals to:

  • Expressly define “emergency medical service first response provider” in KRS 311A.010;
  • Address how the statute applies to combined fire–EMS agencies; and/or
  • Specify whether firefighter/EMA dual-role personnel are within the statute’s protection.

3. Employer-Centric Approach to Preemption Under KRS 311A.027

A notable doctrinal contribution of this decision is its employer-centric framing of KRS 311A.027(1). Preemption analysis under this statute now proceeds as follows:

  1. Identify the employer or organization imposing the residency requirement.
  2. Determine whether that employer is:
    • a “public agency” providing EMS;
    • a “tax district” providing EMS;
    • an “other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider” (interpreted, at least, as equivalent to a medical first response agency maintaining ambulances); or
    • a “licensed ambulance service.”
  3. If no, KRS 311A.027(1) does not preempt the residency requirement, even if employees are EMS-certified or frequently engaged in EMS response.
  4. If yes, KRS 311A.027(1) bars residency requirements for that employer’s employees and volunteers, subject only to time-based response requirements under subsection (2).

This structure narrows KRS 311A.027’s reach, particularly in settings where EMS functions are spread across multiple institutions (e.g., private ambulance service + public fire department).

4. Potential Tension with Legislative Purpose

Although the majority does not foreground legislative purpose, the dissent highlights a potential tension: the Legislature sought to eliminate residency barriers for EMS responders statewide, while the majority’s reading arguably leaves a large class of real-world first responders (firefighters with EMS certification) outside the statute’s protection.

This tension may become more acute as:

  • More municipalities embed substantial EMS responsibilities in their fire departments without formal KBEMS agency licensure; or
  • Staffing shortages increase the need to recruit EMS-capable firefighters from beyond narrow geographic boundaries.

Whether the Legislature will respond by broadening the statutory definition or by clarifying that relief is limited to formally licensed EMS agencies remains to be seen.

IV. Clarifying Complex Concepts and Key Terms

A. “Emergency Medical Service First Response Provider”

As interpreted by the Court, this term refers to:

  • An organization (not an individual) that:
    • is publicly funded;
    • provides emergency medical services as a first responder; and
    • is, at minimum, equivalent to a “medical first response agency” regulated by KBEMS.
  • In practical terms, an entity that maintains ambulances and provides ambulance services, regulated under 202 KAR Chapter 7.

It does not, under this decision, automatically include every fire department whose members have EMS certifications and respond to medical calls.

B. “Public Agency” in KRS 311A.027(1)

The term “public agency” is used in many Kentucky statutes, often with different technical definitions. Here, the Court:

  • Rejects importing the expansive Open Records Act definition; and
  • Defines “public agency” contextually as a local government or government department that provides emergency medical services and employs EMS personnel.

C. “Latent Ambiguity”

A patent ambiguity is an obvious inconsistency or vagueness visible on the statute’s face. A latent ambiguity arises only when seemingly clear statutory language is applied to particular facts and yields uncertainty.

In this case, the statute’s words look clear in the abstract. The majority nonetheless finds latent ambiguity when those words are applied to a fire department that provides EMS response but is not an EMS agency for regulatory purposes. That perceived ambiguity justifies moving beyond text to regulations and other canons.

The dissent rejects this move, arguing that the application to Paducah’s context is straightforward and that the majority’s “latent ambiguity” is judicially manufactured.

D. Last-Antecedent Canon

This canon holds that:

“a limiting clause or phrase … should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”

In KRS 311A.027(1), the phrase “other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider or licensed ambulance service” is parsed as follows:

  • “other … provider” – is the immediate antecedent of “publicly funded,” so the public funding requirement applies to that provider category, not necessarily to “public agency” or “tax district.”
  • This confirms that private EMS agencies (privately funded) are outside the statute’s reach, even if they perform EMS first response.

E. Difference Between EMS-Certified Individuals and EMS Agencies

KRS Chapter 311A distinguishes:

  • “Emergency medical services personnel” (KRS 311A.010(13)(a)):
    • Individuals certified or licensed as EMR, EMT, AEMT, paramedic, etc.
  • “Ambulance providers” / “ambulance services” / “medical first response agencies”:
    • Organizations (public or private) licensed by KBEMS to provide ambulance or first-response EMS services.

The statute at issue, KRS 311A.027(1), protects employees and volunteers of agencies, not individuals qua individuals. Being EMS-certified is not, by itself, sufficient to bring an employee under the statute unless their employer is in one of the covered organizational categories.

V. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Torian v. City of Paducah establishes several important principles:

  1. Employer-Centric Scope of KRS 311A.027(1) – The statute regulates employers (public agencies, tax districts, publicly funded EMS first response providers, and licensed ambulance services), not individual EMS-certified employees.
  2. Narrow Definition of EMS First Response Provider – For purposes of KRS 311A.027(1), an “emergency medical service first response provider” is functionally equivalent to a KBEMS-regulated “medical first response agency,” which at minimum maintains ambulances and provides ambulance services.
  3. Fire Departments Without Ambulances Are Not Covered – Pure fire departments that do not operate ambulances and are not EMS agencies under KBEMS regulations (such as Paducah Fire Department) are not “emergency medical service first response providers,” even if their firefighters are EMS-certified and frequently provide first-response medical care. These departments may lawfully impose residency requirements, at least as against challenges grounded solely in KRS 311A.027(1).
  4. Open Question for Combined Fire–EMS Agencies – The Court expressly leaves unresolved whether hybrid departments that provide both firefighting and EMS/ambulance operations are within KRS 311A.027(1). This is a fertile area for future litigation and/or legislative action.
  5. Methodological Divide – The case highlights a sharp divide between:
    • a majority willing to find “latent ambiguity” and use regulatory context to narrow an undefined statutory term; and
    • a dissent insisting that the statute’s plain text, structure, and evident purpose compel a broader reading that protects publicly funded first responders like Paducah’s firefighters.
  6. Legislative Invitation – The Court calls on the General Assembly to clarify the statutory scheme governing firefighters, EMS personnel, and hybrid fire–EMS departments, particularly in relation to residency requirements and the scope of Chapter 311A.

In practical effect, Torian confirms that, unless and until the Legislature speaks more clearly, municipalities in Kentucky may maintain residency rules for firefighters whose departments do not operate ambulance services, even when those firefighters are medically trained and routinely perform EMS first-response functions. At the same time, the opinion signals that the legal status of combined fire–EMS agencies remains unsettled and ripe for further judicial and legislative development.

Case Details

Comments