Defining “Adverse Actions” and Causation in ADA and State Retaliation Claims: Sosa v. NYC DOE

Introduction

In Sosa v. New York City Department of Education, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether certain workplace measures—disciplinary letters, partial disability accommodations, delays in co-teacher assignments, and a revised bathroom-coverage policy—could constitute adverse actions in retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Plaintiff-appellant Alice Sosa, a special education teacher proceeding pro se, alleged that after she filed a discrimination complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) in January 2017, the Department of Education and her principal, Marcy Berger, retaliated by taking a series of adverse employment actions. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and on May 2, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held, as a matter of law, that none of the challenged actions qualified as materially adverse or were shown to be causally connected to Sosa’s protected activity. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate retaliation under the ADA and NYSHRL, and interpreted NYCHRL claims “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs” but still requiring proof that conduct was “caused at least in part by a retaliatory motive.” It affirmed the district court’s findings that:

The three disciplinary letters were based on legitimate, non-retaliatory grounds and there was no evidence of falsity or comparably harsher treatment of similarly situated employees.
The partial accommodation (avoiding back-to-back classes) pre-dated the CCHR charge and its renewal merely continued an existing arrangement.
The delay in assigning a co-teacher stemmed from a miscommunication rather than retaliatory animus, and once clarified, the co-teacher was assigned.
The bathroom policy change—requiring a regular teacher, not a paraprofessional, to cover the class—was a non-material “minor annoyance” justified by student-safety concerns.

The court therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment on all federal, state, and city retaliation counts, and declined to consider a new due-process theory raised for the first time on appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Establishes the burden-shifting framework for discrimination and retaliation claims.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011): Defines summary judgment standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms that ADA and NYSHRL retaliation claims follow the same burden-shifting steps.
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010): Describes “adverse action” as one that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker” from protected activity.
Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux, 715 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013): Requires NYCHRL claims to be construed liberally, yet still tied to retaliatory motive.
Rivera v. Rochester Genesee RTA, 743 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2014): Labels trivial workplace changes as non-actionable “minor annoyances.”

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several steps:

Prima Facie Case: Sosa needed to show (a) protected activity (the CCHR complaint), (b) employer’s knowledge, (c) materially adverse actions, and (d) “but for” causation. While she satisfied the first two elements, the court found no triable question on adversity or causation.
Adverse Action:
- Disciplinary letters: Valid for rule violations, no evidence they were false or more severe than for others.
- Accommodation: The partial grant preceded the complaint, so lacked temporal nexus.
- Co-teacher delay: A misunderstanding, promptly cured once clarified.
- Bathroom policy: A routine supervisory change justified by safety, not dissuasive.
Burden Shifting & Pretext: For each action, even if a prima facie case existed, the DOE advanced legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. Sosa offered no evidence undermining these explanations or showing pretext, and temporal proximity alone did not suffice.
NYCHRL Standard: Although construed liberally, the city law still requires evidence that retaliatory bias “caused at least in part” the conduct. Sosa’s record contains no such evidence.

Impact

This decision reinforces key principles in the retaliation context:

Minor workplace inconveniences or routine policy clarifications will not sustain adverse-action claims under the ADA or state/city laws.
Temporal proximity, without more, cannot substitute for evidence of pretext when an employer offers clear, neutral explanations.
NYCHRL’s liberal construction does not abolish the requirement to link adverse conduct to retaliatory motive.
Procedural posture matters: actions predating protected activity cannot be shoehorned into retaliation claims.

Future litigants and lower courts will look to Sosa as guidance on the narrow boundaries of “adverse action” and the evidence required to defeat summary judgment in retaliation suits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse Employment Action: An action significant enough to deter a reasonable worker from filing or supporting discrimination charges, such as demotion or pay cut—not mere inconveniences.
Burden-Shifting (McDonnell Douglas Framework): First, the employee shows a prima facie case of retaliation. Then the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason. Finally, the employee must prove that reason is a pretext for retaliation.
Summary Judgment: A court ruling without a trial, granted when no genuine factual dispute remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
NYCHRL Liberal Construction: City anti-discrimination claims are read broadly to aid victims—but still require a causal link to retaliatory intent.

Conclusion

Sosa v. New York City Department of Education clarifies that not every disciplinary notice, accommodation decision, scheduling hiccup, or policy tweak amounts to an actionable adverse employment action under federal, state, or city retaliation statutes. It emphasizes the need for concrete evidence of retaliatory bias and the insufficiency of temporal proximity alone. As a result, employers may take routine administrative or safety-motivated actions without undue fear of retaliation liability—so long as they have legitimate bases and treat similarly situated employees consistently. The decision thus sharpens the contours of retaliation law and guides future claims over the fine line between protected conduct and ordinary workplace management.